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Liberal Peace Implementation and the Durability of Post-war Peace

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the correlation between the implementation of liberal peace provisions in peace accords and the duration of peace by drawing on data from the Peace Accords Matrix that comprises 34 comprehensive peace agreements signed in the post-Cold War period. Our key findings confirm that the duration of peace is improved when the liberal aspects of peace included in peace accords are implemented. In addition, the article examines peace duration in relation to UN peacekeeper deployment and mechanisms for peace accord verification – in an attempt to establish factors that enhance the duration of peace. Peacekeeping is found to have a positive impact, while verification mechanisms do not. The findings highlight the need to unpack and scrutinize more thoroughly the complex roles of liberal peacemaking.

KEYWORDS Peace duration; peace accords; the liberal peace; peacekeeping

Introduction

This article examines some of the key, and heavily debated, issues in contemporary International Relations. It is particularly interested in the duration of peace and thus connects with a series of cognate debates on the meaning(s) of peace and how peace might be measured. Questions that arise from this research agenda touch on the duration versus the quality of peace, and issues of how this is to be captured. The past two decades have seen very considerable academic, policy and public debate on the (dis)advantages of the liberal peace, or the dominant form of peace support intervention favoured by leading states in the international system and its allied international institutions. From its apparently neo-imperialistic nature to its ill-managed exit strategies, a wide range of pitfalls have been discussed from both normative and empirical perspectives. More recent studies have challenged these critiques by questioning the validity of their empirical evidence, and the very

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existence of the liberal peace. This article seeks to contribute to the discourse on contemporary peacemaking by examining the extent to which the liberal peace can impact on the duration of peace. The introduction of empirical evidence into debates on the utility of the liberal peace is, we believe, a useful and original contribution.

Specifically, our study examines the correlation between (1) the implementation of the contents of peace accords that we identify as being core parts of the liberal peace with (2) the duration of peace in post-war societies. Peace duration is measured in terms of whether or not the signatories to a peace accord returned to armed conflict. Our study is based on an analysis of 34 comprehensive peace accords (CPAs) signed in the post-Cold War period and draws on data from the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), a detailed database of post-1989 comprehensive peace accords. PAM includes data and analysis on peace accord content and implementation. Other data sources, notably the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the *Polity 2* database of political stability, are used to augment the PAM data. Through this analysis, we are able to empirically confirm that there is a positive correlation between the implementation of the liberal peace provisions of a peace accord and the duration of peace.

The article proceeds by outlining our understanding of the liberal peace and, in particular, how we identify the liberal aspects of contemporary peace accords and how the implementation of those liberal aspects can lead to a more durable peace, at least on the part of signatories. It then introduces the research design before going on to present and analyse the findings on the extent to which a peace that may be identified as 'liberal' influences the duration of that peace. Moreover, the roles played by field deployment (UN peacekeeping and verification mechanisms) in maintaining peace will be discussed in relation to the implementation of liberal peace provisions. This is followed by a note on the robustness tests of the empirical findings, and a concluding discussion. The chief finding of the article is that the implementation of the liberal aspects of a peace accord has a positive correlation with the duration of peace.

The authors are aware that the concept of peace is notoriously contested. Moreover, they recognize that merely reaching an accord and having an accord that lasts cannot automatically be accepted as 'peace'. The concept of 'political unsettlement' neatly captures post-peace accord situations in which there is a peace accord, but the parties merely grudgingly accept to co-exist with the other rather than engage in meaningful reconciliation.¹ Gauging peace on the basis of whether or not peace accord signatories return to violence does not take account of spoiler violence from those who were not signatories of the peace accord, nor does it take into account post-

¹Bell and Pospisil, "Navigating Inclusion in Transitions."

peace accord criminal violence. Such violence, as attested by high crime rate societies like El Salvador and South Africa, often dominates life in these contexts. Nevertheless, since peace accords are the most visible, and often internationally recognized, statements of peacemaking, it is legitimate for this study to use them and their contents in its examination of peace duration.

The Liberal Peace and Its Critiques

The liberal peace is taken to mean the dominant form of peace-making and peacebuilding that is supported by leading states, international organizations and international financial institutions.² It justifies itself using liberal rhetoric and is associated with practices and institutions that are regarded as liberal such as democracy, free markets, transparency, accountability, individual rights and the rule of law. The extent to which the liberal peace is actually liberal, and whether it sometimes relies on illiberal methods, has been the subject of much debate. The academic literature has examined the philosophical heritage of liberal internationalism,³ the link between a state's liberal disposition and its pacific orientation in international affairs,⁴ and the normative value of liberal institutions.⁵

For the purposes of this article, we are interested in liberal peacebuilding in the sense of post-Cold War comprehensive peace accords and consequent peacebuilding. Importantly, while the liberal peace can be conceptualized as a series of peace accords in quite different conflict contexts, it is prudent to regard it systemically. It is a *system* of peace-building, -keeping, enforcement and maintenance that has a sustained, if not always coherent, ideological heritage and is linked to material power in the sense of particular states and institutions and the incentives and coercion that they can offer. So while this article analyses peace accords, it can also be read as an empirically-informed commentary on the dominant internationally-endorsed contemporary system of international peace intervention and support.

The dominance of the liberal peace in contemporary peacemaking and post-war reconstruction has been subject to extensive academic discussions over the last two decades. These discussions have measured rhetoric against practice and pointed to apparent illiberal and dysfunctional aspects of peacemaking. They have highlighted that the liberal peace primarily reflects third-party interveners' perspectives and frequently fails to reflect the political, social and cultural contexts in the war-affected countries. Critical studies

²Paris, *At War's End*; Richmond, "The Problem of Peace"; Richmond and Franks, *Liberal Peace Transition*.

³Kant, *Perpetual Peace*; Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism*; Richardson, *Contending Liberalisms*.

⁴Small and Singer, "The War-proneness"; Doyle, *Kant, Liberal Legacies*; Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice*; Ray, "Constructing Multivariate Analyses."

⁵Fukuyama, *The End of History*; Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"; Mayall, *The New Interventionism*.

contend that many contemporary peacebuilding programmes demonstrate significant limitations in bringing about consolidated post-war peace,⁶ with some studies focusing on practical challenges and others on the normative and Euro-centric associations of the liberal peace.⁷ The literature has also expanded to include alternative or supplementary mechanisms such as local ownership, hybrid peace, everyday peace, and the like.⁸

In more recent debates, the validity of the previous critiques has begun to be questioned. These 'critiques of critiques' have included defences of the liberal peace, by arguing that alternative models may be unpalatable or less reliable.⁹ Some argue that an assumption of the liberal dominance in contemporary peace interventions is itself an exaggeration or a 'myth' that misunderstands the realist nature of the international politics.¹⁰ Theoretical works have also called into question the ability of critics to make valid criticisms as they themselves are implicated in the very liberal peace that they seek to criticize.

However, a lack of systematic and comprehensive examination of the achievements and limitations of liberal peacebuilding remains a significant knowledge gap in the conventional peacebuilding discourse. Many contemporary discussions on the liberal peace are either normative discussions or a qualitative examination of a selected number of case studies. While normative discussions frequently present a distinctly ideological flavour, the case studies based on field research usually rely on a small number of cases and thus often lack a systematic examination of the overall trends. There are a substantial number of quantitative studies that evaluate the roles of some liberal elements of peace accords such as democratic institutions,¹¹ the demobilization of military groups,¹² the reconstruction of the (market) economy¹³ and the protection of civilians.¹⁴ Nevertheless, these studies tend not to connect directly with debates on the liberal peace, and a comprehensive evaluation of a wider range of peace accord provisions that might be said to constitute the liberal peace is rarely conducted. Hence, we feel justified in offering

⁶Paris, *At War's End*; Richmond, *Understanding the Liberal Peace*; Futamura, Newman and Tajbakhsh, "Towards a Human Security Approach"; Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding Local Resistance*.

⁷Lyons, "Transforming the Institutions of War"; Obi, "Elections and the Challenge"; Franks and Richmond, "Co-opting Liberal Peace-Building"; Bellamy and Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*; Sisk and Reynolds, *Elections and Conflict Management*; Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom"; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, *Whose Peace?*; Chandler, *International Statebuilding*; Harris, *Civil War and Democracy*; Shinoda, "Local Ownership."

⁸Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding Local Resistance*.

⁹Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding"; Quinn and Cox, "For Better, for Worse."

¹⁰Selby, "The Myth of Liberal Peace-building"; Zaum, "Beyond the 'Liberal Peace.'"

¹¹Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*; Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*; Joshi and Mason, "Civil War Settlements"; Joshi, "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix"; Walter, "The Critical Barrier."

¹²Wagner, "The Causes of Peace"; Walter, "The Critical Barrier"; Joshi and Melander, "Explaining Demobilization."

¹³Paris, *At War's End*; Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*.

¹⁴Hultman et al., "United Nations Peacekeeping."

systematic empirical evidence that can guide judgments on the existence, quality, nature and duration of the liberal peace.

This article aims to help address this knowledge gap by examining the correlation between the liberal peace and peace duration. In addition, it will provide a finer grained analysis of how the liberal peace operates alongside two often-deployed elements of peace support: verification mechanisms and UN peacekeeping.

Previous studies using PAM data have been useful in revealing the character of contemporary peacemaking. A study by Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty¹⁵ demonstrated the extent to which contemporary peace accords can be considered 'liberal' through an analysis of peace accord provisions. This contradicts arguments by Selby¹⁶ that denied the existence of the liberal peace. The findings showed that it is accurate to label contemporary internationally-sponsored peace accords as 'liberal' on the basis of the contents of peace accord provisions and their promotion of five factors: democracy, human rights, the rule of law, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and governance reform. Taken together, these five factors constitute the liberal peace as manifest in contemporary peace accords. If an accord prominently promotes these factors then it can be called a liberal peace accord.

Most peace accords address issues of participation and place an emphasis on institutionalizing post-conflict elections and electoral reform. These post-conflict elections are often designed with an emphasis on the inclusion of former armed actors and marginalized segments of the population. The aim is to recalibrate the polity so as to allow for the representation of previously excluded constituencies, and thus lessen the possibility of grievances sparking renewed conflict. Rule of law provisions in peace accords may also be said to be a quintessentially liberal intervention that offer protection and certainty to citizens, property and the polity. This may involve (re)constructing constitutional frameworks, or new governance measures to enhance judicial independence. Relatedly, peace accords often place an emphasis on rights. This may be retrospective in the sense of addressing wartime human rights violations, and other transitional justice measures such as amnesty, reparations and truth commission mechanisms. It may also involve provisions for the post-conflict dispensation such as protections for minorities and cultural expression.

There may also be significant reforms in the security sector with an emphasis on civilian oversight of security agencies. Liberal peace provisions have also placed significant emphasis on governance reforms – often mediated through statebuilding interventions that attempt to right-size, regularize and make the state more efficient and transparent. Thus, through liberal peace provisions,

¹⁵Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, "Just How Liberal."

¹⁶Selby, "The Myth of Liberal Peace-building."

and in an ideal scenario, individual rights are protected and promoted, institutions are reformed, and systems of accountability are put in place. Depending on context, peace agreements may protect and support indigenous and minority rights as well as children's and women's rights, and secure their social, economic and political representation. The philosophy behind such initiatives is that societies with transparent and accountable systems in place to regulate competition over scarce resources, and to regulate relationships between different identity groups, are less likely to experience violent conflict. In a nutshell, the liberal peace is based on the notion that liberalism institutionalized and operationalized in a domestic political setting is likely to result in peace at home and abroad.

Research Design: Data, Dependent and Independent Variables

This study measures the extent to which the liberal peace correlates with peace duration. Specifically, it examines whether the duration of peace is *correlated with the extent of liberal peace implementation*. In order to proceed, we need to identify how we operationalize the liberal peace in this study. To identify the core attributes of the liberal peace we analysed eight major policy documents from international organizations.¹⁷ Taken together, the documents can be regarded as the seminal corpus of contemporary international peacebuilding. The five recurring ideas of the liberal peace outlined in the previous section (the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, security sector reform and governance reform) are often manifest in peace accords. We categorize peace accord provisions around these five clusters and take them to be key signifiers of the liberal peace. These issue areas often form the basis of statebuilding, 'stabilization', and reconstruction programmes that follow a peace accord. Peacebuilding programmes and projects often include many other issues, such as nurturing of civil society, promoting social inclusion and facilitating a market economy, although sometimes these go beyond the scope of the peace agreements and take place in later stages of conflict settlements.

Earlier work on the Peace Accords Matrix identified 51 issue areas with which peace accords dealt.¹⁸ We were then able to match 23 issue areas with the five liberal peace policy categories we identified from the major peacebuilding documents (see Table 1). The primary goal of this study is to examine the impact of all liberal peace provisions in an integrated way, which will address the knowledge gap in the existing liberal peace discourse.

¹⁷The documents examined in this article are: UNSG, *An Agenda for Peace*; The Panel of United Nations Peace Operations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*; UN, *A More Secured World*; ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*; UNSG, *In Larger Freedom*; UNSG, *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*; IDPS, *A New Deal for Engagement*; and UNDP, *Governance for Peace*.

¹⁸Joshi and Darby, "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix."

Table 1. Liberal peace policy areas and corresponding provisions in CPAs.

Promotion of Democracy	1. Electoral/Political Reform
Rule of Law	2. Constitutional Changes
	3. TRC Mechanism
	4. Dispute Resolution Mechanism,
	5. Judiciary Review
Human Rights	6. Human Rights
	7. Refugees
	8. IDPs
	9. Indigenous Rights
	10. Minority Rights
	11. Women's Rights
	12. Children's Rights
	13. Cultural Protections
Security Sector Reform	14. Military Reform
	15. Demobilization
	16. Disarmament
	17. Reintegration
Governance Reforms	18. Transitional Government
	19. Civil Administration
	20. Police Reform
	21. Executive Reform
	22. Legislative Reform
	23. Decentralization

In the next stage of our research design, we matched the implementation of liberal peace elements in CPAs. This study utilizes the implementation rate of all liberal peace provisions included in a peace accord as the primary indicator for measuring the independent variable. Specifically, in examining the implementation of liberal peace provisions, this study refers to the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Data (PAM-ID), which provides annual implementation data for 51 provisions for 10 years after a CPA was signed.¹⁹ For example, the Dayton or General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reached in 1995 and the PAM-ID provides annual implementation data until 2005. The implementation data for these provisions are available until 2012 or when a major armed conflict that produced over 1,000 deaths recurred and the peace accord became obsolete.

Based on the concept of viability – a practical goal for coding full implementation of individual provisions given the current level of implementation – Joshi, Quinn and Regan code implementation of individual provisions in CPA as initiated or not initiated, and if initiated, then whether the status is minimum (coded 1), intermediate (coded 2), or full (coded 3) for the year under observation. If a major reversal takes place in the implementation of particular provisions, such as in Sierra Leone where the agreed-upon amnesty was revoked for the alleged involvement of Foday

¹⁹Joshi, Quinn and Regan, "Annualized Implementation Data."

Sankoh and others in renewed violence, the implementation status is adjusted accordingly.²⁰

Based on this implementation information, a variable *Liberal Peace Implementation* is generated that calculates the annual implementation rate by summing the actual implementation value for all liberal peace related provisions. The sum is then divided by the expected value of implementing these provisions. The outcome is then multiplied by 100. For example, there are 22 liberal peace provisions in Sudan's 2005 CPA. The expected value for fully implementing all these provisions is 66 as the full implementation for each provision takes a value of 3. For all 22 provisions, the overall implementation value for the first year of accord is 33 and therefore the *Liberal Peace Implementation* rate is $(33/66)*100 = 50\%$. This rate improved to 56% in 2006.

The implementation rate captures the extent to which the liberal provisions negotiated in CPAs are implemented and therefore does not provide any information on the scope of the liberal peace reforms as negotiated in the accord. While liberal peace reforms outside the CPA remain a theoretical possibility, the implementation rate variable needs to be contextualized with the scope of liberal peace reforms negotiated in the accord. For example, when focusing entirely on the implementation rate, a peace process with three liberal peace provisions (all of which present a high implementation rate) is considered more liberal than a process with 20 provisions (which present with moderate implementation). At the same time, a focus only on the number of liberal peace reforms cannot be a sufficient indicator to identify the liberal nature of a peace process. The number of liberal peace provisions required in a peace process vary according to the contexts of conflicts, social conditions and the types of challenges facing peace processes. For instance, provisions on 'indigenous rights' or 'transitional government' are relevant to some conflict affected societies but not to others. Hence, to have more liberal peace provisions does not necessarily bring about a stronger representation of liberal peace.

In our model, this factor is reflected by adjusting the implementation rate according to the number of liberal peace provisions using both lenient and strict implementation scores. Moreover, we include the quantity of liberal peace provisions in our empirical analysis along with other provisions (see the 'Robustness and Endogeneity Tests' section). According to PAM-ID, an agreement on average entails 12 provisions related to what we identify as liberal peace signifiers. Guinea-Bissau's *Abuja Peace Agreement* (1998) contained the least with only 3 provisions that could be associated with the liberal peace. Sudan's 2005 *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* had the most with 22 provisions.

²⁰ibid.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Liberal Peace Implementation (Lenient)	314	61.428	23.560	0.000	100.000
Liberal Peace Implementation (Strict)	314	31.210	17.346	0.000	72.464
Battle Deaths all Wars (1000)	314	0.172	0.452	0.000	3.974
Recurrence of Armed Conflict	314	0.057	0.233	0.000	1.000
War Duration (in Months)	314	135.917	132.686	6.000	433.000
Annual GDP Growth (%)	305	4.851	8.853	-50.248	88.9577
Infant Mortality Rate	307	66.003	39.313	4.900	148.100
Media Coverage (log)	314	4.894	1.124	1.792	8.006
UN Peacekeeping (0, 1)	314	0.347	0.477	0.000	1.000
Verification Mechanism (0, 1)	314	0.764	0.425	0.000	1.000
Executive Constrain (0, 1)	314	0.545	0.499	0.000	1.000
Conflict Type (0, 1)	314	0.459	0.499	0.000	1.000
Total Deaths (in 1000)	314	190.778	476.785	0.025	2300.000
Armed Personnel (in 1000)	300	162.774	390.907	2.000	2400.000

As specified in the hypotheses, the dependent variable is the recurrence of armed conflict between the signatories who negotiated the CPA. Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program armed conflict dataset, this variable is coded '1' when armed conflict between signatories reoccurred, otherwise it is coded '0'.²¹ For the first year of observation, or the CPA signing year which could still see some violence prior to the signing of the CPA we do not code armed conflict. In the data used in this analysis, signatories returned to either minor or major conflicts in 10 cases (29.41%) within a decade of signing of an accord.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses. In our empirical analysis, we control for various factors that are related to armed conflict, factors that are likely to influence the content of the peace accord. Moreover, we control for battle deaths by using the data from UCDP (2014) because conflict intensity and duration are found to influence powersharing provisions and are important factors considered for international intervention, especially when the United Nations must decide whether to send peacekeeping forces.²² As an alternative, we also examine total deaths incurred in specific conflicts by utilizing the PAM data.²³ The PAM data is also used to control for war duration. The deployment of peacekeeping forces reduces commitment problems and thus the recurrence of conflict by providing a guarantee of security and reducing uncertainty when peace agreements provide for parties to verify the military.²⁴ Therefore, in our analysis, we control for the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Using the

²¹Themnér and Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts."

²²Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*; Gilligan, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?"

²³Joshi and Darby, "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix."

²⁴Walter, "The Critical Barrier"; Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*; Joshi, "United Nations Peacekeeping"; Mattes and Savun, "Information, Agreement Design."

PAM-ID, this variable is coded '1' when the peacekeeping forces are deployed and '0' if they are not deployed.

Many peace accords provide a verification mechanism to monitor implementation progress and this often involves international monitors, parties to the peace process, and representatives from civil society. This provision is significantly related to the overall implementation of peace agreements.²⁵ We thus control for the implementation of verification provisions by using the PAM-ID data. This variable is coded '1' when verification mechanisms are implemented and '0' if otherwise.

Following previous studies on state capacity and peace agreement implementation,²⁶ we use infant mortality rates and the total number of armed personnel to examine the influence of state capacity in peace implementation. Similarly, we control for annualized GDP growth rate. Data for these variables come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.²⁷ Because the analysis of policy documents related to the liberal peace suggests that the promotion of democracy is the most integral part of liberal peace,²⁸ and emerging democracies are more susceptible to armed conflict, we control for democracy using the executive constraints (XCONST) indicator from the Polity IV data.²⁹ Constraints on the executive as defined in the Polity IV project refer to oversight on the decision-making power of chief executives. In democracies, the oversight function is often carried out by the legislature or the independent judiciary. We derive a dummy variable coded '1' when the XCONST is high (levels 5-7) and '0' when otherwise. This reflects the high levels of constraints that are often seen with democratic regime types.

Additionally, the media can be perceived to be responsible for fomenting violence and/or encouraging peace processes.³⁰ We use data from Joshi and Quinn³¹ to control for media coverage. Data on media coverage is likely to be over-dispersed from case to case because some peace implementation processes receive more media coverage than others. To deal with the data dispersion issue, we take the natural log of this variable.

A final point on research design is a reminder that the PAM data refers to comprehensive peace accords. Thus partial, minor and un-signed accords lie outside of its remit. Comprehensive accords usually seek a definitive end to violent conflict and cover a wide range of issues beyond security and constitutional issues. They will also seek to include a wider range of conflict actors.

²⁵Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty, "Built-in Safeguards."

²⁶DeRouen et al., "Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation."

²⁷World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.

²⁸Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty, "Just How Liberal."

²⁹Marshall, Gurr and Jagers, *Political Regime Characteristics*.

³⁰Mitchell, *Promoting peace, inciting violence*; Wolfsfeld, *Media and the Path to Peace*.

³¹Joshi and Quinn, "Implementing the Peace."

Empirical Analysis and Findings

In analysing the data, our first question was: ‘To what extent were peace accord provisions related with the liberal peace implemented?’ By this we mean provisions of a peace accord that have a demonstrably liberal heritage, as identified by our interrogation of the seminal peacebuilding documents and the post-1989 peace accords that identified five signifiers of a liberal peace: promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights, security sector reform and governance reform. **Figure 1** presents the implementation rates of liberal peace related provisions, either 10 years after their initiation or when the data coding was stopped. Although full implementation has never happened in cases of post-peace accords since the Cold War, the average implementation score of liberal peace related provisions was 70%. This confirms that the CPA provisions associated with the liberal peace themes were prioritized during the implementation processes. Again it is worth reminding ourselves of the rhetorical and declaratory nature of much peacebuilding, and how aspects of the liberal peace may not necessarily result in liberal means and outcomes.

An examination of PAM-ID data also identified different patterns of implementation. **Figure 2** summarizes the overall liberal peace implementation rate for a selection of six peace accords that experienced UN involvement to various degrees and capacities (the transitional authority in




Figure 1. Liberal peace implementation rate.




Figure 2. Liberal peace implementation rate for selected CPAs.

Cambodia to no role in Bangladesh). As can be seen, all peace accords have their own trajectory in terms of how implementation starts and proceeds. This is likely to reflect a complex and context-specific story of international, transnational, national and local politics, and economics that makes cross-case comparison and generic commentary difficult. Some accords achieved a high liberal peace implementation within the first five years of accord (e.g. El Salvador and Mozambique), while others made early progress in implementation before plateauing (e.g. Papua New Guinea). In Bangladesh, the implementation rate did not improve after an initial surge in the first two years. The figures suggest that in many cases there is a gradual implementation process that lasted for a decade or longer. In many studies, the success of a liberal peace is evaluated within two to five years of a peace accord being reached.³² These figures, however, demonstrate a gradual implementation of provisions related to liberal peace, and that, in many instances, liberal peace provisions were not fully implemented even after a decade.

Our next goal was to investigate if the implementation of the liberal peace provisions in a CPA avoids the recurrence of armed conflict between signatories. In other words: does liberal peace implementation impact on peace duration? We use the event history or the survival statistical method to

³²Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*.

determine this.³³ In event history analysis, *depending* on distribution assumption and tests statistics, various parametric modelling options are available. Theoretically, we expect liberal provisions in a CPA to be implemented over time and the risk of armed conflict recurrence to decline as the overall implementation rate increases. This suggests a typical Weibull or continuous probability distribution pattern. The AIC and BIC test statistics rule out the use of the Cox proportional hazard model.³⁴ For all models, but Model 1 and 7, the estimated parameter (p) is higher than 1, which suggests that the Weibull model better fits the data.³⁵ Because we are interested in analysing peace duration until an armed conflict recurs between CPA signatories, or time to event, we use the Weibull model with the accelerated failure time (AFT) matrix.³⁶ The use of AFT matrix reports coefficient (not the proportional hazard), which allows easy interpretation of the coefficient. In the context of survival analysis in this study, positive coefficients suggest an increasing rate of peace duration while negative coefficients suggest a decreasing rate of peace duration (peace failure).

Table 3 presents a series of Weibull regression with recurrence of conflict as the failure event. We began with the first model that has *liberal peace implementation* as the only variable in the model. Model 2 builds on Model 1 by including battle deaths and war duration (measures of costs of conflict), infant mortality rate (a measure of state capacity) and media coverage (a measure for domestic and international influence on peace process). Model 3 includes deployment of UN peacekeeping and implementation of the verification mechanism. In Model 4, we control for executive constraints and conflict type. In Model 5, we add annualized GDP growth rate as a control. In Model 6, we substituted battle deaths from all wars to total deaths related to a specific conflict leading up to the signing of a CPA. We also used the number of armed personnel along with infant mortality as a measure of the state capacity.

In Model 1, we test direct and unmitigated effects of *liberal peace implementation* as this variable does not include controls for other confounding factors. We find statistically significant support for the implementation of liberal peace related provisions ($p < .001$, Model 4). This finding is replicated across all models (2-5). These consistent findings support the theoretical argument that the implementation of liberal peace provisions significantly

³³Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, *Event History Modeling*; Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, *An Introduction to Survival Analysis*.

³⁴The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) penalize for additional variables in the model, therefore we rely on Akaike information criterion (AIC). Test statistics not reported.

³⁵Model 4 and 6 for the lenient implementation rate and 10 and 12 for the strict implementation rate were replicated with the Cox proportional hazard method. Results are in the expected direction, but because of test statistics for model specifications and theoretical expectations regarding the shape of hazard function, results from the Weibull model specification are reported.

³⁶Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, *An Introduction to Survival Analysis*.

Table 3. Liberal peace implementation and recurrence of armed conflict.

	Lenient Models						Strict Models					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Liberal Peace Implementation Rate	0.052**** (0.013)	0.035**** (0.007)	0.038**** (0.006)	0.041**** (0.007)	0.041**** (0.007)	0.033**** (0.008)	0.091**** (0.025)	0.062**** (0.013)	0.061**** (0.011)	0.063**** (0.012)	0.071**** (0.018)	0.069**** (0.013)
Battle Deaths all Wars (1000)	-	0.264 (0.189)	0.681** (0.274)	0.674** (0.287)	1.118** (0.480)	-	-	0.146 (0.195)	0.402** (0.198)	0.396 (0.242)	0.722**** (0.209)	-
War Duration (in Months)	-	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Infant Mortality Rate	-	-0.021**** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.009)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-	-0.021**** (0.003)	-0.018**** (0.003)	-0.018**** (0.005)	-0.025**** (0.006)	-0.021**** (0.004)
Media Coverage (log)	-	-0.636**** (0.174)	-0.797**** (0.229)	-0.744**** (0.194)	-1.032**** (0.286)	-0.745**** (0.280)	-	-0.895**** (0.164)	-1.170**** (0.266)	-1.168**** (0.269)	-1.542**** (0.398)	-1.413**** (0.333)
UN Peacekeeping (0, 1)	-	-	1.160* (0.649)	1.013* (0.535)	2.103** (0.834)	0.625 (0.813)	-	-	1.305*** (0.483)	1.258** (0.552)	2.130*** (0.650)	1.085* (0.567)
Verification Mechanism (0, 1)	-	-	-1.513*** (0.465)	-1.298** (0.510)	-1.341** (0.532)	-	-	-	-1.484**** (0.364)	-1.470**** (0.402)	-1.522**** (0.361)	-
Executive Constrain (0, 1)	-	-	-	0.548 (0.365)	0.573 (0.377)	0.528 (0.408)	-	-	-	-0.101 (0.218)	-0.084 (0.229)	-0.169 (0.339)
Conflict Type (0, 1)	-	-	-	0.204 (0.450)	-0.096	-	-	-	-	0.113 (0.379)	-0.180 (0.305)	-
Annual GDP Growth (%)	-	-	-	-	0.022** (0.009)	-	-	-	-	-	0.023**** (0.007)	-
Total Deaths (in 1000)	-	-	-	-	-	-0.000 (0.001)	-	-	-	-	-	-0.000 (0.000)
Armed Personnel (in 1000)	-	-	-	-	-	0.005 (0.003)	-	-	-	-	-	0.002 (0.002)

Constant	0.760 (0.570)	5.715**** (0.900)	6.334**** (1.649)	4.924**** (1.435)	7.269**** (1.883)	5.390*** (1.658)	1.374** (0.549)	7.292**** (0.906)	8.654**** (1.715)	8.544**** (1.879)	10.920**** (2.649)	9.458**** (1.989)
Parameter (p)	0.833	1.635	2.437	2.403	2.545	1.798	0.766	1.868	3.340	3.354	4.222	2.322
Log pseudo likelihood	-30.390	-21.305	-15.594	-14.752	-13.238	-17.556	-31.059	-17.494	-9.220	-9.180	-5.818	-12.298
Wald χ^2	15.47	101.71	93.11	136.97	148.46	97.70	13.23	79.95	142.32	171.05	666.51	231.00
Probability of χ^2	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations/Time at Risk	225	219	219	219	218	213	225	219	219	219	218	213
No. Subjects at Risk	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34
Failures	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, **** $p < .001$.

increases the duration of peace or reduces recurrence of armed conflict between signatories. Based on model 4 in Table 3, we estimated that a 1% increase in liberal peace implementation rate leads to a 9% [$100*(1-(\exp(-\hat{p}\hat{\beta}))) = [100*(1-(\text{EXP}(-2.403*0.041)))]$] increase in the duration of peace between signatories who signed the CPA. In other words, in those post-CPA countries where the liberal peace implementation rate was 75%, we see an increase in the chance of durable peace by at least two times compared to those post-CPA countries where the implementation rate was just 25%. These findings are robust and substantial.

In Model 2, we find negative and statistically significant support for the *infant mortality rate* impacting on peace durability ($p < .05$, Model 4). This suggests that countries with a higher *infant mortality rate* often see a recurrence of armed conflict. This finding is consistent across all models. On the contrary, and as expected, we find a positive and significant effect of GDP growth rate on the durability of peace ($p < .05$). This finding indicates the relationship between economic growth and the durability of post-conflict peace. Many countries also tend to adopt a liberal market economy in the post-CPA period. Therefore, a portion of economic growth might be a function of the adoption of economic reform consistent with the liberal peacebuilding framework.³⁷ Similarly, *media coverage* has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the recurrence of armed conflict across all models. While we expected *media coverage* to bring international attention and possibly hold the government and former rebel leaders responsible for implementing peace agreements, we find instead that media interest foments violence even after CPAs are negotiated and put through the implementation process. The most logical explanation, however, is that the *media coverage* increases in instances of failed peace processes or in environments where implementation has failed.

After adding the *UN peacekeeping* and *verification mechanisms* variables in Model 3, the *battle deaths* variable becomes positive and significant ($p < .05$), which suggests peace durability after heavy human death tolls. This remains true in Model 4 as well. The *UN peacekeeping* variable has a positive and significant effect in model 3 and 4 ($p < .10$). Although marginally significant, this finding aligns with the results of earlier studies of the relationship between UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding success.³⁸

The *verification mechanism*, which is instituted by the accord itself and often includes representatives from the government, the rebel group(s), and international and civil society actors, is negative and significant. This finding is surprising because prior studies have emphasized how unbiased

³⁷We did not test whether the post-CPA GDP growth could be attributed to the post-CPA economic reform.

³⁸Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*.

verification regarding military strength on both sides can resolve information uncertainty thus giving them the confidence to persist with the peace process/peace deal.³⁹ This does not mean, however, that CPAs with a *verification mechanism* in place lack implementation. In fact, Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty's⁴⁰ analysis of the same PAM dataset finds that verification mechanisms have a positive and robust influence on the overall implementation of the CPA provisions. In the analysis performed here, there was no evidence of significant support of war duration, executive constraints, conflict type, total deaths and armed personnel.

This finding, instead, reflects the procedural and practical limitations that conventional verification mechanisms possess. For instance, many peace processes with strong verification mechanisms completed the implementation of peace accord provisions within two years of initiation (e.g. Tajikistan, Bougainville, Macedonia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau). However, external efforts for speedy implementation, although in line with an agreed implementation timetable, may fail to reflect national military factions' security and political concerns. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge considered it unexpected and biased that the UN Transitional Authority (UNTAC) demanded strict respect for the Paris Peace Accords with little pre-consultation.⁴¹ Moreover, such a verification mechanism may also create obstacles in the implementation process itself. For instance, data provided to or by those charged with verification might differ from perceptions on the frontline, perhaps parking security fears among parties. Despite UNTAC's institutional and procedural arrangements for neutral verification, the Khmer Rouge thought the subsequent demilitarization procedures paid them unfair attention while ignoring their counterparts' 'fake disarmament'.⁴² The danger in circumstances like this is that verification mechanisms provide evidence not of the implementation of a peace accord, but of the perceived bad faith of the other side and so may prompt a resumption of violence. Hence, feeling betrayed by its previous advocates, such as China and Thailand, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia declared that it would refuse to collaborate with UNTAC only eight months after it had signed the peace accords.⁴³

In prior studies, the role of UN peacekeeping operations was often credited with promoting liberal peace or peacebuilding success.⁴⁴ Our analyses, to some extent, help us support this link. For example, we found unmitigated effects of liberal peace implementation on peace duration. This is represented in Figure 3. As can be seen in the first part of the Figure 3(a), when liberal

³⁹Mattes and Savun, "Information, Agreement Design."

⁴⁰Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, "Built-in Safeguards."

⁴¹Heder, *Pol Pot at Bay*.

⁴²Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, *Keeping the Peace*, 118-121.

⁴³Heder, *Pol Pot at Bay*; Lizée, *Peace, power and resistance in Cambodia*.

⁴⁴Stedman, "Policy Implications"; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*.




Figure 3. Implementation of liberal peace provisions and recurrence of armed conflict.

peace implementation is significantly higher (75% or more), recurrence of armed conflict is less likely compared to mid-range (50%), lower (25%) or no implementation. This finding suggests that irrespective of UN peacekeeping deployment, a higher liberal peace implementation leads to a more durable peace between signatories. However, the deployment of UN peacekeeping significantly influences peace duration when the liberal peace provisions are either not implemented or do not achieve a high implementation rate. This effect can be seen in the second part of the [Figure 3\(b\)](#), which replicates the first part accounting for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces.

In other words, the roles and influence of peacekeeping is different depending on the progress of the liberal peace implementation. This finding is understandable since a few key provisions of liberal peacebuilding (e.g. military reform, demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, repatriation of refugees and IPDs) are closely associated with the objectives of UN peacekeeping. In the cases where more liberal peace provisions are implemented, the urgent security issues with which peacekeeping is primarily concerned are more likely to be addressed. In contrast, when the above security-related provisions are not implemented and the risk of security destabilization is high, the operation of external military troops makes a stronger contribution as a deterrence force.

From a theoretical perspective, this finding offers more nuanced information on the roles of peacekeeping in maintaining peace in post-conflict

societies than many previous studies that examined its overall impact.⁴⁵ Moreover, this finding has significant policy implications. The deployment of UN peacekeeping is costly given the time required to get consensus among permanent members in the Security Council and the financial resources and logistics involving the deployment, and security of the peacekeeping troops on the ground.⁴⁶ Moreover, a recent study based on the PAM dataset also suggests that the deployment of external peacekeeping troops may deter the implementation of peace accords.⁴⁷ Hence, there is a need for carefully planning the forms and procedures of external peacekeeping involvement. If we know in advance some probability of the extent to which the liberal peace provisions will be implemented once the CPA is signed, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces may or may not be necessary to sustain the peace.

Moreover, the positive contribution of UN peacekeeping can be further confirmed by examining the liberal peace implementation rate with UN peacekeeping. Considering 12 cases where UN peacekeeping troops were deployed, the average of lenient implementation rate of liberal peace-related provisions is 74.58%, while the average of the cases with no peacekeeping was 65%. This implies that UN peacekeeping positively contributes to the implementation of liberal peacebuilding, and when the liberal peace is not well implemented, to the maintenance of a minimal level of peace.

Robustness and Endogeneity Tests

One could argue that the way we have derived the *liberal peace implementation* rate does not distinguish between accords that contain more liberal peace provisions and those that have few such provisions. This is because some accords contain 3 provisions while others contain 23 provisions. When implemented fully, provisions will have the same implementation rate. Models 6-10 replicate models 1-5 with a rescaled liberal peace implementation rate variable in a way that takes all liberal peace provisions into account when calculating the liberal peace implementation rate. For example, a CPA that has 3 liberal peace provisions will get a $[(3 \times 3) / (23 \times 3)] \times 100 = 13.04\%$ implementation rate for full implementation compared to 95.65% implementation $[(22 \times 3) / (23 \times 3)] \times 100$ for an accord that has 22 out of 23 liberal peace provisions. This is a significant change in the way the independent variable was measured in Model 1-6. Results from this change are reported in Model 7-12 in [Table 3](#). After this

⁴⁵Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War Building Peace*; Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?"; Greig and Diehl, "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma"; Joshi, "United Nations Peacekeeping"; Joshi and Mason, "Civil War Settlements"; Walter, "The Critical Barrier."

⁴⁶Bosco, "The Price of Peace"; United Nations Peacekeeping, "How we are funded."

⁴⁷Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty, "Built-in Safeguards."

Table 4. Liberal peace implementation and recurrence of armed conflict between signatories.

	(13) Lenient	(14) Strict
Liberal Peace Implementation Rate	0.033** (0.013)	0.075*** (0.014)
Number of Liberal Peace Provisions	0.164 (0.088)	-0.014 (0.060)
Number of Non-Liberal Peace Provisions	0.039 (0.189)	0.035 (0.140)
War Duration (in Months)	0.006 (0.011)	0.005 (0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.004)
Media Coverage (log)	-0.790*** (0.160)	-0.793*** (0.100)
Executive Constrain (0, 1)	-0.422 (0.309)	-0.782* (0.315)
Conflict Type (0, 1)	1.740 (1.175)	1.633* (0.982)
Total Deaths (in 1000)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Armed Personnel (in 1000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002 (0.003)
Constant	2.049 (4.072)	3.909 (2.318)
Parameter (p)	2.838	3.352
Log pseudo likelihood	-12.403	-10.045
Wald χ^2	650.63	1170.48
Probability of χ^2	0.000	0.000
Observations/Time at Risk	213	213
No. Subjects at Risk	34	34
Failures	10	10

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

significant change in the main independent variable, however, the effect of liberal peace implementation on peace duration is still in the expected direction and highly significant ($p < .001$).

Table 4 presents two additional models (Model 13 and 14) that include two variables to capture a number of liberal peace provisions as well as a number of non-liberal peace provisions. This allows us to contextualize the liberal peacemaking approach as it unfolds in a real setting. When the rate of implementation is the same, can the number of liberal peace provisions negotiated in a CPA influence the durable peace? As can be seen, provisions themselves are not significant when examined alone with the implementation rate both in lenient and strict tests.⁴⁸ This lends support to our argument that the liberal peace provisions or the scope of liberal reform as negotiated in the accord are not sufficient if they are not implemented.

⁴⁸We also performed bivariate tests both lenient and strict and the provision variable is not significant.

Moreover, because we derive a standardized score for implementation of liberal peace provisions in CPAs and do not make a distinction between the importance of individual provisions, one could suggest that some provisions are critically important in a time of transition from war to peace (e.g. powersharing, military reform etc.) than provisions that can be addressed once peace is more durable (e.g. children's rights, indigenous people's rights etc.). It is logical that some peace process actors choose to prioritize the implementation of certain provisions in earlier phases to build confidence and trust between former adversaries and then focus on other provisions in later phases. However, in most cases, provisions in peace agreements are not meant to be implemented independently. Many of these provisions are implemented concurrently and the processes are very much sequential and interrelated, which makes it difficult to isolate the implementation of some provisions from others in empirical analysis. As can be seen in pairwise correlation tests (Table 5), almost all provisions are statistically correlated with each other.

One could also argue that liberal peace implementation processes are endogenous to factors that potentially influence the armed conflict recurrence as well as liberal peace implementation. In their study, Hartzell and Hoddie⁴⁹ find that protracted conflict determines the powersharing provisions in peace accords. Work by DeRouen and Sobek⁵⁰ finds state capacity to influence civil war duration and outcome. Similarly, DeRouen et al.⁵¹ find state capacity to influence peace implementation. In our analysis, we include war duration, battle deaths and UN peacekeeping variables which explain civil war settlement itself. Similarly, the inclusion of the infant mortality rate, GDP growth rate, and the armed personnel variables enables us to view state capacity in terms of the state's ability to deliver public goods (infant mortality rate) as well as the state's coercive power and its projection.

The implementation data generating process is also another potential source of endogeneity. This would be the case here if the implementation rate (independent variable) is influenced by the post-CPA peaceful environment (dependent variable). In our empirical analysis, we use the PAM implementation data, which is collected independently of whether the armed protagonists went back to conflict or not after they signed the CPA.⁵² Out of 34 CPA cases, signatories went back to armed conflict in 10 cases. This however does not mean that the implementation did not proceed in those cases. Regardless of violence, in all cases implementation proceeded except for Sierra Leone's 1996 accord and Angola's 1994 accord.

⁴⁹Hartzell and Hoddie, *Crafting Peace*, 58.

⁵⁰DeRouen and Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War."

⁵¹DeRouen et al., "Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation."

⁵²Joshi and Darby, "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix"; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan, "Annualized Implementation Data."

Table 5. Pairwise correlation tests of implementation of liberal peace provisions.

	Electoral/Political Reform	Constitutional Changes	TRC Mechanism	Dispute Resolution	Judiciary Review	Human Rights	Refugee	IDPs	Indigenous Rights	Minority Rights	Women's Rights	Children's Rights	Cultural Protections	Military Reform	Demobilization	Disarmament	Reintegration	Powersharing govt.	Civil Admin. Reform	Police Reform	Executive Reform	Legislative Reform	Decentralization	
Electoral/Political Reform	1																							
Constitutional Changes	0.50*	1																						
TRC Mechanism	0.36*	0.37*	1																					
Dispute Resolution	0.36*	0.23*	0.24*	1																				
Judiciary Review	0.39*	0.27*	0.44*	0.17*	1																			
Human Rights	0.46*	0.49*	0.44*	0.38*	0.39*	1																		
Refugee	0.31*	0.32*	0.25*	0.16*	0.07	0.08	1																	
IDPs	0.44*	0.27*	0.22*	0.19*	-0.00	0.12*	0.75*	1																
Indigenous Rights	0.01	-0.05	0.31*	-0.14*	0.0643	0.10	-0.02	-0.02	1															
Minority Rights	0.24*	0.34*	0.03	0.29*	0.24*	0.24*	-0.04	-0.03	0.13*	1														
Women's Rights	0.31*	0.37*	0.38*	0.23*	0.17*	0.35*	0.12*	0.14*	0.39*	0.70*	1													
Children's Rights	0.27*	0.35*	0.50*	0.37*	0.30*	0.21*	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.40*	0.33*	1												
Cultural Protections	0.08	0.08	0.23*	0.08	0.38*	0.27*	-0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.03	0.07	0.18*	1											
Military Reform	0.57*	0.21*	0.37*	0.35*	0.31*	0.11*	0.32*	0.36*	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.24*	0.02	1										
Demobilization	0.54*	0.15*	0.49*	0.42*	0.15*	0.29*	0.18*	0.22*	0.20*	0.09	0.25*	0.28*	0.09	0.52*	1									
Disarmament	0.31*	0.19*	0.34*	0.04	0.16*	0.13*	0.18*	0.18*	0.33*	0.08	0.32*	0.02	0.05	0.27*	0.57*	1								
Reintegration	0.50*	0.18*	0.35*	0.24*	0.11*	0.33*	0.00	0.05	0.13*	0.16*	0.23*	0.20*	0.10	0.38*	0.66*	0.40*	1							
Powersharing govt.	0.37*	0.23*	0.23*	0.40*	0.26*	0.32*	0.33*	0.41*	-0.13*	0.31*	0.28*	0.44*	0.08	0.12*	0.14*	-0.19*	-0.01	1						
Civil Admin. Reform	0.31*	0.19*	0.30*	0.16*	0.37*	0.17*	0.15*	0.25*	0.041	0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.03	0.39*	0.29*	0.34*	0.06	0.05	1					
Police Reform	0.38*	0.45*	0.35*	0.28*	0.34*	0.44*	0.09	0.14*	-0.05	0.24*	0.21*	0.28*	0.12*	0.47*	0.42*	0.41*	0.34*	-0.07	0.52*	1				
Executive Reform	0.27*	0.34*	0.21*	0.29*	0.55*	0.38*	0.12*	0.05	0.20*	0.25*	0.18*	0.34*	0.33*	0.09	0.03	-0.12*	0.02	0.39*	0.18*	0.15*	1			
Legislative Reform	0.14*	0.26*	0.28*	0.12*	0.41*	0.27*	0.16*	0.07	0.25*	0.03	0.09	0.24*	0.40*	0.18*	-0.05	0.00	-0.18*	0.32*	0.27*	0.06	0.58*	1		
Decentralization	0.25*	0.15*	0.06	0.18*	0.27*	0.27*	-0.07	-0.04	0.11*	0.10	0.12*	0.10	0.52*	0.18*	0.09	0.29*	0.26*	-0.04	0.14*	0.23*	0.18*	0.43*	1	

*Significant at .05 confidence interval.

The PAM project stopped collecting implementation data for Sudan's 2005 CPA in 2011 after the independence of South Sudan.

It is also possible that implementation of liberal peace provisions and durable peace are both influenced by the willingness of actors to implement liberal peace provisions. As our data suggests, there is significant variation in liberal peace provisions as well as the implementation of those provisions across CPA cases. The willingness of policy makers to implement liberal peace provisions could be affected by the prospect for stable negative peace. Hence, it should be acknowledged that the causal relationship between liberal peace implementation and the duration of negative peace cannot be substantiated further without information about the willingness of actors. Nevertheless, the statistical robustness of our findings proposes a strong correlation between the liberal peace and peace duration, which offers a solid empirical foundation for further studies.

Concluding Discussion

The key finding of this article challenges the widely shared notion in normative discussions that the liberal peace has barely done any good. The article suggests that the duration of peace is improved if the liberal aspects of peace are included in peace accords and subsequently implemented. A 1% increase in the liberal peace implementation rate leads to a 9% increase in the duration of peace between the signatories who signed the CPA. Although the articulation of the causal relations between them requires further studies, the clear correlation as well as other research findings suggest that the liberal aspects of peacemaking should be taken seriously as they are a predictor of the longevity of peace. While the conventional critiques on the various limitations of the liberal peace are still valid, the evaluation of the roles of liberal peacebuilding should be done in a more nuanced way, observing both the positive and negative dimensions of this approach to peacemaking. Especially during the chaotic periods in the aftermath of armed conflicts, the implementation of liberal elements may have a positive influence in deterring the remobilization of military movements and stabilizing security. To put it another way, this means that coercive and illiberal forms of peace are short-lived and therefore potentially counterproductive.

This finding revisits the validity of previous academic debates on the liberal peace and calls for more nuanced approaches to the roles and functions of the liberal peace elements in post-conflict peacebuilding. To reiterate, the difference between the duration of peace and the quality of peace should be acknowledged. Many critiques of liberal peacebuilding concentrate on the latter rather than the former. By using the term 'no war, no peace', studies argue that a poor quality 'peace', marked by continuing divisions, poverty, authoritarian rule, and lack of

freedom, can persist without a resumption of large-scale violent conflict.⁵³ Many post-peace accord states (e.g. Bosnia-Herzegovina) have experienced serious public dissatisfaction with the peace accord and post-accord living standards, yet they have not reverted back into civil war.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, this study suggests that the progress in the liberal peace may play positive roles, at least, in maintaining negative peace in the aftermath of civil war.

We cannot construct an axiomatic causal link between liberal peace implementation and peace duration. Multiple factors may be at work to explain the duration of a 'peace' including the exhaustion of potential combatants and a range of exogenous factors such as regional dynamics or the state of the global economy. Moreover, when the long *durée* of a peace is examined in a particular society (for example, Northern Ireland) then we can see that notions of linear time in homogenous units are problematic.⁵⁵ Our focus is admittedly short-termist in this sense, but it is worth noting that much of contemporary peacemaking occupies the short-term realm.

In addition, this study examined two types of field deployment (peacekeeping forces and verification mechanisms) and how they interact with peace accords that may be compliant with the liberal peace. Our findings suggest that the deployment of UN peacekeeping alongside a liberal peace accord has a positive impact on the duration of peace. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the institution of peace accord verification mechanisms does not have a positive impact although there may be timing and sequencing issues at play in explaining this finding in that verification mechanisms may be most active at particular periods in a peace process/peace accord lifecycle.

Moreover, while the evaluation of cases included in the analysis suggests overwhelming support for our argument, this study does not examine systemic peace within the country. Violence may occur in some parts of the country or be below a threshold required to be included in databases on conflict. While many security incident databases capture violent incidents, they are less well equipped to capture the tensions and exclusions that amount to structural or indirect violence. Moreover, the implementation of formal aspects of a peace accord is likely to be only one aspect of a post-accord peacebuilding process. Peace accords often concentrate on the public, legal and political realms of peacemaking, which may include constitutional reform, and various state-building, governance and security sector reform tasks. Many other issues may legitimately be regarded as part of a peacebuilding process (e.g. land reform, infrastructure support, programmes focusing on people-to-people behaviour) but these are seldom formally included in peace accords.

⁵³Baghdasarian and Yunusov, *The limits of leadership*; Mac Ginty, *No War No Peace*; Kappler, "Representations of Peace."

⁵⁴Magjill and Hamber, "If They Don't Start Listening."

⁵⁵Loftus, *The Invention of Memory*.

Having said this, our examination presents the need to scrutinize more thoroughly the content and implementation emphases of peace accords. The extent to which a peace accord is 'liberal' in the sense of covering key liberal peace tropes like human rights and the promotion of democracy, and the extent to which these aspects are implemented, have an impact on the duration of peace. The findings highlight the need to unpack and scrutinize more thoroughly the complex roles of liberal peacemaking. We should not see peace accords as undifferentiated and uniformly positive political phenomena. Hence, finer-grained research to understand the precise relationships between institutions and liberalism is required. For instance, do the liberal aspects of peace accords, such as human rights legislation, require the building of particular types of institutions? There is also a need to disaggregate the various tropes within the liberal peace. It is clear that the liberal peace is best treated in the plural rather than as some sort of monolithic leviathan.

It is a task for future research, in this sense, to measure the different social and political impacts that the areas of the liberal peace reforms have on the development of post-conflict peacebuilding. This notion of disaggregating the contents of the liberal peace, and contextualizing it, also suggests the necessity for a conceptual endeavour to look afresh at the concept of the liberal peace. Among some areas of the literature, it has become a by-word for power politics cloaked in a liberal sounding verbiage. This may suggest that a future intellectual task can rescue liberalism (at least those positive aspects that qualitatively improve peace) from 'the liberal peace' that is often regarded as illiberal.

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