

## Humanitarianism: Keywords



# Humanitarianism

*Keywords*

*Edited by*

Antonio De Lauri



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## Endorsements

“This is an original and rigorous exploration of key categories that define both the genealogy and development of humanitarianism. By presenting the dynamics and paradoxes of the humanitarian domain in a dictionary form, the protagonists of the humanitarian enterprise can see more clearly the underlying factors at work through the tensions that affect the sphere of action. It is through informed reflections and syntheses like this dictionary that controversies can become dialogue. This dictionary is indispensable for correctly contextualising and interpreting one of the major political and moral phenomena of the contemporary world.”

– *Mariella Pandolfi, Professor of Anthropology Emeritus, University of Montreal*

“This interdisciplinary dictionary on keywords in the field of humanitarianism is indispensable in today’s world.”

– *Laura Nader, Professor of Anthropology, University of California at Berkeley*

“A strategic selection of sharply focused and neatly concise yet at the same time valuably connotational sketches of some key terms—and principles and ethics—of humanitarian intervention and aid, each entry with a few references for further study added. Excellent.”

– *Raymond Apthorpe, Royal Anthropological Institute, London, and the University of Cambridge*

“The title of the volume downplays its important contribution. The 107 entries provide not only a succinct overview of many of the critical and controversial concepts of humanitarianism, but also a mapping of the shifting ground on which humanitarianism sits. Concise enough to be valuable to those entering the field, while nuanced enough to be a reference for those in the field.”

– *Michael Barnett, University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, George Washington University*

“Humanitarianism is a field which depends heavily on terms of art. Knowing the key concepts in the field—their history, their resonances, their connections to specific policies and practices—is important for anyone who wants to work in or on humanitarianism. This dictionary is more than just a collection of definitions. Written by some of the leading scholars of humanitarianism, this is an essential map of all the key ideas in the field.”

– *Elizabeth Cullen Dunn, Professor of Geography, Indiana University, Bloomington*



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# Foreword

*Antonio De Lauri*

This dictionary comprises 107 entries, each one covering a key term in the broad humanitarian field. The entries are between 600 and 800 words long, followed by selected references. The dictionary is designed as a compass for navigating the conceptual universe of humanitarianism in a way that is both immediate and rooted in the major debates in the field. Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, humanitarian relief has spread worldwide to become a global salvific narrative that today is captured in the notion of “humanitarianism”—whereby the suffix “ism” embodies a whole set of beliefs, practices, categories, discourses, and procedures that, although flexible and apt to change quickly, are recognizable as “humanitarian.” Humanitarianism is manifested in a plurality of actions, movements, and ethics, which are different in their forms of implementation and expression and yet are coherent in their idealistic intentions. While these intentions build on core humanitarian principles such as “Neutrality,” “Independence,” “Humanity,” and “Impartiality” (see dictionary entries) they go beyond these to define a modern redemptory attitude that is expressed in forms of compassion and government. Indeed, humanitarianism is not simply a reaction to crisis but a vast, articulated, evolving, and multiscale mesh of different actors, politics, and structures. It is a modality of *intervention* in the world (with the aim of improving it), a global ethos that is driven by a call to address human needs in extraordinary, unbalanced, or unequal circumstances. As such, it constitutes a consistent and important feature of modernity, its history intertwined with ideas and practices of salvation, civilization, and liberation (see, for example, the dictionary entries for “Missionary,” “Anti-slavery,” “Religion,” “Charity,” and “Decolonization”).

That a short entry is not enough to fully address issues such as “Technology,” “Genocide,” “Rule of law,” “Gift,” “Food,” “Innocence,” “Sentiments,” or “Sovereignty” cannot be denied. Yet we resisted the (academic) temptation to transform the dictionary into a more traditional chapter-length book. The humanitarian literature is extensive, with a plethora of analyses that aim to unravel, criticize, define, and rethink humanitarianism. What is missing, however, is a more intuitive toolkit for practitioners, students, and researchers, a comprehensive dictionary that can be an entry point into the complex arena of humanitarianism. This dictionary maps contemporary humanitarianism and it also explores its potential future articulations. It clearly shows the difficulty in

trying to delimit the humanitarian field and create rigid conceptual and practical boundaries between what is and what is not related to humanitarianism.

By balancing actual humanitarian trends with their legacy, the dictionary spans the history of humanitarianism and its ongoing reconfiguration. It serves a broad readership by providing informed access to the extensive humanitarian vocabulary. The list of contributors includes experts and scholars spread across continents and disciplines (anthropology, sociology, geography, political science, law, international relations, history, and philosophy). Such an interdisciplinary and intersectoral scope mirrors the relevance of humanitarianism today, which brings humanitarian keywords to the forefront of national and international politics, academic debates, and grassroots movement initiatives, as well as formal and informal networks of volunteers and activists.

Certainly, the list of keywords included in the dictionary is temporary, or, perhaps more accurately, arbitrary. Some readers might be surprised by the inclusion of certain entries, while others may wonder why some are absent. The selection process followed a participatory approach: after the initial selection of approximately 60 entries by the editor, contributors were invited to suggest additional keywords in an open conversation about conceptual limits, challenges, and links. As the list of contributors and keywords continued to expand, some entries were redefined, others merged, and some were entirely rethought. A clear, delimiting factor—which of course influenced the whole editorial project—is that humanitarianism’s English vocabulary has been used as the *lingua franca*. While this is consistent with the fact that English is the dominant language of humanitarianism globally, a future project on vernacular humanitarian vocabularies would greatly enrich the literature.

Building on their own expertise, discipline, and professional background, each contributor decided to prioritize some specific aspects or understanding of keywords/entries. The various angles adopted by individual contributors reflect the diverse spectrum of knowledge traditions and practices that converge in the humanitarian field. The tension between technical and critical readings of keywords is retained in order to express the intrinsic difficulty of merging them in humanitarian practice. The variety of the dictionary confirms that humanitarianism remains an elusive term, and yet it impacts different spheres of life and the collective imagination.

Overall, the interdependence of keywords creates a conceptual framework that provides meaning to the multiple aspects of humanitarianism; and the dictionary offers various exploratory paths. For instance, readers interested in the field of medical humanitarianism will find several connections among entries such as “Global health,” “Medical neutrality,” “Vulnerability,” “Epidemic,” “Quarantine,” “Mental health,” and “Trauma.” Similarly, “Displacement,”



“Camp,” “Refugee,” “Borders,” “Migration,” “Shelter,” and “Livelihoods” provide instances of continuity and cross-reference, and so do “Humanitarian war,” “Responsibility to protect,” “Postwar reconstruction,” and “Humanitarian soldier.” At the same time, keywords will allow readers to follow less explored paths as they consider new connections between different concepts and practices.

A dictionary that condenses the broad articulation of humanitarianism is open to several uses. A reader interested in “Human rights,” for example, may find it useful to have, in a single book, the chance to read about concepts such as “Utopia,” “Universality,” “Human dignity,” “Transitional justice,” and “Moral responsibility.” Readers who want to explore the professional realm of humanitarianism will rely on the intersection of entries such as “Expatriates,” “Advocacy,” “Training,” “Evaluation,” “Professionalization,” “Safeguarding,” “Accountability,” and “Risk assessment.”

Clearly, some entries relate more directly to academic debates, while others have a policy-oriented and pragmatic value. However, it is hoped that each entry will be informative and will also provide critical food for thought. As a result, the dictionary is like a road junction that has multiple possible directions: traveling along some of these routes will consolidate readers’ knowledge, while taking others will bring them to new understandings of humanitarianism.

## Acknowledgement

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# Accountability

The word “accountability” shares its etymological roots with “accounting”: the Latin word *accomptare* means “to account”; in turn this derives from *computare*, “to calculate,” and *putare*, “to reckon.” Various dictionaries now define accountability as a fact, condition, quality, or state of being accountable and/or responsible, especially meaning an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility and to be liable to be called to account.

In humanitarian settings, the notion of accountability can have different interpretations. Generally, it is used to describe functioning and transparent relations between people and institutions involved in a humanitarian action, including governments, international and national organizations, civil society organizations, and private companies. The term underlines the responsible use of power in an unbalanced setting where humanitarian actors have significant power over populations affected by crisis and emergency. In such contexts, accountability is seen as a key element through which affected populations can fully benefit from humanitarian response and relief operations (Roberts 2018).

Accountability can include both top-down and bottom-up approaches. In addition to organizations’ accountability towards donors, upward accountability mechanisms are gaining attention thanks to the surge in locally contextualized ownership and the community focus of development processes and aid, and through the overall rights-based approach to relief projects (Van Zyl and Claeys 2018; Murtaza 2012; O’Leary 2017). In such a realm, accountability can be seen as a moral imperative ensuring the sustainability of humanitarian interventions.

Accountability has gained larger attention in humanitarian actions since the 1990s, with the expansion of humanitarian aid mechanisms and after shortcomings in response to high-profile emergencies, including the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the 2004 tsunami in Asia (Rose, O’Keefe, Jayawickrama, and O’Brien 2013; Chynoweth, Zwi, and Whelan 2018). Yet accountability is not a new concept in humanitarianism, and historically can be seen as having correlations with wartime welfare provisions, particularly in the humanitarian actions undertaken by the United States and United Kingdom. For example, in aiming to maintain relief agencies’ efficiency during World War II, the Government of the United States sought regulation of their fundraising (Dijkzeul and Sandvik 2019).

Accountability is embodied through various frameworks, agreements, performance assessments, audits, codes of conduct, standards, and reports, such

as the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) on Quality and Accountability (CHS Alliance, Group URD, and Sphere Project 2014) and yearly Humanitarian Accountability Reports (CHS Alliance 2018, latest edition at the time of writing). Such documentation facilitates monitoring, evaluation, and standardization of accountability, reinforcing transparency through which institutions showcase compliance or non-compliance to previously set standards for humanitarian action.

Criticisms of accountability include the usage of short-term solutions and functionality at the cost of long-term strategic processes that support sustainable social and political changes (Ebrahim 2003). The division between locally owned and non-locally owned intervening organizations raises a further question about the consistency of accountability mechanisms (Van Zyl and Claeeyé 2018). Using numbers (quantifying) to describe social phenomena in order to support accountability efforts can also oversimplify, homogenize, and neglect the surrounding social structures, so this approach has to be complemented by qualitative analysis of the social setting (Merry 2016).

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## Advocacy

Advocacy refers to the act of advocating for something, often on behalf of someone. It derives from the Latin *advocatus*, meaning “to plead in favor of.” The Old French term *avocat* refers to a “barrister, advocate, spokesman” (Online Etymology Dictionary), yet the term has evolved to become a common term not just in the context of courts of justice, but also more broadly to designate the activities of groups or individuals who advocate for societal change. In the wake of European colonization and overseas work of evangelization, and as a precursor to modern forms of human rights or humanitarian advocacy, religious organizations were the first to engage in “long-distance advocacy”—the advent of the anti-slavery movement is the best-known example (Stamatov 2013).

Today, humanitarian organizations engage in advocacy campaigns to raise awareness about ongoing crises and urgent needs and to ensure funding for their activities. Humanitarian advocacy is both about raising public awareness of emerging crises and to increase funding, but can also be about advocating for certain types of responses. As the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs puts it, “advocacy means communicating the right messages to the right people at the right time” (OCHA). Yet here lies part of the dilemma around humanitarian advocacy, as more vocal and critical messages about ongoing crises, responsibilities, and appropriate responses may also compromise the organization’s access to their assistance targets. While some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are more vocal and outspoken about appropriate responses, other NGOs carefully balance their public communication to safeguard their access to the crisis-affected area.

More broadly, this relates to what is often seen as a division of labor between human rights organizations and humanitarian organizations: the first focus their efforts on raising awareness around violations and injustice, while humanitarian actors focus on the provision of basic aid and maintaining or

obtaining humanitarian access through a strict respect of the principle of neutrality. More specifically, this also relates to an assumption that humanitarian action is seen as something distinct from social movements, although this assumption can be questioned.

For Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), advocacy is about bearing witness, which is the core foundation of its existence: the organization was set up in reaction to the position of discretion established by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the face of what had been witnessed during the war in Biafra (1967–70). More specifically, “neutrality” for MSF means being non-partisan, but should not prevent its members from testifying what they have seen (HPG 2007). These two positions, of MSF and the ICRC, are still illustrative of the balancing act operated by many humanitarian organizations involved in providing aid in conflict-affected regions.

The question of humanitarian neutrality and the need for advocacy became particularly charged at the height of the international response to the Darfur conflict (2004–09), and crystallized around the accusations of genocide committed by the government in Khartoum against the non-Arab population in the western province of Sudan. The question of providing humanitarian relief to the population in Darfur also quickly became a question of how to protect civilians and take measures to address the conflict (HPG 2007). There was already a division of labor between the most vocal activists who were carrying the advocacy campaign to bring President Omar al-Bashir to the International Criminal Court (ICC), usually from Western capitals, and the humanitarian organizations with operations in Darfur (Jumbert 2015). Yet after the ICC indictment against the President in March 2009, several humanitarian organizations were expelled from Darfur on the grounds of having collaborated with UN investigators.

The idea that there is a clear distinction between humanitarian action and more engaged activist advocacy may lead to the overseeing of important initiatives that do not fall under the traditional understanding of humanitarian actors as large international NGOs with headquarters in the Global North and mainly operating in the Global South. Local NGOs in crisis-affected regions may often provide humanitarian relief and basic services, while also filling a role of advocating for societal change. Religious charities are another example of organizations that provide humanitarian relief in a broader value-based and religious framework. New volunteer initiatives to support refugees in Europe, in the wake of the refugee reception crisis in Europe in 2015, also often contain strong elements of advocacy to improve reception conditions for these refugees. Yet in this European context, even those who frame their assistance as



apolitical and merely as providing basic aid are nevertheless often seen as taking a political stance through these acts.

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## Anti-slavery

The organized fight against slavery is arguably the pioneering form of humanitarianism aimed at alleviating the suffering of distant strangers—those not considered members of one’s own local/national community or religion, yet imagined as part of a common humanity (Barnett 2011; Blackburn 1988). Before the 18th century, individual activists argued against specific types or circumstances of slavery or even, rarely, against slavery as such. However, the movement that arose in 18th-century England aiming to destroy the slavery of distant people appears to be the first formal collective endeavor, building on the recent invention of the voluntary association and the expansion of the public sphere. Its motives and methods presaged much of what would follow as humanitarianism grew, and its long-term effectiveness was demonstrated first in the country-by-country outlawing of the Atlantic slave trade, then by the end of legal colonial slavery, and eventually by the abolition of legal slavery by every independent country in the world. Yet its work is unfinished, because the end of legal slavery did not extinguish the demand for coerced labor, which the

anti-slavery movement continues to fight today (Miers 2003; Anti-Slavery International 2019).

In aims and methods, the anti-slavery movement is the archetype of what Michael Barnett (2011) has called “alchemical” humanitarianism, aspiring to remove the fundamental cause of suffering, although minor offshoots of the movement did deliver relief in the form of food, supplies, and/or services to the recently freed or unjustly enslaved. In pursuit of fundamental change in laws and enforcement, anti-slavery organizations conducted research, rallied public support, and lobbied governments, relying on the force of their arguments augmented by public opinion to sway those in the political sphere.

From the beginning of the movement, the controversies besetting anti-slavery were those that have also attended other humanitarian groups. Critics have argued that activists’ energies would be better expended on helping those who suffered locally or nationally, have questioned the truthfulness of the movement’s pleas for public support, and posited that activists’ motivations were selfish, such as the desire for moral superiority, ego satisfaction, careerism, enrichment, or power. Like all humanitarians, the activists believed that their work would help the targets of their work lead better lives, but many questioned this premise by predicting or showing how many would be worse off. Some articulated the more general concern that humanitarians were in some way the dupes of the powerful or the unknowing agents of an exploitative system. Regarding anti-slavery, these concerns found their most influential proponent when Eric Williams (1944) postulated that the anti-slavery activists, no matter how well intentioned, were carrying out the task required by burgeoning industrial capitalism as it destroyed older forms of labor to make way for the freely contracted labor of an exploited proletariat. Although Seymour Drescher (1986, 2009) and others undermined the particulars of this argument, humanitarianism’s origins in modern capitalist societies and its presence as a part of a globalized capitalist order has suggested to some that anti-slavery, like humanitarianism in general, is not only a feature of the modern world but also serves the system’s needs by ameliorating its worst effects, distracting participants from pervasive exploitation or justifying its operation.

The original targets of anti-slavery groups were the slave systems of their own countries, remedying the wrongs of which their countries were guilty. Once their own legal slave systems were dismantled, the universality of their principles refocused their fight on other sovereign states, a pattern only amplified as colonial possessions achieved independence. This led to charges of paternalism and neocolonialism, particularly as the end of legal slavery meant going to other countries to ferret out illegal slavery and similar forms of

exploitation. The anti-slavery movement has tried to deal with these concerns by forming partnerships with groups in other countries.

International anti-slavery organizations, like humanitarian groups generally, have multiplied over time, from a handful of organizations in the early 19th century to at least 189 of the 1041 anti-slavery groups listed by End Slavery Now ([www.endslaverynow.org](http://www.endslaverynow.org)); the remaining 852 groups focus on slavery within their own countries, though many receive international funding. A re-definition of their activities from ameliorative to rights-oriented also parallels changes in humanitarianism generally over the past few decades.

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## Atrocity

Dictionary definitions of the word “atrocity” point to acts of extreme cruelty, brutal actions typically involving violence or bodily injury, shockingly bad and ferocious deeds. Mass cruelty and acts aiming to destroy a particular group of people have arguably been a part of human behavior since ancient time. Atrocities and mass-scale ethnic enmity were also present in the medieval world, and are extensively described in religious texts, including the Bible. World history has often been propelled forward by instances of carnage, when the destruction of people on a mass scale has been sought (Kiernan 2007). However, the language of atrocity only entered the public discourse in the Enlightenment era when an intensified fascination with suffering prompted a

surge in “humanitarian” thinking and action. At the time, the modern discourse of human rights was not yet familiar, but the language of atrocity characterized discussions on violations of the human body during war and colonial violence as well as on the suffering of famines and slavery (Twomey 2012; Sliwinski 2011).

Modern politics and advanced technology intensified mass atrocities. In the 21st century, the human community has come to acknowledge, name, and seek to prevent and prosecute atrocity crimes. In humanitarian contexts, starting from the mid-20th century, atrocity—mass atrocity or mass atrocity crimes—has come to indicate political violence that violates international human rights, humanitarian laws, and conventions aiming to protect people from heinous acts of violence. Therefore, the concept of atrocity is today referred to as crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Atrocities are seen as acts of extreme mass violence, brutal instances that shock the public conscience are condemned by the international community, and are seen to constitute a moral obligation to prevent, intervene, and to protect the victims and punish the perpetrators (Kiernan 2007; Brudholm 2018).

The contemporary legal conventions and laws on mass atrocity are products of contemporary history, responses to the bloody events of two world wars. In the aftermath of World War II, and as a response to the atrocities of the Holocaust, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was signed (UN 1948). In the document, genocide is defined as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” The convention defines and condemns genocide as a mass atrocity. It was followed by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (ICRC 2014), which describe and condemn war crimes and seek to protect soldiers, military personnel, and civilians during wartime and occupation. The legal term “crimes against humanity” was developed during the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals (1945). Crimes against humanity are “acts that are deliberately committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian or an identifiable part of a civilian population” (ICC 1998, Article 7). The concept of ethnic cleaning—a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic group from certain geographic areas—was defined in the final report (1994) by a United Nations commission of experts looking into the violations of international humanitarian law during the wars in the former Yugoslavia (UN 1994).

In most of the Cold War cases, mass atrocity was condemned by the international community, but the prevention of atrocities was often hindered by the

norms of non-interference. The end of the Cold War, and the massacres in Rwanda and in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, prompted a renewed concern to protect human beings against mass violence (Bellamy 2012).

Although the prevention of mass atrocity is currently a major concern of international politics and humanitarianism, atrocity crimes continue to be perpetrated by state and non-state actors. Furthermore, what is recognized as an atrocity, and politically treated as such, still remains ambivalent. In addition to global power politics and political co-option, acknowledgement of atrocity is also dependent on attention, mediation, and visibility, and some incidents of mass violence garner more concern than others. Visibility and visual proof have been pivotal in the recognition and confirmation of atrocious events, as some events are seen as more atrocious than others (Sliwinski 2011). Given the dominant role of visual evidence, when there is no visual testimony, no picture of an atrocity, it becomes more difficult to recognize the occurrence and extent of atrocities (Sontag 2003).

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## Big Data

When digital data sets are too large, too complex, or are generated too fast to process by humans or ordinary software, they are called Big Data. Such data sets may be polluted by significant amounts of noise, contain false information, or inflict ethical or privacy issues. If the processing capacity needed to extract meaningful and actionable information from the material is in place, Big Data offers great potential for humanitarian practices (Burns 2014; Whippley and Verity 2015). Big Data may reveal insights that would previously have been expensive or difficult to obtain. The data may be collected or extracted with the aim of mapping people's movement, estimating populations, identifying urgent needs in disasters, or predicting the spread of diseases.

Crowdsourced Big Data is sometimes disputed owing to the problem of representativeness. When information is retrieved from mobile phone messages or social media posts after a major disaster, there logically tends to be a bias in the data sets, which misses disconnected, illiterate, or remote affected populations. Crowdsourcing of Big Data is today seen as a supplement to other sources of information. In the immediate aftermath of major disasters, social media and microblogs are flooded with information. Speed is therefore often seen as the most obvious advantage of crowdsourcing such data. Responding organizations are normally aware of the differences in coverage received when societies with varying access to communication tools are involved.

Various data attributes are highlighted here: volume, variety, velocity, veracity, and value are keywords commonly used to discuss characteristics of Big Data (Castillo 2016; Prasad, Zakaria, and Altay 2018).

Large volumes of data lead to challenges in retrieving, storing, indexing or searching the data. Several strategies exist to address these challenges, including crowdsourcing or distributed computing, and Machine Learning techniques. The task may be to categorize or geolocate text-based messages posted during disasters. It may be to identify tracks, camps, dwellings or disaster affected areas from satellite images. Crowdsourcing has been used to analyze big data sets for health or education programs, during refugee crises or after major disasters.

Machine Learning may be trained to select data with specific characteristics that are relevant for the purpose of the search. The clustering may also be unsupervised, applied when the desired outcome is clustering of similar data. There is increased interest in the field of Machine Learning algorithms trained to identify features in aerial imagery. The aim is to support situational awareness, damage assessments and decision-making from a distance. Machine Learning

is used to identify flooding, damage to buildings or infrastructure, camps, and dwellings from satellite imagery, drone images, or aerial imagery.

The variety of data in Big Data sets harvested from sources such as social media or satellite imagery poses challenges for categorization of the data. Unstructured messages may contain information relevant for multiple humanitarian clusters frequently used to organize the response. A message may also warn about dangers, or spread rumors or false news, but even this information could be of value to decision-makers.

Velocity is sometimes a major feature of Big Data. Messages posted on social media immediately after a sudden onset disaster can contain vital information for situational awareness. Harvesting relevant pieces from fast approaching information streams can be handled by live processing and filtering. In some situations, the benefits of immediacy will be favored over accuracy, which is a challenge in live processing. Batch processing is a common technique to “slow down” the analysis of fast approaching data, giving the time to identify valuable bits of information, thereby increasing accuracy and deleting irrelevant or false information.

Several approaches exist to address the veracity of information. Verification may be achieved through various methods, some of them with their origins in journalism. Identifying the author of the information, the location from where it was sent, and the content itself is a common approach. Images can be back-traced to identify whether they have been previously published. Stories can be checked by trusted onsite agents, or one may rely on a particular source trusted owing to its reputation or official status. In microtask processing, such as the classification of messages or defining the content of imagery, a common practice is to demand that multiple contributors arrive at the same conclusion before a classification is accepted as true.

The value aspects of Big Data cover both the compilation and the use of automatically generated information, such as mobile phone locations or call data. Such data is sometimes used in innovative time- and resource-saving processes, with ethical decisions being made that may be disputed. During the 2014 Ebola pandemic, pressure was put on telecom providers to release call detail records (CDRs). The aim was to try and predict the spread of the disease and even to support the tedious process of contact tracing. According to Sean McDonald (2016), CDRs were released to international donors from Guinea and Sierra Leone, while Liberia resisted all attempts to release such sensitive data.

The United Nations Centre for Humanitarian Data in The Hague has become a hub for humanitarian data, where organizations are encouraged both to share and to use a growing base of relevant data.

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## Borders

Humanitarian action has a fundamental cosmopolitan essence. From the abolitionist movements against slavery in the 18th and 19th centuries, to transnational aid and interventions in contexts of conflict and disasters, humanitarianism has always dealt with borders. Since its inception, Western humanitarianism has not only transcended national borders but also directly challenged them through the concept of universal humanity. The human, as a formative category, was considered beyond any racial or national boundaries (Calhoun 2008). The creation of Médecins Sans Frontières is an example of a humanitarian organization that directly refutes borders and challenges national sovereign power (Redfield 2013).

More recently, the term “humanitarian borders” was introduced by William Walters (2011) to depict the reinscription of the border as a space of humanitarian government. The humanitarian border is defined as “a complex assemblage, comprising particular forms of humanitarian reason” (Walters 2011: 142) and is dedicated to the processes of governing borders and populations on the move. It includes a disparate array of governmental, non-governmental and supra-governmental actors, such as national police forces and coastguards, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, international and local humanitarian organizations, and diverse technologies of monitoring and control. According to Walters, the humanitarian border is a recent development that is closely related to the securitization and advanced migration control that prevails in the contemporary world.



The academic discussion on it cuts across disciplines such as anthropology, geography, and migration and border studies, among others.

Humanitarian practitioners themselves can be described as mobile cosmopolitans who travel across borders to provide assistance in humanitarian crises. However, such activity does not eradicate borders, but is in fact grounded on historically inscribed hierarchies of mobility and their underlying imperial logics, which determine freedom of mobility for some groups and restrictions for others. Humanitarianism itself delves into processes of reterritorialization through the demarcation of specific territories as “humanitarian zones.” Humanitarian government, therefore, performs sovereign power in contexts of “emergency,” and redefines borders as zones affected by humanitarian crisis (De Lauri 2019).

Nowadays, border areas globally are increasingly humanitarianized, as the proliferation of border control and the emergence of humanitarian hubs illustrate. The increased securitization of borders and the emergence of a complex surveillance apparatus are key elements of contemporary repressive and restrictive migration regimes (Fassin 2011). The humanitarian border emphasizes precisely the nexus between humanitarianism and securitization, protection and surveillance, care and control. The humanitarianization of the borders illustrates that the violence of sovereign borders coexists with the governing logics of humanitarianism. The case of the European reception migration/refugee “crisis” is an example of how the crisis frame has become the ground for even more restrictive and punitive border practices, exemplified in the “hotspot approach,” introduced by the European Union (EU) in 2015 to address “exceptional migratory flows” (European Commission 2015) and the expansion of processing and registration centers on the borders of the EU and its neighboring countries. The crisis has thus been a critical point both for the harshening of the EU migration and border regimes and the humanitarianization of the European borders. Another example is United States President Donald Trump’s mobilization of humanitarian categories to legitimize his politics of bordering along the United States–Mexico border (Dunn 2019).

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## Camp

The camp is a technology of care and control that has been historically used in connection with a variety of forms of confinement, examples being concentration camps for soldiers and other prisoners and quarantine camps to prevent the spread of disease or pests. More recently, camps have become the critical device in the management of modern humanitarian crises, “temporary” solutions to accommodate either refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some scholars emphasize the historical transition at the end of World War II, when “certain key techniques for managing mass displacements of people first became standardized and then globalized” (Malkki 1995: 497). Of the approximately 70 million individuals forcibly displaced worldwide, around 2.6 million people live in official camps (UNHCR 2019). Camps are set up as the most suitable solution for the management of the displaced, especially those who cannot find alternative accommodation elsewhere. Even though host states and the large network of humanitarian organizations involved in the management of camps often have different and even contradictory mandates, organizational cultures, and interests, all seem to converge on the idea that disenfranchised people are best managed and controlled in camps. As such, two major premises seem to underlie their functioning and determine the objectives of this spatial regime: (1) displaced populations are a transitory phenomenon of crisis and disorder and are thus only temporarily relevant, and (2) human nature is best served in a sedentary setting.

The discourse on (refugee) camps has traditionally cast the camps as spaces of exception where people are settled, controlled, disciplined, and visualized through humanitarian categories and programs. As Liisa Malkki states: “the segregation of political affiliations and identities, medical and hygienic programs and quarantining, ‘perpetual screening’ and the accumulation of documentation on the inhabitants of the camps, the control of movement and black-marketing, law enforcement and public discipline, and schooling and rehabilitation were some of the operations that the spatial concentration and ordering of people enabled or facilitated” (Malkki 1995: 498). Critical scholarship insists that the humanitarian system has extended a double-edged privilege in the camp: it has kept the destitute alive, educated most, and given jobs to some, but it has also created definitions and categorizations—such as “registered” and “non-registered”—that have minimized displaced numbers and ignored all those outside these definitions (Harrell-Bond 1999). Studies have highlighted how, through the imposition of specific forms of hierarchical organization, humanitarian agencies coordinate the life of populations living in camps around a rational planning of daily life, but often in contempt of former social realities and historical contest.

Even though they are conceived as short-term solutions, camps have the tendency to become permanent and can undergo a process of urbanization and infrastructure development (Agier 2002). Houses of several stories replace tents and shelters, and new roads are often established through the camps or around the perimeter. Scholars have explored the practices of everyday life and spatial forms of resistance through which camp dwellers reappropriate the space of the camp. Studies have documented how humanitarian camps, for their inhabitants, cease to be associated exclusively with negative images—helpless people, passive victims, raw humanity, and so on—and become primary references upon which they reconstruct their identity, their sense of history, their social, cultural, and political views. A body of ethnography on Palestinian studies, for example, shows how—60 years after their settlement in the first camps—Palestinian refugees have gone beyond bureaucratic and humanitarian labels and have rewritten the camp’s space, reproducing the Palestinian culture and land inside the administrative and physical camp boundaries (Achilli 2015; Bisharat 1994).

However, camps are not only established by governments or international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. At times, activists, volunteers, non-governmental organizations, and displaced groups themselves have developed unofficial camps to provide shelter and facilitate service provision, and also as hubs for political

activism and militancy as alternatives to overcrowded camps, or simply because official camps do not exist. A case in point was the unofficial refugee camp of Calais, overlooking the Strait of Dover in the northeast of France, which in 2016 reached an approximate population of 10,000 people—mostly asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Sudan, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa. The settlement, dubbed “the Jungle,” was established by volunteers and grassroots organizations in response to the lack of institutional support, but soon became a space where activists, migrants, and volunteers could exert pressure on the United Kingdom’s border policies and denounce French police brutality (Agier 2018; Sandri 2018).

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## Capacity Development

“Capacity” is understood as the ability of people, organizations, and society to successfully manage their affairs. “Capacity development” is the process

whereby these actors as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain capacity over time. “Promotion of capacity development” refers to what outside partners—domestic or foreign—can do to support, facilitate, or catalyze capacity development and related change processes.

Capacity development thus involves much more than enhancing the knowledge and skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the quality of the organizations in which they work. In turn, the operations of particular organizations are influenced by the enabling environment—the structures of power and influence and the institutions—in which they are embedded. Capacity is not only about skills and procedures, it is also about incentives and governance. Capacity building is thus not just a neutral and technical issue, it is also a highly sensitive political issue.

Country capacity is the key to development performance, and therefore also to efforts to accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty, and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. This applies to both generic capacities (e.g. the ability to plan and manage organizational changes and service improvements) and specific capacities in critical fields (e.g. managing response to a humanitarian crisis) (OECD 2006).

Capacity development is a major challenge for humanitarian actors. In reviews of aid effectiveness, the development of capacity is invariably recognized as one of the most critical issues for both donors and recipients in countries of intervention.

In May 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit emphasized the importance of a localized response to humanitarian crisis—although the concept of “local” was poorly elaborated (Apthorpe and Borton 2019). Despite the clear importance of local actors and the growing role of “grassroots humanitarians,” the international humanitarian system was built by and for international actors, multilateral organizations and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The complexity of modern crises called for a review of this approach. National governmental disaster management agencies and other relevant ministries, local humanitarian responders, NGOs, and Red Cross or Red Crescent societies are now seen as key pillars of an overall humanitarian response. This has led to a renewed emphasis on direct support to local humanitarian actors—financial and in strengthening institutional capacities (ICVA 2015; OECD 2017).

Humanitarian aid was largely exempted from the principles of aid effectiveness that were developed after the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Goals and culminated with the 2005 Paris Agenda for Aid Effectiveness. A central pillar of this agenda was to empower and strengthen local institutions and to channel funding directly to them. The 2016 Humanitarian Summit was an

effort to address some of these issues. However, progress since then has been modest, especially in relation to “localized response.” There is still insufficient focus on empowering local communities and local organizations and on providing capacity-building support. An early study—*Eroding Local Capacity*—examined the interplay between international and local actors operating in the humanitarian arena in Africa (Juma and Suhrke 2002). This study noted that although all sides emphasize the need to build local capacity for humanitarian action, the results are not substantial. Even long-term, semi-permanent emergencies have generated little local capacity to assist and protect the victims of violence, displacement, and related deprivations. In some cases, whatever local capacity did exist has been overwhelmed by the international aid presence (Bank, Hulme, and Edwards 2015). Multiscale capacity-building projects in humanitarian logistics and access to technology (Breman, Giacumo, and Griffith-Boyes 2019) are further key challenges for national and international humanitarian organizations and donors.

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## Care

Care is central to the humanitarian endeavor. The International Committee of the Red Cross emerged in response to the absence of professional care for wounded soldiers after the battle of Solferino in 1859. While the provision of health care in emergencies remains central to the humanitarian enterprise (Feldman 2017), the notion of what humanitarian care is and who can legitimately provide it has broadened. Humanitarian care now includes a complex array of protection of civilian populations, including food aid, shelter, education and vocational training, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, legal aid, and, increasingly, humanitarian workers' "self-care" and wellness.

As ideal humanitarian practice, care builds on the imperatives to do no harm and to assist according to need in a humane, impartial, and neutral manner. Faith-based humanitarian organizations straddle these principled approaches to care and the specific religious duties and obligations of Islam, evangelical Christianity, and Judaism, for example. Rights-based humanitarian organizations seek to base their provision of care on social justice and human rights principles. At the same time, contemporary ideas of humanitarian care are deeply intertwined with the historic legacies of Western colonialism and the civilizing and paternalistic impetus of the military, missionary, and commercial arms of the colonial regimes deployed to provide various forms of care (Barnett 2011). Further, they are influenced by the domestic trajectories of poor management and culturally rooted conceptualizations of how individuals are deemed deserving or undeserving of care (Piven and Cloward 2012).

Critical scholarly contributions focus on humanitarianism as contested regimes of care and its nexus with control, in particular the linkage between care, migration management (Ticktin 2011) and the enforcement of borders (Williams 2015). Recently, the turn to resilience and remote management has produced yet another version of "humanitarian care" with aid and protection tailored to help populations in crisis care for themselves (Duffield 2016). An important part of this is the deployment of surveillance and tracking technologies to measure, map, and quantify movements, social interactions, and consumption, such as drones or wearables. This trend towards "technologizing care" and the digitization and datafication of care practices in the humanitarian cyberspace (Sandvik 2016) engenders important reconceptualizations of the meaning of care, as well as new regimes of care and intervention, such as care for the "digital body."

While the understanding of care needs and practices as gendered, racialized, and stratified are well integrated into humanitarian programming, important blind spots remain, an example being how the term “vulnerability” is mostly associated with women at the cost of making men’s suffering and care needs invisible (Sandvik 2018).

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## Celebrities

Stories of the suffering of global others are today regularly mediated by celebrities. Entertainment stars, film, rock, TV celebrities, and philanthropic billionaires feature in non-governmental organization (NGO) advertisements with the aim of raising awareness about humanitarian issues on the news and in television shows and speak at international summits advocating for a more just world. Modern global humanitarianism is dependent on spectacles



that bring the suffering of distant others to the awareness of the surrounding world. Celebrity advocacy acts as a communicative arrangement that aims to bridge the gap between the global core areas of vulnerability (i.e. the crisis areas of the Global South) and the populations of the Global North, between those who suffer and those who watch from a distance (Chouliaraki 2013). The humanitarian global political North–South dynamic is aptly embodied by Western celebrities acting as the exemplar global do-gooders in the crisis areas of the Global South. However, celebrity philanthropy is not solely a Western practice, as for example, the humanitarian endeavors of Bollywood stars in India (Pramod 2015) as well as Chinese HIV/AIDS heroes (Hood 2015) exemplify.

Celebrity faces first entered the Western humanitarian imaginary in the 1950s, when the United Nations started using glamorous stars, such as Danny Kaye and Audrey Hepburn, as “goodwill ambassadors” and “messengers of peace.” Since the 1980s, many admired, wealthy, and Western elite individuals have saturated the humanitarian visibility and lent a photogenic face to issues of transnational solidarity. Celebrities such as Angelina Jolie, Madonna, Bono, George Clooney, Oprah Winfrey, and Bill Gates have become the most visible characters speaking for the global needy and poor. Moreover, in addition to acting as the marketing tools of NGOs, celebrities today organize spectacular media events, establish their own charities and humanitarian projects, and have made their way higher up into the circles of diplomacy and international political power (Yrjölä 2014; Chouliaraki 2013; Wheeler 2011).

Celebrities have certainly played a role in drawing public awareness to humanitarian issues and have indeed succeeded in popularizing some otherwise neglected episodes in human events (Cooper 2008). Nevertheless, celebrity humanitarianism has received critique from a number of directions. Much research has raised concerns about the mobilizing ability, added value, and emancipatory potential of celebrity humanitarianism, and numerous studies have drawn attention to the ethical problems embedded in such activity.

One central critique has been that celebrity humanitarianism does not challenge the root causes of the injustices and inequalities that humanitarianism seeks to redress in the first place. Rather, it has been argued that the celebrity humanitarianism of recent decades merely serves to legitimate and promote neoliberal capitalism and global inequality, and it is therefore quite destructive for the Global South (Kapoor 2012). Global politics and its ties of celebrity humanitarianism together with global North–South relations in general have also been considered in many studies (Richey 2015). Celebrity humanitarianism

has been seen as consolidating stereotypical imaginaries of the global others, namely of Africa and its “childlike” populations, unable to help themselves without the assistance of wealthy, powerful, and exceptional celebrity humanitarians. Colonial undertones are clearly evident in the celebrity humanitarian narrative (Yrjölä 2014). Therefore, in many ways, conventions of celebrity humanitarianism encapsulate the problematics of the global humanitarian system and its inherent hierarchical global political arrangement. Celebrity humanitarianism is thus an effective lens for scrutinizing contemporary global politics.

Today, the endeavors of the wealthy, mostly white, and beautiful privileged elite individuals speaking on behalf of populations in vulnerable positions and living in poor conditions is perhaps more often met with cynicism, and it seems that many are increasingly viewing the credibility of celebrity humanitarianism with suspicion. The egotistical White Savior Complex (Cole 2012) inherent in celebrity humanitarianism, the global inequality and hierarchy directly evident in the celebrity logic, may even today, in the age of rising media literacy, be at risk of backfiring on the celebrity-driven campaigns and causes. The hypocrisy evident in the activism of influential elites who have themselves benefited from the globally unequal system and hierarchy poignantly reveals the realities of the global intersections of racial and class-based oppression (Hopkins 2017).

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## Charity

Charity, from the Latin *caritas*, is the voluntary giving of help to those in need. Seen as the “queen of virtues,” the term carries a broad semantic meaning and is often understood as a practice of love that establishes a link between God and humans, therewith constituting a ground of unity among humankind (Agrimi and Crisciani 1998). Over the course of history, charity has changed from the acts of wealthy individuals and mission societies, to the rise and proliferation of major foundations and social networks that complemented the role of the welfare state in the 20th century. However, small, individual givers still continued their “good work” and served as the backbone of religious charity. After World War II, a large range of development and humanitarian actors began to dominate this evolving landscape, which turned into a competitive marketplace. The act of charity itself is seen as a precursor of institutionalized and bureaucratized forms of humanitarian aid and continues to exist in multiple alternative forms of gift-giving, such as philanthropy, alms, orphanages, lotteries, and other types of charitable fund-raising activities. In this classical sense, charity is usually provided by individuals or collectives to those not related to them and implies basic supplies such as money, clothes, health care, shelter, and food, but also bodily substances such as blood. Furthermore, benevolent activities, such as visits to prisons, giving advice, spending time with homeless people, and educating orphans, can be considered “charity.”

In contrast to secular forms of aid, however, the notion of charity still carries strongly religious connotations and refers to different, often overlapping, religious strands. Jonathan Benthall points out that non-Western forms of charity were disregarded until recently when historians and anthropologists began studying forms of gift-giving in Islam, Buddhism, or Hinduism, and “deprovincialized” Western assumptions about the “universalism” of Christian charity (Benthall 2018). Practices comparable with the Christian doctrine of *diakonía*, the assumption that anything done for the hungry, homeless, sick, or

imprisoned carries a devotion to God, can be found in several non-Western religious traditions, although with different connotations. In the Islamic charitable foundation of *zakat*, the rules of alms-giving to the poor is the primary purpose. For instance, in her ethnography on Muslim alms-giving in contemporary Egypt, Amira Mittermaier explores the contractual foundations of charity as a kind of “trading with God,” which paradoxically promises an increase in wealth through donating money (Mittermaier 2013). While several works on Muslim forms of charity have shown how religious giving can be framed as a means for socio-economic redistribution and development, others underline the ethical transformation experienced especially among members of the upper class. In her work on middle-aged volunteers in Anatolia, Hilal Alkan-Zeybek shows that charity challenges the hierarchical order of social strata. When members of the educated upper class encounter “the needy” face to face and therefore cross the racially and class-specific bodily boundaries, they alter their discriminatory dispositions (Alkan-Zeybek 2012).

Slightly different but still comparable dimensions of charity are explored by Katherine A. Bowie in Buddhist Thailand, where both givers and recipients of charity may have an interest in the inequalities that are established or confirmed through this socio-economic practice. Merit-making, the definition of who may provide and who may receive charity, can simultaneously protect the status quo of the elite and provide relief for the beneficiaries, who may even execute social pressure on the upper classes (Bowie 1998). In contemporary New Delhi, Erica Bornstein follows the motives and perceptions of philanthropists who build temples, give *dān* (a form of religious donation in Hinduism), construct orphanages, and orchestrate the reception of Hindu temples. She problematizes a clear-cut distinction between unofficial and ad hoc forms of gift-giving and the works of non-governmental organizations and other institutions, and suggests understanding charity as the relational, affectual, and dynamic aspect of the gift, which complements a rights-based form of social welfare (Bornstein 2012).

In our contemporary mediatized world society, charity media events, also called “charitainment,” turn distant suffering to domestic audiences. These mega-spectacles of staged journeys of elite heroism can function as principal motivators but also increase the commodification and secularization of charity. From this perspective, the role of charity celebrities is conceptualized as a form of cultural capital of the most wealthy, which contributes to a simplified, decontextualized, and often depoliticized representation of social suffering.

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## Children

Nearly 400 million children worldwide lack access to essential health care services, 264 million do not go to school, and, as of the end of 2017, 31 million have been forcibly displaced through war, violence, natural disasters, and other crises (UNICEF 2018, 2019). The world's leading child-focused aid agencies that deal with these major issues include UNICEF, Save the Children, Plan International, and Defence for Children International. A large number of big, medium, or small national and local organizations also have the protection of children as their main goal.

Images of suffering children capture the moral imperative of humanitarian action. Moving photos of starving babies, walking skeletons with distended stomachs, have become iconic since the Nigerian–Biafran war, one of the first televised conflicts in contemporary history. As a quintessential embodiment of victimhood, decontextualized images of childhood vulnerability articulate specific aesthetics, emotions, and politics that trigger feelings of compassion, mobilize donors' solidarity, and persuade public opinion of the need for immediate lifesaving actions, including those of a military nature. In popular imagination, saving children's lives encapsulates the essence of humanitarianism (Malkki 2015). Child-focused aid agencies operate in contexts of emergency (e.g. war, natural disaster, extreme poverty) to provide protection and care

services to children in a number of interlinked fields, from children's health and education to child development and well-being. Displaced children, trafficked children, malnourished children are special targets of humanitarian protection. Child soldiers, street children, and child workers, on the other hand, exemplify a category of victims whose "stolen childhood" is addressed through humanitarian programs of rehabilitation and social integration.

The modern project of saving "distant children" can be traced back to 19th-century missionary work, British philanthropy, and the emergence of a romantic conceptualization of "childhood" as a time of innocence in Europe. The first child rights document ever adopted by an intergovernmental organization, the 1924 League of Nations' Declaration of Children's Rights, was drafted by Eglantyne Jebb, a British social reformer best known as the founder of Save the Children. The 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child, subsequently replaced by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), departs from Jebb's original text and incorporates insights from (Western) developmental psychology, dictating that "children" are persons under 18 years of age, demarcated from adults by a series of psychobiological characteristics that are universally valid (Boyden 1997). The CRC marks a pivotal moment for humanitarian child protection as the first legally binding international treaty, which provides for the rights of children in several fields. However, the CRC is deeply entangled in the civilizational trajectories of Western modernity and sets out a Eurocentric standard of childhood that at times contrasts with local cultural notions of "childhood" and children's material conditions in contexts outside Europe and North America (Hart 2006). When asked about their rights, for example, street children in Johannesburg talk about the right to safely cross roads, beg, and work (Swart-Kruger and Chawla 2002); in Ethiopia, girls protest against non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that define their rights in terms of autonomy and individual success, arguing that they have duties and moral responsibilities towards others as well (Nieuwenhuys 2001); in Thailand, "children" and "adults" are not locally construed as fixed age categories but as hierarchical concepts varying according to the interlocutor's social status (Bollotta 2017).

The predominance of psychological frameworks of child development in humanitarian practice can have the effect of obscuring the historical, economic, and political determinants of children's struggles, while their "deviancy" from the established standard of innocence is mainly interpreted as the result of parental abuse and/or backward beliefs. The CRC is thus in danger of harnessing long-standing colonial imaginaries of the North-South divide, where the adult/Northerner offers help to the infantilized/Southerner (Burman 2017).

The developmental formulation of children as dependent and not yet fully formed humans extends the temporal horizon of humanitarianism beyond the space of immediate crisis, making childhood the point of convergence between short-term emergency responses and long-term development endeavors. Social scientists contend that these are cultural politics of future-making for the transfer of Western social values, technologies, and professional forces (Scheper-Hughes and Sargent 1998). As a result, child humanitarian policy has become the locus of fierce ideological battles over the political future of childhood: religious groups, NGOs, development agencies, and nation states compete at all levels to define what childhood (and society's future) is and should be.

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## Civil Society

The concept of civil society originates in Cicero's notion of *societas civilis*, itself a development of Aristotle's idea of *koinonia politike* (political community). The contemporary use of the term can be directly linked to modern European thought and refers to a "dense network of groups, communities, networks, and ties that stand between the individual and the modern state" (Kenny 2007). It is commonly understood as the "third sector" of society, distinct from the state and market. According to the World Health Organization, civil society refers to the arena of collective action around common interests, purposes and values. Although its institutional forms are normally described as distinct from those of the state, family and market, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are always blurred and negotiated. Civil society includes different spaces, actors and institutional forms, "varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development nongovernmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups" (WHO 2007). The United Nations (UN) considers partnerships with civil society crucial for advancing the organization's ideals and helping to support its work ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org)). The UN view reflects a general attitude in the humanitarian sector to use the notion of civil society in a vague sense and, at the same time, as a means to implement grounded interventions via local partners.

The "third sector" has grown rapidly since the 1990s. What many defined as the "global associational revolution" of the aid industry was linked to at least three main elements: a widespread crisis of the state in providing welfare and protection, the growth in number and scale of organized private and voluntary actors (also stimulated by new information and communication possibilities), and the impact of neoliberalism (Salamon et al. 1999). Notwithstanding this rapid growth and the consolidation of the idea of a "global civil society," the very notion of civil society continues to bear a certain degree of ambiguity and remains open to questions regarding its proper definition and the different ways in which it has been applied in various times and places (Foley and Edwards 1996). Civil society has been used, for example, to promote political and economic transition in former communist countries as well as to promote democracy and human rights in fragile states (Roy 2005). Critiques also emphasize the ways in which global civil society increasingly "represents a retreat from universal rights and reinforces official donor government policies disciplining populations" (Pupavac 2005: 45).



Another key question is whether it makes sense to distinguish “civil” from “political” society. Different groups in civil society, from interest groups to religious organizations, are constantly mobilized for political goals. A rigid distinction between political and civil groups can be misleading. Therefore, the notion of civil society is intrinsically ambivalent as it does not make it clear when the “civil” becomes the “political” (Foley and Edwards 1996).

Beyond semantics, some see civil society, or global civil society, as a humanitarian actor itself, which is essential in order to claim a right to humanitarian assistance (Miglinaitė 2015), while others remain skeptical about the universalistic nature of the term and its propensity to make the roles, capacity, and intentions of different social groups, organizations, and other collectivities involved in humanitarian settings less evident.

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## Civil–military Cooperation

Since the 1990s, military operations and warfare organization have become increasingly bureaucratized. This shift is associated with the changing objectives of and expectations from military interventions, in terms of the desired political order, state-building, civil society formation, and so on. The new era has

inspired more ambitious political projects to deal with conflict situations, “fragile” and “rouge” states, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, or other threats to international peace and security. The international interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor in the late 1990s proved to be failures, both in terms of operationalizing coordination between government departments of the intervening nations and in their cooperation with international organizations and humanitarian agencies, in response to dire humanitarian situations and in order to establish control over the socio-political circumstances of conflicts on the ground (Macrae and Leader 2000). States, especially the US and the UK but also many other European states including Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, learned from the experiences in the Balkans and started introducing new mechanisms of coordination among ministries and government entities for effective and prompt policy response to crises, and to impose effectively the desired geopolitical order during and after the crises (Gordon 2006). The changing stance of the United Nations (UN) regarding when and how to get involved in military interventions, especially after the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was deployed in Namibia (1989), was parallel to that transformation at nation-state level.

The growing involvement of the UN in peace-building during conflicts in the 1990s reflected a new era of protracted conflicts, or a new perception of crisis situations as “chronic insecurity.” The “post-conflict” discourse then became obsolete in governing “weak” or “failed” states in the post-Cold War era. Still limited in Bosnia and Kosovo and redesigned for more sophistication in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) has since become an integral part of humanitarian interventions that require intervening states’ civilian capacities to engender local consent for intervention and to facilitate humanitarian operations in conflict regions (Ankersen 2008). CIMIC activities have been transformed from conventional Western strategies of “winning the hearts and minds” of the people of occupied lands to building legitimacy among local communities for occupation and the implementation of highly controversial projects of reconstruction, governance, state-building, and development (Goodhand 2013). CIMIC is essentially a security-oriented notion that sees a necessity for bureaucratized and coordinated operations of various groups of military and civilian actors to achieve the desired political order and build local consent in extremely volatile and hostile circumstances of insecurity (Jackson and Stuart 2007). While the nature of CIMIC is determined by intervening nation-states’ political and military cultures and institutional capacities, the idea is to define the articulation and boundaries between military and civilian actors operating in the same conflict geography.

CIMIC has been endorsed by Western governments because it provides security and opens up and defends safe spaces for humanitarian operations during and after conflicts and other crisis situations. However, CIMIC agendas have become closely integrated with the so-called stabilization, recovery, development, and state-building programs that are highly political in their nature and might have long-term priority for the intervening armies over immediate humanitarian concerns. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan were the first extensive trial of the new CIMIC policies of intervening armies (e.g. the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, Denmark) (Goodhand 2013; Jackson and Stuart 2007). The military-dominated implementation of the PRT strategies contradicted CIMIC premises about the role of civilian agencies and local communities in the narrative, and underlying assumptions about the pacifying role of aid, reconstruction, and development embedded in the narrative proved to be Eurocentric and empirically groundless (Goodhand 2013).

Military personnel and their mindset have leverage over decision-making about and implementation of civilian and humanitarian aspects of CIMIC plans, and the civilian CIMIC activities might be reduced to observation and information extraction from local communities about actual and potential signs of threats to security. This is especially relevant in chronic or extreme insecurity situations, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. NATO and powerful national armies (e.g. those of the US, the UK, and Germany) have been particularly criticized for instrumentalizing civil–military cooperation in their operations for their military interests, and forging an image in the public imagination that confuses war-making with peace-making and soldiers with humanitarian workers (Gordon 2006; Ankersen 2008).

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## Communication

Communication comes from the Latin word *communicare*, to “make something common” or “share,” and it means to share information between people and transfer information from one place to another. Humanitarian communication refers to a specific form of communication (related to humanitarian crises, relief operations, and so on), and to communication during humanitarian emergencies.

Humanitarian communication occurs when humanitarian actors, from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to international organizations, communicate (i.e. through campaigns, appeals, and stories) to create awareness and encourage response to humanitarian crises. It is a form of communication that aims to establish emotional relationships and reactions, and its purpose is to mobilize interest and/or action. In this sense, humanitarian communication defines a form of “proxy humanitarianism” that can mobilize the use of celebrities, “humanitarian ambassadors,” and so on (De Lauri 2016). Lilie Chouliaraki defines humanitarian communication as “the rhetorical practices of transnational actors that engage with universal ethical claims, such as common humanity or global civil society, to mobilize action on human suffering” (Chouliaraki 2010: 108). She argues that it is a form of communication that creates and reproduces ethical and political relationships to distant others, and thus informs both the ways in which we witness the vulnerability of these others and the ways in which we are invited to feel, think and act towards them (Chouliaraki 2006, 2010).

There are ethical dilemmas and academic analyses surrounding the field of humanitarian communication (Nolan and Mikami 2012), especially in relation to the choice of images, texts, and sound used in such communication. Communicators have a responsibility to ensure that all narratives reflect and protect the dignity of those portrayed.

Humanitarian communication also refers to systems or ways of sharing information and collaboration and interaction during emergencies. Information

communication technologies (ICTs) and mobile phones have become defining components of 21st-century humanitarian response operations. ICTs determine the ways in which people collect and share information, connect and interact with each other and the world, and the ways people work together during humanitarian emergencies. The internet and mobile connectivity have enabled real-time communication. Applications based on this connectivity have revolutionized when and how we communicate. Humanitarian organizations, agencies, and individuals within a variety of areas in the emergency domain are pioneering efforts, exploring strategies, and finding best practices in humanitarian communication. They cooperate with private corporations and voluntary technical organizations to access basic data and resources, and to set up comprehensive information infrastructures.

The ability for everybody who is connected to engage in humanitarian communication during crises creates new opportunities and challenges. When a crisis strikes, affected communities and the diaspora tend to rapidly set up their own communication rooms using mobile apps or social media to exchange more or less qualified information.

There are no accepted definitions or requirements for how one should apply traditional humanitarian principles to communication to be able to call it humanitarian communication.

Three criteria have been identified (Raymond, Card, al Achkar 2015) as decisive and required for communication activities to be considered truly humanitarian:

1. Those engaging in communication are either crisis-affected populations or organizations, or those assisting the affected populations.
2. The communication activities uphold the four core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.
3. The fundamental purpose of humanitarian communication activities must be to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of the crisis.

ICT-supported humanitarian communication, like all humanitarian communication, needs guidelines to handle ethical dilemmas (Meier 2015). Our digital reality is allowing communication to evolve at an incredible speed, with possibilities and opportunities for more and better communication, but it also increases the risk for misuse of information, especially in situations of vulnerability that occur in humanitarian emergencies.

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## Corruption

There has been a dramatic increase in the volume, cost, and length of humanitarian assistance provision since 2007, in large part because of the protracted nature of crisis (OCHA 2017). Humanitarian interventions are, for different reasons, more prone to corruption than regular development assistance and incidents of corruption more often go unreported (TI 2010). Paul Harvey (2015) argues that humanitarian aid agencies are reluctant to talk about corruption in the fear that it could undermine public support for aid in donor countries, as well as impact local aid relations and increase tension within societies.

Humanitarian interventions take place when there is a need to respond to an urgent or accumulated need for humanitarian assistance to support victims of conflicts and disasters and to save lives, as well as to negotiate access to and upholding of human rights. There are many types of interventions, ranging from responses to a natural disaster such as an earthquake or a flood, responding to an armed conflict that causes acute or consistent shortages of, for example, food, water, and medicine, and engagement with warring parties of influential groups that might block delivery of aid or deny all or part of the population access to services. The urgency to reach groups in need of assistance can lead to a larger willingness to accept a degree of corruption to get supplies to those in need. With large amounts of assistance shipped into

an area in a short time, there are also more opportunities to siphon off assistance.

Corruption in humanitarian intervention occurs at all stages of the program cycle, from the targeting and registration process to the transport and distribution of relief aid, procurement, financial and staff management, and program monitoring and evaluations (U4 2009). There is a noted concern that international agencies (and at times national ones) bring substantial resources into a resource-poor environment, often rapidly and with little in-depth knowledge of the environment. This leads to the risk of exacerbating existing endemic corruption and of resources being corruptly diverted (Walker and Maxwell 2009).

The term corruption does not lend itself to one univocal definition, since it can refer to different causes, contexts and social dynamics (De Lauri 2013). Corruption in humanitarian assistance can take many forms. According to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 2019), this extends beyond cash bribes and other forms of financial corruption. It can include the fraudulent diversion or theft of resources, the denial or granting of access to resources to serve political or military ends, extortion of affected populations, nepotism in recruitment practices in aid agencies, and sexual exploitation of those (predominantly women) seeking access to aid. The exact nature of corruption depends on the form of aid being provided, whether it is in cash or in kind and whether this is provision of shelter, food, health care, sanitation, longer-term infrastructure development, or all-encompassing support, such as in refugee camps.

Gender is a key dimension to understanding specific forms of corruption, which can then turn into sexual exploitation and abuse. In the short term, corruption compromises people's access to basic services such as food, shelter, family planning, health, and education. This has long-lasting physiological, psychological, and social consequences, and compromises people's opportunities for and prospects of social and economic empowerment (U4 2009).

Harvey (2015) argues that improving how corruption is tackled in humanitarian interventions matters because:

- corruption limits the scarce amount of aid reaching people who desperately need it;
- corruption is one of the main factors preventing better and more direct funding to humanitarian actors in developing countries;
- the perception of corruption undermines support for aid in donor countries.

Onsite monitoring of assistance provision deters and detects corruption, and that greater transparency in the information made available to local governments, recipient communities, and civil society organizations is important for

effective monitoring and genuine accountability (TI 2010). There is moreover some evidence that such downward accountability can empower beneficiaries to report corruption, if not restrained by hierarchical institutional policies, local power structures, and cultural inhibitions.

A significant issue relates to the normative understanding of corruption that still predominantly characterizes international donors and anti-corruption agencies' approaches, with a lack of grounded knowledge about the ways in which corruption itself may be seen as a modality of governance (De Lauri 2013).

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## Criminalization

Criminalization in the humanitarian space is a form of governance whereby national and supranational entities control and sanction humanitarian actors and affected populations. This includes criminalization processes, through which states, media, humanitarians, or citizens define particular groups and practices as criminal or as a crime, and the use of penal power to sanction violations of public law and harm to public welfare.



In humanitarian discourse, the word “criminalization” is used broadly. It includes state-based penal practices and punishment imposed by courts, as well as civil penalties and administrative sanctions by national or supra-international courts and regulative bodies. Administrative sanctions are disciplinary in nature and used when policy, procedure, or codes of conduct have been violated. Sanctions or punishments include monetary penalties, suspension or demotion, loss of authorization to operate, or confiscation of equipment imported or used illegally. They can even involve the suspension of an employee found guilty of sexual misconduct, the expulsion of an international organization by the host country, or the confiscation of drones flown illegally in an emergency.

Socio-legal research has highlighted the blurred relationship between legality and illegality, and the co-constitutive relationship between processes of legalization and juridification and the rise of illegalities. This includes belief in “magical legalism”—the assumption that if an act or transaction is prohibited it either does not occur or it occurs as an anomaly (Sandvik 2011). Focus is given to how classifications, justifications, and enforcement practices originate, and through which moral and political projects they are enacted and changed over time (Schneider and Schneider 2008)—for example, legality claims in formal institutional settings, such as courts, or outside this structure. Legality claims refer to efforts to portray actions as legal or illegal regardless of how the law or elites address or see the actions (Cook 2011), and they also include framing efforts to transform grievances into “criminal” injustices (Sandvik 2018).

The use of penal and quasi-penal legal approaches amounts to a series of sorting exercises involving the demarcation of the kind of activities that are *legitimately* accepted as humanitarian aid (not violating counterterrorism measures, bans on proselytizing); the *permitted* organization of aid activities (measures against money laundering and corruption); and the changing demarcations of legitimate encounters among humanitarian practitioners and between practitioners and beneficiaries (involving bans on harassment, sexual exploitation, and violence by humanitarian workers).

Normatively, from the perspective of the sector, this engenders a stratified conceptualization of criminalization as a narrative of decline of the humanitarian space—but importantly, also as a progress narrative that promotes the imperative to “do no harm.” As a *narrative of decline* that hampers access or the ability of actors to deliver “principled humanitarian aid,” criminalization includes counterterrorism measures and criminalization of local networks through “material support to terror” provisions, restrictive non-governmental organization laws and the merging of migration control and criminal justice, whereby organizations and professional and volunteer humanitarians are punished for assisting displaced individuals. It also refers to the criminalization

of displaced people's self-protection mobility strategies, thereby perpetuating the criminalization of poor people and deviant male youths. Criminalization as *progress narrative* concerns the criminalization of wartime rape; the safeguarding (harassment, sexual exploitation, violence) against unlawful behavior by humanitarian staff; and initiatives to tackle corruption (e.g. in food aid or refugee resettlement).

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## Crisis

A humanitarian crisis is framed as “an event or series of events that represents a critical threat to the health, safety, security or wellbeing of a community or other large group of people, usually over a wide area” (Humanitarian Coalition). Humanitarian crises can be the result of different causes such as natural catastrophes (an earthquake, a cyclone, a flood, a drought, etc.); human-driven actions (armed conflict, fire, etc.) or a combination of the two (famine, displacement). Such classifications, however, are contestable, as natural events are not merely the result of natural processes. The effects of and responses to natural disasters are related to social inequalities and wider political and economic processes.

Historian of concepts Reinhart Koselleck (2006) has followed the conceptual journey of the term “crisis” from classical Greece to contemporary times to

show how it has acquired an important place in everyday vocabulary and has become a catchword since the 19th century. The crisis frame significantly informs our conceptual and epistemological imaginations. At the same time, crisis is a “narrative construction” and a blind spot in the social sciences (Roitman 2013: 11). Crisis justifies specific interventions at the micro- and macrolevel, as Janet Roitman’s work on the financial crisis has illustrated (Roitman 2013). Thus, the crisis vocabulary opens the ground for the detection, diagnosis, and specific therapeutic treatment of social phenomena.

A humanitarian crisis is considered a rupture to a presumed normalcy. It is defined as a disturbance to the ordinary state of affairs and as an exceptional and extraordinary situation. As such, it follows the logic of the “emergency imaginary” (Calhoun 2008). Life in crisis is suspended and replaced by a rule of rapid and unstable change and chaos. Like “humanitarian disaster” or “humanitarian emergency,” terms often used interchangeably with “humanitarian crisis,” the latter appears to be traceable to a specific historical moment in the course of events. For example, the European Commission has highlighted that the Syrian conflict has generated one of “the worst humanitarian crises since World War II” (European Commission 2017). But it was only when more than 1 million displaced people reached Europe’s shores in 2015 that this labeling took place, motivating humanitarian aid by the European Union and the formation of a vast humanitarian apparatus. The year 2015 has thus come to be known as an exceptional moment in history and the time when the humanitarian crisis erupted.

It is not certain when the term “humanitarian crisis” gained currency in the humanitarian sphere, although researchers locate its rise to the Vietnamese boat people in the 1970s (Redfield 2013: 34). The humanitarian crisis frame depoliticizes suffering and gives a moral anchor to it. Such a discourse shifts attention away from the political and economic causes of crisis towards sentiments of pity and compassion. Moreover, saving lives or, more broadly, responding to a humanitarian crisis has a morally legitimizing effect. Therefore, the crisis-thinking logic prepares the ground for what generally follows: the responses of humanitarian actors.

Defining a situation as a humanitarian crisis justifies humanitarian and military interventions (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010), allocates material and symbolic resources, and mobilizes political responses. It is, in fact, the international humanitarian apparatus that defines a situation as a humanitarian crisis and calls for its treatment (Stockton 2004). At the same time, humanitarian images and the world media have a crucial role in locating, highlighting, and, ultimately, defining specific contexts as affected by humanitarian crises. One such example was Biafra in 1968, which became a symbol of humanitarian

crisis and gained global attention through the images that circulated in international media (Heerten 2017).

It goes without saying that there remain crises that are undefined as such (Stockton 2004: 16) or chronic crises (Vigh 2008) that are not on the radar of humanitarian aid. What qualifies as a humanitarian crisis and what does not is thus debatable.

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## Decolonization

Decolonization—the process through which colonies gained independence—has been formally successful largely thanks to the role of the United Nations

(UN) in the first two postwar decades. Shaking off the dominance of the former colonial powers in economic, social, and cultural relations and in the production of knowledge is another matter. The inherent “coloniality” (Quijano 2007) of the Western model is alive and well, an epistemological hegemony that permeates the network power of globalization (Grewal 2008) to the far corners of the earth. According to “coloniality” thinkers, this model positions itself as the only valid way of producing knowledge—and with this knowledge the “Western Code” becomes the hidden software of modernity (Mignolo 2012).

Many authors have highlighted the connections between colonial administration and humanitarian action (Duffield 2001; Fassin 2010). From the start of the 21st century or so, humanitarianism and humanitarian action have been the sites of scholarly analysis aimed at understanding the functions they perform in North–South relations, world ordering, and the promotion of liberal peace. While much has been uncovered about how political and humanitarian agendas tend to reinforce each other, a deeper look into the nature and functions of humanitarianism—as a discourse, an ideology, a set of institutions and professions, and as a political economy—reveals that it is still deeply embedded in a system of knowledge that professes to be universal but is in reality an extension of European and Western worldviews (Donini 2010). This Western epistemic code still undergirds the processes through which the world is conceptualized, including both liberal and anti-capitalist critiques of the model, and therefore much of current humanitarianism. In the words of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are “the mendicant orders of Empire” and the “capillary vessels” of globalization.

As long as the West was in ascendance, its dominance in the humanitarian sphere was broadly acceptable. Institutions largely financed by the West burgeoned, resulting in a kind of oligopoly formed by the UN agencies, key networks of international NGOs, and OECD donors. This oligopoly has played a key role in setting the norms, discourses, and practices of present-day humanitarian action. Isomorphism has thrived: in order to join the club, aspiring non-Western actors have had to accept rules, principles, and practices that are essentially “of the North.” However, now that the East and other centers of power are rising, the West’s dominance is becoming more problematical. Many of the new or emerging powers have no obligation, nor perhaps the inclination, to conform to the parameters of the traditional humanitarian system. Indeed, they can, and often do, define “humanitarian” in their own terms. Current debates on “localization,” meaning the direct funding of national and local NGOs by bypassing the large international agencies, and on accountability to affected

groups can be seen as attempts to shake off some of the top-down dominance of the traditional humanitarian enterprise. However, growing contestation of humanitarian principles and practices coming from non-Western states, and instances of the rejection of the presence of international agencies when disaster strikes, are symptoms of a deeper delinking and/or affirmation of sovereignty. These trends could signal the emergence of more statist “Eastphalian” approaches to relief for those affected by conflict and crisis. The West, for its part, has also participated in undermining humanitarian principles through the global War on Terror by press-ganging international NGOs into supporting political–military interventions or the use of anti-terror legislation to deny access to or interaction with certain groups. Thus, organized humanitarianism that has grown in parallel with contemporary forms of Western capitalism may well have now reached its structural limits (Gordon and Donini 2016). Its purported universality is being questioned, and more “pluriversal” humanitarianisms are likely to emerge.

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## Digital Humanitarianism

Digital humanitarianism is humanitarian intervention conducted at a distance, sometimes without physical presence on the ground, through digital tools and often in an online, collaborative manner including citizen participation. It is technically a consequence of the rapid spread of mobile phones, internet connectivity, social media, and geographical information systems that enable a large number of individuals to effectively collaborate online. When a major crisis occurs, affected populations and concerned organizations turn to their mobile phones or to the internet to seek and to share information on the crisis. Digital humanitarianism developed as a way to describe the activity of volunteers and organizations who apply digital tools to capture this flow of online information, organize it, locate it, and verify its content. The collection and mapping of social media messages after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 is claimed to be the birth of digital humanitarian activity (Meier 2015). Countless humanitarian interventions by ad hoc groups of volunteers or by established organizations have been facilitated by the fact that affected populations are able to share information globally in real time, and concerned citizens are able to organize and act online. Open geographical information systems have made it possible to organize, visualize, and share such information, and the humanitarian community has adopted the value of information sharing both as a supportive activity and as a humanitarian activity on its own (Burns 2014; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011).

In the early days of digital humanitarianism, activities were closely connected to tools such as OpenStreetMap (OSM), Ushahidi, or Sahana. OSM is the “Wikipedia of maps”: an online community of volunteers digitally draws maps, including areas where no maps are currently available. The maps are created using available satellite imagery alongside the community on the ground, which provides place names and details to enrich the map. Similarly, Ushahidi is a platform created for online collaboration to visualize information from SMS text messaging or social media messages by verifying, categorizing, and locating the information on a map. The Sahana platform was developed in a similar setting to allow for online information sharing and collaboration among a large group of users (Burns and Shanley 2012). A growing technical community and private companies engaging in humanitarian crises have led to ever new technologies being applied for humanitarian purposes.

The transition from in-kind to cash-based aid using digital devices and the introduction of biometric IDs has led to the adaption of digital humanitarianism to cover such activities. Drawing the line between humanitarian technology

and digital humanitarianism is a subject of dispute. The rapid increase in connectivity and commercial interest in connecting the world and the subsequent digitalization of education, relief, and humanitarian services, are exposed to critical reflection. Connectivity and open sharing of information generate security risks because it is not always possible to monitor those using the online information and for what purpose (Sandvik, Gabrielsen Jumbert, Karlsrud and Kaufmann 2014). Others claim that digital humanitarianism, remote management, and distant sensing help “to occlude the negative by headlining the problem-solving potential of technoscience” (Duffield 2016: 154). As techno-optimists promote the new digital reality, others challenge the humanitarian adaptation of digital tools, and see them as a threat to true relief or development and as tools for surveillance and oppression (Duffield 2016). In between, there is a broad horizon for exploring the effects, risks, and possibilities of new technologies adapted to a humanitarian landscape.

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## Diplomacy

Providing ongoing access to humanitarian aid during conflict and complex emergencies has always been a major concern for policy-makers and



humanitarian actors. Thus, humanitarian negotiations have historically been conducted in situations of extreme insecurity and unstable political conditions to secure access, assistance, and protection for civilians (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot 2004; Pease 2016). The implicit, sometimes even hidden, practices of humanitarian negotiations (Magone, Neuman, and Weissman 2011) led to the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, which emerged in the early 2000s. Humanitarian diplomacy is generally defined as persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act at all times and in all circumstances in the interest of vulnerable people and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. It encompasses activities carried out by humanitarian actors in order to obtain spaces from political and military authorities within which they can function with integrity. These activities include, for example, arranging for the presence of humanitarian organizations in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, promoting respect for international law and norms, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives (Minear and Smith 2007). In this scenario, humanitarian diplomacy is understood as a means to reach the most vulnerable people. Indeed, the commitment to “leave no one behind” has been a key feature of discussions about the Sustainable Development Goals, and there is now a growing political consensus that operationalizing “leave no one behind” is a crucial element of the 2030 Agenda (Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). However, a significant tension is embedded in humanitarian diplomacy. Diplomacy, for instance, is essentially about representation of one polity vis-à-vis another polity. Humanitarianism is about advocating for and helping people in need. Therefore, diplomacy is characterized by compromise and pragmatic dealings, whereas the public image of humanitarian action (which often contradicts what happens in practice) is the opposite: it is about working for ideals and universal principles regardless of the interests of specific political actors.

The variety of humanitarian actors involved in complex emergencies and their competing priorities and goals produce different understandings and practices of humanitarian diplomacy. Its definitions and perceived content vary as widely as the number of organizations (or states) using the term and the humanitarian operations that they carry out. There is a significant difference between conceiving the idea of humanitarian diplomacy, using the term itself, and arriving at international recognition for its definition and agreement on how it should be conducted (Régnier 2011).

As massive humanitarian crises, such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, have shown, the protected areas that humanitarian action is

meant to provide are increasingly the targets of parties within conflict. This leaves many people either trapped within the conflict or forced to flee along routes where they are in high risk of exploitation from trafficking, and where humanitarians have little or no access. The dangers that humanitarianism faces today are the result of war zones and prolonged crises where civilian populations are the intended victims, where access is difficult, where aid workers are in danger of being perceived as a threat or a kidnapping target, and where their own physical safety is in doubt (Barnett and Weiss 2008). Access to humanitarian aid is increasingly challenged in ways that also redefine the role of humanitarian actors and their diplomatic capacity. The character of violent conflicts is changing, and the politicization of access to aid has become an integral element of conflict itself (De Lauri 2018).

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## Displacement

Displacement can be induced by war, conflict, environmental disasters, and other natural and human-made hazards. The humanitarian response to forced

displacement can be traced to the Eastern Mediterranean during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, when forced deportations of Tartars, Kurds, and Assyrians were followed by the Armenian genocide that prompted the creation of the first professional, neutral, and non-denominational relief organizations (Watenpaugh 2015). This also included the creation of the first refugee camps catering for minority ethno-religious groups (White 2018). After World War II, more than 12 million people (McLaren 2010) were categorized as displaced persons, and the responsibility to aid them was assigned to the United Nations (UN) Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The displacement of Palestinian refugees (1947–1948), was followed by the creation of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA instituted a camp-based approach that would become an integral part of the humanitarian response to later displacement crises (Peteet 2005). The humanitarian response has been especially marked in sub-Saharan Africa, where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) runs several refugee camps, criticized as being spaces under humanitarian government (Agier 2011), with the agency being seen as complicit with a strategy of humanitarian containment (Barnett 2001).

Although figures are uncertain, globally there are currently around 70 million forcibly displaced people—with internally displaced persons (IDPs) the largest group (40 million), followed by refugees (26 million) and asylum seekers (4 million). With many crises unresolved and protracted, almost three-quarters of the displaced hail from just five countries: Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, and Syria (UNHCR 2019). The Syrian displacement crisis (2012–present) is one of the largest, most complex and protracted humanitarian emergencies today, with more than 6 million Syrians displaced as refugees and IDPs. Large sections of the Syrian refugee population are confined indefinitely in what are conventionally considered fragile transit countries. Unable to resolve the displacement causes, host states and UN agencies are instead trying to deal with their consequences by instituting a developmental approach to displacement.

Refugees and IDPs are similarly displaced, and often for the same reasons and causes, but move to different destinations. Most of the world's refugees have been IDPs before crossing national borders, but only refugees are under international legal protection (World Bank Group 2017). Current research on forced displacement shows that the magnitude, scale, and timing depend on conflict intensity, duration, and scale, as well as regime type and conflict outcomes. Migration routes, in turn, are influenced by security concerns, distance, and terrain type as well as information sourced through social networks and social media. Displacement is increasingly urban, with cities and towns

becoming major sites of self-settled people, yet aid policies have not kept pace with this urban transformation. Indeed, the UNHCR has only recently begun reorienting its work away from camps and towards urban contexts (Crisp, Morris, and Refstie 2012).

Displacement is often followed by secondary migration to third countries. Mass displacement, such as the so-called European reception migration crisis (2014–2015), prompted EU member states to institute border closures, maritime surveillance, and new return agreements to curtail migrants' mobility. Moreover, humanitarian aid is now accompanied by biometric registration measures that include iris and retina scans, which represent a shift towards a humanitarian securitization (Hoffmann 2017).

Disasters and climate change-related migrations are still less studied and understood than other forms of displacement, in particular as they combine with other factors such as poverty and persecution (Stapleton, Nadin, Watson, and Kellett 2017). The numbers, scale, and causes of climate-related displacements are all uncertain. Current estimates include between 18–25 million people affected by climate-related and other environmentally related hazards, with future projections reaching close to 150 million displaced by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018).

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## Doctrine

Approaches to humanitarian action are often referred to as doctrines, such as “the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.” A doctrine is “a belief or set of beliefs, especially political or religious ones, that are taught and accepted by a particular group” (Cambridge Dictionary 2019). As with legal and military doctrines, a humanitarian doctrine is more general than a policy, but more issue-specific than a political ideology or scientific paradigm.

In a religious context, doctrines instruct the interpretation of foundational dogmas. This has three functions: (1) instructing the faithful in interpreting their sacred scriptures as guidance for thought and behavior; (2) preserving a religious tradition; and (3) defending the faith against misinterpretation and opposing views (Outler 2012). These functions resemble the roles of humanitarian “isms”—with the Dunantist doctrine of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defined by Jean Pictet and colleagues in the 1960s as the current humanitarian orthodoxy (ICRC 2015). Interpreting the “teachings” of Henri Dunant through the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality, the ICRC (1) provides guidance for how individuals should understand and realize their humanitarian calling; (2) preserves the tradition of humanitarianism (as a “church”); and (3) defends this tradition against alternative accounts of humanitarianism and their shared anti-humanitarian adversaries.

The congregation of humanitarian doctrine(s) is not limited to the members of humanitarian organizations. Adopted by politicians, lawyers, military generals, and individual citizens as a general framework for categorizing and

reacting to world problems, humanitarian doctrines have merged with political, legal, military, and religious doctrines (De Lauri 2016; Fassin 2011).

There is a diversity of religious and secular humanitarian doctrines globally, as there has been throughout history (Barnett 2011). Each major humanitarian organization has developed its own variations of, or alternatives to, the Dunantist orthodoxy as a way of defining its role and justifying its existence. There are also a set of more issue-specific doctrines cutting across these organizations, such as the recent doctrine of the “protection of civilians” defined by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in its “Aide Memoire” (OCHA 2016).

Essentially, these doctrines rarely stem from an isolated focus on humanitarian action, but reflect broader cultural and political outlooks. The Dunantist orthodoxy, for instance, was developed against the backdrop of Christian religion and political liberalism. Abstract formulations of humanitarian principles serve to disentangle the doctrine from these background conditions. The emergence of “new humanitarians” based on non-Western traditions nonetheless make the reliance on underlying cultural and political conditions more evident (Dennis and Zeynep 2015).

One may speak of more or less doctrinal approaches to humanitarian action. Humanitarian practices are usually not about the specific realization of doctrinal objectives, but rather are pragmatic responses in highly diverse settings outside the control of humanitarian actors. Likewise, international humanitarian law is pragmatically balancing on an edge of power and self-interest rather than enforcing a moral doctrine. Under these circumstances, strict doctrinal approaches may get in the way of efficiency, while more flexible doctrines may be needed in order to maintain legitimacy in the face of ethical dilemmas and political compromises. Strict doctrinal readings of humanitarian practices should therefore also be avoided, as too much emphasis easily can be put on the disagreements between different doctrines rather than on the actual reasons why different actors and institutions diverge in their behavior (Givoni 2011).

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## Documents

The word “document” originates from the Latin *documentum*, which means example, proof and lesson. In Medieval Latin, the word derives additional meaning from the verb *docere*, to show, teach, cause to know, and refers to an official written instrument or an authoritative paper. Historian Ben Kafka traces the modern age of paperwork to the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which guaranteed citizens the right to request a full accounting of the government. An explosion of paper followed, documents becoming privileged vehicles to ensure the circulation of information and the stability of newly established state institutions (Kafka 2012). In addition to foundational documents, which define humanitarian organizations’ statutes and principles, corporate documents such as leaflets, reports, funding proposals, forms, and guidelines have come to occupy a ubiquitous presence in contemporary humanitarianism. As “paradigmatic artefacts of modern knowledge practices” (Riles 2006), documents embody the bureaucratization and institutionalization of aid in the liberal humanitarian age that, according to Michael Barnett (2011), started in the 1990s. Together with the blurring of the boundaries between military and humanitarian intervention that has followed the Cold War, this new age of humanitarianism is equally marked by the changing character of relief, as humanitarian organizations increasingly collaborate

with states as “implementing partners” in broader peace-building and reconstruction efforts.

The financial windfall that these new forms of collaboration have triggered and the mission creep that has ensued (Waters 2018), have amplified donors’ requirements for greater accountability, effectiveness, and professionalism (Barnett 2005). Documents have therefore become unavoidable technologies of governance devised not only to ensure internal regulation—via the measuring of impact, the standardization of rules, the streamlining of procedures, and the establishment of doctrines—but also to ensure donors’ control over aid delivery. Meanwhile, registration cards, lists of beneficiaries, and registries are commonly used as standard tools for governing “populations in need,” establishing an unequivocal “triage” between deserving “victims” and undeserving others (Fassin 2011).

As documents became key instruments of aid, humanitarian organizations have embraced the logic of audit to demonstrate their willingness to make themselves transparent, owing to the growing pressure to comply with international professional standards (Sphere, CHS) that regulate the “humanitarian industry” (Weiss 2013) and the introduction of systems of accountability derived from new public management principles. Aligned on externally defined benchmarks and impact indicators, documents are mobilized to produce measurable transparency and legibility (Strathern 2000).

The imperative of “evidence-based programming,” far from being a neutral technicality, powerfully reshapes the everyday practices of humanitarian workers. As data collection becomes strategically important for aid organizations, humanitarians are gradually turned into data managers and analysts, compelled to translate relief operations into measurable outputs. Transformed into graphs and infographics, statistics become evidence of impact and effectiveness, simultaneously keeping the many unquantifiable factors that contribute to the alleviation of suffering out of sight.

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## Donors

Some three-quarters of all humanitarian funding for aid is provided by a relatively small number of, mainly Western, governments. The top three governments—the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany—provide about 60 percent of this funding. The USA is the single largest contributor, providing around a third of the funding for such aid. Together, the European Union (EU) and EU member countries provide just over half of all government funding for global humanitarian aid (Development Initiatives 2018, Willitts-King et al. 2018). Countries such as China (Hirono 2018) and India (Roepstorff 2015) currently play a growing role as global humanitarian actors.

Islamic funding for global humanitarian aid is also emerging. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, together with Turkey, are providing funding, and are among the top 20 government providers of humanitarian aid.

About a quarter of global humanitarian aid is provided by private donors. There are variations between years, with spikes likely driven by high-profile sudden-onset crises such as the Nepal earthquake or the Ebola outbreak. An estimated two-thirds of private funding comes from individuals, with the rest originating with trusts, foundations, or companies.

The donor agencies' financial contribution is channeled through a variety of organizations and often passes through multiple levels of participants to reach the people affected by the crisis. Most government funding, some 60 percent, is disbursed through multilateral organizations, primarily United Nations (UN) agencies. The World Food Programme and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees receive the bulk of this.

Government funding is also channeled to the UN through the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and its various pools. Pooled funds are intended to provide flexible funding that is responsive to changing needs and gaps in resourcing. They allow donors to contribute to collective humanitarian responses and can provide rapid assistance as emergencies develop. Two-thirds of the funding for the UN humanitarian pools is provided by five European donors (UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Norway).

The multilateral development banks—the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and others—also play an increasingly important role in this area. They channel funds as humanitarian assistance, and provide financing beyond humanitarian assistance to countries affected by and at risk of crisis. They have a growing range of instruments and mechanisms that seek to provide crisis financing for preparedness, response, recovery, and reconstruction.

Government donors also provide some funding to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, and global funds and appeals managed by such organizations. Chief among these are the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. They manage two funds: one for mainly “natural” disasters and one that responds to conflict-related disasters.

Most of the private funding (90 percent) is directed to NGOs and humanitarian institutions such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Some NGOs, for example Médecins Sans Frontières, do not accept government funding.

Very little government funding is provided directly to local institutions and organizations in the countries and regions affected by humanitarian emergencies.

Some of the UN agencies and donor agencies have their own facilities for distributing humanitarian aid, but most rely on NGOs and/or commercial service providers, and some also—where possible—use local authorities to distribute the aid (Mowjee et al. 2017).

The main problems related to the role of donors are lack of coordination during humanitarian emergencies, political interests driving the flows of funding, and the consolidation of proper accountability mechanisms. Complexities associated to donors’ policies are also linked to the fact that humanitarian action has become blurred as its goals have expanded to include more developmental and peace-building aims (Macrae et al. 2002).

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## Education

In postwar and post-disaster contexts, national authorities, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations must provide children who have been displaced or are otherwise affected by restricted mobility, growing insecurity, lack of infrastructures, and/or qualified personnel and loss of livelihood and families with access to schooling. Schools are not safe from direct attacks during times of armed conflict. For example, in rural areas, schools may be the only permanent structures, which makes them highly susceptible to shelling, closure, or looting. Local teachers may also become primary targets because they are considered important community members, they may hold strong political views, and they may embody the only form of government representation in an isolated village. The destruction of education networks is one of the most severe democratic setbacks for countries affected by conflict. The deterioration and loss of basic education and professional skills normally takes years to replace, making the overall task of postwar recovery extremely difficult (Aguilar and Retamal 2009). As a basic principle, the 1989 Convention on Rights of the Child obliges “State parties [to] take all feasible measures to

ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict” and make primary education available and compulsory without limitation.

Education in emergencies has expanded as a subfield of expertise and humanitarian assistance because of the high number of children affected by disasters and wars. Education in emergency projects is often part of a larger program encouraging social change and resilience at the community level.

According to international law, displaced refugee children can attend regular schools in host countries but very few are able to in practice. Some host governments refuse to make educational activities for refugee children available or even to allow humanitarian agencies to provide it (Aguilar and Retamal 2009). Providing ongoing access to education in emergencies may range from transitional home-based education (Kirk and Winthrop 2007) to assistance in camps and schools in host communities to double schooling. Protecting children's right to education in emergencies requires attention to the full cycle of education from supporting families to rebuilding schools. Among other concerns, education providers must take into account how to (re)integrate schools into larger societal institutional settings and how to restore trust through access to the “ladder” of education. It is also important to convey life skills and values for health, gender equality, responsible citizenship, and environmental awareness, and provide protection for marginalized groups such as minorities, children with disabilities, and out-of-school adolescents (Sinclair 2007).

Although, in some contexts, agreements and procedures to guarantee access to education exist, they often fail to ensure the quality of the teaching and learning process and the effectiveness of the education response (Gallano 2018). Bottom-up participatory evaluations of education projects aim to identify the challenges of a complex emergency timescale, the production of knowledge, and the capacity to hold a child-centered perspective (Maclure 2006). The latter implies attention and consideration not only to formal schooling but also to the informal educative processes that can play a significant role in society, especially in times of conflict (Anderson and Mendenhall 2006).

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## Emergency

Traditionally defined as an unexpected and serious situation requiring immediate action to solve it, emergency is the primary reason for mobilizing humanitarian actors to intervene in contexts affected by human-made or natural disasters. Employed in situations of human conflict, the notion of “complex emergency” first took place in Mozambique toward the end of the 1980s when aid to the displaced was needed (Calhoun 2008). It indicates a multiplicity of causes underlying emergencies, with the involvement of several actors, beyond just victim, and the need for an international response. Unlike natural disasters, complex emergencies “have a singular ability to erode and destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies” (Duffield 1994: 3).

In more recent academic literature, the state of emergency is no longer interpreted as a matter of fate, but rather as a geopolitical strategy to set out specific global achievements, and the historical result of longstanding economic, political, and social failures. Thereby, most factors that give rise to emergencies are identifiable, even though largely dealt with by humanitarians as autonomous problems to which there is no solution but intervention. Humanitarian work tends to approach emergencies as discontinuities, for which intervention and aid are the only strategies able to restore linearity and predictability. As such, emergencies delineate the temporal and spatial limits of crisis and risk and, therefore, shed light on the urgent character of humanitarian action. Adopting a critical approach, emergency and general tendencies to interpret political processes as catastrophes have increasingly been studied as modalities of governance to preserve social and political order by establishing

“states of exception” that serve as repressive and control measures (Ophir 2010; Vazquez-Arroyo 2013). The idea of emergency has allowed interventionists to imagine a norm to which there should be an exception and a deviation from times of “normality.” The exceptional use of security measures protects the status quo in the Global North and highlights threats and risks in the Global South. For these reasons, emergency has been prioritized in the mobilization of international resources vis-à-vis chronic vulnerabilities and social predicaments, to the extent that scholars have talked of the “tyranny of emergency” (Minear 2002). In international media and global politics, the idea of emergency easily makes the headlines, and, therefore, its official declaration needs to be accurately considered as an important instrument of decision-making and the political organization of society.

Current concepts of protracted human displacement and consequent provision of long-term humanitarian assistance challenge emergency as the *sine qua non* condition for (both aid and military) humanitarian interventions, as international responses today continue when crisis becomes routinized. Likewise, while the concept of emergency has traditionally set the separation line between humanitarian and development practices, as well as short-term and long-term interventions, the increasing number of protracted crises has unraveled how problematic the technical tendency is to assess the beginning and the end of emergencies, and to place definitional and temporal boundaries around an emergency.

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# Epidemic

An epidemic typically refers to a sudden increase in the number of cases of a disease above the normal expectation for a population in a particular time and area. Globally, epidemics of HIV/AIDS, various influenza viral strains, and viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola garner the most attention from news media and responding organizations (e.g. the United States Centers for Disease Prevention and Control, the CDC, or the United Nations World Health Organization). Previously, the term “epidemic” only referred to a sudden increase of a contagious infectious disease in a population, but now it is used more broadly to include extraordinary increases in non-communicable diseases, such as type 2 diabetes and cancer in particular populations, and sudden increases in zoonotic diseases (meaning that they are caused by pathogens transmitted between humans and other animals, such as the West Nile virus), which are not contagious (CDC 2018).

In the more traditional definition of an epidemic as being caused by an infectious agent, epidemics occur when something changes about either the population of infectious agents or the population of susceptible hosts. For this kind of an epidemic to take place, susceptible host species (such as humans) must exist in adequate numbers, and circumstances must cause enough susceptible hosts to become infected with the disease agent of concern.

Epidemics are caused by a variety of phenomena: the introduction of an infectious agent into an environment where it has not been before and/or where extant hosts lack adequate immune response; changes in transmission dynamics or the ecology of the host or agent population; the emergence and proliferation of genetic variants or mutations of the hosts or infectious agents that change susceptibility or immunity; or when the transmission dynamics or the population of infectious agents shift such that new or more susceptible hosts are exposed to the pathogen. Most contemporary epidemics, including recent epidemics of the Ebola virus, HIV, MERS-CoV, different influenza virus strains, anthrax, and so on, are zoonotic. Often, zoonotic diseases emerge in areas already beset by poverty and inequity (Gebreyes et al. 2014). The One Health paradigm is a framework that is often invoked to study and respond to epidemics of zoonotic disease and focuses on viewing diseases as they emerge and spread within multispecies ecologies (CDC 2019).

The term epidemic is often contrasted with the word endemic, which means the baseline number of cases of a disease that are usually present in a given population. Endemicity is the observed normal level of disease in a given population. For example, malaria is endemic in much of sub-Saharan

Africa; by contrast, Ebola has caused several epidemics in Africa but it is not currently endemic to African communities or countries. An infectious disease can continue to spread indefinitely in the absence of prevention or treatment interventions, and assuming that the level of a particular disease is not high enough to deplete the pool of susceptible persons. The term pandemic refers to an epidemic that is spread over multiple regions of the world or continents. One example is the COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the SARS-COV-2 virus.

Recent debates in the fields of global health, medicine, and epidemiology focus on the best ways to predict, track, prevent, and control epidemics of infectious disease. Some scientists are now pushing for better disease surveillance systems, especially in low-income countries, as the best way to prevent outbreaks of disease. However, governments and non-governmental organizations in the health sector often commit few resources to the local infrastructural and educational resources necessary for disease surveillance. Instead, they mostly invest in technically sophisticated, but not socially or politically responsive, mathematical modeling tools that are designed to predict future outbreaks (Andersen 2018), or only invest in responses once epidemics emerge and threaten other countries. Funding for research often focuses on the development and testing of new vaccines, treatments, diagnostics, and other forms of biotechnology that have the potential to generate private sector money, rather than on sustainable and local forms of labor, higher education, and basic laboratory equipment required of disease surveillance systems in impoverished communities (Andersen 2018; Kelly 2018).

As of today, social science literature on epidemics mostly entails studies of two infamous epidemics: HIV/AIDS and the Ebola virus. These studies point to how the sudden and narrow emergence of funding for epidemics (often of diseases feared by the general public in donor countries) can lead to inadequate funding to address broader and entrenched health inequities and gaps in basic primary health care that have long plagued the places where outbreaks occur (Benton 2015). Rather than being neutral or limited in scope, epidemic control initiatives shape local social relations and political formations (Kenworthy 2017). International responses to disease epidemics are also frequently examples of “vertical” or top-down and disease-specific global intervention programs that can ignore, thwart, or overshadow local efforts to stem the transmission of disease and care for affected persons (Abramowitz et al. 2015).

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## Ethics

With the identity of humanitarian action as a moral endeavor, ethics is central to the study of humanitarianism (Slim 2015). The responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance and abide with international humanitarian law brings up questions of ethics and moral responsibility, as do normative criticisms of the nature and effects of humanitarian efforts.

Ethics is concerned with the evaluation of attitudes and behavior based on a combination of ideas of values and reality. A distinction can be made between *meta-ethics*, *normative ethics*, *applied ethics*, and *descriptive ethics*. *Meta-ethics* examines the theoretical foundations of ethics, such as the idea of deriving prescriptive implications from a notion of humanity in humanitarianism. *Normative ethics* evaluates ethical ideas, such as the adequacy of “humanity” as a principle of action. *Applied ethics* assesses attitudes and behavior in concrete practical contexts, such as the operationalization of a principle of humanity in refugee management. Ethics can also be studied in a *descriptive* sense by examining the ethical ideas that people have, without evaluating whether these are true or false, right or wrong.

When ethics is addressed in the context of humanitarian action, it is usually done in an applied sense with reference to the principles of international humanitarian law, human rights, or the “humanitarian principles” of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Pictet 1979). In line with operational demands of aligning practices with these principles, the coherence of policies and practices with the principles are assessed and the justification of departing from the principles is discussed.

The question of coherence relates to the dispute between so-called “Dunantist” and “Wilsonian” approaches concerning the hierarchy between emergency relief based on humanitarian law and a broader development agenda based on human rights (Barnett 2011).

Departing from these principles is the subject of longstanding disputes between principled and pragmatic approaches—a dispute that overlaps with the distinction between duty-based ethics (deontology), evaluating behavior based on its motives, and consequentialist ethics (associated with utilitarianism), evaluating behavior on the basis of its effects (Baron, Pettit, and Slote 1997).

Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, another approach to the ethics of humanitarian action concentrates on the qualities of humanitarian workers and decision-makers (Löfquist 2017). This approach seems particularly suited as guidance for action in situations where a multitude of identities, moral codes, and political considerations are at play.

Arguably, the hardest ethical questions pertain to the *consequences* of humanitarian action. It is well documented that immediate relief may have adverse effects. For instance, food relief may keep militias going and refugee camps can be exploited for the displacement of ethnic or political groups (Anderson 1999). Prominent examples include the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Nazi concentration camps and the military strategic uses (instrumentalization) of humanitarian aid by NATO in Afghanistan (Donini 2012). According to consequentialist ethics, relief should be avoided if the benefits are outweighed by negative side effects. Still, it is highly controversial to allow for avoidable suffering with reference to such side effects—in particular, when decisions involve a high degree of uncertainty and no realistic alternative exists for a humanitarian response.

A problem with the literature on ethics in humanitarian action is that it tends either to be internal to a discourse of humanitarian problems, principles, and solutions or to rely on unrealistic assumptions about alternatives, such as the absolute commitment of politicians to humanitarian objectives or the global redistribution of power and privilege. Ethics can have a constructive role in bridging these opposites through a principled but realistic engagement with humanitarian practices.

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## Evaluation

“Evaluation” emerged in the 1990s as an important, now essential, element in the efforts to enhance the quality of humanitarian aid. An evaluation is typically defined as a systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program, or policy, including its design, implementation, and results. An evaluation should provide useful and credible information that enables the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making processes of recipients and providers of such aid.

The purpose of such evaluations is to improve ongoing or future projects, programs, and policies through the feedback of lessons learned and/or to provide a basis for accountability, including the provision of information to the public. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has identified five major evaluation criteria and developed a main standard for evaluation. These are:

- *Relevance*: the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient, and donor;
- *Effectiveness*: a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objective;
- *Efficiency*: this measures outputs—qualitative and quantitative—in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term that signifies the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results;

- *Impact*: the positive and negative changes produced by aid intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended;
- *Sustainability*: this is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.

The OECD DAC has carried out its own studies of how evaluations are conducted by their members (e.g. OECD 2016) or synthesized evaluation findings conducted by member countries on, for instance, how to respond to the refugee crisis (Ruauudel and Morrison-Métois 2017; OECD 2017). DAC also maintains a searchable database of evaluations of development aid, including humanitarian aid.

The DAC criteria have been in place since the early 1990s and are widely used by many organizations and actors in the evaluation of development programs. They are reflected in policies and manuals, and in the terms of reference in a wide range of individual evaluations by development ministries, agencies, banks, partners, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example. The DAC criteria consequently have a strong influence on current evaluation practice. In 2018, DAC began a process of exploring how the evaluation criteria could be adapted to new scenarios, including humanitarian aid in complex and protracted crises, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

DAC's members are governments and intergovernmental organizations. Outside this framework there is another important network addressing evaluations in the humanitarian sector: the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). ALNAP is a global network of NGOs, United Nations agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics, and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve responses to humanitarian crises. It was set up in 1997 following the genocide in Rwanda and new demands for increased professionalization of the humanitarian sector. ALNAP was established in the belief that by improving the quality, availability, and use of knowledge and evidence from previous responses the system would perform better and be more accountable. ALNAP's activities are managed and implemented through a Secretariat hosted by the Overseas Development Institute in London.

ALNAP maintains an online library—the biggest repository of lessons learned in the sector—and seeks to develop guidance on humanitarian evaluation. In 2016, it released the Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide, which consolidated current knowledge about initiating, managing, and completing an evaluation of humanitarian action, offering a common reference point for humanitarian evaluators (ALNAP 2016).

The technical and professional quality of evaluations has steadily improved. However, the use of evaluations is highly uneven, especially at strategic and

policy level of donor agencies and implementing institutions. This is partly because evaluation reports are just one of several inputs into decision-making and these decisions can also be shaped by competing interests. Moreover, the need for rapid response in emergency situations often overrides attention to lessons learnt from evaluations. Participation (Rossignoli et al. 2017), capacity building (Vallejo and When 2016), and the role played by donors (Andersen, Bull and Kennedy-Chouane 2014) represent key aspects of humanitarian evaluations and may significantly affect their quality.

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## Expatriates

Hundreds of thousands people work on an international assignment in countries where humanitarian, development, or peace-building interventions are

taking place for the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international and non-governmental organizations. These people are commonly referred to as “expatriates,” professionals working outside their countries of primary residence for an extended period of time—for example, as project managers, logisticians, medical professionals, engineers, accountants, or security coordinators. The term “expatriate” is composed of the Latin words *ex* (out of) and *patria* (native country) and is mostly reserved for people involved in privileged forms of work migration that follow the flow of resources and materialities set free by the recurrent nature of global crisis. In terms of their salary, their mobility, and their protection, expatriate humanitarians are distinctive from national humanitarians—the professionals employed locally in the zones of intervention who constitute the vast majority of active humanitarians worldwide (Redfield 2012).

There are a number of studies on forms of expatriate culture(s) in humanitarian, developmental, and peace-building interventions, their situatedness in postcolonial continuities (Baaz 2005), the patterns of their mobilities (Redfield 2012), their role as bureaucrats, brokers, and intermediaries (Mosse and Lewis 2006), and questions of morals, ethics, and hierarchies surrounding the constitution of their practices (Fassin 2011). The “mobile professionals” (Fechter 2007) employed in international intervention form a “community of practice” (Autesserre 2014) that is driven by a common set of values and a particular perspective on modernity. They often share similar educational and racial backgrounds and trajectories (Benton 2016). The personal beliefs and motivations of expatriates underpin the field of practice of humanitarian intervention and are a formative feature of the humanitarian space as a whole. The presence of humanitarians in the zones of intervention also creates new forms of socialities. “Aidland” (Apthorpe 2013) is characterized by guest houses, bars, restaurants, shopping malls, and other such venues frequented predominantly by foreign humanitarians. As humanitarian space is co-constituted and embodied by expatriates working for international non-governmental organizations, those spaces equally become zones of humanitarian encounter (Smirl 2015).

The so called “expatriate bubble” is one of the key characteristics of ethnographic studies on aid workers. The dynamics surrounding the everyday lives of international aid workers in the fields of intervention have been described as the “bunkerization” of expatriate communities. This perspective complements the view of the luxurious lifestyles of “mobile professionals,” while adding to the picture mobility limitations, as evident in the classification of humanitarian space into red, yellow, and green zones, curfews, closed compounds, and insurance liabilities.

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## Financing

Financing humanitarian aid remains a major challenge. Governments have the primary responsibility to prepare for, respond to, and support recovery from crises in their own territories. However, many humanitarian and major prolonged crises take place in countries where domestic capacity and revenue sources cannot meet the scale of needs. International humanitarian assistance and development aid is therefore essential for alleviating suffering and addressing the longer-term developmental needs often underpinning and exacerbating crises.

The humanitarian system and its financing are under immense pressure from ongoing crises affecting over 200 million people in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Nigeria, and beyond. The gap between needs and funding continues to grow even while traditional donors—governments, foundations, and private funders—increase their grant funding to traditional emergency responders

such as the United Nations (UN), the Red Cross Movement, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The global humanitarian assistance budget keeps increasing and yet there is never enough “humanitarian money.” There are more crises, they are lasting longer, and humanitarian aid is covering more aspects than it ever has before (Development Initiatives 2018).

The World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 put the financing gap on the global agenda with the Report to the UN Secretary General from the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2016). The gap still remains a major challenge. UN-coordinated appeals are central to a humanitarian response. Total funding received by UN-coordinated appeals increased by USD 2.4 billion to USD 14.9 billion, the largest volume of funding ever received. Despite this increase, there was a funding shortfall of more than USD 10 billion against appeal requirements, the largest shortfall ever.

The biggest contributors of humanitarian aid to developing countries are also the main providers of development assistance reporting to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. All funding for humanitarian aid is allocated from the aid budgets of these donor countries. Over the last decade (2007–2016), official humanitarian assistance has grown at three times the rate of official development aid. It has risen by 124 percent, from USD 8.7 billion to USD 19.5 billion, while overall development aid has grown by 41 percent, from USD 119 billion to USD 167 billion (OECD 2017).

There is a growing realization that there will never be enough quality money to fund responses to humanitarian crises. The growing gap between demand and supply has led to an emphasis on the failures to adapt the humanitarian system, and what has been called a dysfunctional and inefficient financing architecture (Scott 2015).

Several key issues and challenges are emerging in this debate. One is to improve the predictability of funding. This should include more systematic multiannual funding commitments from donors. There is also a need to expand the financing pool for protracted crises. The various post-2015 processes provide many opportunities for improving coherence between humanitarian and development actors working in longer-term crises.

Crises in middle-income countries pose a special financing challenge, and the solution requires a paradigm shift about how to approach crises in these countries. Financing to meet crises in middle-income countries is a growing and complex problem: 53 percent of all humanitarian funds requested in 2015 were for crises in these countries, and there was limited access to anything other than dedicated humanitarian budgets. Finally, there is a pressing need for the money to effectively reach those in need, and to increase the value for



money of humanitarian programming. Delivery of humanitarian aid needs to become more cost effective. The cost of delivering humanitarian aid varies greatly between different countries and institutions. This is exaggerated by tied aid and the use of Northern resources and institutions in the delivery of much humanitarian aid. Likewise, the prevalence of corruption also increases costs.

Beyond current reform efforts to make humanitarian crisis funding faster, more consistent, and more effective, there is a sense that donors need to move from grant-making to using a wider range of financial tools—and private finance has a part to play in new partnerships where grant funding can leverage investment finance (Willitts-King 2019).

There is also an appetite among traditional donors and foundations to explore different uses of grant funding to attract greater capital input from investors. New partnerships and financial instruments from across the philanthropic–commercial spectrum could be used to address the challenges facing humanitarian financing. This has become known as innovative financing, and it opens up opportunities but also includes challenges, such as the potential conflict of interest for private corporations involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

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## Food

The right to food is protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions, and therefore should be granted to every human being in every situation. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights introduced the concept of “adequate food” (Article 11) as one of the crucial rights to guarantee “an adequate standard of living.” This definition is further clarified in the “General Comment No. 12, The Right to Adequate Food,” which defines “availability, accessibility, adequacy and sustainability” as key elements in the right. The first definition of a “world food security system ... which would ensure adequate availability of, and reasonable prices for, food at all times” appeared in the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition (UDEHM, section g). The United Nations has two agencies that grant access to food: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program. These organizations work together with a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other institutions. The main humanitarian issue related to food is famine. Following the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, the UDEHM was approved, and introduced the concept of Food Security (FS), which aims to guarantee access to food in any context. FS acquired global importance during the famines in Ethiopia and the Sahel (1984–1985), whose representation in Western media generated a massive food delivery (Edkins 2000). Amartya Sen (1983) defines famine as a reduction of “exchange entitlement” that someone has towards food, overtaking the traditional Malthusian approach that associated famines with a population growing faster than the food production capacity. Sen defines the “exchange entitlement” as the “set of all the alternative bundles of commodities” that someone “can acquire in exchange for what he owns.” Thus, famine happens when “the exchange entitlement does not contain any feasible bundle including enough food” (Sen 1983: 3). Alex de Waal (1997: 23) emphasizes how Sen contributed to “the institutionalization and professionalization of fighting famine”: famines are defined as a technical problem produced by several (including natural) causes that can be solved by appropriate institutions. However, despite the effort of Sen to connect famines to their political causes, humanitarian organizations could not fully deal with them, as exemplified by the Ethiopia famine of 1984–1985, when the responsibilities of the government had to be hidden to allow relief interventions (Edkins 2000). Moreover, humanitarian organizations narrowed the definition of famine as an “epidemic undernutrition” (de Waal 1997: 55), focusing on food mainly as a source of nutrients and further depoliticizing the treatment of famines. In the 1990s, in the wake of free trade agreements including

staple food, social movements connected to peasants' organizations in the Global South drafted a critique of this approach and promoted the concept of "food sovereignty," which connected the idea of "adequate food" to characteristics such as "healthy and culturally appropriate" and "produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods" (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007). This concept was partially taken into account by the FAO and some governments in their development policies.

In the last two decades, humanitarian approaches towards food have been partially revised by the idea of a "relief development continuum" (Scott-Smith 2018a: 668) and the frameworks of the Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals. Following these debates, two approaches became influential in FS policies: the idea of resilience as a clue for famine prevention and the reliance on "Ready to Use Therapeutic Food" (RUTF) as a standard remedy for malnutrition. Resilience emphasizes the need of communities to reduce vulnerability to external shock, diversifying the production and increasing the capacity of local producers, so that they can quickly react, relying on humanitarian organizations only for some support. RUTFs are pastes enriched with nutrients easy to administer to malnourished people, which is a quick solution that can potentially be applied to any context and can be handled by local communities as they do not require heavy infrastructure or trained staff to be administered (Scott-Smith 2018b). However, the 2007–2008 food price crisis made evident the difficulties in controlling the fluctuation of the markets and protecting the more vulnerable strata of society by promoting their "resilience." The reactions to the famines in the Horn of Africa and Sahel in 2011 were also criticized as slow and incapable of reaching vulnerable groups (Save the Children and Oxfam 2012), while NGOs and scholars criticized the "fetishization" of the RUTFs as a sort of miraculous solution for any forms of malnutrition (Scott-Smith 2018b). Despite efforts to revise their strategies and assumptions, the main challenge for humanitarian institutions remains to better contextualize food in its complex circuit of production and exchange on both global and local levels.

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## Foreign Aid

Foreign aid can be defined as an international transfer of resources (capital, goods, or services) on a voluntary basis from one country or international organization (a donor) to another country (recipient). This transfer aims to benefit the population of a developing country in the form of either grants or loans. Foreign aid includes military, economic, or humanitarian international assistance. The United Nations target for foreign aid is 0.7 percent of a donor country’s gross national income.

In the post-Cold War context, foreign aid combines humanitarian intervention with political action and can be considered as a pillar of political humanitarianism. Humanitarian intervention was limited by the principle of non-interference into the domestic affairs of the sovereign states in the post-1945 bipolar world. In the multipolar world after 1991, foreign aid has become a product of the interventionist approach to international relations (Macrae and Leader 2000).

Foreign aid is based on the foreign policy interests of donors, embedded in humanitarian and development projects, and on the engagement between aid organizations and political authorities in times of crisis on issues of population access and aid distribution (Ehrenfeld 2004). Donor foreign policy interests vary from getting access to the country’s strategic natural resources in exchange for aid to reducing the number of refugees coming out of crisis zones. This means that, in some cases, the provision of foreign aid benefits the donor countries more than the recipients (Atlani-Duault and Dozon 2011). The dependency between the donor and recipient countries is indeed two way: “although

dependent on foreign aid, several countries in the Global South significantly contribute to the prosperity of the Global North via interest payments, subcontracts, exploitation of resources, and labor force” (De Lauri 2016: 3).

Aid organizations must negotiate on population access and aid distribution with political authorities in crisis countries to ensure that aid is delivered to non-combatants on a needs basis, regardless of which side of the conflict they belong to (Macrae and Leader 2000). The principles of neutrality and impartiality of aid provision aim to ensure that aid cannot be used as a weapon of war by antagonistic parties, by blocking or cutting supplies to a political rival or enriching people in power through bribes, for example. This, however, is not always the case, and foreign aid can become yet another battlefield of conflicting perceptions, identities, relationships, and interests between the donors, aid organizations, local authorities, and populations in need (Dunn 2012).

Foreign aid is highly political and thus closely related to the humanitarian–development–security nexus, where separation between the apolitical (humanitarian) and the political (development, security) no longer holds (Lewis 2016). An emergency can evolve into a chronic humanitarian crisis, while an armed conflict can develop into a frozen or recurring military activity, both requiring long-term solutions, where humanitarian aid becomes development assistance (Atlani-Duault and Dozon 2011). Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of prolonged armed conflicts, whereas Vietnam and the Philippines are examples of countries with recurring natural disasters. In conflict zones, security is no longer considered in merely military terms but includes human, social, economic, and environmental dimensions of aid programming as peace-making. Similarly, practices such as disaster risk reduction and risk management are now employed as part of development aid aimed at preventing future humanitarian crises and regulating the delivery of humanitarian assistance when a crisis occurs.

The intersections of humanitarian–development–security issues in foreign aid have paved the way for the term “complex emergencies” (Macrae and Leader 2000). This idea has complicated an understanding of what a humanitarian crisis is and what type of assistance it requires. The proliferation of various tools to address crises has also contributed to the complexity and compartmentalization of emergencies. Such a professionalization and bureaucratization of aid has focused on predetermined programming solutions, rather than solutions stemming from the identified problems on the ground (Dunn 2012).

Because of these developments, academics and practitioners keep battling with the following questions: how to separate aid from political goals and to do more good than harm, how to better understand lived experiences of aid

by giving and receiving sides, and how to use critiques to improve aid effectiveness.

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## Gender Empowerment

The concept of “empowerment” originates in the social movements that emerged in West Europe and North America in the late 1960s, notably those related to the rights of women and ethnic and sexual minorities. These movements brought issues of gender, race, and ethnicity into the public realm in a collective attempt to resist assimilation policies inspired from “humanist” universalism. Self-empowerment was a means for those who had experienced discrimination to boost their self-confidence and self-esteem in order to find the strength to devise their own path towards emancipation (Jennings 2001).

Women’s empowerment was a major motto of second-wave feminists after their realization that the egalitarian politics pursued by their predecessors had

failed to bring about positive change for women. This identitarian and communitarian trend of second-wave feminism understood oppression as primarily located in the “personal” private realm (Beauvoir 2015), the arena where self-deprecation took place and where sexual taboos (such as abortion or harassment) were kept secret. Consciousness-raising groups, following the “pedagogy of the oppressed” (Freire 2014), became a mode of subjective exploration of widely shared forms of stigmatization that had been silenced in public. Women’s empowerment involved a broad range of practices, including speaking out about personal experiences and breaking taboos, building relationships of solidarity among women (guided by the principle of “sisterhood”), or establishing spaces and institutions exclusively reserved to women. The universalist category of “human” was deconstructed to reintroduce two sexes (Fouque 1995), not only in philosophical and psychoanalytical terminology, but also in the grammar of everyday life practices.

Since the 1990s, international institutions, influenced by the capabilities approach to development (Sen 2011; Nussbaum 2011, 2001; Alexander 2008), have begun to use the notion of gender empowerment (rather than empowerment for women) in development policies and humanitarian actions. Gender empowerment was notably promoted in the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals and then in the Sustainable Development Goals, where it is presented as a necessary step for a country to overcome obstacles associated with poverty and development.

Gender empowerment in the context of development entails policies aimed at ensuring women’s equal participation with men in decision-making processes and their inclusion in the economic sphere. In humanitarian emergencies, it involves strengthening the resilience of affected populations by empowering women and girls, portrayed in the literature as ideal victims and agents of change. “Empowerment hubs” established by UN Women for female victims of gender-based violence, for example, are conceived as places for girls and women “to come together, break social isolation, participate and show leadership” (UN Women 2018: 16). The ideal of femininity promoted in such projects is often one that embodies a specific form of subjectivity: self-driven, agentic, entrepreneurial. The “girl powering” of humanitarian aid has therefore to be placed in the broader context of the depoliticization and corporatization of humanitarianism (Koffman, Orgad, and Gill 2015), where responses to “emergencies” are found at the individual level via “self-help” programs rather than in more political projects of redistribution and social justice (Billaud 2012, 2015). This focus on individual empowerment tends to overlook the various forms of structural inequalities that are responsible for triggering crises in the first place.

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## Genocide

From its very conception, the word genocide has been entwined with humanitarian concerns and the heavy legal, social, and moral obligation to act in the face of atrocity. Until 1944, genocide was “the crime without a name,” and instead acts of genocide fell into the general categories of mass killing or crimes against humanity; but the systematic horrors of the Holocaust meant that these acts could no longer be ignored.

“Genocide” was coined by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in his seminal work *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944). After experiencing the suffering of World War II, Lemkin tirelessly advocated at the United Nations (UN) for



international and legal recognition of the crime of genocide. His efforts were instrumental to the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 (Jones 2016).

Comprised of the Greek “*genos*” (meaning race or tribe) and the Latin “*cide*” (killing), genocide literally means the killing of a specific group of people (Lemkin 1944). Lemkin envisaged that genocide would also include the social, economic, and historical destruction of a group of peoples and would therefore encompass not only killing, but also eradication or removal. According to Lemkin, genocide “is intended ... to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944). Thus, its broad definition could include the eradication of language, destruction of historical monuments, or even the lack of memorialization of a significant event in the history of a people. However, genocide, its meaning, and how the international community should respond are all subject to fierce academic and legal debate (Jones 2016; Short 2016).

Genocide is legally defined by the UN Convention (1948) as an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” This could be achieved through killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction of the group, imposing measures to prevent births, or forcibly transferring children. One of the primary criticisms leveled at the convention is that it excludes cultural, indigenous, political, gender, and social groups from the legal definition of genocide, making it theoretically impossible to prosecute a perpetrator of genocide against these groups (Jones 2016; Short 2016). For an act to be considered genocide in the legal setting, there needs to be demonstrable *intent* to destroy. This often creates a legal stumbling block as documents proving intent very rarely exist, and, if they do, are veiled with neutral terminology or relevant information is redacted (Power 2003).

The 1948 convention was aimed to legally bind the signatories into acting in the face of atrocity. However, the lack of consensus about when an act constitutes genocide and the lack of political will to intervene in the affairs of another country often translates in practice to a lack of agreement about when or how to intervene or provide support (Annan 1998).

The international community was criticized for being a bystander and not intervening to prevent genocide in either Rwanda or Cambodia. Further, during the Bosnian war the UN was present but was unable to secure protection of civilians and protect a safe area, leading to the murder of 8000 men and boys in Srebrenica (Power 2003). The 1995 Srebrenica massacre, genocide in Rwanda

(1994), and atrocities in Kosovo (1998–1999) and Darfur in the 1990s pushed genocide to the forefront of political and humanitarian discourses, bringing questions of the role of humanitarianism in confronting and preventing genocide into public, political, and academic debate. In 2005, arguably as a result of the atrocities witnessed in the 1990s, the UN implemented the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). While this has created an infrastructure that is supposed to protect the most vulnerable and prevent genocide and other mass atrocities, it has also raised concerns that military interventions with other goals are justified by R2P. Although evoked several times, Libya is the only case where the R2P doctrine has been officially used. The doctrine was claimed to be implemented via the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which was proposed by France, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom and adopted on March 17, 2011. The multistate NATO-led coalition adopted military means with the supposed aim of protecting civilians from an oppressive regime. However, the legitimacy and the effects of the international intervention are still debated, and figures related to casualties of the 2011 coalition bombing are contested. According to Human Rights Watch (2012), the bombing resulted in a loss of life of at least 72 civilians and up to 1000 supposed combatants; according to Libyan sources, the figures are higher. The long-term implications of the intervention, including displacement and instability, are still unfolding.

Different cases globally demonstrate the complicated humanitarian challenges posed by genocide and intervention. The international community is yet to find a way to effectively protect civilians and prevent murderous conflict and genocide (Annan 1998; Kuperman 2001).

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## Gift

In 1925, French sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss wrote the classic of social theories of reciprocity and gift exchange, arguing that gifts create and reproduce social relations. Mauss noticed three obligations in societies practicing the so-called gift economies: to give, to accept, and to return the gift (Mauss 1967[1925]). Since every gift carries with it a set of obligations, it presents a materialization of social relations. When there is a significant temporal delay between the gift and the counter-gift, or when there are many people linked into a network (Lévi-Strauss 1969), participants can avoid recognizing their participation in a gift exchange.

Anthropologist Anette Weiner suggests that there are forms of giving that contribute to the reproduction of whole societies, not just of relations between particular individuals. In such forms of giving, an obligation is created not just between the giver and the receiver, but also between their relatives and non-kin, allowing for "long term regeneration of intergenerational (and intragenerational) social relations" (Weiner 1980: 79).

This view of the gift as productive of social relations has sparked a discussion among various social theorists on the possibilities of a "free gift"—one that requires no answer, and thus is not implicated in the creation and reiteration of social relations. For instance, French philosopher Jacques Derrida claimed that a true gift must not be linked with any acknowledgment. Any sort of a response—even saying "thank you"—moves the gift into a domain of exchange: "For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counter-gift or debt" (Derrida 1992: 13). In his reading, the only real gift can be the gift of time.

Anthropologist James Parry has critically assessed the urge of Western scholars to find the free gift, noticing that “the ideology of disinterested gift emerges in parallel with an ideology of purely interested exchange” (Parry 1986: 458). In other words, an assumption that there is something corrupt about gifts intertwined with reciprocity or interest is the product of an ideology that first appeared in modern states with an advanced division of labor. Exchange of commodities and gifts in modernist societies works in a specific conceptual frame, where gifts and exchange, persons and things, interest and disinterest need to be clearly kept apart.

Theories of gift exchange have influenced humanitarian studies. Humanitarianism presents a distinct form of a transnational gift that cannot be reciprocated (Bornstein 2012). As Didier Fassin argues, there is an assumption of ontological inequality between the givers and the recipients of humanitarian aid. Those who need saving “are those for whom the gift cannot imply a counter-gift, since it is assumed that they can only receive. They are the indebted of the world” (Fassin 2007: 512). Although it precludes reciprocity, humanitarian aid is not quite a “free gift.” Following Weiner’s argument (that gift giving is not necessarily about reciprocity between particular persons, but about regeneration of the wider social order), we can analyze how obligations created through humanitarian aid reproduce geopolitical links and social relations on a global scale. Finally, there is an ongoing tension in humanitarianism between the spontaneous and fleeting impulse to save lives and the regulation of this impulse through attempts to bureaucratize humanitarian aid (Bornstein 2009). Very often, this tension results in adhocery, “a system that used rough-and-ready ways of knowing to quickly arrive at improvised solutions” (Dunn 2012: 15) creating along the way “chaos and vulnerability as much as it creates order” (Dunn 2012: 2).

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## Global Health

Global health can be defined as “collaborative international research and action for promoting health for all” in an equitable manner (Beaglehole and Bonita 2010). The roots of global health lie in colonial medicine, and in the 19th-century concept of “international health,” which worked to control the spread of epidemics between countries, including between developed and developing countries.

When the World Health Organization (WHO) was formed in 1948, 70 countries were represented; by 2010, there were 193 countries. After some early setbacks because of the WHO’s top-down approach, global health priorities were significantly reformulated in 1978 at a conference in Alma-Ata according to the principle of “health for all.” This involved access to health education, immunization, disease control, and essential medications (Farmer, Kleinman, Yong Kim and Basilico 2013). However, with the marketization and privatization of health in the 1980s, global health was reframed as a commodity rather than a right, and, alongside national governments, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and UNICEF became major players in health. The Gates Foundation is now the largest funder for global health.

Severe health inequity remains a burning human rights issue. With the poor bearing the brunt of both preventable ill health and human rights violations in all countries, health advocacy, public health, and humanitarian and social justice concerns have been jointly mobilized by governments, non-governmental organizations, social and political movements, and health activists to address the “pathogenic role of inequity” (Farmer 2003). Humanitarianism operates in global health as organized institutional and government action, as well as a discourse and justification for community and political action.

The AIDS pandemic of the 1980s and 1990s catalyzed global health as a field. As anti-retroviral treatments transformed a fatal disease to a manageable one

and linked to the Millennium Development Goals, billions of dollars became available in grants and debt relief in what has been termed global health's "golden age" (Farmer, Kleinman, Yong Kim and Basilio 2013). The United Nations and WHO ambitiously aimed to extend anti-retroviral treatments to millions in low- and middle-income countries, in African countries particularly. The United States (USA) increased funding to AIDS prevention, care, and treatment tenfold between 2000 and 2006. Despite enormous successes in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, however, this roll-out was complicated. Some governments, for example in South Africa, ignored medical findings and denied AIDS treatments to stigmatized populations, with tragic consequences (Fassin 2007). Others, such as Pakistan, failed owing to other government priorities and corruption in state bureaucracies.

Global health now encompasses interventions for infectious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria, Ebola, Zika), unexplained illness, illness prevention and vaccination, maternal and reproductive health, the impact of war, chemical and nuclear spills, and political violence towards health and health services. Ad hoc actions range from fistula and birthing injuries, for example in Niger (Heller 2018), to immunizations; rural health delivery in Haiti and Rwanda (Farmer et al. 2013) to interventions in societies in transition to democracy. Global health involves temporalities of urgency in situations requiring an immediate mobilization of resources, as well as longer-term temporalities in programs to improve health outcomes, and fractured health systems. These are required to be cost-effective and sustainable, conditions that are not always compatible with reducing inequity.

Humanitarian interventions have comprised an array of methodologies and techniques. "Quick fix" approaches apply technological innovations, including mobile health interventions in remote locations, flying doctors and temporary surgical camps, and mass screenings for infectious disease.

Controversies arise concerning the delivery of justice and intervention within colonial and postcolonial matrices of organized and institutional power and knowledge. Interventions must also address challenges involving scaling and translating universalist projects for local contexts. For example, in the Republic of Guinea, humanitarian responses to Ebola, insensitive to and ill informed about local histories of structural violence, unsettled the explosive but latent social tensions in everyday modes of social accommodations between existing burial practices and hospital medicine, local political structures and external political subjection, mining interests and communities, and those suspected of "sorcery"—which severely restricted its efficacy (Fairhead 2016). Responses must also address the application of Western-derived knowledge to local contexts, accommodate tensions between local, indigenous, and

standardized global approaches, and confront issues of professionalism and legitimacy—as well as local community efforts to resist and decolonize top-down deductive approaches of the global health imperium (Farmer et al. 2013). While historically the “West” has been at the center of economic imperialism and global health, power is fluid and shifting, as evident in China’s medical campaigns across 30 African countries, including the building of private hospitals, in postwar and developing contexts.

Despite clinicians’ best efforts, citizens of the USA are dying on the streets. This is because of a confluence of inadequate public health care, acute funding pressures on community psychiatry, social inequality, inner-city degeneration, and homelessness and related illnesses (Brodwin 2013). In Europe, the confluence of changing food environments, long-term financial crisis and austerity, and cuts in state health provision have also led to deepening health inequities. Controversies additionally surround the politics of health care provision to asylum seekers. For example, in Europe access to health care for clandestine and illegal migrants varies significantly across countries, raising questions about health equity, global bioethics, and the need for a more joined-up approach for mitigating health risks in some of the world’s newest and most vulnerable communities.

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## Governance

Humanitarian governance, broadly defined, is the attempt to regulate the humanitarian field—including rules, structures, and mechanisms for promoting accountable and effective humanitarian practice. Linked to the overall aim of humanitarianism, of helping vulnerable populations in need, humanitarian governance can be seen as “an increasingly organized and internationalized attempt to save the lives, enhance the welfare, and reduce the suffering of the world’s vulnerable populations” (Barnett 2013: 379). Although humanitarian governance is legitimized as an act of benevolence, it may also help a particular set of actors achieve their own political and economic goals (Pandolfi 2003; Nader and Savinar 2016). Power and inequality are thus central aspects of humanitarian governance.

Self-regulation is a core element of humanitarian governance. At the global, transnational, and local levels, the humanitarian field has traditionally been governed by non-state actors—the humanitarian organizations themselves. The rules and regulations governing the humanitarian sector have therefore been a self-organized attempt at collective action, ranging from voluntary codes of conduct to more institutional structures with enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms. The content of these regulations, however, is defined by political processes led by actors with varying degrees of power and influence, and with different agency, values, and objectives.

One of the challenges of governing humanitarian non-state actors is the so-called accountability black hole (Yuhas 2015). Although humanitarian governance may originally be driven by a humanitarian ethos of helping the most vulnerable, it also involves practices ruling the lives of the most vulnerable without providing them with a means of recourse to hold the humanitarian actors accountable for their actions (Garnier, Sandvik, and Jubilit 2016). Humanitarian actors may be involved in operations to promote their own agendas or states’ agendas, thus reproducing unequal power relations, but are not necessarily held responsible for this.

Specific humanitarian crises and the unintended and negative impacts of humanitarian intervention have spurred the development of humanitarian governance. Assessments of the operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–1993), the genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the interventions in Bosnia 1992–1995 and Kosovo (1999) led to recommendations in form of regulation and enforcement to ensure the improved performance of non-governmental and international organizations (Givoni 2011). One outcome of this process was the



establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs—turned into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998. OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies and for guaranteeing a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

The Oslo Guidelines on the use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief were developed in 1994, and then updated (OCHA 2007), in response to the increasing role of the military in humanitarian operations.

The non-governmental organizations created the Sphere handbook and Sphere standards, including minimum standards that would help to improve accountability and the overall quality of humanitarian response to those affected by disasters. Although the main actors are international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), states play a role in defining and implementing humanitarian governance (Harvey 2009). Based on the 1991 UN Humanitarian Resolution 46/182, states have the first responsibility to protect citizens in situations of natural disasters and other emergencies and should in principle be able to respond to humanitarian crises. If they require aid, states should be able to coordinate external assistance. State laws and registration procedures both in aid-receiving and origin states are regulating humanitarian organizations. These regulations are related to wider issues of governance and politics, as restrictions of access for humanitarian organizations can be used as a way of controlling the citizens, constraining NGOs, and curtailing human rights. Humanitarian actors must face the potential contradiction between providing support to governments and preserving the independence needed to protect those who need it.

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## Human Dignity

Human dignity relates to myriad of meanings across different cultural contexts and time frames (Habermas 2010; Kateb 2011). Its current use, which is codified within international law as a legal principle, a utilitarian and universal ideal, is located within Eurocentric epistemologies of rights and personhood. In this sense, its origins have both Roman and Greek roots. As a construct, the notion “human dignity” conjoins the predicate “human” and the noun “dignity,” which draws on the Latin expressions *humus* for human, *decus* for dignity, and on the Greek word *dignitas* for dignity. But while the idea of human dignity enjoys global acceptance as a basic ethical and legal principle, it is also captured by contextually specific vocabularies embedded in philosophies of moral value, mutual respect, interdependency and conviviality, such as the notions of *Ubuntu* (South Africa), *Ujama* (Tanzania), *Kizuna* (Japan), *Satyagraha* (India), and *Ashia* (Southern Cameroons), among others. Any universal use of human dignity must therefore be sensitive to specific contextual understandings and be further subjected to empirical substantiation.

As a key humanitarian concept (Edkins 2003; McCrudden 2008; Meron and Rosas 1991), human dignity refers to the basic act of recognizing another person as a worthy human—that is, the status of human beings that entitles them to respect. It is the basic foundation of every human relationship and is

manifested differently across various cultural contexts. To be human is to have dignity, which Italian scholar Giorgio Agamben (1998) refers to as more than just bare life: a respectable and respected social being, rather than just a brute biological organism. It is a grounding justification for all the actions undertaken to protect and preserve human welfare.

Human dignity became one of the most significant constructs of humanitarianism after the end of World War II and is now protected in almost every internal law and domestic jurisdiction. It became an institutionalized practice after the Holocaust and the founding of the United Nations system. Within this context, “human” was defined as a particular kind of liberal individual requiring protection. In international law, human dignity is articulated as a right and is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

At the individual level, human dignity refers to a sense of pride over one’s self-worth and value, often operationalized by development agencies and national governments as a cultivation of individual capabilities. Collectively, it is a moral obligation embedded in an ethics of care that spells out the conditions through which people get processed as valuable humans deserving of recognition—that is, the terms by which a person gains recognition as a full and equal human being.

Although they are premised on the notion of human dignity and equality, humanitarian interventions are not always distributed equally. Therefore, some scholars argue that they are part of a broader matrix of political projects, where there is more urgency to salvage some groups’ human dignity than that of others. This can be referred to as the inequality of humanitarianism, situated within a narrow recognition of a status as citizen with specific rights, privileges, and obligations. This is embedded in the thesis, to paraphrase George Orwell (1945), that while all humans are equal, some are more equal than others, and therefore the responsibility to protect them is more urgent—hence creating a hierarchy of suffering and being.

Today, dignity is a deeply contested construct with shifting interpretations, and not only the prerogative of humans, as seen in instruments protecting the dignity of plants, animals, and, more recently, robots. It is also invoked in bioethical debates and a core element of instruments concerned with biotechnology, biomedicine and artificial intelligence, calling for a concept of dignity that is inclusive of posthumans (Beyleveld 2001; Bostrom 2005).

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## Human Rights

Human rights are a discourse and ideology around which a massive global phenomenon has formed since World War II. This phenomenon encompasses the human rights community, including human rights experts and activists, and artifacts including human rights covenants, policy papers, and reports. The core of human rights ideology rests on the ideas of equality and emancipation, and is further anchored in the universalizing category of “everyone,” a gender-neutral and all-encompassing term that eludes distinctions on the basis of nationality or other criteria. At the same time, human rights can be conceptualized as entities protecting the individual against the arbitrary treatment of the sovereign, whether embodied by a monarch, state, tribe, clan, or family.

In their emphasis on the individual, human rights are connected to international humanitarian law, which likewise places its emphasis on the individual, not on states, which are the primary subjects of international law. Both human rights and international humanitarian law also aim to find different ways of protecting the individual. Yet the temporality and overall vision of human

nature and reality are fundamentally different. While international humanitarian law is more history-oriented and pessimistic, human rights ideology is forward-looking and utopian, founded on a notion of human nature as flawed but capable of improvement. Thus, the main impetus of human rights work is to address existing wrongdoing and harmful patterns and structures, and to work toward future improvement. Simultaneously, future improvement forms a fundamental legitimating component for human rights work occurring today.

The history of human rights is commonly presented in scholarly accounts through a standardized, mythical “textbook narrative of origins,” a tale of forward-looking progressiveness authored primarily by Western legal philosophers and legal scholars that depicts human rights as the ultimate outcome of human evolution. Sometimes, this narrative is presented via a “universalizing variation” that aims to find precedence for human rights thinking across different eras and civilizations. Yet such efforts fall into conceptual vagueness by overlooking the distinctive discourses and contexts of such efforts (Halme-Tuomisaari and Slotte 2015). The same problematic applies also to the universalism–relativism debate that has characterized human rights since the 1947 statement by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) on the planned Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948 (AAA 1947; UN 1948).

Over the past few decades, the history of human rights has started to awaken vivid debate (Moyn 2012). The gist of the debate can be summarized by two questions. First, have human rights in some form always been around, in all cultures and geographic areas, gradually growing into human consciousness via the “evolution” of mankind? Or are they rather “new inventions,” receiving their origin in a “big bang moment,” most commonly seen as the adoption of the UDHR, followed by subsequent expansion in geographic and substantive terms? Today, most scholars have adopted an interim position, seeing human rights as a particular post-World War II phenomenon while simultaneously acknowledging diverse forms of continuity, both institutional continuities, with practices of the League of Nations, and ideological continuities with earlier rights initiatives that extend back to the revolutionary era and natural rights tradition.

The popularity of human rights can be connected both to their emancipatory ethos and to their capacity to appear simultaneously as “absolute” and “undefined”; or, in the words of legal scholar Duncan Kennedy, universal and factoid (Kennedy 2002). These qualities also lend themselves to the relationship that human rights have to law: human rights are both law *and* reason for law. Combined, these qualities support the continued expansion of human

rights as they have in the much-utilized terminology of Sally Merry become “vernacularized,” as new concerns and interest groups have become recognized under their umbrella (Merry 2006). The transition of women’s or indigenous peoples’ rights into human rights are familiar examples, with the rights of LGBTQI people forming the latest high-profile example. Human rights also provide important legitimation for humanitarian interventions and form a contemporary standard of “civilization.”

A central dimension of expansion is the *legalization* of human rights, illustrated by the UDHR. While the 1948 document was adopted as a legally non-binding declaration, over the subsequent decades most of the declaration’s content has gained legal recognition either through the introduction of national legislation or via specialized United Nations human rights covenants—including the two primary covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Today, some legal scholars argue that basic human rights tenets form customary international law. Adherence to human rights forms a contemporary measuring stick for “modern nations,” which in some instances is used as legitimation to curtail the recognition of state sovereignty, resulting in such labels as “rogue” or “failed” states. Today, human rights are accompanied by vast monitoring mechanisms. Yet there is continual concern for the “culture of impunity” for grave human rights violations.

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## Human Security

Human security refers to the protection of individual safety, dignity, and well-being at both the national and international level. While the notion of security has been historically mainly associated with state security and military threats, the concept of human security has broadened its meaning to include individuals as new referent objects and to envisage other kinds of threats (economic, environmental, health, political, etc.) to their safety. In the human security framework, individuals are not only put at the center of the attention, but also their safety is considered crucial for international peace and stability. Human security is understood beyond the physical safety or survival of individuals; it concerns people's physical and psychological integrity, dignity and well-being.

The concept emerged in 1990s, when the end of the Cold War radically altered the international security structure. The notion of human security was first conceptualized in the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), when the *Human Development Report* (UNDP 1994) provided a broad definition of the concept in terms of concern for human life and dignity. The term was officially framed in 2001 by the Commission on Human Security, which was established in response to the UN Secretary-General's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world "free from want and fear." It was defined as follows: "Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity" (Ogata and Sen 2003).

In the humanitarian sector, the conceptualization of human security, understood in terms of rights rather than needs, has brought an increasing emphasis on protection activities and humanitarian actors' widespread shift from a needs-based approach to a rights-based approach to assistance. The protection of individuals' safety, dignity, and integrity has become a core element of assistance, along with the more traditional sectors of intervention such as food, water, shelter, and health.

More generally, by putting the human being at the center of the global security system, the elaboration of the notion of human security has had several important implications. The concept has been used to justify military

humanitarian interventions considered necessary to address serious violations of people's human security during internal conflict or civil war, natural disasters, famine, and other emergencies. In order to protect human security, the international community can be called into action, not only by the aggressive behavior of one state towards another, but also by serious violations of human rights perpetrated against people by another non-state actor and/or the state itself.

Proponents of human security have underlined its potential emancipatory power in different realms—from the possibility to address economic, social, and political causes of human insecurity (Newman 2001) to the capacity of challenging existing power relations (Grayson 2004); from the claim that human security tends to be and is produced through individual empowerment (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007) to the potential of human security in giving voice to the voiceless and powerless (Suhrke 1999; MacFarlane 2004). Critical readings, however, have pointed out the inability of human security agendas to disrupt existing power inequalities (McCormack 2008) and policy frameworks (Chandler 2008), and the tendency of human security to strengthen international institutions rather than empowering individuals (McCormack 2008). Others have highlighted how this new paradigm has not brought any particularly innovative practical strategy or positive outcome in humanitarian operations (Muggah and Krause 2006), but rather has de facto replaced development aspirations and inscribed them into a security agenda (Pupavac 2005).

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## Human Trafficking

Trafficking in persons (TIP) is the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, typically for, but not limited to, the purposes of sexual exploitation or forced labor (UNODC 2018). “Trafficking” is also described as a modern slave trade, a throwback to an ancient time that has its roots in precapitalist societies. Until recently, there was no international agreement on the legal definition of trafficking. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its accompanying protocols—more commonly known as the Palermo Protocols—were adopted by the UN General Assembly to clarify the term and distinguish the phenomenon from human smuggling. According to the UN, human trafficking involves “the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation ... shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth ... have been used” (UN 2000: 42).

Nonetheless, in public discourse, TIP often continues to be confused with the smuggling of people (SOM), which is “the procurement, in order to obtain,

directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (UN 2000: 54–55). The conflation of trafficking with smuggling also seems to be sanctioned by the Palermo Protocols (Sharma 2005). While these are intended to differentiate TIP from SOM, the distinction has been collapsed in law. As Nandita Sharma argues, "by making the consent of the migrant in her/his movement across borders 'irrelevant' if they experience any form of deception, coercion, or abuse in the process, this definition also dramatically expands the scope of trafficking" (Sharma 2005: 90). This is even more evident if we consider that "coercion," within the definition of TIP, is not only understood in the terms of brute physical force or mental domination, but also in more general terms as the abuse of a position of vulnerability (Sharma 2005). It is thus very difficult to set human smuggling apart from human trafficking, especially if the former occurs in a condition of extreme vulnerability, such as that faced by war-displaced communities.

Although there is no consensus on the actual number of trafficked persons, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there were 40.3 million victims of human trafficking globally in 2016 alone (ILO 2019). In this context, TIP has grown into a multibillion-dollar industry in which, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), females are mostly trafficked for sexual exploitation and males for forced labor (UNODC 2018). Studies suggest that minors increasingly make up larger shares of the total number of trafficked persons (UNODC 2018).

Lately, recognition of how humanitarian crises such as armed conflicts and forced displacement exacerbate people's exposure to trafficking and exploitation has grown. In other words, human trafficking flourishes in wartime because people are particularly vulnerable and criminals are less compelled to abide by the rule of law (Shelley 2010). However, a growing body of critical scholarship on TIP has begun to question the narratives of victimization and criminality in the official discourse on trafficking as inadequate categories to account for the complexity of the phenomenon (Davidson O'Connell 2010). One of the main conclusions of recent research on the effects of the Syrian war on TIP, for example, indicates that much of the exploitation taking place is not carried out by criminal minded organizations, but rather involves families and communities left with no viable alternatives for survival other than situations that can be characterized as exploitation, both in the terms of exploiting and being exploited (ICMPD 2015).

A large swathe of literature has also demonstrated how tightening border controls and the implementation of restrictive immigration policies favor the emergence of TIP (Andrijasevic 2007). Along those lines, other studies have argued that, instead of conflating human smuggling with human trafficking,

researchers and humanitarian practitioners should better address the implications of stricter border regimes and the militarization of border control on smuggling and trafficking in human beings (Achilli 2017).

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## Humanitarian Corridor

A humanitarian corridor is a safe route via which endangered civilians are provided with aid and/or are evacuated. A humanitarian corridor is defined and characterized by its highly restricted, narrow space, which distinguishes it from humanitarian projects carried out within a wider or unrestricted space. Humanitarian corridors have a long history and have occurred in many conflicts and disaster zones. Famous examples include the Kindertransport of

1938–1939, in which Jewish children were evacuated from areas under Nazi control to the United Kingdom; the 1992–1995 humanitarian corridor into the besieged Bosnian city of Sarajevo, which included an international air lift; and, more recently, the 2018 evacuation of civilians by bus out of the Syrian city of Ghouta. As these examples show, humanitarian corridors can take on many different forms and can occur through many different initiatives.

The need for humanitarian corridors arises when armed conflict cuts off large numbers of civilians from accessing basic needs. This may occur incidentally as conflict parties fight without taking the civilian presence into account. But it may also happen deliberately through sieges, in which armed actors purposefully cut off residential areas from water, electricity, food, and health care, and effectively hold civilian populations to ransom.

Since the 1990s, most humanitarian corridors have been called for and negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Humanitarian corridors may be created through negotiations with armed actors who agree to cease hostilities within the corridor; but they can also occur spontaneously when civilians collectively seek a path to safety and are helped by other civilians or state authorities on their way (Kukavica and Plesnicar 2016). Humanitarian corridors can be enforced by military means, and against the explicit goal of whichever actor is endangering the civilian population. A well-known example for this type of corridor is the 1948/1949 airlift by the American army into the German city of Berlin, which was cut off from West Germany by Soviet forces. Since 2011, a new form of aerial humanitarian corridor has emerged in which charitable organizations collect resources to fly civilians out of crisis zones, to enable them to claim asylum or shelter in another country (Kellogg Institute For International Studies 2018). A shared feature of humanitarian corridors is their temporary character. All humanitarian corridors are opened and closed, or appear or disappear, at some point in time. They may exist for only a day, or for several years, or may open repeatedly on certain occasions.

Humanitarian corridors may fail to achieve their goal and have occasionally been abused by armed actors as smuggling routes for weapons or other resources. In every case, humanitarian corridors are not neutral or impact-free activities; their existence changes the make-up of the local war economy, which includes the presence or absence of civilians, and, of course, aid. This explains why it is often so difficult to get all stakeholders to agree on a humanitarian corridor and why corridors are frequently attacked shortly after opening. Another reason why actors may be reluctant to open humanitarian corridors is that they may also lead to the exposure of war crimes by accompanying UN observers or journalists.

Humanitarian corridors draw attention to the way in which space and territory are restructured during crises and disasters. The presence of humanitarian

actors can change local infrastructure, real estate markets, leisure zones, and perceptions of where safety and danger are located and who is allowed to access certain spaces (Smirl 2015; Duffield 2012). Thus, humanitarian actors can have a powerful impact on the way in which space is reassigned and redivided in the region in which they operate.

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## Humanitarian Design

Humanitarian design is a term that can be used to describe the process of designing products, services, or systems for populations affected by natural and/or human-made disasters. For example, a cooking stove designed for a refugee camp is a *product* that needs to take into account not only cultural appropriateness and the needs of the refugee, but also the *services* attached to the product, such as fuel production in the area. It should also consider the *system* realities of the humanitarian market, such as logistics, humanitarian budgets, and decision-making (Fladvad Nielsen, Sandvik, and Gabrielsen Jumbert 2016).

The occurrence of humanitarian crises, such as conflicts or natural and industrial disasters, triggers the response of multiple international stakeholders to provide different kinds of assistance to the affected populations. This international response generally implies the deployment of products and services that temporarily strengthen or even replace disrupted local activities (Fladvad Nielsen and Santos 2013). Humanitarian design aims to create strategies to improve the delivery of emergency aid and the efficiency/effectiveness of

humanitarian action. It seeks to develop innovations for the humanitarian market, defined as the market that emerges in the aftermath of the crisis, heavily represented by international and national non-governmental organizations. It also includes donors, service providers, and enterprises that develop, purchase, and distribute goods such as food, shelter, medical equipment, and energy generating devices. To understand the goals of humanitarian design, one must understand the definitions and goals of humanitarian action and the Humanitarian Charter (Sphere 2018), which centers on dignity. Through the Humanitarian Charter, humanitarian action has committed itself to provide disaster-affected communities with essential physical goods and services in emergencies. The goal of dignity implies that the aim of humanitarian action is value based and human centered, as is design science (Cross 2007). This is where design and design thinking become relevant.

Design is a value-oriented activity in which the designer seeks to identify designs that bring improved well-being for those involved. Following this line of reasoning, “humanitarian design” should also refer to the application of “designerly” approaches that assist crisis-affected people in reaching a situation in which they can live with dignity. “Designerly ways” and design thinking offer the ability to make sense of how contributions can deliver impact within complex and multistakeholder landscapes, including actors within the humanitarian market. “Designerly ways” imply that designers arrive at the final products, services, and organizational/policy changes through a wide range of methods, tools, and processes that are combined with a mindset that reduce bias in their decision-making while solving problems. Humanitarian design and humanitarian innovation both aim at reaching the “end users” of humanitarian action. This is a complex goal, as humanitarian end users such as refugees, especially in the contexts of low income and least developed countries, are often vulnerable and marginalized, in the sense that they are most often deprived of rights such as free movement or workers’ and educational rights. In other settings they can have different legal rights; in other words, they do not form a homogeneous group yet are often the target of “one-size-fits-all” innovations. As in humanitarian innovation, humanitarian design involves thorough assessments and insight gathering; prototyping and testing in-field; follow-up and evaluation processes; and business models that take into account the local market, existing services, and power relations. However, while humanitarian designers emphasize contextual approaches by adapting or designing with end users (Green 2005), humanitarian innovation focuses more strongly on identifying theories of change (Sandvik 2017) and on the structural changes needed for humanitarian aid to deliver impact.

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## Humanitarian Soldier

Humanitarianly legitimized military interventions in global crisis zones, zones breeding instability—large-scale violence, sickness, military treats, and displacement—have become normalized in the post-Cold War era. Particularly after 9/11, humanitarianism has become multifariously entangled with the outright political and strategic international objectives of state actors. Many researchers have argued that during this time the so-called liberal Western states began to use humanitarian rationale, rhetoric, and practices as tools to advance their strategic objectives in global politics (Barnett 2011; Chandler 2002; Douzinas 2007). This trajectory fortified the collaboration and cooption between military and humanitarian actors, resulting in a blurring of the line between military, state, and humanitarian action and actors.

As a result of the politicization and militarization of humanitarianism, the operational environment in conflict areas has changed. The blurring of the boundaries between humanitarian non-governmental organizations and other actors—state, military, and counter insurgency—and their agendas in conflict zones has resulted in the shrinking of “humanitarian space.” Thus, the credibility of the neutrality of humanitarian actors and respect for humanitarian law has also decreased, ensuring an increased level of violence targeting

humanitarian workers and a decline in the access of vulnerable populations to aid (Acuto 2014). Moreover, the public imaginary and people's conceptions of and expectations regarding foreign conflict, crisis zones, and humanitarian/military presence in areas of action have also witnessed changes. The cooption and closer collaboration of humanitarianism and militarism have given birth to a figure that appropriately encapsulates and embodies the global politics of the politicized humanitarian system and the logics of the new wars: the humanitarian soldier.

The figure of the humanitarian soldier is apparent in the legitimizing speeches and the official and public relations contexts of post-9/11 military operations, and such a figure often becomes most apparent in visual form. The figure of the contemporary soldier employed in global crisis areas incorporates the physical and visual features of a humanitarian worker and a strong militarized soldier rolled into one, and therefore they corporally embody the merging of humanitarian and military action. For example, material released by the multinational NATO-led International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan characterizes the key features of the new humane soldiers in global crisis zones. The ISAF soldiers are pictured as armed with state-of-the-art military equipment and presented as strong and determined in their fight against the Taliban. Yet, in addition to this, the soldiers are habitually shown distributing humanitarian aid, providing health care, tutoring local populations, helping to reconstruct the war-ravaged country, and humanely communicating and interacting with the locals (Kotilainen 2016).

Humanitarian soldiers embody the military-humanitarian ethos of post-9/11 global politics, and they represent the strong, care-giving, moral, yet militarized power of the "international community" and the "West" and of the "humanitarian international order" (Barnett 2010) at work on the ground in global crisis zones (De Lauri 2019; Kotilainen 2016). This figure, in public relations use, aspires to make Western warfare seem humane and conducted in accordance with the moral legitimization for such interventions. The humanitarian soldier is therefore well suited to winning over the hearts and minds of the domestic populations of the warring states. Furthermore, in addition to these deliberate objectives, the strong, militarized, yet compassionate soldiers create a symbolic contrast with the local, less-developed objects in need of help and tutelage, an image that embodies strong colonial undertones and poignantly echoes contemporary global hierarchies (Kotilainen 2016).

The humanitarian soldier is also deployed in non-military operations, for example in the massive intervention by the United States in Haiti after the 2010



earthquake, or in the intervention to help fight the West African Ebola epidemic of 2014–2015.

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## Humanitarian War

In the post- World War II period, the newly created (1945) United Nations (UN) was hesitant to approve the idea of military intervention by a member state in the sovereign land of another member state, even in the case of alarming humanitarian situations. During the Cold War, geopolitics played an important role in rendering the UN Security Council ineffective as member states turned a blind eye to human rights violations of their political allies around the world (Roberts 1993).

The principle of non-intervention was the dominant norm within the UN system until the late 1980s, and member states would be expected to justify their interventionist actions based on the UN Charter's chapter concerning "threat to the international peace and security" so as not to receive condemnation and pushback from the UN (Vincent 2015). Yet, between World War II and the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed interstate wars (e.g. the Korean and Vietnam wars), political interventions through coup d'états (e.g. Nicaragua,

Greece, Chile, and Turkey), and proxy wars (e.g. the Congo Crisis and Angolan Civil War) organized by powerful states, most actively by the United States (USA) and a number of western European states.

Despite the UN's reluctance to endorse military interventions, the idea of "just war" in contemporary politics was subtly consolidated during the Cold War era through the foreign policy of the USA, the Truman Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Carter Doctrine, as well as European policies for the post-colonial governance of former colonies (De Lauri 2019a). After the end of the Cold War, the idea of "humanitarian war" as the massive use of armed force in the name of humanitarianism proliferated globally (De Lauri 2019b). Humanitarian military interventions in Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) were all backed by the UN Security Council through missions, resolutions, and peace-keeping operations, and gathered significant support from civil society groups associated with the (new) left of the post-Cold War era, at least until the devastating consequences of these humanitarian wars unfolded. International law provided not legality but a certain degree of legitimacy to most of the foreign military interventions, on the grounds that they were implemented to end genocides, civil wars, and human rights violations in situations of state failure or tyranny (Chesterman 2002).

Between the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, both humanitarians and activists assumed and claimed autonomy, neutrality, and independence for humanitarian engagements around the world to deliver "global *pietas*" and to defend human rights. At the same time, the world witnessed a growing overlapping between compassion and war (De Lauri 2019a; Pandolfi and Rousseau 2016). A surprising number of leftist scholars and activists, some of whom became fervent supporters of the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), were convinced that mass atrocities, incidents of genocide, and massive abuses of human rights around the world needed to be stopped through armed interventions for the sake of humanity (Çubukçu 2018). Therefore, in the 21st century, humanitarian war has become synonymous to war-making (and vice versa), and integral to understanding the changing economic, geopolitical, and warfare organization in the world. While the legitimacy of humanitarian wars continues to be a matter of fierce legal debate in policy and scholarly circles, humanitarianism has proven to be a complex enterprise embedded into the political economy of the organization of warfare (Duffield 2014).

Introducing humanitarianism into warfare, under the banner of "humanitarian war," at the end of the 20th century coincided with the global restructuring of power and hegemony, the changing nature of geopolitical competition, the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, and the increasing complexity of state

organization/mobilization for warfare (Malesevic 2010; Duffield 2014). The innovation of defining militarism as humanitarianism and war as peace has been used to legitimate the protracted presence of foreign armies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria in the first two decades of the 21st century, with the increasingly visible presence of militaries, businesses, and humanitarians from the non-Western world as well, more specifically Russia, China, Turkey, and the oil-rich Arabian Gulf countries, which are altering the Western-dominated international system of security (Snetkov and Lanteigne 2015; Ziadah 2019).

Humanitarian war has normalized the extraordinary circumstances of war by turning large swathes of lands in the Global South into sites of “emergency,” “recovery,” “stabilization,” and “reconstruction,” where the legal and illegal/extrajudicial networks of warfare, humanitarian assistance, business, trade, banking, trafficking, and smuggling are all entangled through increasingly sophisticated and securitized new technologies (Andreas 2008; Duffield 2014; Kaldor 2012; Nordstrom 2004).

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## Humanitarian–development Nexus

Strengthening the humanitarian–development nexus and overcoming long-standing attitudinal, institutional, and funding obstacles was identified as a top priority at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (OCHA 2017). However, this is a challenging aim in fragile states and cases of protracted conflict, in which the majority of the world's poor live (IDS 2018).

The nexus refers to the transition or overlap between the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the provision of long-term development assistance. While this may appear as a logical shift from one type of assistance to another, it implies a number of challenges (Hanatani, Gómez, and Kawaguchi 2018), especially if there is no linear development from humanitarian assistance to development aid or there is a need for simultaneous provision of both types of assistance in a given area, country, or region. There are different temporalities inherent to international humanitarianism and development, which are always the product of the particular historical–political spaces in which international organizations operate (Brun 2016). Issues to be considered include the aim and type of the assistance provided, who provides it and through which channels, and the degree of expected government and community involvement and decision-making power. Recently, scholars and practitioners have critically scrutinized the link between security (or rather securitization policies) and humanitarian–development assistance (Hinds 2015).

The starting point, and main dividing line, is the formal distinction between humanitarian assistance and development assistance. Humanitarian assistance, and those delivering it, has to comply with the four humanitarian principles approved by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 58/114 of 2004: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence (OCHA

2012). Development assistance is not defined as neutral and independent, but rather aims to meet a country's (and the donors) political priorities and longer-term development plans.

The humanitarian principles derive from the core principles guiding the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent societies. A large number of non-governmental organizations have signed up to a Code of Conduct for disaster relief and a set of Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is assigned to mobilize and coordinate principled humanitarian action. In practice, politics of negotiation and humanitarian diplomacy between state and non-state actors play a key role in determining when, where, and how aid is delivered (De Lauri 2018).

Development assistance and actors depend on approval from a national government and assistance is expected to be planned and delivered in accordance with national development priorities and plans and in collaboration with and coordinated by national and local authorities. A number of specialized UN agencies are involved, in addition to the UN Development Programme and frequently the World Bank and various other development banks.

The volume, cost, and length of humanitarian assistance provision has, according to OCHA (2017), grown dramatically since 2017, in large part owing to the protracted nature of crises and the blurred distinctions between the two types of assistance. Interagency humanitarian appeals now last an average of seven years, which extends the timeframe of many development programs, and the size of appeals has increased nearly 400 percent during this period. At the same time, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals have set out not just to meet (humanitarian) needs, but also to reduce risk, vulnerability, and overall levels of need, and thus provide a reference frame for both humanitarian and development actors.

So far, this has been difficult to achieve, and the humanitarian–development nexus remains a significant conceptual division (Zetter 2014) of the longstanding attitudinal, institutional, and funding differences that will require a major reform of the UN system to achieve.

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## Humanity

The term “humanity” forms one of the four core principles of humanitarian assistance alongside neutrality, impartiality, and independence (DuBois 2018). As such, it has become enshrined as a humanitarian principle implying a consensus understanding of its definition as a form of collective belonging. While it is deployed politically to appeal for humanitarian aid, its ideological force derives from how it masks asymmetrical power relations and the consequent harm that humanitarian missions can impart. In the global humanitarian discourse, the term has become a strategic rhetorical device used to gain support for such endeavors. In his critique of humanitarian missions, Didier Fassin (2011) acknowledges how such assistance is framed as a “noble” pursuit, for it seeks to ameliorate the impoverished conditions of others. However, this very impulse subjugates, establishing a relation of domination between those who give over those who receive. Thus, Fassin characterizes humanitarianism as a system of governance that reproduces this inequity.

The problem of inequity is a reoccurring strain throughout scholarship that interrogates the notion of humanity as a collective ideal and a natural state. Samara Esmeir (2012) notes that in Egypt the shaping of the human “subject” was performed through the institution of legal reforms that sought to distinguish between the “civility” of the law and the barbarity of colonial violence. However, Esmeir’s work shows that the law itself did not secure a common humanity for its subjects, but rather subjugated Egyptians and perpetrated a

new form of violence by inscribing their humanity into the teleology of the law (Esmeir 2012). The law thus became a means of bifurcating citizens between legally recognized “humans” and “nonhuman” entities illegible to the Egyptian legal system. This conundrum is what Esmeir defines as “juridical humanity,” which enabled a particular legal visibility for certain subjects while producing the erasure of others. Noting the continual discrepancies between the constructed nature of the category of “human” and the “non-human” subjects it seems to engender, the extent to which humanity is deemed a universal condition is undoubtedly an aspirational stance.

In Neda Atanasoski’s criticism of the liberal humanist paradigm, she posits that humanity is a term deployed by the United States (USA) in the postsocialist era to signal the “resolution” of its violent legacy of colonialism, genocide, and racism. By promoting a false representation of an inclusive multicultural society in order to shield its imperialist agenda, the USA positions its military campaigns as a form of global moral stewardship (Atanasoski 2013). This agenda is apparent in the strategic use of “freedom” and “democracy” as justifications for military interventions, through which the USA applies a neocolonial “civilizing” discourse that characterizes non-Western subjects as anachronistic and in need of liberation. These ideological forces often play out within the context of humanitarian wars; and, as Antonio De Lauri states, such wars “are a primary means of globally affirming a specific model of humanity, one that is built according to the cultural, moral, and economic standards of Western democracies” (De Lauri 2019: 48).

The universalizing language that underpins the term “humanity” in support of humanitarian campaigns conducted by non-governmental organizations employs a different set of intentions. Benevolence, altruism, and compassion constitute the driving force of such missions, which aim to alleviate the suffering of those in crisis. As Marc DuBois states, “humanity focuses humanitarian action on the urgency of the immediate needs of *people*, not the needs of a system, even if ultimately it is that system that must deal with those needs in the long term. More deeply, humanity steeps humanitarian action in the dignity of each individual” (DuBois 2018: 7). While DuBois is concerned with recognizing the limitations of humanitarian actions and ensuring a bottom-up approach to long-term structural change, his use of the term “humanity” suggests that even in its invocation it can produce a more nuanced and authentic recognition of subjects in need.

One productive way in which to approach the term humanity is to recognize its perpetual politicization, prompting scholars to analyze the hierarchies in which the term itself is deployed. This endeavor becomes exceptionally pertinent when boundaries are actively drawn between different social groups

through rhetoric concerning national and tribal affiliations, religious practices, cultural norms, class stratifications, and gendered, racial, or ethnic categories. These classifications and other practices of identification can work to marginalize any given social group. In these instances, recognizing an individual or a collective's humanity becomes the arbiter of who can enter the domain of citizenship and be afforded sovereign protection, who can access and benefit from the institutions of housing, health care, education, or employment, and who is prone to violence, incarceration, or execution. In considering the binary of inclusion and exclusion, Giorgio Agamben's (1998) theory of *homo sacer* is a useful rubric by which to recognize that humanity is often understood as those that are afforded social protection over and against those who are cast out from society and can be killed with impunity. Thus, the term "humanity" is as much entrenched in the enactment of social divisions and exposure to violence as it is in aspiring to imagine a coherent, secure, and unified social whole.

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## Impartiality

Impartiality is one of the most well-known humanitarian principles, which were first declared in 1965 by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (OCHA 2012). Impartiality means that humanitarian aid should be



strictly given to those who need it most, and there should be no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religion, or political beliefs. Impartiality is thus closely related to the humanitarian principle of humanity, which enshrines humanitarian aid's universal humanism. It is also closely related to the principle of neutrality, meaning that humanitarian actors should not take political or controversial positions, or take sides in a conflict. Further, impartiality is closely related to the humanitarian practice of needs assessment, which is a survey of a disaster-affected population, to determine where the most urgent humanitarian needs lie.

Most large humanitarian organizations, whether non-governmental, faith-based, or associated with the United Nations, officially adhere to the humanitarian principles, including impartiality. On paper, acting impartially appears simple. Programs and projects can be easily designed according to impartiality, by including needs-assessments or by developing categories of people who are understood to be the most in need, for example.

However, in practice, impartiality is a very difficult principle to operationalize. This is primarily because of the complex political and social environment that humanitarian organizations work in and a lack of prior understanding of this complex environment. This means that organizations might misunderstand who most urgently requires aid or may have a different view on aid prioritization than the disaster-affected population. Access is another important factor that can inhibit impartiality because organizations may not be able to reach those in the greatest need. Such lack of access can be geographical, but also social—for example, when vulnerable persons are too poor or discriminated against to participate in needs assessments or simply remain invisible to aid agencies. Humanitarian agencies can also face significant pressure to distribute aid quickly or according to project deadlines, and in such cases, impartiality may be compromised. Despite their intentions to act impartially, humanitarian organizations are therefore quite frequently accused of being biased or distributing aid in an unfair way (Krähenbühl 2013).

The international designation of some political groups as terrorist organizations has provided another complication for impartial aid distribution, as it criminalizes aid provision to these groups. Providing aid to both sides in a conflict can also create pragmatic hurdles, for example when it compromises the safety of organizations or inhibits its ability to carry out the humanitarian negotiations that are required to ensure access to vulnerable groups.

Impartiality, similar to other principles of international humanitarian action, can perhaps be best understood “as a complex rule that requires interpretation in practice” (Green 2017). Many large organizations have analyzed how they operate and interpret the humanitarian principles, and a number of “best

practice” reports and field experiences can be found in their publications (Labbé and Daudin 2015).

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## Independence

Along with humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, independence is a core humanitarian principle: “Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented” (OCHA 2012). Therefore, in its ideal configuration, humanitarianism aims at independence, for it is guided only by the aim to alleviate human suffering and save lives. Yet, wherever humanitarian action is promoted and conducted, a major concern that humanitarian organizations and practitioners have to face is the risk of manipulation by political, military, private, and religious actors.

Independence as a term situates humanitarian action in opposition to dependency, subjection, and domination. As a humanitarian principle, it is a product of “history, ethical imagination, and practical considerations” (Barnett and Weiss 2011: 109). Independence, like the principle of neutrality, is foundational in the pursuit of maintaining an apolitical impression of humanitarianism. Remaining aside, independent from politics, is an active strategy to create humanitarian space. Herein humanitarian issues are seen either as outside of

politics or the lowest common denominator between different politics, or even as diplomacy's "ground zero" (Paulmann 2013; Egeland 2013).

Maintaining humanitarian independence is a complex task. As a core principle and key operational strategy, independence is endorsed by those humanitarian actors refusing to accept resources (i.e. funding and donations) that might produce a conditionality compromising the actor's autonomy, either in scale or objectives (Minear 2002). In the context of complex emergencies and long-term conflicts, there have been several attempts by governmental, para-state, and armed groups at subordinating humanitarian goals to political ones (Donini 2011). However, humanitarian actors themselves may be inclined, in some circumstances, to accommodate or use political reasons and means to negotiate and deliver humanitarian aid, and at times to influence the course of events in conflict or post-disaster settings.

There are several other factors that may jeopardize the ambition for independence, for example the pressures of donors' agendas, the growing role of the private sector (from pharmaceutical corporations to agricultural industries and from insurance companies to service providers), the influence of broader goals (for instance in the case of faith-based humanitarian organizations) or simply the difficulty of handling the complexity of specific circumstances.

Independence is advocated particularly by some so-called traditional humanitarian actors. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) publicly speak against the instrumentalization of humanitarianism—although what happens in humanitarian practice is often the result of compromises and negotiations (De Lauri 2018). Other humanitarian actors are more directly involved in broad political projects such as promoting democracy, overthrowing a regime, or contributing to post-war reconstruction (Mascarenhas 2017). This indicates that the geography of humanitarian interventions and the variety of actors in the realm of humanitarianism are continuously redefining the interpretation of core humanitarian principles, including independence, and the way they are promoted and/or contested. Rather than being discussed ontologically as a single system, humanitarianism is best understood in plural terms with several independent and dependent interests at stake (Barnett and Weiss 2011).

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## Indicators

Indicators are used to describe and measure different aspects of humanitarian aid. Humanitarian indicators fall into three distinct categories: situation indicators, response monitoring indicators, and impact indicators. Situation indicators track the effect a crisis has on both the affected population and infrastructure and services. They can either explain what the current situation is (baseline indicators) or explain what is required in crisis-affected areas (needs indicators). Response monitoring indicators consist of input, outcome, and output indicators. Input indicators show the financial and human resources provided for the response, outcome indicators measure the delivery of goods and services to affected populations towards the achievement of a particular outcome, and output indicators measure the likely or achieved effects of an intervention. Impact indicators measure the medium- to long-term results of an intervention (NATF 2012).

Gathering primary data for measuring progress using humanitarian indicators is often not feasible because of the inherent difficulties in collecting data during the acute phase of humanitarian emergencies and the ethical issues that surround conducting research when civilians are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. However, it may be possible to gather secondary data

for situation indicators from government data sources, such as the national census. In chronic humanitarian crises, primary data collection is often more feasible. However, secondary data may be outdated owing to the absence of functioning government statistical agencies (UNFPA 2010).

There are numerous established sources of humanitarian indicators. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs runs a humanitarian indicator registry, a repository of indicators that are used in all stages of a humanitarian crisis. The Sphere Project, launched in 1997, is another key source of indicators for measuring humanitarian response. The Sphere Handbook provides a set of core minimum standards related to water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, food security and nutrition, shelter, settlement and non-food items, and health action. Sphere indicators are designed to measure whether these minimum standards have been attained. The 2011 edition of the handbook includes 48 minimum standards and 159 indicators. An assessment of the 2011 edition of the Sphere Handbook found that standards and indicators were not robust enough, and that measurement definitions were unclear, leaving room for interpretation (Frison, Smith, and Blanchet 2018). Moreover, Sphere indicators are not always appropriate, as there are times when humanitarian indicators need to be contextualized. For example, in some cases minimum standards are above existing living conditions in a country and thus the minimum standard has to be lowered to be attainable, with the reverse also holding true. A new edition of the Sphere Handbook was published in 2018.

While indicators are important for learning lessons and improving professional practices, too great an emphasis on indicators and technical discussions can detract from genuine focus on crisis-affected communities. Donor reporting requirements have become increasingly stringent, owing to increased emphasis on “value for money” and a desire for greater accountability. While these are important considerations, too many indicators can be onerous for implementing partners. This is because of the increased paperwork required and the fact that they draw human resources away from operational capacity without necessarily increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian response (Satterthwaite 2010; DARA 2013). The fact that different donors have different reporting requirements compounds this issue. There is therefore a need for donors to harmonize their reporting requirements and to strike the right balance between ensuring accountability and maintaining operational capacity (DARA 2013).

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## Innocence

Calls for humanitarian interventions are often based on the urgent need to protect “innocent lives” (i.e. civilians under attack, refugees, trafficked victims, and—especially—vulnerable children). In a recent report, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, CEO of Save the Children and former Prime Minister of Denmark, made a passionate plea to stop the suffering of children affected by war: “These children have seen and experienced things no child ever should: their homes burnt, their families killed and their *innocence* stolen” (Save the Children International 2018).

As a moral and ethical concept, innocence refers to the absence of guilt, moral wrongdoing, and responsibility. Either as a sinless, pre-fall, Garden-of-Eden condition in Judeo-Christian theology or as the pre-social “state of nature” in modern Enlightenment philosophy, the notion of innocence that historically shapes humanitarian sensitivity designates an apolitical status of “epistemic and moral purity” (Ticktin 2017: 578), uncorrupted and uncontaminated by power, and best epitomized by children. Addressing children’s suffering through the trope of “stolen innocence,” humanitarianism can thus claim to operate beyond political logics.

Questioning the cross-cultural universality of the concept and its supposed apolitical character, critical social scientists have argued that the humanitarian mobilization of innocence produces profoundly political consequences as it sets oversimplifying dichotomic boundaries between “the innocent” and “the guilty” and establishes ethnocentric hierarchies of moral deservingness between “differently innocent” victims (Fassin 2010). During the 2015 European

migration reception crisis, for instance, children and (pregnant) women were granted priority access to humanitarian protection as archetypical figures of innocence in the West. Some male migrants purposely made themselves seriously injured or sick to qualify as defenseless and innocent (enough) for protection, while boatmen were assigned the position of ruthless, cold-blooded “human traffickers”—though many of them may be family members, friends, or part of migrant communities in a similar situation to the migrants themselves (Ticktin 2015).

Similarly, not all children are considered equally innocent, and the dividing line between innocence and culpability can be blurred, creating contradictions. The massive involvement of children as combatants in conflict zones, from Somalia to Myanmar, from Yemen to Syria, has scandalously contaminated the purity of childhood innocence and generated moral panic. At the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), major humanitarian organizations lobbied to prevent any child perpetrator below 18 years of age from being prosecuted or punished for war crimes in the country’s United Nations special court. As a result, former child soldiers were inserted in socio-rehabilitation programs, including special schools, vocational training, and child protection structures. This generated a widespread sense of injustice among those survivors who saw the killers of their family members—who were now recategorized as innocent victims—being granted greater access to the limited postwar development funds (Rosen 2007).

Humanitarian organizations’ own “innocence”—namely their neutrality, impartiality, and independence from the “corrupted realm” of politics—is also increasingly challenged by the inescapable necessity to interact, negotiate, and mingle with a plurality of political actors in complex emergencies. Aid agencies involved in peace-keeping operations or post-disaster reconstructions have to cooperate with national governments and military forces, while subcontracting to other non-governmental organizations and local organizations to deliver services. In fact, providing relief to afflicted victims does not occur in a political vacuum (Weiss 2007) and, despite official rhetoric, it often forces humanitarians to act outside the framework of innocence.

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## Innovation

In November 2009, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance held an innovation fair introducing the notion of innovation as a key category within the humanitarian system (Betts and Bloom 2014). Since then, innovation has been the subject and focus of attention in the humanitarian policy agenda, within and across organizations. Additionally, special funds and partnerships, so-called “innovation units,” have been developed by several United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, governments, the military, and businesses (UNHCR 2015; McDonald et al. 2017). Although the notion itself remains poorly understood in many international debates (Bloom and Betts 2013) and its “meaning and value remain contested” (Betts and Bloom 2014: 5), humanitarian innovation has been embraced as a strategic concern for organizations and the humanitarian field as a whole (Scriven 2016). Broadly put, humanitarian innovation refers to “a means of adaptation and improvement through finding and scaling solutions to problems, in the forms of products, processes or wider business models” (Betts and Bloom 2014: 5) with the aim of transforming the operations, management, methods, and partnerships of organizations (Scriven 2016).

The emerging discussion about the term draws mainly on the traditional understandings and models from management theory (Scriven 2016). While the concept of “novation” first appeared in the 13th century as a legal category signifying imitation, it later developed into the term “innovation,” which endorses “the concept of a new idea being scaled over time” (Godin quoted in Bloom and Betts 2013: 5). In the first studies that treated innovation as an independent subject of analysis, it was correlated with theories of diffusion, the manner by which ideas are adopted by people, and with business management,



which aims at creating advantages for profit in the global market (Bloom and Betts 2013). The importance of humanitarian innovation has been linked to its capacity to change the trajectory of humanitarian assistance allowing for improvement, and therefore the opportunity to overcome programmatic and operational obstacles (Scriven 2016) in categories including grants and finance, research and development, and/or collaborations and networks (Betts and Bloom 2014).

However, precisely because humanitarian innovation's processes rely heavily on learning and readaptation to aimed results as its "causal pathway for change is unknown" (Obrecht 2017: 6), it introduces untested technologies and methods into unstable environments, making their potential harm and long-term consequences invisible to aid recipients and communities alike (McDonald et al. 2017). Here, innovation's "effectiveness" is permeated by the desirability of transformative and radical change "to both what humanitarian actors do and how they do it," consequently creating or increasing risk (Sandvik 2017: 7; see also Ramalingam et al. 2015). As such, alliances and partnerships fostering innovation are forged in the vein of new technological transformations focused on automation/artificial intelligence and data exchange. These innovations can only be unraveled as outcomes of a (fourth) industrial revolution "offering entirely new capabilities for people and machines and ways in which technology becomes embedded within societies" (RobotWorx 2018). Specific technologies such as blockchain or robotics/automation systems contain values and assumptions held by those who produce them (Forsythe and Hess 2002), not only impacting efficiency and productivity (WeRobotics 2018) but fundamentally redefining the boundaries of the humanitarian field (Downey, Dumit, and Williams 2013).

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## International Cooperation

International cooperation is a necessary element of humanitarian action and has been integral to humanitarian aid from its earliest beginnings. International cooperation can take many forms, be carried out between a large number of actors, and take place on different levels (El Taraboulsi et al. 2016). Cooperation does not necessarily involve state authorities. Depending on the context within which humanitarian aid is delivered, it may take place via, for example, a partnership between a small non-governmental organization (NGO) located in the Global South and a large NGO in the Global North. It may involve militias, private businesses, donors, NGO field staff, NGO headquarters, and the head of a village or a ministry. International cooperation is carried out both within complex, high-level diplomatic meetings and day-to-day interactions between, for example, expatriate and national staff in the field.

In the context of large-scale humanitarian emergencies that involve a number of different actors, international cooperation happens on a multitude of scales. For example, while the European Union's Emergency Response Coordination Center responds to a request from the disaster-affected country's civil protection authorities (European Commission 2019), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) may be searching for implementing partners among national NGOs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross may be negotiating access with an armed group (Janmyr 2018). At the

same time, the director of a national NGO may be responding to a call for projects by a specific NGO consortium that is helping her understand specific donor requirements. Thus, international cooperation takes place between aid providers and host states and societies, but also among aid providers from different countries.

The reasons for international cooperation are similarly varied. First, international cooperation ensures that providers of foreign aid have a legal basis for their presence abroad and are present at the request of host-state authorities. Secondly, cooperation is required to ensure an effective coordination between a large number of multinational aid providers and host state and society. Thirdly, cooperation is needed to agree on approaches to aid delivery that are acceptable to all stakeholders involved in the aid effort (Di Iorio and Zeuthen 2011). International cooperation can take place around questions of resources (e.g. when host states provide land for refugee camps built by UNHCR), of access (e.g. when armed actors agree to ceasefires to allow aid into conflict zones), and also questions of cultural or political interests. As a bedrock of humanitarian aid, international cooperation occurs throughout and on all levels of the aid delivery process. Yet it is constantly subject to challenges related to, for example, unequal power relations within the international system, coercive measures implemented by powerful state actors, power imbalances, or the right to reject aid. When foreign actors deliver aid abroad without the cooperation of the host country, this mostly has negative results: aid delivery may become chaotic, and at worst it may be considered a hostile act.

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## International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law (IHL) is a part of public international law that addresses the limits of acceptable conduct in armed conflict (Crawford and Pert 2015; Clapham and Gaeta 2014). In its underlying assumptions and ideology, IHL is related to human rights as the individual is at the core of both, as opposed to states that form the primary subjects of international law. Both human rights and international humanitarian law aim to find different ways of protecting the individual. Yet their temporality and overall vision of human nature are fundamentally different. While human rights ideology is forward-looking and utopian, international humanitarian law keeps its gaze fixed on the past record of violence and warfare that has characterized much of human history. This record is treated as offering evidence of fundamental characteristics of human nature, namely that such acts are endemic and inevitable, and by extension seen as impossible to eradicate for good. Thus, the main purpose of IHL is to create tools and standards for governing this part of human nature and human conduct, so as to restrict harm and destruction in the inevitable case of violent outbreaks.

IHL can be classified under two distinct trajectories, namely the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. Each term refers to a cluster of treaties and declarations while also having distinct emphases: the Hague Conventions articulate acceptable methods of warfare, conduct of hostilities, and occupation, while the Geneva Conventions are directed at protecting the individual, civilians during warfare as well as injured combatants. Laws to govern warfare have long roots that date back centuries, if not millennia. The basis of current codification goes back to the 19th century and to agreements between states, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The major part of IHL is contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, complemented by the Additional Protocols of 1977 that relate to the protection of victims of armed conflicts. Both documents have broad international applicability. The two branches of law covered in the Hague and Geneva Conventions are further developed by the first two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians (1977). These are referred to as Additional Protocol I (AP I), which governs international armed conflict, and Additional Protocol II (AP II), which governs non-international armed conflict.

Initially, IHL only applied to international armed conflict (IAC), and thus excluded internal tensions and disturbances. Yet Protocol II (adopted in 1977 and entered into force in 1978) of the Geneva Convention extended IHL to non-international armed conflict. The definition of IAC is found in Article Two,

which is common to the four Geneva Conventions: this states that the rules of IAC apply to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” Thus, IAC can only be between two or more sovereign states (Dinstein 2016). A situation in which a foreign power sends troops into a territory to support a local movement is also considered an international armed conflict (GC Art. 2(2)). Additional Protocol I extends the field of application to “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” (API, Art. 1(4)).

IHL aims to address and restrict harm towards both participants in hostilities and civilians. At the core of IHL are two principles: that persons who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities must be protected; and that the right of parties in an armed conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited. On these bases, IHL is further divided into two main branches. *Jus ad bellum* refers to the conditions under which a state may resort to the use of warfare, loosely referring to armed attack and aggression. Such acts are generally prohibited today, save for two exceptions: self-defense and United Nations authorization. *Jus in bellum* refers to rules applying in the case of armed conflicts, protecting persons who are not participating in the hostilities, as well as restricting the means and methods of warfare (Solis 2016).

The law goes into effect once armed conflict has commenced and applies to all sides of a conflict irrespective of who has initiated it. IHL includes regulations on the treatment of prisoners of war, combatant status, and rules regulating the conduct of hostilities and humanitarian access and assistance to certain categories of vulnerable persons. Vulnerable persons include wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (GC I); wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (GC II); prisoners of war (GC III); and protected civilians (GC IV). The latter is particularly relevant to humanitarian protection and assistance, and was established to prevent in future conflicts the scale of civilian suffering experienced during the two World Wars.

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## International Organizations

The term international organization is most frequently associated with inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization, or the International Labour Organization. International organizations are generally comprised of sovereign states, although other entities can also apply to become members. They are, by their nature, multilateral. The International Law Commission defines an international organization as an “organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality” (ILC 2011). It is important to distinguish between intergovernmental organizations, which are the focus of this entry, and international non-governmental organizations, which are not established by intergovernmental agreement, are non-profit in nature and must adhere to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Willets 2001). The International Committee of the Red Cross has a unique legal status, similar to that of intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, while not being intergovernmental in nature.

International humanitarian organizations including the UN and the International Organization for Migration, which became a “Related Organization” of the UN in 2016, are generally well funded. This is largely because most donors continue to prefer to channel aid through these organizations, rather than giving it directly to other implementing organizations. This is because intergovernmental organizations are perceived as having greater capacity to manage large volumes of funds, and greater knowledge and expertise. In 2016, for example, 60 percent of all direct government humanitarian funding went to multilateral organizations. In contrast, non-governmental organizations received just 20 percent of direct government funding (Development Initiatives 2018).

International humanitarian organizations adopt different approaches to emergency and aid, and are subject to different mandates and restrictions. The UN is exempt from some key international legislation governing humanitarian

relief operations. For example, humanitarian operations that are undertaken as a result of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution are exempt from requiring consent from the parties involved. The UNSC “may adopt binding measures requiring parties to an armed conflict, and other relevant states, to consent to humanitarian relief operations or impose such operations on parties” (Akande and Gillard 2016: 18). Syria is an example of this: UNSC Resolution 2165 (2014) constituted a binding decision that UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners were authorized to provide humanitarian relief to conflict-affected populations. In this case, consent from the parties to the armed conflict was not required (Akande and Gillard 2016).

The UN often uses integrated missions in crisis-affected countries. However, at least some degree of political consensus is required for this approach to work. Moreover, when engaging in peace-keeping and peace-building missions, their legitimacy to coordinate humanitarian response may be compromised “as they are bringing humanitarian response within the all-encompassing strategy of stabilization” (DARA 2013: 5).

Humanitarian international organizations also face political limitations when it comes to humanitarian response. In Syria, for instance, the UN can only operate within the Syrian government’s mandate and with its consent. The UN’s presence in Damascus and its cooperation with the government have led to distrust among partners in opposition areas. This has had a negative impact on the organization’s ability to deliver an effective humanitarian response (Independent Commission for Aid Impact 2018).

Despite efforts to improve coordination within the UN system, challenges persist. Agencies often compete rather than collaborate. There are instances of different agencies running parallel efforts, an example being during the early years of the Syrian refugee crisis, when agencies failed to coordinate their response (Mansour 2017; Kelley 2017).

A number of UN agencies increasingly “outsource” their work to local contractors and organizations. This reduces contact between those providing assistance and crisis-affected communities. Contact is also an issue in relation to understanding the needs of local populations and in terms of taking local context into account. Although some progress has been made, further efforts are required in this regard (DARA 2013).

International organizations have much to offer in terms of humanitarian response. However, continued efforts are needed to address some of the challenges outlined here and to maximize the effectiveness of their engagement in crisis-affected contexts.

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## Livelihoods

In the humanitarian world, livelihoods are activities that allow people to secure the basic necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing (UNHCR 2014: 1). The term has historically drawn special attention as it is widely employed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations agencies dealing with development and relief in rural and urban environments. The frequently protracted nature of crises produced by human-made conflict or natural disasters has ended up placing greater emphasis on refugee capacity to develop coping mechanisms and self-reliance, which have now gained great momentum in international debates. In fact, during the 1960s and 1970s the strategy of targeting refugees around the world by humanitarian livelihoods-programming changed from the care and maintenance of refugees to a self-reliance formula. In the same vein, the language of “resilient” (Reid 2012) or “sustainable” livelihoods (Chambers and Conway 1992) has placed further responsibility to survive and thrive on the beneficiaries themselves, based on



the capacity of crisis-affected people to circumvent exclusion with urban- or rural-based methods.

NGOs have primarily used livelihoods to refer to biological life and the way in which individuals or social groups develop means to sustain life in contexts of displacement through access to both employment and services. Nonetheless, NGOs' approaches have nuanced this understanding of livelihoods, which has become a self-standing professional sector, although cutting across humanitarian protection, shelter, labor, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (these three latter often referred to as WASH). The increased importance of livelihoods in the humanitarian sector has paved the way to a common, transnational—but mostly technical—understanding of the term. Against this backdrop, the challenge of translating the word from English into other languages is noteworthy, with several languages borrowing it from English *tout court*. Some languages, Arabic being an example, resort to paraphrases, such as “ways to improve life.” Tentative translations of the term livelihoods play a major role in unfolding the standardized and dehistoricized way in which livelihood strategies have often been exported through humanitarian programming, which is aimed at guaranteeing survival on the basis of local specificities.

Employed in contexts of crisis, where the source of instability, poor infrastructure, hazards, risks, and violence is both political and economic, the term has gradually been redefined in the light of political vulnerabilities and governance deficiencies (Jaspars and Shoham 2002). Since the early 2000s, the culture-specific concept of livelihoods and the process of livelihood-hunting have increasingly concerned practitioners and researchers. For instance, while the term has largely been employed as an individual strategy of developing tactics of survival in crisis-affected contexts, livelihoods can now also entail a collective aspiration (Kaiser 2009) to economic sustainability and self-sufficiency in cultures where family, religious belonging, or household-oriented ways of coping write the real grammar of everyday life.

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## Media

Media plays a central role in shaping the humanitarian field, from mediating and drawing attention to humanitarian crises, to serving as a platform for alerts about unfolding crises, to reporting on the hidden and underlying causes of crises. Media is here broadly understood as both the medium, whether press, radio, or television, as well as online news media and the media actors—the editorial teams and journalists of respective media outlets—who make decisions about events to cover and how to cover them. Social media outlets are increasingly also studied in the framework of media studies, where news is both produced (by social media users) and relayed from other news sources. Different types of media exercise significant power in framing perceptions about the key issues at stake in an emergency setting.

The war in Biafra between 1967 and 1970 led to the emergence of a new visual culture in modern humanitarianism, and the establishment of Médecins Sans Frontières was essentially motivated by the need to “bear witness” (*témoigner*). This mobilized media coverage of the war and the ensuing suffering. Following this, photographic images came to be seen as central to mobilizing Western political attention towards ongoing crises and to ensuring humanitarian access.

Scholarly literature has extensively focused on the role of the media in prioritizing certain humanitarian crises. This literature has debated whether there is a “CNN effect,” or other types of effects, that media coverage of a given situation would have on the political responses and “calls for intervention” (Robinson 2002). In order to assess which political contexts in Western capitals are more or less likely to give the media a decisive role in shaping responses, the focus has been primarily Westerncentric, mainly looking at North American and European media channels and how they portray crises occurring elsewhere.

Media is generally omnipresent in humanitarian studies, even beyond media studies. In the critical literature that discusses what humanitarianism is or should be and its moral underpinnings, the role of the media is either explicitly pointed out or is a background element that mediates the relationship between the external “humanitarian actors” and the victims and “beneficiaries” of humanitarian aid and compassion. Peter Singer (1972) argues that we are as obliged to help a distant stranger in dire need as we are to help somebody in extreme distress who is in close proximity to us—that distance per se does not have any impact. Yet media coverage of such distant suffering is what makes it possible to mobilize funds and aid workers to provide assistance “elsewhere.” Along the same lines, Deen K. Chatterjee, in seeking to make sense of duties to help distant strangers, writes: “Today we live in a world in which spheres of interaction are constantly expanding, while advanced technology makes it easy to reach the distant needy and vividly broadcast their plight to all” (Chatterjee 2004). Lilie Chouliaraki also studies distant suffering and how it is mediated through news media, and emphasizes the “asymmetry of power between the comfort of spectators in their living rooms and the vulnerability of sufferers on the spectator’s television screens” (2006: 4).

Media plays an important role in framing humanitarian crises in certain ways, shaping narratives about ongoing crises and the way they are understood in the public sphere. For this reason, humanitarian organizations rely on mass media to draw attention to otherwise forgotten crises. This, in turn, is seen as the gateway to increased donations and political attention (Powers 2014). At the same time, humanitarian actors are used by journalists to provide factual information, from statistics to broader political context.

The emergence of new technologies has impacted the communication of humanitarian actors, for example with the growing use of social media to share campaign ads and short videos in social-media friendly formats. Such platforms have opened up for online activism, another form of engagement for humanitarian causes, allowing almost anyone to launch their own awareness raising campaigns or crowdfunding for specific causes.

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## Medical Neutrality

Medical neutrality refers to the principle of non-interference with medical services during conflicts and other humanitarian crises. The concept of medical neutrality is grounded in statutes in international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law, and is informed by ethical codes such as the Hippocratic Oath (Bouchet-Saulnier et al. 2013; Roberts and VanRooyen 2013). It requires three things: (1) the protection of and non-interference with the operations of medical facilities, medical transport, and medical personnel; (2) the provision of the best medical care possible to all who need medical attention, combatants and non-combatants alike, regardless of their political affiliation or participation in conflicts and politics; and most generally, (3) the mandate that warring factions both protect and refrain from targeting civilians during conflicts. Numerous non-governmental aid and human rights organizations, United Nations agencies, and state signatories to international laws and treaties support and variably enact the principle of medical neutrality. For example, alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Physicians for Human Rights has led many initiatives to define and enforce medical neutrality.

The four Geneva Conventions, which allude to the idea of medical neutrality, were ratified in 1949. Protocols I and II were added in 1977 to, among other things, specify the meaning of medical neutrality and more generally expand the application of IHL to account for the nature of 20th-century conflicts. Protocol I sets out new rules regarding the treatment of the deceased, the protection and care for civilians and prisoners involved in and affected by conflicts, and the protection of all forms of medical units and personnel. Protocol II adds the protection of victims of non-international and internal armed conflicts to those already covered within the laws of war. These additional protocols

have been ratified by 168 countries, excepting several countries including Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and the United States. Benton and Atshan (2016: 153) argue that these legal and clinical artifacts “were developed in the interests of state power” and serve political ends.

Violations of medical neutrality occur when, for instance, civilians, medical facilities, and medical personnel are deliberately targeted in conflict. In recent years, the armed forces of several countries have repeatedly and deliberately targeted civilian and medical infrastructures such as hospitals and ambulances, and have strategically obstructed and corrupted the flow of medical supplies (Hamdy and Bayoumi 2016). National militaries now undermine the provision of health care to oppositional groups by retaliating against the health professionals who treat the sick and wounded, for example in Syria. Access to populations in need, medical facilities, and medical supplies are sometimes controlled by parties to conflict, forcing humanitarian organizations and medical providers to partner with them and funnel aid through partisan affiliates (Sparrow 2018). While violations of medical neutrality can rise to the level of war crimes, there are few mechanisms to enforce or punish the actors involved. During periods of civil unrest, violations of medical neutrality can infringe important human rights treaties such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture, but again, there are few mechanisms through which victims can seek justice.

There remains a tension between the principle and operational necessity of medical neutrality legally required of state actors and intervening aid organizations, and the principle of medical neutrality and activism on behalf of patients practiced by individuals who provide medical care and protection during humanitarian emergencies (Allhoff 2008). This tension, referred to as “the problem of neutrality” by Peter Redfield (2013), has been central to the differences in missions and practices of organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the ICRC that hire and deploy clinical medical providers during conflicts. Ethnographies of medical care in conflict provide a window into these tensions, and into how medical neutrality is variably socially and politically constructed and debated by different individuals within different aid and donor organizations—especially various medical providers involved in humanitarian response. For example, Hamdy and Bayoumi (2016) and Aciksoz (2016) demonstrate that while clinical providers provide a unique witness to the physical toll of conflict on the bodies of their patients in Egypt and Turkey respectively, these clinicians also use their position as “neutral” actors as a political stance from which to advocate for social and political change. Their neutrality, in these cases, is not apolitical, exceptional, or immune from the

conflicts at hand, but rather explicitly and strategically political and engaged in advocacy on behalf of patients.

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## Mental Health

The nexus of humanitarianism and mental health has gained traction in regard to environmental, political, and epidemiological situations. Humanitarian frameworks of response, assistance, relief, and aid have been operationalized heterogeneously around disruptions to mental health caused by conflict, war, environmental disaster, climate change impacts, poverty, and displacement. The deleterious effects of these factors on clinical and subclinical forms of suffering have been targeted, and the enhanced ability of health services to deliver care has been sought.

Mental health and humanitarianism foster collaborations between social scientists, medical practitioners, lawyers, politicians, anthropologists, and

international development and aid experts. This is important for the framing and practical delivery of mental health needs, for example in recognizing the social and structural origins of mental health, integrating contexts of emergency and crisis into diagnostic practice, and task-sharing in low and high resource situations (Kohrt and Mendenhall 2015). Such collaborations also rightly recognize the complexity of mental health problems in humanitarian situations and the multiple bureaucracies that those seeking mental health care for themselves or others must navigate. The field of medical humanitarianism seeks to harmonize humanitarianism's quest for universals—particularly around the entwining of humanity and human rights with intellectual innovation, comparison, and programmatic delivery—while simultaneously accounting for elements of state sovereignty, geopolitics, socio-political tensions, violence and militarism, and the psychological distress of affected people, including the mental health problems of humanitarian workers, practitioners, and consultants themselves (Abramovitz and Panter-Brick 2015).

The humanitarianism–mental health nexus originated with 19th-century psychiatrists who introduced humanitarian reforms into the treatment of the criminally insane (Khan 2017). This led definitions of mental illness to emerge and expand. A century on, humanitarian “psy-ences” and new subfields, such as humanitarian psychiatry, have emerged, notably through the ideological ascendancy of the psychiatric classification post-traumatic stress disorder. Critics question the political uses of trauma in governing the structures and borders of the international legal system, military and humanitarian interventions, and policies around military populations, displaced people, refugees, and asylum seekers. They identify the hierarchical assumptions in the ways that traumas are selectively denied or recognized in crisis situations (James 2010). Others criticize the ways in which psychiatry and medicine have become entwined with legal doctrines regarding the right to refuge, family life, and protection from persecution. They also criticize how refugee minds and bodies, diagnosed with physical and psychological trauma, become border tools governing a humanitarian gateway to “Western citizenship,” and restrict doctors’ ability to deliver treatment and care (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). These criticisms show us that collaborations between doctors and lawyers, designed to help people in humanitarian crises, are by no means always beneficial.

Regarding conjunctions with humanitarianism and development, the World Health Organization (WHO) was formed in 1948 as a global unified health body to tackle “international health” crises. This meant the world’s richest countries would help the world’s poorest, according to a crude geography based on first, second, and third worlds. The collaboration built on a historical genealogy that largely began with colonial medicine, through associated forms of tropical

medicine and missionary medicine, to international health, global health, and finally global mental health (Farmer, Kim, Kleinman, and Basílico 2013).

Significantly, in 2001, a WHO report highlighting the growing “global burden” of mental disorders stated that “there can be no health without mental health” (WHO 2001). This led to the new Movement for Global Mental Health to urgently call, in 2007, for the scaling-up of mental health services in low- and middle-income countries. Access to health services was framed as a pressing moral imperative, affordable medication as a basic human right, and mental disorders as having universal neurological and biological causes. Critics, on the other hand, have vociferously opposed the increasing overprescription of psychiatric medication, and the neglect of cultural, political, and socio-economic factors involved (Fernando 2014). They raise colonial critiques of Western agenda-setting, the Americanization of distress, and the imperium of Western psychiatry (Watters 2011). In their criticisms of global mental health, anthropologists have made important advances in cultural and global psychiatry, including in the cultural formulation of the world’s largest de facto classification system: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association.

Debating the relationship between intellectual critique and practical action, academics question the cultural limitations of social science as ameliorative practice. They ask how intellectual and moral ideals can be combined with realistic and pragmatic approaches to suffering and sustain a commitment to humanitarian social reform, especially when health systems, the humanitarian industry, and the languages of psychiatric classification are flawed (Wilkinson and Kleinman 2016).

Overcoming implementation challenges has produced numerous multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary approaches to psychosocial and mental health support programs. Notwithstanding, challenges arise in aligning program priorities across sectors, overcoming coordination challenges, reconciling theories and models of change, and obtaining funding.

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## Migration

There is no universally accepted definition of human migration. Consequently, multiple interpretations of the term “migrant” coexist. In its most basic sense, migration can refer to physical movement from one place to another. According to the United Nations, “most experts agree that an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status” (UN 2019). Often, both spatial and temporal dimensions are included in definitions of migration. While people can migrate from a rural town to a nearby metropolis or frequently travel back and forth between two places, migrants are commonly described as people who cross international borders and change their habitual place of residence for a limited period or longer stay.

If an element of coercion exists, the act of migration is generally referred to as forced. Similarly, if individuals cross national borders unauthorized, they are commonly referred to as irregular migrants. However, migration can occur anywhere on the spectrum of experiences between forced and voluntary (Erdal and Oeppen 2018) and regular and irregular (Kubal 2013). While migration can be defined as voluntary and/or irregular by state agencies, it may be experienced differently by the individual migrant and other actors. Therefore, migrant labels and categories are frequently contested. Following the 2015

migration reception crisis in Europe, for example, debates concerning refugees versus migrants soared. While humanitarian actors mostly argued that “refugees are not migrants” (UNHCR 2016), advocates for an inclusive understanding of migrants highlighted refugees as a type of migrants (Carling 2017). While some migrants are victimized and granted protection as refugees under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, others are not. However, anyone on the move may be in need of humanitarian assistance and protection—regardless their legal status.

The relationship between migration and humanitarianism is not clear cut. In humanitarian crises, affected populations are commonly displaced owing to conflicts or natural disasters, but are not necessarily labeled internal or international migrants. Migrants have no legal protection in international humanitarian law, but they may be protected in their capacity as refugees or as civilians (Gieseken and Ouellet-Décoste 2018). This could be the case in contexts of armed conflict, where international humanitarian law regulates the limits of acceptable conduct. Migrants may also be entitled to protection through international human rights law or even national legislation as, for example, workers, residents, or citizens (ILO 2016).

Yet, as part of its core responsibility to “leave no one behind,” the Agenda for Humanity (OCHA 2019) aims to integrate the specific vulnerabilities of migrations “into humanitarian and other response plans.” Likewise, the International Committee of the Red Cross response to vulnerable migrants is based on the “needs of migrants.” It is not conditioned by the migrants’ status (ICRC 2019). Indeed, a diversity of internal and international migrants can find themselves in precarious situations and in need of shelter, support, or assistance. The range of vulnerable migrants includes, but is not limited to, people who leave their home owing to poverty or climate change, victims of trafficking, internally displaced people, exploited child workers, irregular migrants who are criminalized in host societies, stateless people, failed asylum seekers who cannot re-enter their origin countries, forcefully evicted migrant workers, and low-skilled migrants performing dirty, dangerous, and demeaning work for low wages and with few rights.

As manifested by the diversity of migrants’ precariousness, migrants can affect or be affected by humanitarian crises throughout all stages of migration: before, during, and after the journey. Prospective migrants can choose or be forced to leave owing to humanitarian crises, migrants en route are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuse as they are outside their countries of citizenship or residency, and immigrants who reside as foreigners can lack basic rights or services as they do not have citizenship. Migrants can also influence humanitarian crises, both by intensifying or abating conflicts. Emigrants,

for instance through diaspora networks, can engage before, during, and after conflicts. By returning, transferring money, or engaging in national and international politics, they may alter the humanitarian, or developmental, state of affairs in their countries of origin.

In sum, the relationship between migration and humanitarianism is manifold. It is also in constant development. While refugee movement has long been high on the humanitarian agenda, migration and vulnerable migrants have more recently come to the fore of the discourse. Whether stuck in inhumane detention camps, displaced in the wake of natural disasters, or packed in leaky boats, migrants have taken center stage on the global humanitarian scene.

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## Minorities

A minority can be defined as “a cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, sexual and gender distinct group that coexists with other groups but is generally subordinate to a dominant group” (Encyclopædia Britannica). Minorities can coincide with indigenous people (understood as the earliest known inhabitants of an area) but can also be new or emergent groups in national or urban settings. Resources and the traditional way of life of indigenous people and minorities are often challenged by dominant state centers that exploit the group’s resource base for the interests of the state center and in the long run undermine the group’s capacity to reproduce their way of life, its relationship with the environment, and its cultural identity (see, for example, [www.culturalsurvival.org](http://www.culturalsurvival.org)). Competition for resources has made minorities vulnerable for discrimination or—as in the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar—even outright expulsion. As minorities are typically marginalized or oppressed in relation to the center, they are often (but not always) more vulnerable to disasters and conflicts (Roeder 2014).

Humanitarian organizations emerge as a third force, working as a boost for ethnic and religious minorities’ aspirations for cultural autonomy and rights claims. However, humanitarian organizations and development cooperation can also lead to enhancing the enclosure of previously inaccessible minorities and their unwillingly participation in the “civilizing” and disciplining assimilation programs of dominant centers in the minority regions (Duncan 2004). Humanitarian organizations are becoming increasingly important in producing the “truth” about human rights violations in the international media (Redfield 2013). In some ethnic minority areas, where the state does not exercise full sovereignty, humanitarian organizations and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) may assume state functions, providing much of the lacking infrastructures in terms of human rights protection, public health, and education.

When humanitarian organizations lack access to some areas, they negotiate access with local actors, including armed groups (De Lauri 2018). In this way, they often consolidate or reconfigure power relations at the local level among ethnic minorities, armed groups, and political parties. International humanitarian organizations also partner with local organizations in ethnic minority areas and support existing structures and local knowledge (Ferris 2011). Working for ethnic and religious minorities in conflict situations can be difficult, as in most cases organizations do not receive permission to operate and therefore do not receive access to the most vulnerable people. Dependence on permission can lead to perverse effects: for example, the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees might be led to relocate villages and thus contribute to enhancing state control over minority villagers (Feldman and Ticktin 2010). In conflict situations, humanitarian agents may even endanger local people who regard INGOs with suspicion or open hostility. International humanitarian organizations can bolster transnational networks of minority people and constitute a crucial part in the making of transnational ethnic and religious communities (Salemink 2003), but can equally contradict strategies of local communities that are based on local knowledge.

In the worst case, competition for humanitarian funding might become a cause for an escalation in violence between different parties in a conflict (De Lauri 2016). In some cases, humanitarian aid can be used as a leverage to consolidate the position of some ethnic, religious, or political groups to the detriment of others.

Support of linguistic minorities is another area of intervention, for example via mother tongue-based education in minority or frontier regions (Lall 2016). Humanitarian organizations engaged in supporting indigenous or minorities' access to education are at the forefront of pulling together resources for indigenous or minority literacy movements, enhancing the globalization of local aspirations. In this endeavor, INGOs risk a clash with state interests, but can also contribute to the peace process by helping to bridge minority education with national education.

Humanitarian assistance in the education and health sectors complement and add to existing development cooperation from donor governments that support infrastructural projects in minority regions in relation to business investments. These mega-projects are often used for business as well as being ordering devices for military purposes, and can bring about resistance from minorities if they suffer land-grabs and inadequate compensation.

The role of humanitarian organizations and humanitarian workers' lifestyles may affect trusting relations with minorities. International humanitarian workers are often part of a privileged transnational and networked elite: they use hotels, drive SUVs, and are not always fully aware of specific minorities' concerns (Smirl 2008).

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## Missionary

The concept and figure of the missionary, a qualified agent authorized to recruit adherents in areas outside the de facto spiritual jurisdiction of a church, arose in the context of Western Christianity. The history and practices of humanitarianism and Christian missions are closely intertwined. While expansion and recruitment are a hallmark of many religious traditions, the humanitarian dimension of expansion practices in religions outside Western Christianity is less well understood, partly because of Christian ideological and technological dominance in the organizational field of systematic recruitment across space. As a consequence, there is no comparable body of research examining the connection between humanitarianism and missionaries of other religions, such as Islam and Buddhism.

Christianity has been actively recruiting since its early stages, and the conversion of “pagans” was an important factor in the religious homogenization of Europe in the Middle Ages (Wood 2001). Yet a more specialized mission sector only emerged with the geographical mobility of the mendicant orders in the 15th century and the formation of Vatican’s specialized Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in the context of competition with strengthening Protestant churches in the 17th century. Initially weak, the Protestant challenge

found a solid missionary footing in the late 18th century with the founding of the first effective missionary voluntary organizations (Neill 1986). This new Protestant missionary movement created the organizationally powerful modern form of missions.

Modern Christian missions were historically intertwined with confessional hostilities playing out in the enlarging theater of European overseas expansions. Their humanitarian dimensions inscribe themselves in the complex religious and political tensions of the last six centuries and the dynamics of European expansionism. The goal of conversion of other populations to Christianity almost naturally aligned the missions with imperial political authorities (Abernethy 2000). However, the relationship between missionaries and political agents empirically occupies a spectrum from full collaboration to highly contentious opposition (Stanley 1990; Porter 2004).

Missionary initiated and implemented humanitarian projects emerged within this spectrum as religious representatives identified issues and conditions that they sought to alleviate. Substantively, missionaries contributed to the emerging humanitarian field by identifying and mobilizing support for a series of social problems and policies: they were active in promoting education (Savage 1997), health care (Williams 1982), and disaster relief (Bohr 1972), and in combating economic exploitation and body-harming practices such as enslavement, female genital mutilation, foot-binding, or widows' ritual self-immolation in India (Oddie 1979).

Missionaries' typical role as initiators of humanitarian projects thus comes from the combination of several factors: their geographical proximity to observed social problems and cases of social injustice (Nepstad 2004); religious ideologies of compassion and the perceived value of humanitarian practices as technologies of salvation (Chaves 1998); and the ability of missionary organizations to enlist the support of distant "metropolitan" congregations (Maughan 1996).

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## Mitigation

Broadly put, there are three meanings of the notion of mitigation in the humanitarian context. The first meaning refers to the prevention or avoidance of humanitarian crises often caused by armed conflict (Lane 2016). Here, mitigation takes the form of anticipatory responses aimed at tackling three aspects: the societal preconditions of violent politics, the potential of violent conflict itself, and the potential effects of the conflict (Albala-Bertrand 2000). The second meaning of mitigation refers to the alleviation of suffering caused by humanitarian emergencies through the provision of relief aid that creates temporary administrative, personnel, and financial compromises (Hoffman, Weiss, and Egeland 2017). The third meaning is that mitigation is a specific phase of the so-called “disaster management cycle,” which is typically divided into different stages (Coetzee and Van Niekerk 2012) such as mitigation, preparedness,



and response and recovery phases. In this context, mitigation deals with complex emergencies, considered the outcome of “societal/institutional weakness” and multicausal factors such as food insecurity, epidemics, conflicts, or displaced populations, and also with natural disasters, perceived as the result of the “physical weakness” of structures and processes (Albala-Bertrand 2000: 216).

Following the end of the Cold War, the boundaries between humanitarian relief and development have been progressively blurred and integrated into a resilient life cycle. There is now no clear division between communities directly experiencing crises, those vulnerable to future disaster/emergencies, or those in recovery stages. In parallel, the notion of mitigation has shifted from being primarily reactive to being integrated into a larger project to build “better societies” (Hoffman, Weiss, and Egeland 2017: 19). In this logic, mitigation is merged into the broader framework of sustainable development that seeks to create safer communities (Schneider 2017). Although complex emergencies are integral to political and economic structures, the logic of mitigation in humanitarian settings “derives from a natural disaster model that pays little attention to social or political factors” (Duffield 1994). However, the violent and entrenched political nature of complex humanitarian emergencies requires more multifaceted mitigation measures and responses than natural disasters (Albala-Bertrand 2000).

By the end of the Cold War, mitigation measures were less focused on rescue or protection and more on the modulation of social and economic processes to promote “adaptative coping strategies” (Duffield 2013: 8). The division between ex-ante and ex-post disaster related activities emerged as a separate yet interconnected stream of humanitarian aid (Hollis 2014). This included a shift towards the view that disasters were the outcome of interconnected events and that emergencies were integral to the human–environment relationship. Subsequently, disasters seemed not only very predictable, but their magnitude also seemed reducible to advance planning (Schneider 2017). Akin to this new trend, disaster risk reduction required the implementation of measures and policies with a twofold aim: to enable societies to be resilient to natural hazards and to decrease societal vulnerability (UN 2004). Disaster risk reduction conceived the lessening of risk as a series of endeavors tracked across social, economic, governmental, and professional sectors of activity (UN 2004). Instead of fearing disasters per se, societies are “urged to learn the new life-skills of preparedness and resilience” (Duffield 2013: 480). Disaster mitigation centers on the technical and material inputs to “prepare for the predetermined roles” that different actors and processes have in pre-disaster, during the disaster, and during post-disaster operations (Sushil 2017). In this vein, the United

Nations General Assembly established an open-ended intergovernmental expert working group to update the terminology used by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (UN General Assembly 2015). In June 2015, the UNISDR working group defined mitigation as “[t]he lessening or minimizing of the adverse impacts of a hazardous event” (UN General Assembly 2016: 20).

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## Monitoring Mechanisms

Monitoring mechanisms are a set of institutions and practices that in the fields of international human rights and humanitarian law address either already committed wrongdoing or aim to prevent future wrongdoing. The ideas behind monitoring mechanisms borrow from criminal law, and have similar aims to realize reconciliation, restitution, reparations, and even deterrence. More broadly, monitoring mechanisms can be seen as aiming to end what is known as “the culture of impunity” towards grave human rights violations.

Monitoring mechanisms can have both states and individuals as their parties, and they can be either permanent or temporary in nature. In the United Nations (UN) context, monitoring mechanisms include expert committees and councils formed of states. An example of expert committees is offered by UN human rights treaty bodies, which monitor how states comply with the obligations that they have undertaken by becoming parties to international human rights covenants (Halme-Tuomisaari 2013). In the absence of an international human rights court operating under the UN with universal jurisdiction, treaty bodies are also the UN’s most authoritative human rights monitoring mechanisms. To date, there are ten UN treaty bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee founded in 1976, which monitors how states comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, founded in 1985, which monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.

The treaty bodies are composed of 15–20 selected nationals of state parties to a given covenant and are not the same as courts. In their tasks, members act (or are supposed to act) as autonomous experts representing the viewpoint of a particular covenant and human rights, not the national interests of their host states. UN committees convene regularly, today most often in the Geneva offices of the UN Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights. Sessions are also sometimes arranged at the UN headquarters in New York. These sessions include elements called “constructive dialogue” with state parties, referring to a formal exchange between the committee and state representatives, as well as informal sessions between committee members and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some committees also process individual petitions and issue documents known as “general comments”: these lengthy documents elaborate on the content of individual covenant paragraphs in light of committee case law. The most important element of treaty bodies is their cyclical nature: as is stipulated in their covenant-based mandates, treaty body hearings

are intended to be a recurring and repetitive, instead of an exceptional and unique practice, which jointly form an ongoing rights dialogue, ideally leading towards a gradual and permanent improvement in state and non-state human rights conduct, thus also leading to world improvement.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is another UN monitoring mechanism that operates with a similar repetitive logic. It is a monitoring practice organized by the UN Human Rights Council, an international body composed of the member states of the UN. The UPR was launched in 2006 as the former UN Human Rights Commission was transformed into the current Council, accompanied by the hope that the new body would be rid of its predecessor's adversarial and politicized nature. The operational logic of the UPR is straightforward: each state takes turns in presenting the Council with its report in a highly formalized and organized "ritual" (Charlesworth and Larking 2014; Cowan and Billaud 2017). In its first decade, the UPR has been praised for its universal participation and high visibility, making it the preferred monitoring mechanism for the lobbying of many NGOs. Yet recent developments have posed challenges to the stated aims of the Human Rights Council to form a truly universal monitoring mechanism: echoing broader dynamics of world politics and the return of unilateralism instead of postwar multilateralism, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Council in 2018.

Other monitoring mechanisms include regional human rights expert bodies and diverse international courts, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, both of which operate under the UN. Numerous regional mechanisms also exist: these include the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights. The past few decades have also seen the proliferation of diverse kinds of other monitoring mechanisms of a more interim nature, aimed at addressing grave international humanitarian catastrophes and genocide, including the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in Yugoslavia, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of Rwanda, and the Kosovo Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Kelly 2011; Wilson 2001, 2017).

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## Moral Responsibility

Philosophers and theologians from all traditions have long been preoccupied with the issue of doing “the right thing” and apportioning praise or blame accordingly. For example, in the parable of the Good Samaritan, two passers-by ignore the suffering of a bludgeoned stranger but the third stops to assist and protect the stranger because he feels compelled to do so (Boltanski 2007). It is immediately clear to the reader where the moral obligation lies, and that it is connected with our common humanity. Or, to quote George Steiner, “men are accomplices to that which leaves them indifferent” (Steiner 1967: 150). In the context of humanitarian action, this moral imperative often clashes with messy or fast-moving realities on the ground. Thus, in Kantian terms, “ought implies can,” meaning that in a given situation the moral responsibility of the humanitarian is to alleviate suffering when it is realistically possible to do so (Slim, 2015: 179). In real life humanitarian situations, deliberations around the morality of acts of commission or omission are rarely so clear cut. A number of variables make such deliberations more difficult. These include considerations of distance, time, universality, and, of course, politics.

In principle, the quality of mercy is not strained—absolutes cannot be compromised—and distance should not matter, especially today when “anybody can know everything about anything” (Primo Levi in Boltanski 2007: 9). While it is true that more suffering is more visible than in any earlier phase of human history, distance still lengthens the causal chain of moral responsibility in practice, making the determination of the morality or otherwise of acts of omission more difficult (Boltanski 2007; Ginzburg 1994). The knowledge of

distant suffering triggers the imperative to assist, but the representation of the suffering might be subject to manipulation by media or actors on the ground (Boltanski 2007). Time raises the issue of the tension between deontological and consequentialist ethics: should actions be judged morally right based on duty and principles in the here and now, or in terms of consequences and desired ends at some future time? A difficult moral calculation has to be made: saving a few lives today could preclude saving much larger numbers tomorrow, or, on the contrary, humanitarian access and space might shrink over time.

What is the humanitarian's universe of obligation? Should the perspectives of insiders prevail over those of outsiders? Traditional humanitarian discourse posits that humanitarian values are universal and consubstantial with our common humanity. It follows that all societies understand vulnerability, pain, and anguish in broadly similar terms, and that the imperative to assist and protect according to need is generalizable (Linklater 2007). However, this view is disputed outside the mainly Western humanitarian canon, and postcolonial and communitarian perspectives warn against the assumptions that it is self evident that all human beings have some common interests (Linklater 2007). Insiders and outsiders may clash over whether moral obligations are first and foremost to family, tribe, community, or religious affinity, or cut across these. Current debates on the localization of humanitarian action further complicate debates around principles and universes of obligation.

Politics of all actors involved in humanitarian situations are always a major challenge to the moral responsibility of doing the right thing. Governments, belligerents, local authorities, affected groups, and of course humanitarians—individually or collectively—naturally seek advantages from the provision of aid through a variety of forms of instrumentalization (Donini 2012). Decisions on where, how, and how much to intervene all have moral implications for which there is no easy solution. For many, navigating as close as possible to principle and carefully deliberating trade-offs on the basis of facts rather than politics or ideology is the best guarantee for effective and morally sound humanitarian action.

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## Needs

One of the key specificities of organizations active in the humanitarian space is the emphasis they place on the role that needs play in shaping their decisions. The needs-based approach can be seen as a way of operationalizing humanitarian principles—especially impartiality—as it aims to give priority to humanitarian concerns over any other type of political consideration. Funding is said to be provided on a needs-only basis, while the quality of the needs-assessment strategy followed by humanitarian practitioners is often taken as a key standard of professionalism. Although humanitarian practice has always involved documenting and analyzing the needs of crisis-affected people, the emphasis has been more on the defense of human rights than on the alleviation of humanitarian needs in the language used (Cabanes 2014). Needs-based rhetoric entered humanitarian language in the 1980s, building on the development field of the 1970s in which the use of the term “needs” meant to signal the rejection of a development agenda was based on the promotion of growth (Singh 1979).

The historical emergence of the term has strongly influenced its contemporary multifaceted use in the humanitarian field. A first use refers to basic human needs that must be met during and after a crisis. From the early ages of humanitarianism, when aid mostly consisted of protection and intervention for health-related needs, the notion of needs has seen a considerable expansion, and it now covers elements that were traditionally regarded as belonging to the development realm, such as education or infrastructure building. This mission creep has been criticized for diluting the humanitarian agenda and increasing the risk of aid manipulation. By covering an expanding range of needs, humanitarian actors provide the same services that governmental authorities would provide under normal circumstances, hence relieving the pressure on these authorities to provide public goods (Narang and Stanton 2017).

Moreover, the narrative of a humanitarian agenda driven by universal needs is often used to hide the very political nature of the humanitarian endeavor. Research on humanitarian funding shows that, despite rhetorical commitments, humanitarian donors prioritize needs according to a political agenda (Fink and Redaelli 2011). An illustrative example of this lies in the recent development of humanitarian strategies in which donors target specific geographical areas (e.g. former colonies for Belgium, France, or the United Kingdom) or specific vulnerable groups (as the Netherlands does for children in crisis settings). Besides, humanitarian organizations often create needs to ensure their organizational survival.

A second use of the term refers to the state of deprivation of a crisis-affected population. This deficit conception has also attracted criticism. First, in the absence of commonly agreed standards on humanitarian needs, humanitarian organizations often assume that they have the authority to decide on the norm and minimum requirements in terms of access to basic needs and services. Under this assumption, humanitarianism can be conceived as a paternalist endeavor combining expression of care with a form of domination (Barnett 2016). To signal their opposition to this agenda, some organizations prefer to speak of a humanitarian duty to uphold the rights of crisis-affected populations, even if this right-based approach has been questioned for paving the way for military interventionism in crisis contexts. Secondly, the language of needs is closely linked to a commodification of humanitarian action, where the emphasis is put on needs that are easy to quantify. Core concepts of humanitarian practice such as “protection,” “security,” and “dignity” are too subjective and multifaceted to be quantified (Darcy and Hofmann 2003). Thirdly, focusing on a needs-only approach contributes to the continuation of current pathologies of aid. Although practices considerably differ, needs assessment exercises are often formal processes—mostly carried out by international organizations at inter-agency level (the so-called clusters)—which rely on a series of quantifiable and often partial indicators. Contextualizing these exercises is often challenging, as vulnerability is relative, depending on the capacity of a population to adapt to a crisis. Getting to the contextual level implies being able to devote time and resources in needs assessments that organizations often lack in crisis contexts.

Humanitarian organizations do not always involve local communities and institutions properly. As a consequence, they reinforce the aid dependency cycle. The needs-based approach is of a reactive nature, whereas concepts such as vulnerability and risk allow humanitarian needs to be put in a broader political and historical perspective, emphasizing the role of root causes and the importance of local knowledge and crisis prevention.

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## Neutrality

Together with humanity, impartiality, and independence, neutrality is a prime humanitarian principle that lies at the center of humanitarian orthodoxy. It is so bound up with traditional definitions of what distinguishes humanitarianism that neutrality is seen as a metric that can be used to determine the humanitarian status of a person, project, action, or organization. Yet this belies the slippery nature of neutrality because it exists primarily as a claim that rests on the recognition of others for its achievement. This constitutes a major, and possibly permanent, instability for humanitarian actors and organizations. It means that whatever form, relation, or action humanitarianism takes will be shaped and limited by the need to manage the perceptions of others in order to fulfill the relevant requirements for recognition. To inquire into neutrality is to open up the contested and contingent basis of humanitarian-ness itself, and its relationship to politics.

The role played by neutrality in common definitions of humanitarianism indexes the outsized influence played by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the field of modern humanitarian action (Barnett 2011; Redfield 2010). The ICRC emerged in the latter half of the 19th century as a moral response to war-related suffering. It proclaimed a neutral or apolitical position—the refusal to “take side in hostilities or engage at any time in

controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature” (Plattner 1996)—which was instrumental in gaining access to victims of war. Neutrality thus became part of an attempt to (re)define the scene of violent conflict or natural disaster and carve out a humanitarian space conducive to the delivery of care and aid to those suffering or otherwise in need. The commitment to neutrality is not without its critics or controversies, for in practice it can work against the aim of humanitarianism to relieve and protect those in need. Indeed, a neutral position tends to favor the more powerful in a given conflict, thus nullifying the claim to neutrality even as it is being made. Fiona Terry recalls the reaction to humanitarian organizations from Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s war when they shouted, “we have no need of you, we need arms to defend ourselves, your food aid and medicines only allow us to die in good health” (2002: 22). In recent years, the position of some groups has evolved. For example, Doctors Without Borders has argued that the instrumental neutrality that enables their work does not mean that they are neutral about suffering, and they claim this as grounds to speak out against the atrocities that they witness in ways that can have political effects (Redfield 2010).

Such tensions reveal humanitarianism’s fraught relationship to politics and an acknowledgement that the claim to be apolitical is itself strategic, for as one veteran manager of several ICRC relief operations put it, “only if you’re politically savvy can you be politically neutral” (quote in Minear 2002: 78). This points to the fact that neutrality is—like impartiality and independence—a performative claim that must be demonstrated to oneself and others (donors, beneficiaries, colleagues, parties to a conflict, etc.), and this means responding to and shaping the perceptions of those others. This can become paramount in contexts of aid: “The need to be perceived as neutral in order to remain present outweighs the importance of basing assistance on the greatest need” (Terry 2001: 4). Shaping perceptions of neutrality can be quite a challenge because humanitarians act in diverse contexts where people are likely to see politics everywhere. Neutrality is thus often a claim seeking evidence, and humanitarians must frequently submit their actions, and their status as humanitarians, to the evaluation of others who might have their own ideas about what constitutes “neutrality” or “politics.” Indeed, neutrality is a semantic shifter; that is, its meaning can only be defined relatively and in relation to other definitions and categories (Brada 2016), such as “politics” (as that which it is not). Consequently, to successfully claim neutrality requires intervening in socially complex and culturally diverse contexts in order to secure the recognition necessary to maintain a humanitarian field of operations (Gilbert 2016).

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## Non-governmental Organizations

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are crucial actors in the humanitarian field. However, there are differences between NGOs and other humanitarian actors in terms of origin and status. Humanitarianism is mostly understood as emergency relief for vulnerable and suffering people. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), created in 1863 after the massacre at the Battle of Solferino (1859), constitutes the core of modern humanitarian intervention. It was recognized as a transnational humanitarian organization by the Geneva Conventions in 1949. NGOs, instead, are generally seen as promoters of social change, even though there is no internationally agreed definition of them (Ryffman 2007). Anti-Slavery International, created in 1839 and inspired by a Christian attitude against slavery, is often mentioned as the first international NGO, although the term “non-governmental organization” was introduced later, in 1945 with Article 71 of the United Nations (UN) Charter. A variety of different organizations have been established since the end of World War II and the

process of decolonization that triggered international development as a global phenomenon (Krause 2014). In the 1980s, a boost in the sector led to a global rise of NGOs, including a number of faith-based organizations (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, etc.) who got involved in delivering humanitarian aid (Ferris 2005). Since that time, these actors have brought new approaches, but also new problems, especially following the “War on Terror” and the over-politicized relationship between Christian and Muslim organizations (Ryfman 2007).

Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind (2009) distinguish between the roles of NGOs as actors and agents. As actors, NGOs promote certain values. At the same time, they work as agents of social cohesion and stability. In the relationship with humanitarianism, both aspects are relevant. Yet NGOs do not represent a homogeneous body of organizations, which may differ significantly in terms of ideals and actions. While the creation of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in 1971 was an open critique of the ICRC approach to the Biafra crisis and inaugurated a new course of actions to address humanitarian crises, the UN Development Programme and other UN agencies have since the 1970s increased their cooperation with NGOs, who progressively assumed the role of services providers in the humanitarian field. Organizations such as Oxfam, CARE, or Action Contre la Faim became important humanitarian actors, and their involvement was connected to standards and procedures set by the donors, rather than by the critical and independent approach promoted by MSF (Krause 2014). These organizations deal with various aspects of emergency aid in different sectors, and their role has increased since the 1980s.

NGOs connect humanitarian and development interventions, for instance through the discourse of human rights. Moreover, global neoliberal reforms in the post-Cold War era have reduced the intervention of the state in welfare provision, delegating this role to NGOs. However, as they are not recognized under international law, the nature of their legitimacy is often contested. Howell and Lind (2009: 30) note that “the relationship between NGOs and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was fraught with tension and mutual suspicion,” putting the roles and legitimacy of NGOs under more scrutiny.

Janice Gross Stein (2008) emphasizes the double nature of NGOs’ accountability, toward representativeness and effectiveness. NGOs should both prove capable of guaranteeing a certain standard of intervention and also of representing the needs and interest of their stakeholders to win legitimacy at the international level. While an organization such as the ICRC has a recognized code and procedures that can be applied in every humanitarian context, most

of the NGOs' legitimacy comes from their connection to their stakeholders and beneficiaries. Philippe Ryfman (2007) underlines this tension between standardized procedures required by donors, such as the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations or the UN, and the need to be accountable to a grassroots base inspired by specific values.

The growing importance of humanitarian budgets has pushed NGOs onto a path of standardization and professionalization. There are initiatives aimed at supporting this tendency, such as the Sphere project, launched in 1996 to create a common set of humanitarian standards, and the Humanitarian Accountability Project, which aimed to create a standard procedure to make NGOs accountable toward their beneficiaries. Monica Krause (2014) relates both these initiatives to what she defines as the "market for project" approach, which sees NGOs competing for funding in the production of projects evaluated by donors. This competition is pushing NGOs to enlarge their field of action, for example by increasing their roles in the security and state-building sectors. This was evident in the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan and Iraq and, more recently, in the fight against Boko Haram in the Sahel. Moreover, humanitarian agencies count on the capacity of NGOs to mobilize funding through their stakeholders, examples being after the earthquakes in the Indian Ocean in 2004 and in Haiti in 2010. According to Howell and Lind (2009), this blurs the borders between humanitarian and military actors, and between NGOs and state actors.

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## Peace-building

The emergence of post-conflict peace-building in the 1990s created a new arena for humanitarian action and formed part of broader efforts to assist war-torn societies and help them in a more peaceful direction. Peace-building was introduced to United Nations (UN) doctrine in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, where it was defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §15). The notion came to encompass a wide range of activities: from physical reconstruction, disarmament, and elections to refugee management, security sector reform, political and legal reform, reconciliation, and transitional justice.

Resources for peace-building in civil war settings boosted the budgets of international humanitarian organizations (Fearon 2008). The protection, return, and resettlement of refugees were central tasks for humanitarian actors, but they also took on broader responsibilities for assistance to war-affected populations in anticipation of more permanent state institutions that could fill their needs. With the limited success of international state-building efforts, this role often turned into semi-permanent structures of welfare provision (Lie 2017).

The integration of humanitarian aid within a broader peace-building agenda has been criticized for undermining the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors. In particular, contested peace-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced the reputation of humanitarian organizations as part of a Western political agenda. At present, humanitarian organizations face the opposite dilemma in postwar Syria: to stay on as part of a peace-building process to the benefit of the current government’s regime, or to withdraw in the name of human rights.

It is possible to maintain a strictly humanitarian role in the context of peace-building, and there is a long tradition in humanitarian action for operating pragmatically in controversial political environments without taking a political stance. The question, therefore, is not so much whether to engage in post-conflict situations but to what extent humanitarian priorities should be dictated by an overarching agenda of peace and development. Indeed, such integration was recently prescribed as a central objective in the Agenda for Humanity adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 in order to address the root causes of humanitarian needs (Ki-Moon 2016).

Peace-building evolved in an international political climate where political liberalism was the predominant ideology. In effect, political and economic

liberalization was the framework for all major international peace operations in the 1990s and 2000s, usually even without thematizing this political orientation (Paris 2004). Eventually, this resulted in scholarly and political criticism of “liberal peace-building” for being a Western hegemonic project poorly adapted to local conditions in “non-liberal” countries. More recently, scholarly debates have emphasized the non-liberal rationales behind the international engagement in peace-building as well as the multiple roles and potentials of local political actors in both generating and resisting foreign interference (Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam 2011).

After two decades of lofty ambitions of radical social and political transformation, hopes for peace-building as a miracle cure have waned (Chandler 2017). Moreover, the combination of a shift in American attention towards the “Global War on Terror” and the increased opposition to political liberalism by Russia and China in the UN Security Council has contributed to the replacement of the objective of peace-building with “stabilization,” “resilience,” and the “protection of civilians.” These are currently more dominant policy frameworks of humanitarian action in war-torn countries than peace-building.

Although the idea of promoting peace through political and economic liberalization has been downplayed as a strategy for peace operations, it nonetheless still lives on in UN policies of conflict prevention, development assistance, prevention of extremism, and in the UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN 2015; UN 2018). It is in this wider sense of peace-building that it remains central to debates on humanitarian action as part of the nexus between humanitarianism, development, and peace.

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## Philanthropy

The etymology of the term “philanthropy” refers to the love of humankind (*philos* + *anthropos*) and it is associated with altruistic and disinterested giving. Humanitarianism and philanthropy have been the focus of distinct bodies of scholarly work that, to a large extent, remain disconnected. Although the historiography of philanthropy is extremely rich and vast, social science’s explorations of humanitarianism have infrequently, if at all, drawn upon relevant historical studies of philanthropy. Apart from being unproductive, such a disconnection ignores the historical roots of Western humanitarianism. As Craig Calhoun (2008) notes, the emergence of the term “humanitarian” may be traced to the late 18th and early 19th century. Initially, the concept had theological connotations and referred to the humanity of Christ, but later it came to depict systematic efforts to alleviate human suffering and advance humanity in general. In fact, initially, humanitarianism and philanthropy largely converged (Calhoun 2008: 79).

As efforts to alleviate the pain of the suffering stranger, humanitarianism and philanthropy have much in common. Yet they are based on differences in scale, scope, technologies, and *modi operandi*. The cosmopolitan character of humanitarianism is a key differential component. Michael Barnett (2011: 18) describes humanitarianism as “nothing less than a revolution in the ethics of care” and stresses the internationalization of care in a shifting global arena. As the impulse to alleviate the suffering of the “other,” humanitarianism has a clear orientation towards the distant stranger. Philanthropy, on the other hand, can be both local and international. Nevertheless, recent studies have



unsettled the de facto cosmopolitan character of humanitarianism, focusing on small-scale local humanitarian endeavors that could easily be defined as philanthropic, such as fundraising projects for acquaintances or nearby (rather than distant) strangers. Finally, although philanthropy is often associated with an impulse and an affect, historical studies of “scientific philanthropy” have demonstrated that, like humanitarianism, philanthropy is also regularized and institutionalized (Howe 1980).

There are a few exceptions in the literature that seek to bridge the distinction between philanthropy and humanitarianism. Erica Bornstein’s ethnography of humanitarianism in New Delhi (Bornstein 2012) is one such example. Bornstein draws on the anthropological discussions on the gift to explore everyday and, mostly, informal humanitarian practices in India. As she shows, these mundane philanthropic practices are shaped by the broader global economies of philanthropy and humanitarianism, and efforts to regulate and institutionalize giving. Other studies of religious philanthropy, such as Islamic philanthropy (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003), draw upon local gifting practices and explore their manifestations in the contemporary humanitarian and philanthropic worlds. As Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein have stressed (2010: 9), drawing parallels between humanitarianism and religious traditions can help unsettle Eurocentric assumptions around humanitarianism and, in the case of philanthropy, bring continuities and affinities to the fore.

The demarcation of spheres and ethics of care implied by the distinction between philanthropy and humanitarianism can be traced in the vernacular understandings of the two words, their genealogy, and the historical burden they carry. In the mid-19th century, the term philanthropy was widely used by the people who participated in the emerging forms of collective intervention towards the poorest sections of the population. At the beginning of the 21st century, however, particularly in Europe, philanthropy has increasingly been accompanied by criticism, at times being seen as an effect of bourgeois hypocrisy and class domination. In a similar vein, local understandings of humanitarianism underline similar inequalities and hierarchies of lives.

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## Photography

Photography is the process of impressing a transparent film coated with a light-sensitive emulsion (analog photography) or a magnetic memory (digital photography) with the light reflected from a subject or object through the lens of a camera and reproducing the image thereby created. Photography has been commonly associated with a higher true value than other genres, such as pictorial art or sculpture, because of the particular technology that it uses. Victor Bürgin (1982) notes how pictorial art and films are usually received by the public as objects that need to be experienced critically, whereas photography presents itself as part of the environment. Similarly, Susan Sontag (1973) explains how photography is commonly perceived as a transparent method showing a piece of reality, while writing and paintings are associated with interpretation. On the contrary, scholars have highlighted how the act of taking a picture is not only about appropriating what is represented, but also about locating the image producer in a certain position toward the subject/object photographed, this being a position of knowledge and therefore power (Sontag 1973; Bürgin 1982).

Since the end of the 19th century, when technological progress allowed the popularization and easy reproduction of photographs, photography was increasingly used “to focus public attention on select examples of human misery in the world—from the local slum to the distant famine—transforming specific episodes of privation and suffering into humanitarian crises and campaigns” (Fehrenbach and Rodogno 2015: 4). Photographic accounts of humanitarian

crises, together with documentaries and other visual representations, have been crucial in the second half of the 20th century in the global spread of information about large-scale suffering and affliction, and have been functional in mobilizing support and raising awareness and funds for relief operations. The relatively new notion of “humanitarian photography,” coined in the 1990s, refers specifically to the use of photo representation in the humanitarian sector (Fehrenbach and Rodogno 2015).

However, although images of distant suffering are particularly powerful in creating an emotional response in the viewer (Sontag 2003; Boltanski 1999), their ability to elicit an ethical or political action is less clear. Vivid and shocking images of suffering have been denounced for reproducing a colonial perspective, further distancing the observer from the victim and ultimately dehumanizing the sufferer (Benthall 1993). Representations of suffering, a characteristic trait of humanitarian communication, have also been criticized for their inherent commodification of suffering (Kennedy 2009), compassion fatigue (Moeller 1999), and their role in concealing the root political causes of humanitarian disasters (Campbell 2012). Humanitarian photography has also been extensively criticized for its tendency to represent people as helpless and passive victims (Manzo 2008; Kurasawa 2015).

At the same time, humanitarian photography has been characterized by an attempt to gradually modify its iconography and using more positive imagery (Lidchi 1999; Chouliaraki 2013). In 2006, some of the major international humanitarian organizations have collaboratively elaborated and signed a code of conducts on the use of images (Concord 2006) with the objective of challenging traditional visual stereotypes of starving babies and images of people in distress.

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## Post-disaster Recovery

Post-disaster recovery is a complex process at the crossroads of environmental, social, and infrastructural dimensions. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines recovery as the “restoring or improving of livelihoods and health, as well as economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected community or society, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and ‘build back better,’ to avoid or reduce future disaster risk” (UNDRR). Recovery comprises the short-term restoration of basic services and facilities, which is called rehabilitation, and medium- to long-term reconstruction activities, which relate to the construction environment and social systems and livelihoods.

In the past, recovery was seen as the last phase of the disaster management cycle and it emphasized the reconstruction of infrastructure, subsuming social considerations. This linear understanding also informed sequential typologies of post-disaster shelter and housing provision. It can be correlated to the defunct, event-centric, “hazards view” of disasters—where the goal of recovery meant a return to the status quo, albeit with improved technological

fixes—and to the “engineering view” of resilience, which defined a system as resilient when it returned to its former state after a disturbance.

Contemporary approaches to recovery have debunked this “physicalist paradigm” and instead adopt integrated and multidisciplinary lenses. They underscore the importance of prevention and planning through comprehensive vulnerability and resilience assessments, and much research is being done on how to best articulate recovery to sustainable outcomes to minimize future risks. Many models of disaster recovery exist: some foreground safety, others sequential phases or sectors of intervention; some focus on organizational logistics and others on linkages with development. They are all “approximations of reality” (Davis and Alexander 2016: 41). Recovery is not a uniform process because certain areas, groups, and sectors may recover faster than others, depending on a disaster’s impacts and people’s capacities/assets to overcome them. Recovery is multiscalar, in that it simultaneously involves individual, household, community, national, and global processes. Social recovery is influenced by factors relating to market incentives, political ecology and economy, governance, timeliness and effectiveness of search and rescue activities, and appropriateness of emergency assistance, socio-cultural values and belief systems, strength of civil society, institutional capacity, and questions of transparency, trust, and accountability. No doubt, recovery is greatly enhanced or hindered by its predisaster context—thus the emphasis on prevention and preparedness. Moreover, many studies have shown the wide range of competing interests that characterize the window of opportunity that post-disaster recovery opens.

Specific issues have garnered sustained attention from researchers and practitioners alike. This is namely the case for community participation (Marsh et al. 2018), the role of social capital and networks (Aldrich 2012), and gender (Enarson and Chakrabarti 2009). Studies have approached these topics under normative frameworks to facilitate operationalization and through critical analytical lenses to show the limitations of policy rhetoric. For example, community-based disaster management is a significant area of intervention for capacity-building, although many scholars have shown that community cohesion and completion are elusive. Furthermore, because of their complexity and resistance to quantitative forms of valuation, significant dimensions of social recovery, such as culture and local knowledge, remain unevenly addressed (Krüger et al. 2015), although culture has always been the starting point in the anthropology of disaster (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002).

Today, as the field of post-disaster recovery seeks to better implement sustainability principles, and while more longitudinal studies become available,

questions of environmental justice, fairness, and ethics, as well as affect, creativity, and memorialization are enriching our understanding of what a successful recovery means. Recovery will always entail a mix of technical and social processes requiring collaboration, inspiration, and resolve.

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## Postwar Reconstruction

The expression “postwar reconstruction” was first mobilized after World War II when the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a partner institution of the World Bank Group, was established with the mission of financing the reconstruction of European nations. The Bank shared the goals of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing devastated European economies by rebuilding infrastructures, removing trade barriers and modernizing industries. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund remain major stakeholders in postwar reconstruction efforts, although the European Union and Japan also contribute their share (Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell and Sitea 2007). Postwar reconstruction is now part of larger “peace-building” enterprises that, in addition to economic recovery, entail stabilizing post-conflict zones

(via disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs), restoring state institutions (via the reconstruction of infrastructures, the establishment of the rule of law) and dealing with social issues (via transitional justice programs, human rights promotion, and gender empowerment).

Since the end of the Cold War, security has become a more prominent international concern, and has triggered major transformations in the conflict prevention machinery of the United Nations (UN). Moving away from the foundational pillars of the UN Charter that prohibit the recourse to force in the name of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and self-determination, the UN Security Council has gradually authorized the use of force by broadening its definition of the “threat to peace and security” (Orford 2013). These UN-sponsored military interventions have simultaneously played an important role in the expansion of the humanitarian realm. Influenced by the UN’s greater emphasis on responsibility (via the responsibility to protect doctrine) instead of neutrality, humanitarianism has become progressively enmeshed with governance and security interests. As a result, humanitarianism is now entangled with projects of peace-building, democratic transition, and reconstruction.

The humanitarian apparatus deployed to realize postwar reconstruction objectives displaces state sovereignty in favor of more concentrated forms of power and accumulation, such as NATO troops, international organizations, development agencies, non-governmental organizations, local civil society organizations, and private contractors (Monsutti 2012), a process that Barnett Rubin qualifies as “internationalized state-building” (Rubin 2006).

Beyond the reconstruction of state institutions, postwar reconstruction also involves cultural and symbolic production via rituals such as workshops and trainings aimed at achieving the objective of “good governance” (Billaud 2012). Humanitarian action embedded in democratization efforts is therefore largely immaterial and productive. As a manifestation of “transnational governmentality” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002), it consists of shaping modern subjectivities via the transmission of certain knowledge practices, institutional codes, and norms, which are envisioned as necessary components for the establishment of a rational state administration. Often disconnected from the material and social reality of local war economies, the “peace” that is built is therefore often very flimsy and at best virtual (De Lauri and Billaud 2016), rather than emancipatory. While bolstering the idea of change and progress for external constituencies, the narrative of postwar reconstruction often hides the continuity of injustice and the consolidation of hierarchies at a local level.

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## Private Sector

Private businesses started to become important agents in humanitarian aid after World War II. The nature of the post-World War II humanitarian aid from the United States to Europe was mostly dictated by the availability of food products and consumer goods from well-known American companies. This aid facilitated European integration into liberal capitalism and the introduction of consumerism to European societies (Wieters 2016). During the Cold War era, the Global South turned into a market space in which humanitarianism could dispose of Western agricultural and commodity surplus, and discipline so called Third World citizens as healthy labor force and customers for Western businesses (Sasson 2016; Wieters 2016). The second half of the Cold War era witnessed human rights activism that was concerned with growing business interests in the expanding humanitarian space, as well as the changing role of some humanitarian agencies in the business capitalization of emergency situations (Sasson 2016). Following the end of the Cold War, the siege of Sarajevo



between 1992 and 1995 marked an interesting era in the history of expansionary capitalism that was facilitated by new communication/satellite technologies: humanitarian space opened by military intervention began to harbor black market activities (i.e. smuggling of aid items and sex trafficking), which produced private revenues and created a local business class before the eyes of aid workers, United Nations peacekeepers, foreign journalists, and academics (Andreas 2008).

A remarkable trait of the humanitarian wars in the 21st century was the extensive use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a long history of private mercenaries in human warfare, but their redefinition as private contractors, their presence in the new humanitarian wars, and their diverse areas of activity have been particularly questionable, especially in terms of legitimacy in international law and the potential impact on human security (Gillard 2006; Spearin 2009). Liberal expectations (e.g. democracy, freedom, peace, economic development) from humanitarian interventions, wars on terror and international state-building attempts in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and more recently Libya, Syria, and Yemen have failed dramatically; however, the presence of foreigners as armies, humanitarians, social entrepreneurs, and businesses is gaining a new discourse and format in the 21st century. The new trend refers to the growing, and increasingly more privatized, intersection between the processes of neoliberalism, securitization/militarization, and humanitarianism (Duffield 2014).

Financial institutions (from the World Bank to the German Development Bank), businesses (e.g. PMSCs, construction, food, logistics, energy, information, media, communication and digital technology firms), and social enterprises (e.g. digitalized entrepreneurial networks for refugees as part of resilience-building) are in active collaboration in areas of aid provision, disaster risk financing and management, service delivery, governance, reconstruction, stabilization, and development in post-disaster and conflict zones. At the same time, the nature of the international humanitarian regime has been changing with the gradual physical and financial withdrawal of the Western states and their humanitarian forces from the humanitarian space on the ground in dangerous war zones. Mark Duffield (2016: 149) argues that this is associated with anxiety and risk aversion in the Western world that is due to “policy failure, political push-back and humanitarian access denial.” This kind of change entails (1) a new discourse centered around resilience-building among civilians in conflict zones to reduce dependency on humanitarian assistance (i.e. social entrepreneurship in capitalistic and neoliberal terms), (2) new technologies to continue distant monitoring and controlling of “people of

concern” (i.e. remote management of humanitarian crisis and “bunkerization”), and (3) local and regional allies based in stable countries close to conflict regions who can be trusted to manage the conflict zones (e.g. the United Arab Emirates) (Duffield 2016; Ziadah 2019).

The recent international humanitarian engagement with Syrian refugees in the Middle East demonstrated some of the most privatized aspects of this evolution in the humanitarian regime. Automation of aid, cash-transfer programs, and informational mobile apps for Syrian refugees are promoted as examples of social entrepreneurship, innovation, and capacity-building for self-reliance. New surveillance technologies such as biometric registration, satellite sensing, mapping and networking software, and algorithmic analysis have become strategic tools to keep Syrian refugees in surveillance not only where they are currently, but also in places to which they may move in the future (Duffield 2016; Jacobsen 2017). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is now playing the role of a facilitator and financier in this remote management mode of engagement with Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The UAE is the most skillful oil-rich Gulf state in terms of commercializing humanitarian aid and incorporating it into supply chain capitalism through its ports and logistical capacities worldwide (Ziadah 2019). The UAE organizes the annual Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development Conference and Exhibition as an innovative platform for businesses to exhibit and advertise their products (e.g. tents, furniture, medicine, portable toilets, solar energy panels, and nutritional formulas) to potential state and non-state customers in the humanitarian sector. In this highly commercialized world of humanitarianism in the 21st century, it is not surprising that the busiest street with grocery stores and stands in the Zaatari Camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan is called Champs-Élysées, and Bulgari, the luxury jewelry brand, donated funds to a kindergarten inside the camp in 2018 (Nichol 2018).

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## Professionalization

Since the late 1990s, “the humanitarian sector has bureaucratized, rationalized, and professionalized with an unpredictable passion” (Barnett 2012: 188). Historically, the urge to professionalize was a reaction to the manifold shortcomings and failures of humanitarian organizations, such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which traumatized the humanitarian community and triggered a series of internal evaluations such as the one “held the year after [which] sadly concluded that, once political failure led to the crisis, many more lives could have been saved had humanitarian organizations better coordinated and acted more professionally” (Hilhorst 2002: 359). Since the 1990s, alongside increased budgets and an ever-growing number of people employed by humanitarian organizations, the importance of humanitarian intervention in global politics has risen.

Professionalization in humanitarian contexts has a set of meanings that all imply processes of specialization and diversification. First, professionalization refers to the acquirement of the necessary competencies and skills represented by the individual humanitarian. This points both to respective professions, such as engineering, nursing, logistics, and international humanitarian law in general, and also to specific training for the provision of professional assistance

in the context of a humanitarian mission. Today, a growing number of universities offer specialized master's degree courses in humanitarian aid and international assistance, many of which are part of the Network on Humanitarian Action. Secondly, professionalization implies that the humanitarian organization holds itself and is being held accountable to its beneficiaries, donors, and employees. Systems of control are increasingly being put into place to make sure humanitarians work in professional ways. Thirdly, professionalization is coined through the set of codes and standards arranged in and through key humanitarian actors. The level of professionalism is measured through adherence to those principles. The last three decades have shown a variety of concerted efforts to regulate, standardize, and professionalize humanitarian intervention (Roth 2012), from the 1994 "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief," over projects such as Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and Sphere, to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action network. Those initiatives are meant to safeguard the professional conduct of intervention and heighten the efficiency and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.

Professionalization is as much an outcome as it is a strategy of aid organizations working within the increasing complexities and demands of humanitarian contexts. Today, humanitarian organizations have to navigate a "dense professional world of NGOs" (Bornstein 2005). While professionalization aims to provide improved assistance, it can also be used to enact and enforce hierarchies between different sets of people involved in the humanitarian encounter: national and international staff, humanitarians and beneficiaries, headquarters and field offices. Those dynamics are a reflection of a structural lack of balance that is inscribed in the humanitarian system as a whole. During the processes of codification and standardization that often accompany the larger process of professionalization, the universal is emphasized over the contextual (Lewis and Mosse 2006). Tensions between the different levels of intervention and between standardized technocratic knowledge and contextual value-driven commitment remain at the heart of processes of professionalization.

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## Protection

Broadly speaking, protection refers to “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law)” (IASC 1999; see also Goodwin-Gill 1989 and Stevens 2013). In the humanitarian context, its purpose is to ensure that people at risk—for example, because of conflict, disasters, or persecution—have access to the rights and assistance to which they are entitled. In extreme cases, force may be justified to intervene in states that are failing to protect their population from the most heinous crimes.

While the main legal duty of protection lies with states and specialized agencies, protection is widely recognized as an integral component of any humanitarian action (DuBois 2010). In other words, a range of actors, from United Nations (UN) peacekeepers to community health care providers, can potentially offer protection (see UNSC Resolution 1265). Protection activities may prevent or stop rights violations or facilitate recovery after they occur. They include not only assistance and rehabilitation support but also environment-building activities to “create a social, cultural, institutional and legal environment conducive to the respect for rights” (OCHA 2012).

In contrast to this operational description, various regimes of international law define “protection” in particular ways. In humanitarian law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols refer to the guarantees that warring parties must afford to persons not engaged in the fighting. The framework for ensuring protection includes: (1) provision of an international legal status and rights to categories of non-combatants (i.e. civilians, the sick and injured, prisoners of war, and medical and religious personnel) and (2) regulations related to relief actions (Bouchet-Saulnier 2002). The International Committee of the

Red Cross and parties to the conflict are obliged to facilitate assistance and monitor the rights afforded to persons with special legal status.

In refugee law, meanwhile, protection refers to the international protection provided by the host state or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as the national protection (or lack thereof) in the country of origin. The international dimension includes consular and diplomatic protection, normally provided to nationals abroad, and rights and benefits in the host community (UNHCR 2004). Most importantly, host states may not directly or indirectly remove someone to a country where he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution or risks certain serious harms (the principle of non-refoulement).

Under international law, the space of protection is unspecified. An increasing variety of “protection elsewhere” practices have therefore been adopted by destination states to deflect and deter refugee arrivals. These include safe third country policies, such as the EU–Turkey agreement and the Dublin Regulation, extraterritorial processing centers, containment in safe havens, and application of the “internal protection alternative” as an exception to refugee status. To be compatible with legal obligations, the protection in such contexts must be “effective” and “durable” (UNHCR 2003). However, all too often, sending states rely on warring factions, peacekeeping forces, or even a person’s personal networks to provide protection without any mechanism for ensuring that such actors are able and willing to do so for a significant period of time.

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## Quarantine

The notion of quarantine is embedded in local and global health practices. Historically, it has been defined as the “detention and segregation of subjects suspected to carry a contagious disease” (Gensini, Yacoub and Conti 2004: 257–258). Today, the term is used by the World Health Organization (WHO) to refer to “the compulsory physical separation, including restriction of movement, of populations or groups of healthy people who have been exposed to a contagious disease. This may include efforts to segregate these persons within specified geographic areas” (WHO 2008: 10). In the context of the recent COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, quarantine has been widely enforced globally to restrict the movement, or separate “from the rest of the population, of healthy persons who may have been exposed to the virus, with the objective of monitoring their symptoms and ensuring early detection of cases” (WHO 2020). Therefore, the term quarantine is restricted to healthy (asymptomatic) individuals after exposure and only in the potential scenario that they might transmit the disease. The term isolation, however, refers to infected (symptomatic) persons. Both measures are considered preventive tools to avoid transmission and protect public health (Allen 2017). The origin of the term dates back to the 14th century, when quarantine was the foundation of coordinated disease control strategies that included actions such as sanitary cordons, bills of health issued to ships, fumigation, disinfection, and regulation of groups of persons (Tognotti 2013: 254–255).

After 1893, in both Europe and the United States, conventions and regulations for the standardization of quarantine measures began to be ratified, establishing periods of detention. When WHO replaced the International Office of Public Health in 1948, the expression “quarantine diseases” disappeared and was replaced by “pathologies controlled under international health law,” such

as plague, cholera, and yellow fever, and “pathologies under surveillance,” such as poliomyelitis, recurrent fever, and typhus (Gensini, Yacoub and Conti 2004: 259–260; Davey et al. 2013: 6). The modern quarantine concept has been driven by three main currents: first, the personification of epidemics, where a concrete connection between travel and outbreak is established; secondly, the existence of a social organization capable of supporting the necessary infrastructure; and thirdly, the role of medical science (Mafart and Perret 1998).

The quarantine-humanitarian nexus can be traced back to the resurgence of attention towards infectious diseases that were catalogued as “emergencies” and the arrival of a global governance logic where “health spread” was constituted as an imperative (Bashford 2006; Mafart and Perret 1998; Gensini, Yacoub and Conti 2004: 260). The contemporary regimes for intervention in the field of global health can be divided into global health security and humanitarian biomedicine. The first one focuses on “emerging infectious diseases” that threaten wealthy countries and on systems of preparedness. The second type targets diseases that afflict poor nations and is directed towards individual human lives (Lakoff 2010: 60). The treatment of the Ebola outbreak in 2014 is exemplary of the intersection of these two regimes and the difficult use of quarantine in humanitarian contexts. Measures to contain the spread of Ebola via quarantines and isolation units to care for patients required extensive infrastructure and resources that were impossible to either sustain by humanitarian organizations, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, or replicate through national public health systems. Furthermore, the application of quarantine measures, often raises ethical problems as discussed by WHO’s *Guidance for Managing Ethical Issues in Infectious Disease Outbreaks* (2016). Moreover, pandemic preparedness inscribes a distinct notion of security into the regulations of populations whereby “good” circulations are created in opposition to “bad” circulations: “protective care from dangerous care, infected from non-infected people moving across space and time” (Park and Umlauf 2014).

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## Refugee

Who is a refugee? This question has no easy answers. In the public imagination, refugees are people forcibly displaced by events beyond their control: war, ethnic persecution, natural disasters. Lacking the protection of their own government, refugees are entitled to its substitute by a third party.

The core international refugee instruments, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, establish criteria for refugee status and set out the rights and benefits that states must accord refugees. They define “refugees” as persons who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. For stateless persons, the same criteria apply with regard to the country of former habitual residence. Unlike an *internally* displaced person, a refugee has crossed an international border to a third state.

This “global” refugee concept is both broader and narrower than is commonly assumed. On the one hand, despite its specific language, it covers most displacement that results from armed conflict and serious public disorder (UNHCR 2016). One would be hard pressed to think of many conflicts where the violence has no relationship to ethnicity, religion, political opinion, or race. The concept of an “imputed political opinion,” for example, can apply to entire communities presumed to support a certain faction. The Convention definition also covers cases of socio-economic deprivation when the country of origin fails to ensure access to basic rights on a non-discriminatory basis (Foster 2007).

On the other hand, the 1951 Convention excludes people who face truly indiscriminate threats: shelling, food insecurity, or the collapse of basic facilities. This is where regional regimes of refugee protection come to the rescue—at least for refugees in those regions. The 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa specifically covers people fleeing from “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of (their) country of origin or nationality” (OAU 1969). In Latin America, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) includes refugees fleeing from “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” This “soft law” definition is the basis for refugee status in many states in the region. In Europe, the Qualification Directive of the Common European Asylum System extends protection to persons fleeing indiscriminate violence or facing torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment in a third country.

The 1951 Convention also excludes, for the most part, environmental refugees, whether the cause of displacement is a natural disaster or the effects of climate change. Nonetheless, a claim might be recognized if assistance is being withheld or obstructed in a way that marginalizes a specific group.

In an effort to refine the refugee concept, scholars have proposed alternative ways to identify those with the strongest claims to assistance. Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo (1989: 33) observe that refugees are persons whose “presence abroad is attributable to a well-founded fear of violence” (including structural violence) and who “can be assisted only abroad, unless conditions change in their country of origin.” The concept of “survival migration” similarly describes those who are “outside their country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution” (Betts 2010: 4–5). These definitions, while not legally binding, aim to promote a more effective international response to refugee flows.

The 1951 Convention and regional instruments clarify the rights and obligations that refugees have in their host countries. Most importantly, refugees may not be returned to the place where they face persecution or other similar harms (the principle of non-refoulement). Policies that outsource migration

control, by paying third countries and companies to prevent onward migration or by erecting physical borders, for example, may violate this and other core principles, including the right to seek asylum (UDHR, article 14), and the right to leave any country, including one's own (UDHR, article 13).

For logistical, political, and security reasons, humanitarian management of large refugee flows is typically organized through camps run by the host state, the UN (in particular the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), other organizations, or a combination of the above. To a lesser degree, the humanitarian response has supported self-settlement of refugees, for example by channeling assistance to the local receiving community.

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## Religion

The expansion of humanitarianism as an ideology in Europe was informed by the suffering of World War I and humanist ideas of compassion. The emergence of human rights and their universal application after World War II gave

new impetus to humanitarian aid globally (De Lauri 2016). The assumption was that humankind could not ethically afford to stay idle. The focus of humanitarian aid was to relieve immediate suffering; it was not a long-term plan to help people affected by poverty or structural inequality. The “obligation” to help was largely endorsed and disseminated by faith-based organizations, with their actions ranging from initiatives to help refugees, such as the sanctuary movement in the United States (Rabben 2016) to the consolidation of Islamic humanitarianism (Mutaqin 2013). Historically, religious philanthropic practices pre-date the modern humanitarian system, and they continue to shape charity and humanitarian action in different regions of the world. Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim concepts and ideals, for instance, are mobilized to nourish humanitarian strategies and different modalities of aid.

The secularization of humanitarianism promoted by some humanitarian organizations in the second half of the 20th century has questioned the missionary character of faith-based humanitarianism, and the secular and religious have come, at least to some extent, into tension. Yet both scholars and practitioners have increasingly challenged the rigid dichotomy between secular and religious approaches. Indeed, many humanitarian organizations have their roots in and are still logistically and financially supported by church networks and religious actors.

The number of missionaries and volunteers has greatly increased since the 1980s and 1990s, and the number of protestant and evangelical faith-based organizations throughout the Global South has multiplied (Barnett and Stein 2012). While faith-based humanitarian actors that receive financial support from governments are generally not allowed to proselytize, in practice proselytism is a component of several religious-humanitarian actions. Organizations such as World Vision—an Evangelical Christian humanitarian and development organization—downplay their religious ethos. Indeed, in many organizations, humanitarian work and missionary work overlap. Some organizations, inspired for example by Pentecostal or denominational churches, may proselytize more aggressively than others, and may contribute to religious tensions in contexts that are characterized by religious competition and volatility. One example of a problematic area of intervention is that of orphanages. Following humanitarian campaigns and flows of money, hundreds of orphanages have been established in volatile areas after violent conflicts, and faith-based organizations have played a dominant role in the creation and management of these institutions. One problem that emerged was that many of the orphans turned out to have parents who had lost access to their children. Another was the commodification of orphanages and mismanagement. Some orphanages have been open to sexual abuse and violence.

The form of control that some religious humanitarian actors have in the management of specific social sectors in conflict and post-conflict areas has been widely criticized by scholars, as religious faith organizations may exercise almost unlimited power over the most vulnerable people, for example in orphanages, refugee shelters, or safe houses for victims of violence. Jin-Heon Jung (2015) describes the case of American evangelist organizations operating in the Chinese borderland, with conversion to Christianity being almost obligatory in exchange of humanitarian entitlements and support. This was also the case, for example, with the Free Burma Rangers, an evangelical, humanitarian non-governmental organization (NGO) that provides emergency health care and have established a firm presence in the ethnic minority regions of Myanmar. Conversion was not formally required in this case, but the Free Burma Rangers used to share the Bible while implementing humanitarian aid.

Stephen Hopgood and Leslie Vinjamuri (2012) argue that World Vision represents the business model in the humanitarian marketplace, raising its cash and motivation for its staff on evangelical and protestant principles. Buddhist and Islamic organizations also represent important actors in the humanitarian arena. The Tzu Chi Foundation is a case in point. Presently, Tzu Chi is arguably the largest Chinese Buddhist charity in the world. It has run an island-wide medical network, runs the largest bone marrow databank of the Chinese diaspora, and has established the Tzu Chi International Medical Association, modeled upon the secular Médecins Sans Frontières. Julia Huang (2017) notes that the foundation did not present Buddhist beliefs, as expected by the founder's followers, but modern sciences and bureaucracy as a solution to human suffering, a sacralized medical assistance using Buddhist justification and legitimation to giving, including bodily giving.

Organizations such as Islamic Relief—an international aid agency that provides humanitarian aid and development assistance globally—must maintain a degree of secularization to qualify for public funds, but the religious giving, and the religious loyalty and motivation of its members are the competitive edge in the humanitarian marketplace (Hopgood and Vinjamuri 2012). Besides following Islamic principles and Islamic law, Islamic humanitarianism promotes itself to markets and donors by advertising activities in Islamic radical contexts, which have become no-go areas for many seculars or non-Muslim humanitarians, and hence for competitors in humanitarian business.

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## Resilience

Resilience is one of those ubiquitous concepts that permeate the spectrum of social sciences, global governance, and public policy. The conceptual trajectory of resilience is transdisciplinary, and so are its applications. In the field of humanitarianism, resilience has been discussed as a managerial technique, a paradigm for the study of governmentality, a theory describing interdependencies between humans and ecosystems, or an individual's or group's capacity to overcome shocks. For each of these dimensions, resilience has adopted complementary tropes that stress the anticipatory nature, adaptability, and robustness of a given system.

Resilience comes from the Latin word *resilio*, meaning to jump back or rebound. Some scholars trace the origins of the concept to the physical sciences, where it characterizes the quality of materials to return to their former shape after an exterior stressor. Thus, in engineering, resilience is a design objective for buildings and infrastructure. Other scholars consider that resilience developed out of environmental economics and ecology (Holling 1973) to describe the flexibility and adaptability of ecosystems. Resilience also entered the field of psychology in the 1970s, when it was used to explain an individual's capacity to overcome trauma. The more recent iteration of socio-ecological resilience

(Folke 2006) emphasizes the interplay between social and ecological systems, especially their adaptive capacity to overcome hazards and other shocks, rather than the idea of returning to a previous equilibrium. These views consider resilience as a positive property of a system, whether it be a forest, a community, or a city. However, debates have taken place about whether this capacity means a return to the status quo ante after an efficient recovery, such as after a disaster, or a deeper process of reconfiguration wherein a system uses adversity to proactively adjust and renew itself. In fact, recent proposals underscore transformability as a cornerstone of resilience thinking, and resilience has become a bridging concept in the fields of disaster risk reduction, climate change, sustainable development, and humanitarian assistance.

Analyzing the mainstreaming of resilience in these arenas, critics have underscored how resilience research tended to sideline concerns of political economy, political ecology, culture, affect, and memory, ultimately further marginalizing vulnerable populations. Others have argued instead that resilience provides a solution to questions of vulnerability via increased agency, while others contend for the co-constitutive mutuality of resilience and vulnerability. The operationalization of resilience has also led to divergent views between quantitative and qualitative approaches, on whether it is an objective or subjective state, or process, and whether it is context dependent or not. The link between risk and resilience is also significant: when the latter exacerbates the former, many undesirable properties can be quite persistent (e.g. poverty), and the ability to address their root causes and break them down is as important as the ability to bounce back after a disturbance, as the common view of resilience suggests. Moreover, resilience can have pernicious outcomes, as when disaster victims are deemed resilient—thereby justifying insufficient aid.

A different line of inquiry stems from the vantage point of security and humanitarian studies. Scholars inspired by the work of Michel Foucault have analyzed resilience as a neoliberal form of governmentality that internalizes emergency and normalizes danger by producing a “risk-accepting” biopolitics, supplanting the “safety first” approaches of the past (Duffield 2012; Hall and Lamont 2013). Here, resilience is akin to a regime of thought, a plastic word, when not an ontological category, that instructs to accept, and live with, unknowable global risks, shifting the responsibility onto individuals.

Within the international humanitarian regime, the vocabulary of resilience has been used for some time as a means to promote the mental health of aid workers, foster aid effectiveness, and further beneficiary self-reliance, notably through a re-envisioning of the space and temporality of refugee camps. The notion of “resiliency humanitarianism” captures this rationale of care and

camp management, which aims to responsabilize refugees in their efforts to adapt to, and survive, crisis (Ilcan and Rygiel 2015).

There is no doubt that challenges abound when the vocabulary of resilience is adopted by such different epistemic communities, but nonetheless, it signals a desire to make sense of complexity that yields generative tensions and debates.

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## Responsibility to Protect

Responsibility to Protect is a policy doctrine that was endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Summit Meeting in 2005. It affirms the primary obligation of states to protect its population against harm and, failing that, a secondary responsibility by the international community to take collective action, and, in accordance with the UN Charter, to “help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN 2005, para. 139). While frequently cited in UN Security Council resolutions, the doctrine has only been invoked once to justify military intervention—in Libya in March 2011. In the academic literature, it is controversial.



The doctrine developed from mounting international concern in the 1990s over rights and obligations relating to the protection of civilians in situations of mass atrocities. The near-paralysis of the UN during the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) generated demands for effective international intervention on humanitarian grounds. However, the military intervention by NATO in Kosovo four years later—while justified on humanitarian grounds and arguably effective in protecting an ethnic minority from further death and displacement—was not authorized by the UN Security Council and was thus illegal under international law. The conflicting implications of these cases accelerated efforts initiated earlier in the UN to strengthen the normative basis for humanitarian intervention. The result was a Canadian semi-official report issued in 2001 (ICISS 2001). Building on the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility,” the report essentially argues that effectiveness generates rights: a government that cannot effectively protect its population against mass atrocities—defined as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity—forfeits its right to sovereignty, and the responsibility of protection falls to the international community.

The UN Secretariat under Secretary-General Kofi Annan took the work forward, but the text approved at the World Summit in 2005 was noticeably careful. Potential target states and intervening powers alike refused to add new binding, legal obligations on states, or to weaken existing restraints on international intervention vested in the Security Council.

What, then, is the significance of the doctrine? Soon known under the emblem R2P, the doctrine generated considerable activity in the academic and policy communities. An international advocacy and research center was formed in 2007, followed by the journal *Global Responsibility to Protect*. At the UN, the Secretariat established a special advisor on R2P to the Secretary-General and issued annual reports on the subject, while the General Assembly held regularly scheduled “interactive dialogues.” The Security Council frequently referred to the doctrine, but only one of its 63 resolutions calling for protection of civilians during the 2006–2018 period invoked an *international* responsibility to protect. That was in Libya. On all other occasions, the Security Council merely affirmed that the primary responsibility to protect fell to the government of the state in question.

Debate has followed. Legal scholars note that the doctrine adds nothing to existing rights and obligations under international law developed in relation to humanitarian intervention. Some argue that it nevertheless provides a discursive framework for clarifying rights, obligations, and consequences of choices made in difficult matters of humanitarian intervention; further theorizing and

conceptual refinement is therefore important (Orford 2011; Thakur and Maley 2015). Its strongest proponents view the doctrine as a normative guide for action to a more humane world, despite—or precisely because of—the manifest failure of the UN to alleviate mass violence in Darfur and Central Africa in the early 2000s (Evans 2008; Bellamy 2011), and later in Syria and Myanmar. Critics, on the other hand, warn against its potential to legitimize an international regime of trusteeship whose populations “are seen as wards in need of external protection” (Mamdani 2010: 53). The Libyan intervention crystallized fears that the doctrine would be used to justify military action for non-humanitarian reasons (Hehir and Murray 2013). The subsequent unraveling of the Libyan state and society reinforced concerns over the fundamentally problematic aspects of external intervention (Paris 2014) and forms of transnational solidarity (Çubukçu 2013).

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## Risk Assessment

Humanitarian organizations work to address the needs of those affected by natural disaster, famine, internal conflict, or international war; thus their activities are necessary in high-risk contexts. In these cases, humanitarian action is prompted by the risk to civilians. However, these situations also generate risks for both individual humanitarian actors and humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian organizations often define risk as a consideration of the possibility of a detrimental event, and the potential impact generated if the event occurs. It can also be expressed as  $\text{Risk} = \text{Likelihood} \times \text{Impact}$  (Stoddard et al. 2016). Here, likelihood refers to the potential of a harmful event, while impact refers to the potential severity of an event.

In a global context, where the rules of war and human rights are often perverted and humanitarian need is high, organizations must allocate more time, consideration, and resources to assessing the risks of their work. Risk management in the humanitarian industry means “a formalized system for forecasting, weighing and preparing for possible risks in order to minimize their impact” (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016: 8). There are countless risks for organizations offering humanitarian aid to populations affected by war, conflict, displacement, natural disaster, and so on. Potential fiduciary risk, reputational risk, operational risk, residual risk, and risks to staff are ever looming on the horizon of humanitarian activities in increasingly insecure contexts. Some define fiduciary risk as “the possibility that resources will not be used as intended” which includes, but is not limited to, “corruption, fraud, embezzlement, theft and diversion of assets” (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016: 3). Reputational risk is the potential for an occurrence that will ultimately damage the public image of an organization. For example, irreparable reputational risk could ensue if an organization makes a move that will damage their credibility, such as misrepresentation of need or impact, misallocation of funds, or intentional diversion of earmarked funds to a project for which the financial assistance was not originally allocated (Sarazen 2018). High profile duty of care incidents could also damage the public perception of a humanitarian organization. Risks to staff can present as emotional, physical or financial, and can range from street harassment to death (Czwarno, Haver, and Stoddard 2016).

Some organizations conduct risk assessments through rigorous frameworks, while others consider risk on an ad hoc basis or via non-standard methodology. Each system, either formal or informal, assists organizations in determining if and how their humanitarian operations may be exposed to danger. Risk

assessment processes are not currently standardized across the humanitarian industry. Formal risk assessments are often conducted by program and security teams tasked with decision-making processes that could either prompt or curb humanitarian activities. Further, risk assessments form part of the security management systems of humanitarian organizations, meaning that they are often focused on potential risks to staff or the risks of implementing programs in certain areas, rather than the risk of non-delivery of aid.

Contrary to popular belief, aid workers who operate in high risk contexts are not primarily expatriate staff representing organizations headquartered far away. Traditional risk assessments, if implemented at all, have been critiqued for weighing the risks posed to international staff more heavily than the risks posed to national staff. In fact, incident and demographic numbers suggest that, in some cases, national aid staff are more likely to be targeted by violence (Aid Worker Security Database 2017; Bickley 2017; Sarazen 2018).

In contexts where there is a high need for the intervention of international organizations and non-governmental organizations because of violence and human rights violations, the perpetrators of the violence make the risk assessment matrices even more complex. In short, higher risks provoke higher stakes for all involved (Sarazen 2018).

Ultimately, “risk management, no matter how well-conceived and implemented, cannot eliminate risk; it only reduces the likelihood of its occurrence and mitigates against the potential consequences” of threats (Stoddard 2016). Improved risk management strategies can and should be designed for and adapted to the new frontier of humanitarianism in years to come, especially to counteract the relative scarcity of humanitarian aid in increasingly high-risk contexts (Stoddard et al. 2016).

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## Rule of Law

Political leaders and legal thinkers across the globe have unanimously defended the rule of law as an essential, universal good. In fact, it has become “the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today” (Tamanaha 2004: 4), as compelling as it is seemingly self-evident: a “ubiquitous and ‘natural’ formulation” (Rajkovic 2010: 35).

Yet the rule of law eludes any clear definition. Whether the rule of law includes the protection of individual rights or ideals of democracy, whether it is to be understood in strictly formalistic terms (i.e. abiding by written legal rules and limiting law-making power), or whether it refers to the conditions for the fulfillment of humanity’s “legitimate aspirations and dignity” (International Commission of Jurists 1959: VII, in Tamanaha 2004: 2) remains open to question. What is clear, however, is that the more the rule of law is invoked (and the more money is spent on its realization worldwide), the more concerns emerge regarding its forms of implementation, especially in contexts of post-conflict and massive humanitarian responses.

Since the early 1990s, humanitarian and “transitional” settings have been underpinned by a lingua franca of combined economic and legal development in the name of the rule of law. International donors started seeing the rule of law (in terms of government accountability and transparency, and the independence of the judiciary) as indispensable for, and inseparable from, economic development and the creation of a “level playing field’ for economic actors” (Channell 2005: 3). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund imposed the implementation of the rule of law as a condition of financial assistance on recipient countries, and millions have been spent on legal reforms, largely via humanitarian channels, in places such as Kosovo, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. Moreover, a renewed United Nations focus on civilian protection has led humanitarian actors to postulate a strong link between protection and the rule of law, and thus to include access to justice programs geared at displaced and war-affected populations in their postwar reconstruction efforts.

Different reasons have been offered to explain major failures in the implementation of rule of law programs in postwar contexts, ranging from arguments about the hasty transplants of legal rules from one system to another that do not sufficiently take historical and socio-cultural contexts into account; the short-term nature of most law reform and institution building projects; the excessively narrow, legal-technical focus of such projects; and a general lack of attention towards “the actual people and processes rather than the abstract categories of judge, court, civil society, stakeholder, and the like” (Garth and Dezalay 2011: 3).

Others have gone further, proposing outright critiques of the rule of law’s *raison d’être*, from Karl Marx’s critique of the rule of law as bourgeois ideology at the service of private property to Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) claim that the rule of law nowadays increasingly entails its exception. In a similar vein, Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader have argued that the rule of law is an imperial, hegemonic ideology that serves to justify plunder, the “often violent extraction by stronger international political actors victimizing weaker ones” (2008: 2). Such (illegal) plunder is nonetheless legitimized by claiming to advance the rule of law. Rather than being an exception to the rule, it is the “rule” of law that promotes inequality and impunity (Holston 2008). Anthropological and sociological research has also shown how neoliberal governance impacts the way the rule of law works in humanitarian theaters (De Lauri and Billaud 2016). The increasingly managerial, quantitative, technical approach to the rule of law has subordinated its proclaimed ideals of “doing good” to the formal requirements of bureaucratic accountability.

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## Safe Haven

The term safe haven is often used interchangeably with “safe area” and “safe zone” (Long 2012; Orchard 2014). While international law does not provide a universally accepted definition of the term, it does provide indications of what criteria should be met for a safe zone to be established (Gilbert and Rüschi 2017). Safe havens are designed to protect those in areas affected by armed conflict from military attack. In particular, the human rights of those in danger should be safeguarded and those within safe havens should be protected from the impact of armed conflict, through access to food and medication as well as education or employment (Yamashita 2017; Gilbert and Rüschi 2017).

While the Geneva Conventions include provisions for safe havens, the modern concept emerged during the 1990s, in response to the human rights violations perpetrated during ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the 1990s, safe havens were established as the result of negotiations between the parties to a conflict and relied on voluntary compliance. They were demilitarized and monitored by neutral observers. Subsequent safe havens were largely created by third parties. They were imposed rather than negotiated and involved military deterrents to protect civilians, with varying degrees of success (Recchia 2018).

There has been considerable debate about the efficacy and desirability of establishing safe havens in humanitarian emergencies. This debate centers on whether such areas are truly safe for the populations within and on the motivations behind their establishment. Few, if any, humanitarian safe havens have been deemed an unequivocal success. Risks associated with the establishment of safe havens by third parties include a shift in the balance of power in the conflict zone owing to the deployment of international military forces to establish and enforce a safe area. In the case of ethnic conflict, those protected by a safe haven are often of one ethnicity. While the establishment of a safe

haven may buy time for negotiations, it can also risk prolonging them, as the protected group—often the militarily weaker group—may harden its negotiating position on the basis of the protection it now receives. This delay can result in a greater loss of civilian life (Recchia 2018). Failure to disarm those within the safe haven increases the risk that militias will use the protected area as a space from which to launch their own military offensives, putting civilians at risk (Recchia 2018).

In recent years, there have been numerous proposals to establish safe havens in conflict-affected areas, including in Syria and Libya. The establishment of safe havens has often been linked to attempts to stem the flow of refugees from conflict-affected areas. However, safe havens cannot provide protection equivalent to that provided by the fundamental right to seek asylum. Moreover, the idea that safe havens constitute a place to which refugees can be returned is problematic, given the minimal form of protection they provide (Gilbert and Rüschi 2017).

There are a number of factors that increase the chances of successfully protecting civilians in safe havens. These include the establishment of a safe haven via an agreement between all parties to a conflict and the presence of a safe corridor to the safe haven that guarantees humanitarian access (Gilbert and Rüschi 2017). Moreover, any military presence to protect a safe haven must be a credible deterrent and be present for the duration of the safe haven's existence.

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## Safeguarding

In the wake of the Oxfam scandal in Haiti, in which the organization is perceived to have failed to act on and then attempted to cover up sexual misconduct by staff after the 2010 earthquake, the aid sector has been engaged in “safeguarding” exercises (BBC 2018). The term was initially based on a United Kingdom (UK) legal definition that applied to vulnerable adults and children. However, more recently, safeguarding has acquired a broader meaning to include all actions by aid actors to protect staff from harm (abuse, sexual harassment, and violence) and to ensure staff do not harm beneficiaries (Hoppe and Williamson 2018). Nevertheless, safeguarding has already been strongly criticized for being a buzzword largely confined to specific humanitarian policy arenas in the Global North, for its lack of inclusiveness, and for being yet another costly top-down initiative (Bruce-Raeburn 2018).

At its core, the safeguarding concept aims to reinforce the humanitarian imperative to do no harm by preventing sexual abuse and exploitation, and is part of the broader struggle for humanitarian accountability that emerged in the 1980s. Since this time, sexual exploitation has been considered the very worst kind of humanitarian worker behavior, but the parameters of what constitutes exploitation have been contested. Safeguarding means different things to different people in the aid sector, depending on how they are situated within the sector, and varies based on gender, nationality, geographical location, and age.

Today, the work of preventing sexual exploitation and abuse is commonly known by the acronym PSEA (protection from sexual exploitation and abuse) and is led by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Safeguarding has emerged at a very specific historical moment for women's rights, and indeed for the humanitarian sector itself. The current “safeguarding crisis” comes after the global #MeToo movement that has had particularly significant impact in some of the largest donor countries in the Global North. (The movement highlighted the prevalence of sexual exploitation and harassment and also of impunity.) Safeguarding is also shaped by the professionalization and legalization of aid work and the emergence of a duty of care standard for humanitarian workers, with respect to humanitarian organizations' responsibility for the well-being and safety of their staff.

The interpretation of what safeguarding means is shaped by the changing cultural perceptions of transactional sex and prostitution, primarily in the Global North. Whereas codes of conduct have been promoted as a

key mechanism for governing the sexual behavior of humanitarian workers (Matti 2015), there appears to be an emergent assumption that paying for sex, anywhere and at any time, is incompatible with being a “good” humanitarian worker and dependable employee. In practice, this means that the distinction between paying for sex and exploiting someone for sex is erased.

As part of the ongoing push towards digitization and datafication, efforts are being made to “technologize” safeguarding responses. The UK government has launched a new Interpol/Save the Children-coordinated vetting project, Soteria, which will provide criminal record checks and improve information sharing (Gov.UK 2018). The push for quantification and “evidence-based approaches” engender a framing of social life—and its problems—that lends itself to a focus on aspects of “the social” that can be (or be made) classified/classifiable or counted/countable. However, this also links to surveillance as an increasingly common technique of humanitarian governance. How remote control strategies will correspond meaningfully to the need to reduce power imbalances and empower those in precarious positions, be they beneficiaries or staff, remains to be seen (Sandvik 2019).

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## Securitization

Securitization within the humanitarian lexicon refers to the ways in which states use humanitarian assistance to further national security or foreign policy objectives. It assumes a mutually reinforcing association between conflict and poverty, and the resulting security threats that emerge from refugees and failed states. Securitization in the humanitarian sector is built on a “fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity and international instability” (Duffield 2001: 7). It is precisely these assumptions that link violent conflict, security, development, and humanitarian action. More generally, processes of fear are used to justify the exceptional security measures put in place to deter or prevent the movement of internally displaced within or refugees across geopolitical borders, whether in the midst of civil war (Hyndman 2007) or, more recently, in the context of refugee movements in Europe and the United States (USA), and the criminal prosecution of those who assist them.

While the extraordinary efforts to secure borders from migration and the manipulation of aid in support of political, military, or security aims are not new phenomena, the term “securitization” gained prominence in the humanitarian sector after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the USA. The 9/11 attacks ushered in an era in which counter-terrorism aims have altered the context within which humanitarian actors operate (O’Leary 2018). Securitization is commonly justified as a way of making foreign assistance more effective and coherent. Critics, however, object to securitization on two grounds. First, it compromises neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian assistance (Williamson 2011), and second, it increases risk and danger for those providing such assistance (Fast 2015). In post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) comprising military and civilian members engaged in diplomatic, development, and humanitarian activities, often designed to “win the hearts and minds” of the communities in which they operated. The integration of these activities not only blurred the lines between civilian and military actors, but it also complicated efforts to distinguish principled humanitarian assistance from the political action and security agenda of the PRTs and the states that championed them. These blurred lines and the erosion of principled humanitarian action, in turn, are often used to explain attacks on aid workers.

Yet the contributions to securitization are not entirely one sided. Humanitarian agencies adopt security risk management approaches to protect staff

and programs and to ensure access to conflict or violence-affected populations. The most common of these approaches are consent-based, in which humanitarians seek the tacit or negotiated consent for their presence and programs, in contrast to “hardened” measures, in which they aim to either deter attacks through the threat of counterthreat (armed escort or withdrawal of services) or to decrease their vulnerability through the use of policies, devices, or other measures (e.g., restriction of movement, use of perimeter fences). In adopting a visibly fortified architecture to protect their staff and compounds in the most dangerous places, humanitarian actors more closely resemble the military actors from whom they aim to distinguish themselves, further blurring the lines between them (Fast 2014).

Evidence related to securitization is mixed, however, both in terms of the efficacy of counter-insurgency operations (Fishstein and Wilder 2012) and in their effects on the security of aid workers. Nevertheless, securitization remains a potent narrative for states and a complication for principled humanitarian action.

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## Sentiments

Adam Smith's 1759 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* provides one of the earliest instances of humanitarian sentiments, which are defined as the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and urge us to remedy them. From the mid-18th century onwards, moral feelings of love, friendship, trust, and solidarity were seen to be equally important as a rational sense of obligation towards helping distant others. These sentiments have been cultivated in everyday practices in modern and contemporary history, although they continue to be unevenly distributed. They also necessitate a broader definition of humanitarianism, going beyond emergencies and their relief to its conceptualization as “a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral principles, a basis for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action” (Redfield and Bornstein 2010: 17).

Thomas Haskell (1985) identified the conditions for the historic emergence of humanitarian sentiments as (1) the existence of ethical maxims to help suffering strangers, often grounded in religious ideas, (2) the perception of involvement in the causes of this suffering, (3) the ability to see a way to end it, and (4) the existence of ordinary and familiar recipes for intervention. This is linked to the growth of capitalism, which provided new insights into the causes of human suffering, as well as the discipline and technologies to act on these insights. The movement to abolish slavery is often identified as one of the first campaigns fueled by humanitarian sentiments, with the powerful feelings of sympathy and moral qualms that were aroused in supporters leading to political action (Wilson and Brown 2009). Another early event that contributed to the emergence of foundational ideas of shared humanity was the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. Its reporting across Europe focused on how the calamity affected ordinary people, and this created an imagined empathy with the sufferings of distant strangers.

From the 19th century onwards, the expansion of international trade brought with it new senses of interconnectedness. The early achievements of science and technology, wrapped up in modern ideas of progress and improvement, led to new understandings of responsibility and obligation. Secular approaches—as alternatives to religious practices—were also beginning to be applied to fighting poverty, and together with changes in media, advertising, and marketing, they gave rise to mass humanitarianism (Rozario 2003). Since the early 20th century, humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Oxfam, and innumerable subsequent organizations have been working to foster humanitarian sentiments among ever more

people. The emergence of child sponsorship, with its affective dimensions and the involvement of celebrities who have contributed to the emotionalization of humanitarianism, has been especially effective. As a result, humanitarian sentiments now include feelings of empowerment among Northern citizens that they can “Make Poverty History,” often with the help of new digital technologies (Roy 2010).

It is important to acknowledge the limits of humanitarian sentiments. They are often generated by individual stories of suffering that can discourage an understanding of the complexities of humanitarian situations. Sentiments can be fleeting and therefore provide unstable ground for action (Cohen 2001). When such action, be it charitable or political, does occur, it is characterized by the tension between seeing the sufferer as poor and in need of compassion and as an equal human being with whom to stand in solidarity (Fassin 2012). Last but not least, a focus on humanitarian sentiments must not neglect the material conditions, political dynamics, and structural causes of suffering. Instead, it can enrich our understanding of how these work in the world and contribute to mobilizing support for its alleviation.

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## Shelter

Shelter, understood as a place where temporary protection is provided, is a priority in an emergency. However, the right to shelter is entangled with other issues, thus making it difficult to set a defined humanitarian standard (Babister and Kelman 2002). “Adequate housing” (OHCHR 2009) is listed in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, there is not a definition of adequate housing. Shelters and housing do not constitute the core mandate of humanitarian agencies; therefore, there is no standardized policy for related issues, such as homelessness or slums. In humanitarian contexts, shelter is a temporary need for displaced people. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Refugee Organization sheltered people displaced by World War II. In 1950, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was instituted as the only commission in charge of shelter. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, approved in 1967, enlarged the geographical scope of the UNHCR, whose mandate to support displaced people was applied all over the world.

Ian Davis explored the ways in which shelters were historically built and used in different parts of the world, stating that “shelters must be considered as a process, and not as an object” (1978: 33). This statement constitutes the basic theoretical approach to shelters, even though its implementation was difficult to integrate with humanitarian practice. Although solutions such as self-resettlement or the use of local facilities are formally prioritized, there are other variables in the provision of shelters, such as potential resistance by host government, security, and timing of the intervention. There is often a tension between the need to provide “temporary” shelters and the difficulties in quickly granting people adequate accommodation. Shelters need to be built fast, and it is important that they appear “temporary,” to avoid the host population seeing them as something permanent and thus creating hostility (Babister and Kelman 2002). Protecting shelters from external threats is also important, as humanitarian shelters are often located in conflict-affected areas. Events such as the attacks on the Palestinian refugee camp of Shatila by Christian Maronite militias in 1982 or, more recently, the far-right attacks against refugee camps in Chios (Greece) in 2016, the accidental bombings of Kamona refugee camp in Syria (2016), Rann refugee camp in northern Nigeria (2017), and Makhmour refugee camp in northern Iraq (2017–2018) show how the location of the shelters and the security arrangements are crucial. Critics have noticed that

humanitarian management of shelters is a way of controlling displaced people until they can be resettled under the control of another authority (Rajaram 2002). Scholars have also described the provision of shelters as a process of dehistoricization and depoliticization of displaced populations (De Lauri 2016; Malkki 1996). These critics emphasize how humanitarian organizations focus on abstract standards rather than involving displaced communities in the “process” of sheltering.

The bureaucratization of sheltering has led to a progressive focus on the shelter as a product. In 2005, UNHCR and some non-governmental organizations arranged the “Shelter Cluster” to set common standards of sheltering, involving experts such as architects and designers. In 2017, the IKEA refugee shelter was awarded “Design of the Year.” However, this standardized shelter, very similar to a tent in size and functions, was criticized by humanitarian organizations as a finished product that did not leave rooms for local appropriation (Scott-Smith 2018). The lack of an agency focusing on shelter contributes to the fact that tension between the idea of shelter as a process and the need of standardized tools remains unsolved. In recent interventions connected to Syria’s crisis, the use of alternative shelters in the camps increased. In Greece (Dicker 2017), Italy, Germany and Turkey (Feyzi et al. 2018) there are experiences of sheltering models based on urban housing and self-settlement. These models are criticized because they are not seen as temporary solutions by host societies and they make displaced people more difficult to protect. The removal of refugees from the Italian town of Riace (2018) and the evictions of refugees spontaneously sheltering in the Athenians neighborhood of Exarchia (2019) show the frequent resistance of state authority toward these alternative models. However, solutions like this help the UNHCR to reach its formal target to reduce the percentage of people living in camps (Culbertson et al. 2016; Dicker 2017). The tensions between the temporariness and quality of the shelters, as well as issues of security and freedom of displaced people, remain the main concerns in humanitarian sheltering, and frequently erupt in tensions between state authorities and different civil society actors.

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## Solidarity

Solidarity derives from the French word *solidarité*, which refers to a communion of interests and mutual responsibility. In this sense, “social solidarity is regarded as the glue that keeps people together, whether by mutually identifying and sharing certain norms and values, or by contributing to some common good, or both” (Komter 2004: 2). The questions of mutuality and communalism, either as an accomplished fact or as an end towards which social action is required, are prevalent in the different definitions of solidarity provided over time and across disciplines and sectors. In his seminal work *The Division of Labor in Society*, first published in 1893, Émile Durkheim made the distinction between mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity. According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is characteristic of traditional, undifferentiated societies and is based on similarity and homogeneity between people, in terms of values and beliefs; whereas organic solidarity stems from diversification and the complex division of labor that characterizes modern societies. Therefore, solidarity in modern societies springs from functional interdependency and complementarity (Durkheim 1997 [1893]). Despite the limitations of Durkheim’s functionalist theory and the emphasis on social cohesion, Durkheim’s conceptualization of solidarity sheds light on the historical development of humanitarianism as a feeling of connectedness that is based on a common and shared identity. In particular, humanitarianism as a moral imperative and action that

programmatically seeks to alleviate the suffering of distant strangers was historically enabled by the solidification of shared humanity as a common and all-encompassing category during the Enlightenment. Solidarity among distant suffering strangers as fellow humans has thus been the underlying force of modern humanitarian sensibility and cosmopolitan humanitarianism.

In her work on humanitarian solidarity and communication, Lilie Chouliaraki (2013) traces the transformation from this other-oriented morality, which was grounded on the principle of a shared humanity, to a self-oriented morality. The changes in the aesthetics of humanitarian communication reflect changes in the very ethics of solidarity. The contemporary times of post-humanitarianism that Chouliaraki locates in the post-Cold War world are marked by the shift from a “solidarity as pity” to a “solidarity of irony.” The “spectators” of distant suffering are motivated by a self-centered moral imperative to help (in order to feel good themselves) while they are dominated by a skepticism against the efficacy of any humanitarian solidarity action.

This egalitarian essence of solidarity brings to the fore the tensions between solidarity and humanitarianism, albeit from a different perspective. The depoliticizing effects of humanitarianism, criticized by much literature on humanitarian relief, show how humanitarianism is a particular form of intervention grounded on inequality between the “giver” and the “receiver” of aid (Fassin 2007; Feldman and Ticktin 2010). This tension between solidarity and hierarchy, control and care, domination and aid, is constitutive of humanitarianism as a particular form of government and reason (Fassin 2012).

Nevertheless, novel forms of humanitarianism that embrace a solidarity ethos overtly challenge the political foundations of Western humanitarianism. In the European context, the so called 2015 “migration/refugee crisis” formed the ground for the emergence of a disparate humanitarian field that apart from large-scale humanitarian organizations included grassroots groups and independent humanitarian volunteers. This vast arena has been described, for instance, as solidarity (Rozakou 2017), volunteer (Sandri 2018), or grassroots humanitarianism (McGee and Pelham 2018). These semantic inventions and the coinage of new terms illustrate the researchers’ need to describe a humanitarian milieu that is exemplified by informal and often ad hoc groups and individuals. Moreover, the field of “solidarity humanitarianism” pushes us to critically reflect upon and revisit our perspective of humanitarianism and the relationship of humanitarianism with the state. In fact, very often it is the “independent volunteers” or “solidarians” themselves who powerfully contest the *modus operandi*, logics, and structure of traditional humanitarian organizations (Rozakou 2017), promoting an egalitarian ethos (Cantat and Feischmidt

2018; Millner 2011). Solidarity humanitarianism not only challenges established modalities of humanitarian action by endorsing a horizontal, anti-bureaucratic and political form of assistance, but it also sets coexistence and being with the refugees/asylum seekers/migrants at its core (Rozakou 2016). In that sense, solidarity humanitarianism has solidarity as its key formative feature, and it poses the question of connectedness under a new egalitarian light.

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## South–South Cooperation

The United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC) defines South–South cooperation in its broadest sense as political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and/or technical collaboration in the forms of knowledge, skills, expertise, and/or resource sharing between countries in the Global South. It can involve one or more of the so-called “developing countries” and the cooperation can occur on bilateral, regional, intraregional, or interregional basis (Lengyel and Malacalza 2011; UNOSSC 2018).

The word “South” in South–South cooperation refers to an arguably contested term of Global South, which broadly refers to the regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. The term generally excludes Europe and North America, signifying geopolitical difference and global and historical relations of power (Dados and Connell 2012).

Historically, the forms and modalities of South–South cooperation vary contextually to a high degree. Some milestones of broad South–South cooperation include the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the First Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and the following Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978. Furthermore, countries of the Global South have significantly increased their participation and leadership in humanitarian action and peacekeeping missions in the 20th century (Amar 2013).

The role of non-traditional (new or re-emerging) actors in the wider spectrum of development cooperation has expanded in the last two decades, increasingly diversifying and challenging traditional approaches to development assistance and humanitarianism (De Renzio and Seifert 2014; Pickup 2018). For example, some South–South cooperation providers reject the labels of “donor” and “recipient” countries, and rather focus on mutually beneficial peer relationship with partner countries and emphasize the exchange of technical skills (Zimmermann and Smith 2011). South–South cooperation can be seen as creating a new developmental narrative that contests the traditional conditionality-given narrative, which focuses on advancing the donors’ ideological interests. Notable Southern donors such as China and India tend to refuse to enter into donor arrangements so they do not interfere with other states’ sovereign affairs (Mawdsley 2012). The general focus of South–South aid is in non-tied autonomous development, where strategic priorities are shaped by the countries at the receiving end (Quadir 2013).

Criticism of South–South cooperation cautions against generalizations and assumptions of ubiquitous and unanimous approaches of solidarity between the Global Southern states, and questions the acritical use of the notion of

“Global South” itself. The diversity of the countries of the Global South, in addition to their different relative positions in international relations, requires contextual analysis of the cooperation (Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). Humanitarian and development aid provided by the Global South has been fragmented owing to the lack of national aid strategies and clear organizational structures to coordinate, manage, monitor, and evaluate new and existing aid programs and needs (Quadir 2013). Further, some scholars argue that the South–South cooperation paradigm faces similar challenges to its North–South counterpart, as both are characterized by involving countries’ heterogenic policies, institutional arrangements, and engagements in international initiatives and forums (De Renzio and Seifert 2014).

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## Sovereignty

Sovereignty is a type of power usually ascribed to an actor who can determine the behavior and actions that are permitted within a given territory. In humanitarian arenas, sovereignty may be temporary and unclear as different actors fight for power over the same territory. Sovereignty may also be layered, with different actors controlling different elements of life. For example, religious authorities may hold sovereignty over questions of marriage, child custody, and inheritance, while the regional land registry holds sovereignty over the distribution of seeds and tools. It is very important for humanitarian actors to understand who holds sovereignty over their area of operations. Whoever holds sovereignty is the actor that humanitarian negotiations will take place with as they determine whether and what kind of humanitarian activities are permitted (Fast, Freeman, O'Neill and Rowley 2013).

Commonsense understanding of sovereignty attributes it to states and their regional and local institutions. However, in many places the state only holds nominal sovereignty, while effective sovereignty is exercised by non-state actors (Denham and Lombardi 1996). For humanitarian actors, it is important to understand this distinction between nominal and effective sovereignty because humanitarian work often requires interactions with both levels. While, for example, visa and official permissions are obtained via the state, they may be useless in the actual area of operations if actors who do not recognize state sovereignty exercise effective sovereignty in that region.

The ability to hold on to sovereignty is not only related to brute force, but also to whether the population believes in the legitimacy of the sovereign. This means it is important to understand that while sovereignty is held or exercised it is also embodied in people, institutions, and, of course, deities. To understand better the distribution of power, and the strength of a sovereign actor in their area of operations, humanitarian actors should gather an understanding of whom sovereignty is invested in by recipients of aid.

The question of whether humanitarian agencies can develop into sovereign actors is contested (Hoffmann 2011). A research paper argues that “many gaps in the protection of refugees can be connected to a de facto transfer of

responsibility for managing refugee policy from sovereign states to United Nations agencies” (Kagan 2011: 1). The humanitarian aid system is designed to cover a short-term inability of states to protect their populations. However, today there is a growing phenomenon of protracted humanitarian crises. Therefore, humanitarian aid can develop into a permanent substitute for public services that should be provided by the state. In the case of a refugee crisis, for example, if a state lacks relevant administrative bodies, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees decides whether someone receives refugee status or becomes eligible for aid. In certain crises, therefore, humanitarian actors may well hold the “power over life and death” of aid recipients, which is another famous definition of sovereignty (Foucault 1977).

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## Stabilization

Stabilization is ambiguous in its definition and highly politically oriented in its practice. Therefore, it is one of the most controversial notions in the humanitarian vocabulary. The term became popular in the 1990s, around the same time as civil–military cooperation (CIMIC). Both CIMIC and stabilization have been criticized for curtailing the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the humanitarian community. The ideological and operational meaning of stabilization is embedded in American (US) military doctrine concerning

combating insurgencies with the involvement of either the country's international allies in the Western world (e.g. the Philippines, 1898–1902; Vietnam, 1967–1975; and Afghanistan, 2001–present) or national allies in the regions of insurgency (e.g. Colombia, 2004–present) (Fishel 2008; Barakat, Deely and Zyck 2010). The term has been given multiple names in US army manuals since the early 20th century, including “small wars,” “counterinsurgency or COIN,” “low intensity conflict,” “operations other than war,” and “stability and support operations,” but has come to refer to the civil–military operations of US and Western governments in asymmetric warfare with the aim of creating sustainable conditions for their own version of indigenous government and political order (Fishel 2008). After the Cold War, the notion of stabilization has been associated with state fragility. It has been defended with reference to the urgency to stabilize so-called “failed states” through international military intervention and to save human lives in the aftermath of military operations (e.g. in Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of Congo).

Stabilization always involves military operations, especially in countries and regions seen to be infested with what are variously referred to as “chronic insecurities,” “fragilities,” “protracted conflicts,” and “uncertainties,” which are almost always defined without reference to the broader historical and political contexts and are framed as if domestically driven and created (e.g. Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq) (Manyena and Gordon 2015).

Stability operations mostly include security reform, good governance, institution building, public service delivery, humanitarian assistance, and development (Jackson and Gordon 2007). The increasing number of stabilization operations and their expanding scope of activities are an indication of the changing stance of the international community and the United Nations (UN) towards the principle of state sovereignty. The most recent examples of stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria represent the radical divergence from the principle of state sovereignty in the international regime that has taken place in the 21st century. The discourse of stabilization, coupled with peace-building, reconstruction, and state-building, has justified military interventions in states that are seen to be failing to protect the lives of their citizens owing to institutional collapse, while disassociating the root causes of state failure from the conditions created by the political and military conduct of the intervening states. For example, the state failure or fragility in Iraq was partly the result of the UN sanctions of the 1990s and the military intervention in 2003. However, the stabilization operations to combat insurgency, ethnic strife, and ISIS that followed the Anglo-American invasion assumed that the root causes of the violence were internally driven.

There has been a growing trend to integrate humanitarian assistance into stabilization operations, and this has raised questions not only about the



militarization of humanitarian activities, but also the ambiguous role of humanitarian assistance in terms of security benefits and conflict resolution (Bailey 2011). Stabilization operations have repeatedly failed to demonstrate any solid link between humanitarian and development aid and peace and conflict resolution. However, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in conflict zones, especially in countries such as Somalia and Yemen, means that humanitarian and development assistance are an integral part of stabilization efforts (Barakat, Deely and Zyck 2010). The UN has followed the same trend of integrating emergency and stabilization operations to achieve “coherence” across political, security, and humanitarian priorities. The UN’s humanitarian assistance activities tend to overlap with and be integrated into stabilization operations (i.e. integrated operations). In theory, the UN’s stabilization operations are expected to respect the humanitarian space. In practice, however, stabilization priorities conflict with humanitarian concerns and introduce security-mindedness and politicization into integrated UN operations (combination of military, humanitarian, and diplomatic engagements) (Muggah 2010; Bailey 2011).

Different Western states have theorized, designed, and prioritized their stabilization operations differently, depending on their level of intervention and the nature of geopolitical interests in the stabilization zones (Gordon 2006). Alternatively, stabilization operations, especially those authorized by NATO and the UN, provide mechanisms of involvement other than deployment of armies to those states that are unwilling to send conventional armed forces, but are willing to contribute to reconstruction and development efforts.

Consent-building appears to be a key aspect of stabilization programming, as opposed to a commitment to mobilize national and local capabilities, and systems and instruments to formulate stabilization priorities (Jackson and Gordon 2007). Both consent-building and development aspects of stabilization have been accused of being militarily led and economically defined by the intervening states and donors, rather than designed by locally driven political dialogues and social contracts.

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## State-building

Since the end of the 20th century, state-building became an overall framework and objective of peace-building. By then, peace-building had consolidated into a large scale, standardized, and externally led transformation of war-torn societies deemed necessary to prevent the recurrence of conflict. The establishment of state-building as its overall goal was the peace-building enterprise at its most ambitious heights. As it turned out, levels of ambitions would soon waver and the goal of state-building was more or less abandoned.

State-building grew out of at least two different academic discourses and policy fields. One was a political science preoccupation with state failure—both a cause and a consequence of the inability of some states to uphold the monopoly of violence and other basic functions (Jackson 1991; Zartman 1995). With the post-9/11 war on terror, such state failure became framed as a threat to global, and in particular Western, security, specifically as a haven for terrorist groups but also as a more generalized source of destabilization of the world order. Another backdrop to the emergence of the peace-building as state-building doctrine originated in development studies and international aid practice, with the so-called Post-Washington consensus holding economic growth to be contingent on a specific kind of state, characterized by efficient and capable institutions able to implement and support liberal economic policies.

As a space where development agencies, military forces, and political missions now found themselves working alongside each other, postwar societies

became a meeting ground for these two strands of state-building, both conceptually and physically. For some time, all aspects of state-building (marketization and economic liberalization, democratization, and the rebuilding or restructuring of the security apparatus, legal frameworks, the judiciary, and the state administration more generally) came to be seen as mutually constitutive. This idea was articulated perhaps in its purest form in the notion of “vicious” and “virtuous” cycles, which was coined by Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan (2005). The authors argued that failure to perform one or many of the core functions of the state such as security will undermine other core functions (such as market formation or the rule of law) in a vicious circle, and vice versa.

This line of thinking was criticized by scholars for being ahistorical, being based on flawed liberal assumptions of linear progress and “all good things going together” (Milliken 2003). Some pointed out that actual state formation in the West was driven by specific political and economic elite interests rather than functional convergence. Others questioned the legitimacy or possibility of imposing external Western frameworks on non-Western settings (Suhrke 2011). Arguably, however, the fatal blow to state-building as a guiding principle for humanitarian intervention in postwar or conflict countries came from political and strategic quarters. Since 2001, the international peace-building regime, and consequently humanitarian aid, have coexisted uneasily with, and increasingly merged with, the “war on terror,” which has had the effect of aligning the former closer to Western security interests—and exposing it as such. The two initial sites of the war on terror—Afghanistan and Iraq—were also sites of multilateral state-building and large humanitarian theatres. Here, the idea of a mutually reinforcing virtuous circle was extended to include military operations, as commanders sought to coopt development and humanitarian aid for the purpose of shoring up support for their counterinsurgency campaigns. Certainly, many development and humanitarian agencies resisted being made part of the war effort by “winning hearts and minds” for the military, but largely ended up being associated with it nonetheless. In turn, the rather spectacular failures of United States-led attempts at pacification in these two countries undermined the expansive visions of state-building everywhere. By the beginning of the 2010s, the narrowing of objectives and pragmatism was observable across the pillars of state-building: security, administrative reform, democratization, and the justice sector. Military operations shifted their focus from providing security to the population and ensuring states’ monopoly of violence to more selective, “enemycentric,” missions. United Nations peace enforcement operations increasingly worked alongside and resembled American-led counter terrorist missions (Karlsruud 2019). Some suggest that new

forms of “liquid warfare” made the control of territory (and thus state-building) abundant and counterproductive (Demmers and Gould 2018). A more minimalist, pragmatic, and decisively less liberal approach also took place in other fields of state-building. Increasingly, it was proposed that the public provision of security and justice be relegated to informal and “traditional” actors, such as militias and religious or traditional councils, and ambitions for democracy and “good governance” were downscaled or abandoned. Some saw this as a corrective to the imposition of Western frameworks and a belated recognition of “the local” (Boege, Brown, Clements and Nolan 2009), whereas others saw parallels to colonial templates of indirect rule and constructions of the Other as unfit for modern statehood (Wimpelmann 2013). A return to strongman politics and its denunciation of liberal intervention (and often liberalism *per se*) in many Western countries added to the sense that the historical moment of state-building as a framework for Western-led intervention might have passed. Humanitarian agencies have struggled to emerge from the lingering shadow of state-building. In most of the contexts where humanitarian action is implemented, it remains tainted by perceptions that it serves other, more transformative, political agendas.

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## Suffering

Suffering points toward experiences of physical or mental pain. Suffering, and the act of reflecting on the nature of suffering, are central issues in philosophy, religion, psychology, and the social sciences. On the one hand, suffering is a deeply personal and individual experience that escapes easy definitions and representation (Wilkinson 2005). On the other hand, however, social suffering points to suffering as a societal experience, and in such instances it is the result of what political, economic and institutional powers do to people (or other sentient creatures) (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997). In humanitarian contexts, suffering is a mobilizing force: witnessing the suffering of others triggers compassion, empathy, and emotion-driven ethical responses, which sometimes leads to humanitarian responses and action (Wilson and Brown 2008).

Jeremy Bentham (2012 [1789]) identified the ability to suffer as the precondition for protection against exploitation and exposure to cruelty as a requirement for (human) rights. He famously proposed that the question is not “Can they reason? or, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith (2007 [1759]) described compassion for the suffering other as one of the “original passions of human nature.” Compassion towards the suffering of others is undoubtedly as old as human culture, but the idea of a universal humanity and a global human community with transboundary moral obligations—and, therefore, obligations to alleviate the suffering of others—is often traced back to the Enlightenment era. During the Enlightenment, a cult of sensibility and fascination with suffering prompted a surge in “humanitarian” thinking and action. At the time, the rise of secular thinking helped sow the seeds of modern humanitarian thinking and gave voice to the idea that people themselves could, and should, intervene in the suffering of others—even unknown, distant people who remain anonymous to us. The recognition of a shared human condition, one bound by bodily precarity and vulnerability to suffering, formed the basis for ideas of a common human community and the obligation of people to safeguard fragile humanity themselves (Sliwinski 2011; Wilson and Brown 2008).

According to Hannah Arendt, humanitarianism builds on a “politics of pity,” and it divides us into those who suffer and those who do not, those in need of help and those able to help. Therefore, humanitarianism is dependent on the spectacle of suffering, on mediating representations of the suffering of others in the awareness of distant, able-to-help spectators (Arendt 1963). Witnessing the suffering of another person, recognizing it as suffering, reacting to the suffering in a compassionate manner, and having the will to help are at the core of

humanitarianism. The evolution of transboundary humanitarianism, and its institutionalism and expansion, may be traced through episodes in which extreme suffering has been witnessed and benevolent, humanitarian responses to it have been organized (Kotilainen 2016; Sliwinski 2011; Wilson and Brown 2008).

The birth of modern organizational humanitarianism is often dated to 1859 and the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. Deeply impacted by the suffering that he saw and heard during the battle, Henry Dunant wrote *A Memory of Solferino* in 1862. Inspired by the ideas presented in the book, the International Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863. Similarly, the anti-slavery movement led to recognition of slaves as humans capable of suffering and of their suffering (Sliwinski 2011; Hochschild 2005). Perhaps most famously, the horrors of World War II, and the witnessing of the immense suffering of those affected by the Holocaust, prompted the codification of international humanitarian laws and the implementation of conventions that aimed to protect humanity from future atrocities and rights violations. More recently, driven by the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect was signed in 2005 by all United Nations member states.

A critical question arises about what it is that counts as a life able (in our understanding) to suffer, a life we feel compassion for, a life worthy of grief and mourning (Butler 2004). This question is pertinent today with respect to, for instance, the issue of legal, mass-scale exploitation of animals in relation to animal rights.

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## Technology

Technology can refer to at least two different things: a particular equipment/machinery or the application of knowledge. In the humanitarian realm, this implies that technology can refer both to the application of logistical, medical, or other expertise for practical humanitarian purposes, and to such things as off-grid solar power in refugee camps, humanitarian demining devices, or “Plumpy’Nut” (Scott-Smith 2017), to mention a few. Despite this broad meaning, in recent years the term has mostly been used with reference to new technologies, such as blockchain, drones (Sandvik and Lohne 2014), biometrics (Jacobsen 2017), satellites, and information and communications technology more broadly.

This current trend in usage of the term reflects the fact that numerous humanitarian actors have introduced a range of new technologies into different aspects of their work, examples being biometrics for refugee registration, satellites for crisis mapping, drones for the delivery of medical aid, apps for refugees, and mobile phones for cash transfers. These and other uses of new technology in humanitarian work have given rise to debates that mainly center around two core themes: (1) benefits versus risks and (2) agency, politics, and accountability.

(1) Benefits versus risks. Accuracy, empowerment, and the link between technology and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals are benefits that have been emphasized in discussions about the possibilities and promises of technology. For example, in response to allegation of fraud, the World Food Programme called for the use of new technology to reduce theft of food aid in Yemen. More broadly, debates have emerged about the potential of technology to revolutionize humanitarian action (Read, Taithe and Mac Ginty 2016). The numerous expectations invested in the use of new technology in various humanitarian settings have given rise to debates about techno-optimism in the humanitarian community, possibly involving the appreciation of potential risks (Duffield 2016). One of these is technology failure, and harm

stemming from such a failure. Debates about “experimental” technology are related to this issue. This links to the gap between laboratory and humanitarian field use, the effects and implications of using humanitarian technologies in volatile aid settings (Kalkman 2018), and how to limit risks, referring to revitalized discussions about the principle of “do no harm” (i.e. delivering aid without causing harm) in the context of humanitarian technology (Sandvik, Jacobsen and McDonald 2017).

(2) Agency, politics, and accountability. A second central theme in recent debates about humanitarian technology has been the question of agency. In short, debates have centered on the question of whether technology is best understood as a “neutral means” (a tool through which to achieve predefined humanitarian objectives) or as having the potential to generate productive effects beyond what humans intend when they deploy it. One example of a productive effect is that many of the technologies mentioned here have produced enormous amounts of new and sometimes very sensitive data. This has certain benefits, but comes with new challenges, including data protection, privacy, and access questions. Accordingly, the International Committee of the Red Cross notes that guidance on “the interpretation of data protection principles” is particularly relevant when new technologies are employed (ICRC 2017). Another example is the impact of connectivity, not only on how humanitarian assistance is practiced, but also, importantly, on how it is conceptualized.

More broadly, these debates suggest that technology cannot easily be understood in isolation from broader questions of politics, power, ethics, and accountability. It is, for example, difficult to grasp the implications of using new technology in humanitarian work without considering the politics of humanitarian actors’ relations with other actors, such as host countries, donor countries, and asylum countries, as well as with private technology companies.

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## Training

Training can be defined as the “systematic acquisition of knowledge and skills with the goal of developing competencies necessary for effective performance in work environments” (Nazli, Sipon and Radzi 2014: 576). Humanitarian training aims to build the skills of volunteers, staff, participants, and the management of a team to improve preparedness and response at all levels before, during, and after emergencies (IFRC 2019). Several types of training are aimed at humanitarian professionals, including humanitarian negotiation, advocacy, and diplomacy (Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation 2019); humanitarian logistics and supply chains (NOHA 2019); human resources and finance management, program management, and coordination (Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action 2012); security training in hostile environments (NRC 2019); generic and technical trainings concerning water, sanitation, and hygiene (Centre for Affordable Water and Sanitation Technology 2019); nutrition project management (Bioforce 2019); and cash-based interventions (NOHA 2019).

Humanitarian response comprises various professional disciplines, expertise, and work experiences. As such, the education of staff operating in humanitarian emergencies integrates “task-related, profession-specific, and cross-disciplinary competencies” (Ripoll Gallardo et al. 2015: 430), where knowledge is coproduced by educators and practitioners. This form of coproduction results in an exchangeable role between educators and practitioners

in the teaching of humanitarian action, in which humanitarian “experts” act as educators who intermediate and translate the humanitarian discourse into local concerns through academic and applied scientific degrees, open and tailor-made diplomas, summer schools, and program modules, for example. At the same time, the *teaching curricula* are simultaneously the *learning curricula* in terms of what humanitarianism is and how it should be. One critical element here is that this coproduction of knowledge, although dynamic and adaptive, is primarily characterized as either discipline or multidiscipline-centric, largely leaving aside non-American/European perspectives with “limited success as an evidentiary basis for policy improvements” (Weichselgartner and Pigeon 2015: 109).

In the disaster risk management cycle, for example, the preparedness stage is intended to increase readiness and knowledge among staff and community (Nazli, Sipon and Radzi 2014). This comprises a complex sequence of planning, equipment, training, exercises, and improvement, with emergency preparedness exercises often viewed as the most important component (Skryabina et al. 2017). These exercises aim to test the workability of emergency planning with four main purposes: learning the emergency plan, learning to collaborate during emergencies, providing collective training, and gaining input from stakeholders (Watts 2016). In disaster preparedness, training exercises can be broadly divided into two major groups: *discussion-based exercises*, including table or desk exercises, workshops, or seminar-based activities, and *operation-based exercises*, such as drills, functional exercises/command post exercises, and fieldwork training. The first category is used to familiarize participants with their plans, roles, and procedures. It can also involve allowing participants to practice their role through simulated emergency situations. The format is led by facilitators and presenters who check whether participants meet the desired objectives. The second category usually involves responding to a scenario where a more realistic emergency is imitated. For example, fieldwork training looks at replicating as closely as possible a response to an actual emergency event, allowing for the testing of various “tools, plans, procedures, resources, interagency coordination, and command centres” (Skryabina et al. 2017: 274–275).

In all circumstances, training in humanitarian settings implies *knowing in practice*, where “work-practice-knowing” is formed through regular interactions between various types of persons with specific roles, materialities, institutions, and discourses. Thus, the knowledge attained is not “fixed” but is adapted and engaged in practice by its practitioners.

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## Transitional Justice

Since the 1980s, transitional justice has moved away from being a peripheral concern to become a ubiquitous feature of societies that are recovering from mass conflict or repressive rule—and is now a key component of humanitarian and development interventions. It is informed by a liberal and redemptive teleology of history as progress, according to which the reparation of past harms produces a non-violent future characterized by “sustainable peace”

(UN 2012: 3), democracy, a culture of human rights, and respect for the rule of law (UN 2012; UN 2004).

Transitional justice refers to a range of instruments (often used in combination) that are enshrined in both domestic and international (human rights and humanitarian) law, including truth-telling and truth commissions, public apologies and forgiveness, memorialization and commemoration, pardons and amnesties, compensation, restoration, restitution (of land and property), international and regional criminal courts and tribunals, lustration and vetting, and legal and institutional reforms. Among the best-known transitional justice processes of the last decades are the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Argentina's reparations to victims of its military regime, the prosecution and conviction for crimes against humanity and war crimes of Liberian ex-President Charles Taylor, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

The paradigm of "transition," embedded in the concept of transitional justice, is a product of the late 1980s to mid-1990s and the unfolding "worldwide democratic revolution" triggered by the end of the Cold War, and the "triumph" of economic and political liberalism (Hazan 2010: 50; Carothers 2002). While its legitimation can be traced back to the post-World War II war crimes and Holocaust trials (Teitel 2000), the "justice" of transitional justice was shaped by a renewed emphasis on human rights and judicial remedies to mass violence (Palmer, Clark and Granville 2012). In the post-Cold War period, the moral imperative propagated by human rights discourses combined with humanitarian action to defend individual (and, to a lesser extent, collective) rights.

The demarcation between "conflict" and "post-conflict" and the conception of a "toolbox" approach for managing mass crimes are central to this moral imperative. Such a toolbox approach has been widely criticized, notably for its over-reliance on legalistic, institutionalized measures and a top-down method (Palmer, Clark and Granville 2012) as well as its entrenching of a disconnect between international legal norms and localized priorities and practices (Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan 2010). Even in supposedly informal truth-seeking settings, such as the Rwandan *gacaca* (a mechanism of community justice), the unequal equation of culture, power, and the influence of international actors shapes how mass violence and memory are handled. These critiques demand a question about whose transitional justice measure should be considered; by whom, for whom, and for what (Jansen 2013).

The increased emphasis on global security after 2001 was accompanied by the normalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization of transitional justice through various judicial fora (e.g. international criminal courts and tribunals, but also mass claims and quasi-judicial procedures) and increased United Nations involvement (most notably in East Timor and Kosovo) (Rubli

2012; Teitel 2014). Transitional justice shifted from a moral and legal duty to an instrumentalized tool of peace-building (Subotić 2012; Vinjamuri 2010), operating as a short-term technical and legal reform unfolding mainly at the institutional level of politics (Arthur 2009). Such transitional justice mechanisms often lose sight of their initial moral impetus and broader objectives. The teleological premise of transition becomes an end in itself, legitimating both exceptional measures and their perpetuation.

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## Trauma

The word trauma stems from the Greek word *traûma*, meaning wound. The definition of trauma as a physical wound first appeared in the 1650s in medical practice. The 1890s saw the emergence of trauma as a psychic wound, thus paving the way for psychology and psychiatry. The popularization of these ideas has influenced the study of humanitarianism, particularly since the anthropology of suffering has spread as a concept. Regarding trauma as a medical category and as a social norm entered humanitarian work in the second half of the 20th century (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). Trauma as a medical category became popular with the definition of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD was applied to both victims and perpetrators of the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and contributed to the depoliticization of war crimes (Young 1995). Deconstructing the idea of soldiers as either heroes or war criminals, war veterans increasingly became mental health sufferers. Through this representation, trauma as diagnosis turned into a tool that allowed sufferers to gain a new symbolic identity in order to receive compensation (Fassin and Rechman 2009). This logic of reasoning has since been applied to all victims of violence who are seeking support from humanitarian organizations, whether because of rape, torture, or persecution. Even humanitarian relief workers are being diagnosed with PTSD in emergency situations (Connorton et al. 2012).

Despite being a medical category, trauma has also been used to define a social norm. Several generations of African Americans in the United States have drawn attention to the trauma of slavery as the collective memory of suffering in the public sphere (Eyerman 2011). Building on this legacy, trauma as historical injustice has turned into a tool that is used to gain public recognition for perished victims and to demand the state's political accountability, so that the descendants of slaves can be compensated through legislation and reparations. This has evolved into a call for humanity, solidarity, and compassion transnationally through the work of humanitarian organizations on behalf of victims of violence. These organizations work within the framework of human rights and draw on past injustices perpetrated by one nation or social group on another, whether based on mass colonization, slavery, or genocide (Fassin and Rechtman 2009).

In addition to asking what trauma does to individuals and societies (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), humanitarian studies also consider how experiences of violence manifest themselves in everyday life and the cultural meanings that people give them (Das 2015). In this case, it might be worth going beyond the concept of trauma, because it is neither “a concept with hard boundaries” nor

“a malleable category that becomes saturated with context” (Das 2015: 108). On the one hand, people who have survived multiple displacements as refugees may not even develop trauma; rather, they may think of their past experiences as “the currency with which they can buy the right to move elsewhere” (Das 2015: 109). On the other hand, people might develop trauma as a result of their constant suppression of emotions in times of crisis. This is the case for men who respond to social expectations of heroism by performing in a conventionally masculine manner. Instead of regarding medical diagnoses as tools that can be used to claim benefits (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), men might consider medical treatment as providing a safe space in which they can demonstrate weakness without fear of social judgment (Das 2015). While the case of refugee displacement demonstrates that “trauma is not found where it is expected to be” (Das 2015: 107), where gender expectations in conflicts are concerned, trauma may exist where it is not searched for.

Our understanding of trauma in humanitarianism, therefore, depends on who has the authority and voice to publicly speak about human suffering. Experts and institutions define what trauma is and how it should be treated (Fassin and Rechtman 2009). As a result, survivors embody and act upon an institutional definition of trauma, such as PTSD, unable to speak for themselves. At the same time, expert definitions of trauma are limited because survivors’ experiences are broad and complex (Das 2015). Instead of universalizing human suffering under the concept of trauma, it is worth understanding war or disaster experiences in the terms that are articulated by survivors themselves.

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## Universality

Humanitarian action is characterized by a tension between the universality of its pretensions and the particularity of the contexts of its realization. The notion of “humanitarian” builds on the concept of “humanity” and signals the universality of its outlook—implying that it relies on a universal human inclination and also that it applies to humanity as a whole (Fast 2016).

As a variation on an old theme, this universality was emphasized in the United Nations report *One Humanity: Shared Responsibility*, which was prepared for the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. It is stated that effective action requires a “unified vision”: “In a globalized world, this vision needs to be inclusive and universal and to bring people, communities and countries together, while recognizing and transcending cultural, religious or political differences.” It is maintained that this vision must rely on a notion of “our common humanity”; “that there is inherent dignity and worth in every individual that must be protected, respected and given the opportunity and conditions to flourish” (Ki-Moon 2016: 15–16).

In the humanitarian principles defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “humanity” and “universality” appear separately. In this instance, humanity, combined with neutrality, impartiality, and independence, pertains to how humanitarian law and assistance should be conceived and applied, while universality refers to the global scope of their application (ICRC 2015). The ICRC currently has a near universal reach in this respect, and while most headquarters of large international humanitarian organizations are based in Europe, international and local organizations doing humanitarian work are a global phenomenon (UNOCHA 2018). That said, there is a tension between the ideal of universal reach and the reality of “forgotten crises” and trends in humanitarian action, where certain crises are overfunded and over-represented. Moreover, the desired universal outreach might be limited by access denial—as reflected in debates about constraints on the humanitarian space.

Surprisingly, humanitarian law and assistance are criticized both for not being sufficiently universal and also for their universal attitude. For instance, Costas Douzinas reminds us that the notion of humanity is itself an invention of modernity, with no universalist equivalent in Greek or Roman thought (Douzinas 2007: 1). Contrary to this universalist image, Didier Fassin describes how humanitarianism as we know it today is integral to broader social and political developments in Europe over the past few decades, and is not a timeless manifestation of empathy and care (Fassin 2011).



Yet there is a universal dimension to the basic humanitarian objective of assisting people in desperate need, independent of their identity or self-interest. This objective does not rely on a particular notion of humanity or humanitarianism but rather on inclinations towards charity and compassion. The ways in which humanitarian practices turn these inclinations into ideas and actions are nonetheless always formed by their cultural and political settings, both at the sending and receiving ends. Jacinta O'Hagan and Miwa Hirono (2014), for instance, describe how the emergence of new humanitarian actors and arenas in Asia has resulted in new "cultures of humanitarianism," without necessarily undermining international humanitarian cooperation (O'Hagan and Hirono 2014). Others have demonstrated how any humanitarian practice involves a degree of political instrumentalization when being realized, entailing a great diversity in political features and consequences of humanitarian governance (Dijkzeul and Sandvik 2019). Indeed, the supposed universality of humanitarianism lends itself well to the facilitation and justification of political agendas.

Moreover, bureaucratic and technological rationales form humanitarian engagement. On the one hand, this contributes to the universality of the assistance, given its reliance on universal rules and standards. On the other hand, bureaucracy and technology represent a non-universal modern rationality that may depart from predominant political rationalities and technologies in those arenas where humanitarian organizations operate (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010).

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## Utopia

Is humanitarianism a feature of modernist utopias? Does international humanitarian law express utopian designs? Certainly, global consensus about humanitarian interventions, namely of the military kind, does not exist, and these interventions have always involved strategic, normative, and empirical considerations. Still, humanitarianism is deployed in the name of humanity (Feldman and Ticktin 2010), and different routes are open to us if we wish to explore its links with the utopian trope: the religious moorings of humanitarianism that instruct us to help those in need, the idea of the sacredness of human life, a secular common humanity that transcends all nationalities and boundaries, the core principles of humanitarian action, or the universality of human rights. All are symbolic horizons that inform a myriad of humanitarian configurations and gestures on the ground. No doubt, when seen as an ethos, humanitarianism has had sweeping ambitions, propelling the end of the slave trade, the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the so-called "laws of humanity." The humanity that grounds humanitarian law, and the humanness that informs humanitarian moral reasoning, have sanctioned all sorts of saving interventions in post-disaster and conflict settings (Fassin 2011). Discursive and visual tropes have also been deployed at great length to galvanize global compassion and the "gift" of aid. The constellation that emerges from this cursory review is quite extraordinary, but this is not to say that institutional humanitarianism is devoid of all sorts of self-interested, neo-imperialistic, hypocritical, and power-driven ambitions. However, this is not the point. The idealistic, universalizing, and aspirational contours of humanitarian reasoning are readily identifiable; what needs to be elucidated here is its relation to utopia.

In common parlance, utopia refers to a desirable yet impossible state. One could argue that were we to live in a fully realized utopia, there would be no

need for humanitarianism because suffering and injustice would have been eradicated. Conversely, qualifying humanitarian goals as utopian stresses their unrealistic features. This stance adopts a partial and reductionist view of utopia's theoretical, political, symbolic, and affective potential, and ignores the vibrant scholarship around utopia's semantic reach and practices of collective engagement. The gist of the matter lies partly in utopia's relation to the real. Recent works seek to pull the concept of utopia back to the everyday, not to re-enchant the world, but rather to revitalize intellectual imagination. Key proposals reconsider utopia as an analytical category of experience of time, space, and relationality that brings to the fore those frictions between the desired and the concrete that shape specific encounters (Cooper 2014; Gardiner 2013; Maskens and Blanes 2018). Methodologically, utopia becomes a non-essentialized evaluative term that is apt to characterize the qualities and configurations of future-oriented projects or praxis (Levitas 2013). Intentional neo-rural communities come to mind as an example of this, along with many other social projects that seek to foster human betterment. The proposal of empirical utopias is not to ascertain utopian achievements, but rather to reveal the politics of possibility, and this often entails an ethical orientation toward a shared becoming (Wright 2010). Ultimately, the utopian trope seeks to galvanize the politics of social critique.

These comments invite us to shift our analytical gaze away from the (unrealistic) end goal of humanitarianism's (flawed) ethics of care, and to consider instead localized encounters, where, as a frame of mind that guides action, humanitarianism's aspirational gestures toward better futures are rendered visible, however imperfect they may be.

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## Vernacular Humanitarianism

Vernacular humanitarianism refers to aid provided by various local actors in tune with their socio-historically specific ideas of humanness, as a response to an emerging need that cannot be adequately addressed through conventional channels of help. It encompasses practices of helping that follow the universal humanitarian logic, but in a different form to the international humanitarian organizations.

A range of new terms has been offered recently to analyze these small-scale practices of helping. For instance, Anne-Meike Fechter and Anke Schwittay (2019: 1769) speak about “citizen aid” and “grassroots humanitarianism” in order to encompass “forms of aid and development ... which are not orchestrated by large donors or aid agencies, but are initiated by ordinary citizens, from the Global North and South.” Elisa Sandri (2018) suggests that volunteers helping the refugees in France who refused any financial or other support from the international aid agencies and national governments enacted “voluntary humanitarianism.” Darragh McGee and Juliette Pelham (2018) discuss “grassroots humanitarianism” in the context of the Calais “Jungle” in France as an alternative to the large-scale, professionalized forms of aid delivery. Katerina Rozakou (2017) writes about “solidarity humanitarianism” in Greece, referring to the work of the volunteers who helped the refugees and, in doing so, established a clear opposition between their solidary and self-reflective work and that of the professional humanitarian and state workers. Alexander Horstmann (2017) discusses “everyday humanitarianism,” which emerged at the intersection of grassroots, local, and international humanitarian practices after a violent conflict in Myanmar.

The term vernacular humanitarianism was also coined (Brković 2017) as a way to capture under the same conceptual umbrella the diverse forms of helping that combine local notions of gift, duty, and responsibility with a universalizing claim to aid humanity. A good example of this is an orphanage in India that was “at once, a realm of Hindu *dan*; a form of nonreciprocal giving that does not demand a return; a site of state welfare, where citizens enjoyed certain rights; and a place where volunteers responded to social obligations and

the impulse to help others” (Bornstein 2012: 11–12). Other good examples are the small-scale experiments in helping refugees that exist throughout the West and do not fit neatly with more traditional forms of support (Feischmidt, Pries, and Cantat 2018). These practices show the junctures as well as the tensions between humanitarianism, philanthropy, development, public welfare, religious charity, and political activism.

These vernacular ways of providing aid have several things in common. First, all instances of vernacular humanitarianism posit a universalizing notion of humanity. Just like international humanitarianism, its vernacular counterparts are grounded in the idea that all people deserve help simply because they are human beings, irrespective of their particular identities (including, for example, their race, class, citizenship, ethnonationality, gender, age, and sexuality). Secondly, vernacular humanitarianism interweaves this universalizing notion of humanity with socio-historically situated frameworks of giving, such as French ideas of how a good citizen ought to behave towards others (Sandri 2018); Greek understandings of hospitality (Rozakou 2017); relational empathy in India, which “challenges liberal models of humanitarian activity oriented towards the needs of strangers” (Bornstein 2012: 149); and post-Yugoslav ideas about what a state ought to give to its citizens (Brković 2016). The interweaving of different frameworks of giving forges new responses to these novel needs. Thirdly, vernacular humanitarian practices are ad-hoc, non-professional, non-bureaucratized forms of helping that tend to ignore legal distinctions between citizens and aliens or bureaucratic framings of vulnerability and deservingness (Dunn 2017).

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## Victim

The fundamental prerogative of humanitarian organizations is to ensure that protection and relief are provided to the most vulnerable: victims of war, illness, genocide, natural disasters, torture, displacement, famines, rape. As part of this endeavor, media-friendly portraits of “the victims” and their rescuers are deployed globally to arouse empathic responses, foster solidarity, legitimize military interventions, and raise funds. Taxonomies of victimhood are also developed on the ground as map charts and classificatory tools, in order to plan, monitor, and execute humanitarian programs in favor of the “eligible victims.” In practice, bureaucratic transactions, paperwork, and official artifacts such as medical reports documenting “trauma” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009) mediate the formal allocation of “victim status.” Experts and practitioners such as lawyers, physicians, police officers, cultural mediators, and mental health professionals thus have the final responsibility for certifying an individual as a victim in a number of areas.

While the humanitarian production of the victim is based on naturalistic assumptions of objectivity, universality, and equality, a set of moral, political, and ethical dilemmas continuously arise at the interface between theory and practice, self-definition, and external impositions of victimhood. Notions of victimhood vary enormously across time and space and are differently framed and contested by a range of actors, religious practices, socio-political, and gender norms (Ronsbo and Jensen 2014).

Outside legalistic frameworks that take victims' identities for granted, academics have criticized the primacy of "pathetic" representations of victimhood (the passive victim) that simultaneously fetishize, dehistoricize, and individualize suffering masses: in the process, victims' experiences are removed from their socio-political, cultural, and economic contexts, their agency obscured, and their identities reduced to mute bodies. In order to be recognized as refugees, for instance, migrants must convince experts that they are "pure victims" (Meyers 2011): if they do not reduce themselves to anything but damaged biological life, they can be suspected of engaging in victimhood performances.

While the humanitarian victim is normally construed as helpless and passive, the givers—humanitarians, individual donors, wealthy benefactors, celebrities—are endowed with agency to save others. This salvific capacity is invested with a "god-like power" to make decisions over life and death, which, according to several critics, historically reflects colonial and post-colonial relationships between "the victim" and the "good-man," that is to say the "white-man" (Badiou 2001: 12–13).

While not all victims are accorded the same moral value, humanitarian attempts to stabilize individuals in certain typologies of victimhood can be differently contested by eligible candidates. A recent report published by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (Kapur and Muddell 2016), for example, shows that male victims of sexual violence have few opportunities for recognition and compensation owing to the prevalent narratives of female victimhood that identify sexual violence as a women's issue. Categories of victimhood are also appropriated and repoliticized by affected stakeholders, as demonstrated by the rise of victims' organizations. Here, private suffering is turned into collective public action that deindividualizes victimhood and molds it according to externally established legal formulations while, at the same time, increasing victims' chances to access reparation (Druliolle and Brett 2018).

Recently, humanitarians have attempted to overcome the victim–benefactor dichotomy by promoting victims' participation in bottom-up processes of program design and implementation. Yet the primary focus on victimhood as a legal and natural condition tends to push affected communities' changing subjectivities and agency, and their lived socio-political realities, into the background.

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## Voluntary Work

“Voluntary work” is a broad term that encompasses a wide range of human activity, including animal and environmental protection, social and medical care, and refugee relief. The adjective “voluntary” refers to the non-compulsory and unpaid character of work. Nevertheless, in practice voluntary work may entail some financial compensation for the volunteer involved. Whereas the distinction between the terms “*bénévole*” and “*volontaire*” in French is more informative, as the first explicitly indicates the lack of payment while the second refers to paid work, in English as in other languages such a distinction does not exist. This blurring of the categories echoes the moral content of the volunteer as a disinterested subject and the epitome of a modern citizen working for the good. The moral values of the gift and altruism lie at the heart of civic volunteerism and the volunteer as a moral subjectivity (Rozakou 2016). Such an analysis of voluntary work helps us to grasp the compatibility between volunteerism and neoliberalism, which, at first glance, seems antithetical to the principle of morality. In fact, zones that stand outside the logic of market exchange and individual self-interest and areas of social interaction that are



grounded in disinterestedness and giving are both compatible with and essential to the formation of responsible neoliberal citizens (Muehlebach 2012).

Voluntary work is a key element of humanitarianism, not only because volunteers form a significant labor force, but also because of the moral character associated with this specific kind of labor. The distinction between benevolence and interest is also relevant to critiques of humanitarianism that have brought to the fore discrepancies between expatriate and national humanitarian staff. While the mobile international expatriate personnel is perceived as selfless, the national and locally recruited staff are seen to be potentially corrupt and selfish (Redfield 2012) or merely as paid employees (Fassin 2007). Didier Fassin (2007) further highlights this distinction as part of the inherent contradiction in humanitarianism, specifically the inequality between those who disinterestedly risk their lives, and as such deserve the utmost protection of their humanitarian organization (international volunteers), and those who are only accorded limited protection (national personnel).

Much literature on humanitarianism focuses on Western liberal humanitarianism and the workings of large-scale traditional humanitarian organizations. However, recent ethnographies of grassroots humanitarianism(s) illuminate a different facet of voluntary work and one that directly challenges the modus operandi of established humanitarian organizations. Two such examples draw upon the recent so-called “refugee crisis” that has taken place since 2015 in Europe and the broad and diverse informal humanitarian responses to it that are composed largely by independent and untrained volunteers. It is no coincidence that researchers have felt the need to come up with new terms to describe this landscape. Based on her fieldwork at the makeshift camp at Calais in France, Elisa Sandri (2018) coins the term “volunteer humanitarianism” to describe an informal body of volunteers who provide humanitarian aid, and at the same time overtly challenge and oppose the border regime. In the setting of this volunteer humanitarianism, humanitarianism and activism are inseparable. In a similar vein, Katerina Rozakou (2017) notes that largely informal grassroots groups made up of volunteers consciously differentiate themselves and their work from large-scale humanitarian organizations. These groups emphasize egalitarian, non-professionalized, and horizontal relationships in contrast to the vertical provision of aid administered by humanitarian organizations and professional humanitarians.

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## Vulnerability

Vulnerability in humanitarian emergencies is the result of class, gender, age, ethnic, racial, able-bodied, and religious inequalities and hierarchies that prevent the individual from satisfying basic needs, accessing resources, and exercising their rights (Bankoff 2001). Humanitarian crises, such as armed conflicts or disasters, can either exacerbate pre-existing structural vulnerabilities (e.g. economic inequalities, social roles, and cultural stereotypes) or create new ones (e.g. injuries, diseases, losses, displacements, poverty, violence, and exclusion). For example, owing to unequal gender relations in a family and society, women may lose their social status because of the death of their husband, be subjected to sexual violence, have no access to basic hygiene during pregnancy, be burdened by carrying small children, have restrictions on clothing when fleeing, become victims of human trafficking, or have limited legal status and rights to claim benefits (Ní Aoláin 2011). People may also lack necessary survival skills during rescue operations, such as being able to read government announcements or swim during floods. In these circumstances, vulnerability becomes an obstacle for human agency, and this can reinforce conservative attitudes, as well as control of and discrimination against certain social groups.

The concept of vulnerability has received particular attention in the study of disasters. This has enabled understanding of “why disasters in the developing world [a]re so much worse than in the developed world” (Faas 2016: 15).

Disaster vulnerability is viewed as a result of a person's characteristics (e.g. a lack of an individual or group capacity to protect themselves), poor decision-making (e.g. social construction), an unequal socio-economic situation (e.g. a lack of resources and entitlements), geographical proximity to danger (i.e. exposure of places and populations), historical or distal causes (e.g. colonialism, inability to access land, clientelist politics), and the outcomes and frequency of the hazard itself (Faas 2016).

As the concept of vulnerability is primarily applied to those who are considered the most vulnerable groups, such as women, children, the elderly, or people living with disabilities, it can contribute to rendering victims passive, inevitably justifying humanitarian intervention (Bankoff 2001). This is particularly the case when the state fails to provide, or is reluctant to engage in providing, assistance to affected groups. In this case, humanitarian response runs a risk of undermining local capacities and knowledge in responding to emergencies, turning affected people into objects to be governed by external bodies and specialists, or even reinforcing harmful coping strategies. External experts can also ignore "the particular histories and power relations of a given place" (Faas 2016: 22) and instead "import their own stereotypes of cultural roles and powers" (Ní Aoláin 2011: 8).

However, people affected by humanitarian emergencies are not passive victims and can respond to vulnerability differently, either by recognizing and engaging with it or by denying and ignoring it (Faas 2016: 20). Survivors may recognize and engage with vulnerability if their understanding of it correlates with definitions used by national and international actors who do not restrict survivors' agency. On the contrary, affected people may ignore and deny vulnerability as it is applied to them by institutions if the concept prevents them from accessing resources and limits their agency. Thus, vulnerability becomes a bargaining chip in accessing humanitarian aid and turns into an opportunity for human agency. As such, vulnerability can positively change social behaviors, invite more openness, and permit access to the public sphere for marginalized groups during humanitarian emergencies, especially when an affected population is organizing collectively to rebuild their community. Here, vulnerability is understood as a condition of inevitable human interdependency, relational existence, ties to others, and common humanity (Gilson 2014). It represents a critique of the liberal notion of autonomous subjects responsible for their own lives. At the same time, the vulnerability of people affected by humanitarian emergencies is closely tied to the vulnerability of those who come to their rescue (Cavarero 2009). On the one hand, representatives of aid organizations are vulnerable to resisting the structures of neoliberal governance, colonial history, racism, and social injustices. On the other hand, they are also

vulnerable to a poor knowledge of local culture and language, a lack of infrastructure and necessary equipment to perform their tasks, and violent attacks such as kidnapping and rape. In this way, vulnerability combines both humanitarian violence and care.

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## Water

Access to water, human welfare, and economic development are indisputably and fundamentally linked. Access to fresh clean water is critical to human life; it preserves health, enables food production and security, and ensures equality, education, and economic development. It is also crucially related to gender roles and human dignity (UN Water 2015). There is an intensifying competition for water supplies between water “uses” and water “users” (UN Water 2015), with the most vulnerable and marginalized groups usually being those who lose out and cannot claim or ensure a safe and sustainable access to water. Thus, there is a close relation between access to water and social inequality. People around the world suffer from floods, droughts, and contamination from pollution caused by industries, mining, and urban sewers, the privatization of water and sanitation services, and displacement by dam projects (Perreault, Boelens, and Vos 2018). The ongoing impact of climate change has intensified droughts and other natural phenomena, reducing the availability of fresh

water. Therefore, water has become a central catalyst for some of the bloodiest conflicts around the world, to the extent that it is common to refer to “water conflicts” (Kliot 1994; Selby and Hoffmann 2014).

Conflicts over water have triggered the development of legal frames at both international and national levels. In 2003, the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General Comment 15: this outlined that the human right to water “entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.” In 2010, the UN General Assembly approved the adoption of Resolution 64/292, which recognizes access to clean water and sanitation as an independent human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. In 2015, the UN included the improvement of access to water and sanitation among the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In times of crisis, war, and natural disasters, the issue of water access creates different and major challenges. Humanitarian activities and politics (De Lauri 2016) have developed towards comprehensive interventions that include providing access to clean water and sanitation, as well as purification of water sources, temporary irrigation projects, and livestock watering. These water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) priorities increasingly include research as a key step to help improve interventions (D’Mello-Guyett et al. 2018). Interventions in contexts such as refugee camps have shown the need to understand access to water beyond physical access or provision, and to include social dimensions such as sex, age, ethnicity, class, and religion that could be affected by limiting or changing the traditional use of and access to water.

The lack of understanding of and the value placed on the social aspects around water in the design of WASH interventions has caused conflict between donors, humanitarian organizations, and local communities. One example of this is the top-down prioritization of water and sanitation over other uses of water; for example, the use of water for livestock. This is a very typical conflict between nomadic pastoralists living in arid and semi-arid environments and humanitarian agencies (Harvey and Reed 2006; Betti 2018).

Humanitarian actors have been collaborating with existing state and international institutions to safeguard the right to access to water for vulnerable groups and to adopt policies, plans, and legislation that can protect such rights. The development of legal frames, diplomatic collaborations, and targets (e.g. coverage targets) can be placed under the umbrella of “water governance.” This has moved from exclusively monitoring household access to also prioritizing the monitoring of institutional settings, such as schools, health care facilities, and workplaces (WHO and UNCF 2017b).

Despite these developments, hundreds of millions of people still lack access to safely managed drinking water services and continue to live without access to safely managed sanitation services (WHO and UNCF 2017a).

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