


① A two-period battle of the sexes

The game is as follows:



1) Find the N.E.

2) Find the subgame perfect N.E.

We have two players (P_1, P_2).

P_1 plays once so the strategies are (F, O) .

For P_2 we have two "choice" nodes so in order to write down the strategies, we need to pick an action for every node:

P_2 can play f after F and f after O .

$\gg$ f $\gg$ o $\gg$.
 $\gg$ o $\gg$ f $\gg$.
 $\gg$ o $\gg$ o $\gg$.



So the table containing the payoffs is:

		P_2			
		o, o	o, f	f, o	f, f
P_1	O	2, 1	0, 0	2, 1	0, 0
	F	0, 0	0, 0	1, 2	1, 2


② Using one underline for the b.r. of P_1 , P_2 we have

>> two underlines >>

		P_2			
		o, o	o, f	f, o	f, f
P_1	O	<u><u>$2, 1$</u></u>	<u>$0, 0$</u>	<u><u>$2, 1$</u></u>	$0, 0$
	F	$0, 0$	<u>$0, 0$</u>	<u>$1, 2$</u>	<u><u>$1, 2$</u></u>

So there are 3 N.E. : O, o, o
 O, f, o
 $F, f, f.$


Which one(s) are Subgame perfect N.E. ? Let's return to the tree :



We have three subgames in total.

The first is the one starting at


the left node of P_2 . The second is the one starting at the right node of P_2 . The third one is the game on its own. Starting with the first subgame we have :



Since $2 > 0$, P_2 chooses f after F .


③

As for the second subgame we have :



Since $1 > 0$, P2 chooses o after O.

Since P2 chooses f after F and o after O the third subgame becomes :



Since $2 > 1$, P1 chooses O. Any N.E. containing O and o can be subgame perfect. So F, f, f is definitely not one of them. What about O, o, o and O, f, o ?

The N.E. O, o, o is not subgame perfect since P2 claims to play o after P1 plays F. However, this is not a credible threat since, as we have seen in the end of p.2, P2 plays f (not o) after F.

Hence, the single subgame perfect N.E. is

O, f, o.

