

Michael Herzfeld

The Absent Presence: Discourses of Crypto-Colonialism

The disciplines of social and cultural anthropology emerged from the ferment of West European world domination as instrument and expression of the colonial project. Although it subsequently turned against the practices and ideology of colonialism, it remains strongly marked by that historical entailment. Among the many effects of colonialism on anthropology, one in particular stands out: the fact that much of the discipline's theoretical capital is palpably derived from ethnographic research done in the colonial dominions.

The Discourse of Humanity: Echoes from the Crypto-Colonies

While anthropology lays claim to global relevance, cultural groups that were never directly controlled by those colonial powers from which anthropology itself emanated (including countries, such as the United States, that practiced an internal form of imperial dominion) often seem suggestively marginal to the predominant forms of scholarly discourse.

Within this broad spectrum of exclusion,

anthropology displays two major, closely intertwined absences—one conspicuous, the other furtive—from its theoretical canon. The conspicuous absence is that of modern Greece, the reasons rooted in the special kind of political marginality that has marked Greece's relations with the West throughout most of its history as a nominally independent though practically tributary nation-state. While it is true that the extensive production of ethnographic monographs about present-day Greece has done much to rectify the situation in recent years, it is only rarely that one encounters the country in, for example, introductory social and cultural anthropology textbooks—those photo-negative images of Western civilization introductory primers.

The furtive absence is that of the classical Greek culture. It is furtive because it shelters behind the multifarious signs of a presence, which melts into insignificance as soon as we attempt to grasp and identify it. Much is made of the roots of anthropology in Herodotean curiosity and in Attic philosophy, but it is of a prohibitively generic character. There seems to be surprisingly little that one could say with any confidence about the practical significance of ancient Greece in the intellectual genealogy of anthropological thought, despite a plethora of both casual allusions to, and specialized invocations of, a hypostatized classical past.

These twin absences spring from a common source in the construction of a discursive and geographical space called Greece. Greece *tout court* is almost always automatically assumed to be *ancient* Greece; the modern country, even in its own travel brochures, yields to the commanding presence of a high antiquity created in the crucible of late-eighteenth-century Aryanism—that same tradition of cultural eugenics that bred the Nazis' "race science" and, at least in one controversial but persuasive historiographic reading, occluded both Semitic and Egyptian ("African") contributions to European culture.¹

Although the German philologists and art historians who generated the neoclassical model of Greek (and more generally European) culture were not themselves military colonizers, they were doing the ideological work of the project of European world hegemony. While much recent literature has been devoted to the analysis of that project in the form of colonialism, I want here to initiate discussion of a rather specific variety—or perhaps it is an offshoot—of that phenomenon. I shall call it *crypto-colonialism* and define it as the curious alchemy whereby certain countries, buffer zones between the colonized lands and those as yet untamed, were compelled to acquire their

political independence at the expense of massive economic dependence, this relationship being articulated in the iconic guise of aggressively national culture fashioned to suit foreign models. Such countries were and are living paradoxes: they are nominally independent, but that independence comes at the price of a sometimes humiliating form of effective dependence.

Two such countries are Greece and Thailand. There are many more, and the variety among them—where, for example, should we place such diverse entities as the former Yugoslavia, Japan, or Mexico?—and further exploration is likely to undercut the category of *crypto-colonies*, producing still finer discriminations. Nevertheless, these two cases, while geographically far apart and separated by religion and language, display some common elements that at least should serve to open up discussion. I mostly confine my remarks here to Greece, but the Thai case will be useful—albeit in necessarily sketchy form—for beginning the process of complicating the category of *crypto-colonialism* at its very point of genesis.

The strategy of building instability into the model right from the start in this way is entirely deliberate. It would be a strange irony were we, in an effort to transcend the binarism of colonizers and colonized, to generate instead a tripartite taxonomy that was no less impervious to the hugely diverse complexities of local experience. Greece offers a further provocation that will help in maintaining awareness of such complexities, for the country has a unique historical relationship with anthropology: it is assumed to be the intellectual and spiritual birthplace of the Western cultures that generated the discipline, and its relative absence from the anthropological canon of theory is for that reason all the more striking. Thailand in this sense is more like so many other countries that happen not to have spawned major theoretical traditions by becoming paradigm cases, although both Thailand and Greece have been sites of important ethnographic research and considerable theoretical elaboration. But the Thai case provides an especially useful foil here to that of Greece precisely because of the remarkable parallels that appear to subsist between the two countries. While some of these similarities do undoubtedly derive from the radiating fallout from colonialism, the historical specificities of the two cases—including their very different relationships with the emergence of the human sciences in the West—will not permit any such simplistic closure. Other countries produce other variations on this theme of exclusion from the theoretical canon: Japan, for example, hardly a weak player in world politics and economics (and a considerable imperial power in its own right not very long ago), nevertheless

exhibits certain features of crypto-colonial status, including its comparative irrelevance to the production of theory in the West.² Yet perhaps one feature that all these countries share is the aggressive promotion of their claims to civilizational superiority or antiquity, claims that almost always appear disproportionate to their political influence. One begins to suspect that they have been placed, or place themselves, on high cultural pedestals that effectively isolate them from other, more brutally material forms of power, and that this ironic predicament is the defining feature of crypto-colonialism.

In suggesting that comparisons of this sort can be helpful, I am also extending an argument I have already made about the relationship between Greece and social-cultural anthropology: that both were products of the colonialist venture, being respectively a physical location and a discourse through which the moral segregation of the West from the rest of the world was effected.³ Moreover, both Greek cultural politics and anthropological theory exhibit a progressive rejection of these presumptions over the past several decades. Local discourses about the nature of culture, civilization, and identity thus become immediately and interestingly comparable to anthropological writings, on which such discourses often draw directly. Greece is certainly not the only country in which elites cultivated among the citizenry a deep fear of becoming too closely identified with some vague category of barbarians. But as the alleged inventor of the term *barbarian* itself, and as the alleged ancestor of the modern exponents of “civilization,” it serves as an intriguing locus of such concerns, particularly given the degree to which it has been a marginal and subordinate player in the various projects of European cultural politics.

If Thailand, like Greece, holds a mirror to Western anthropological models, it is in some respects of a different sort. Here, we are looking at a country that has long been regarded in the West as possessing a distinctive culture. But that image is partly the outcome of some careful impression management at the level of state-supported institutions, responding to perceived threats from the ever-colonizing West (especially in the form of Britain and France—two major sites of anthropological emergence). For many in the West, Greece represents the first flowering of Indo-European language and culture on European soil from roots traced to the Sanskrit traditions of India but now deeply domesticated as Western. In Thailand, however, despite the arrival of Sanskrit and Brahmanism many centuries earlier, the colonial powers threatened the independence of a Siam they encountered as a site of racial difference. Thus, the uses to which Greek and Thai

scholars, respectively, could put the evidence of an ancient, partially Indo-European heritage was not the same, because it did not have the same relationship to the “Aryanist” project of European global domination.

My concern here is with the curious paradox of Greece, at once the collective spiritual ancestor and a political pariah in today’s “fast-capitalist” Europe,⁴ and with the uses to which internal elites put civilizational discourses to enhance their own power, at the cost of accepting the collective subjugation of their country to a global cultural hierarchy. While such processes have been well documented for colonies in the strict sense of the term—India is an especially dramatic and well-documented case⁵—the model of crypto-colonialism suggests that this hierarchy was not confined to the colonies themselves. The Thai case is suggestive, moreover, not because it mirrors the Greek situation exactly, but because the similarities these two countries present do suggest that there may be some common elements, deriving from partially common experiences, in the ways in which crypto-colonies respond to that hierarchy by deploying a world-dominating discourse about “culture” in defense of their perceived national interests and specificity. They appear to resist domination, but do so at the cost of effective complicity—a model that more closely approaches the Gramscian definition of hegemony than do more recent and controversial notions of “resistance.”⁶

The striking paradox of the Greek case makes it both exemplary of these processes and yet also eccentric. Reminding ourselves of suggestive parallels with Thailand will serve, at the very least, to rebut the temptation of reducing all crypto-colonialism to refractions of the Greek experience, although the latter is extremely revealing of the internal contradictions that models of European domination all contain. The very variety of crypto-colonialisms is the mark of the many ways in which colonial power had to deal with persistent local ideologies and values, and the production of civilizational discourses—including that of anthropology—is an important part of that history. Anthropology, moreover, cannot afford to ignore its own past entailments in these discursive processes if it is also to maintain its claim to critical purchase.

A Risky Comparison

The recent histories of Greece and Thailand would certainly suggest both strong similarities and equally striking contrasts. At first blush, the similarities seem to be directly related to international realpolitik, and such an

impression would not be so much inaccurate as historically shallow. Both countries lie at the southeastern peninsular tips of continental landmasses in which they have bordered, until recently, on countries with aggressively communist ideologies—ideologies to which these countries' official discourses oppose their own respective "national characters." (Thailand also looks south and southeast to Malaysia and Indonesia, both of which have also been the scenes of communist revolutionary activity and fierce counter-repression; Greece only has Cyprus to the southeast in its immediate vicinity, and here Greece's own role is viewed by some internal critics as a form of cultural as well as political colonialism in itself.⁷) The prevailing cultural and political tensions that both Greece and Thailand entertain with their respective northern neighbors have deep historical roots that pre-date the arrival of avowedly Marxist polities. Greece and Thailand, however, both served U.S. interests as strategic positions in the cold war, and seem to have more or less absorbed the American view that communism was incompatible with civilization; it is this logic that has to some extent absorbed the locally specific features of earlier antipathies.

The Greek right-wing response to communism succeeded more or less seamlessly to preceding ideas about the country's northern neighbors. Greek intellectuals had, since before independence, sought to identify Greek social atomism as a variety of "European individualism" in a manner that at one and the same time allowed them to argue both that their Slavic neighbors were uncivilized collectivists and that their own peasants and workers were spiritually corrupt (because of "Turkish" influence) and so incapable of working collectively without the strong leadership that the elite stood ready to provide.⁸ For Thailand the idea of freedom is certainly not a product of this Eurocentric ideology, although its expression in national discourse may owe something to it.

The irony of this freedom, however, is that it indexes both countries' subjection to imported models. The Greeks celebrate the "free spirit" that "liberated" them from "Turkish" (that is, Ottoman) rule and led them to prefer "freedom to death," while the name *prathet Thai* ("land of the free") was adopted at the height of an irredentist phase of modern Thai history partially inspired by Italian and German fascist models.⁹ Those who dare to oppose such models are "anti-Greek" or "un-Thai," and are said to lack "culture"—*politismos* in Greek, *watthanatham* in Thai.¹⁰ Such terms are archaic coinages, said to be derived from ancient Greek and Sanskrit respectively.

Although both were coined in their respective locales as marks of indigenous pride, they are clearly both responses to external criteria of cultural excellence.

In Greek, *politismos* means both “culture” and “civilization.” Despite frequent invocations of a pastoral idyll, the internal-European answer to the “noble savage,”¹¹ the European ideal was rooted in the idea of the city and its accomplishments. In Italy, similarly, the ideal of *civiltà* remains a key to urban cultural domination over the rural hinterland.¹² But in Thai this equivalence is not sustained, and that fact alone should alert us to a somewhat different dynamic, in which imitating the accomplishments of the West has meant having *khwaamsiwilai* (“the quality of being civilized”), whereas *watthanatham* (“culture”) might actually *exclude* the crass materialism that some Thai critics associate with the polluting effects of Western cultural influence. The Thai use of Sanskrit terms for lofty concepts predates the European fascination with Sanskrit that supposedly began with Jones’s eighteenth-century explorations, and has deep roots in religious discourse, whereas the Greek terms, while certainly intelligible to anyone brought up on a diet of ecclesiastical Greek, were actually secular calques on the cultural terminology of the Enlightenment. The parallel between the two countries therefore does not lie in a shared acceptance of Aryanist theses emanating from the groves of German academe, but rather in the fact that both generated civilizational terms intended, through their august antiquity and cultural dignity, to earn the grudging respect of foreign powers.

The term *siwilai*, by contrast, is unmistakably a European-inspired coinage in Thailand, and its ideological implications have to do with what Thongchai Winichakul, adopting a metaphor developed by Mary Louise Pratt, describes as the “contact zone” that Thailand provides between local and invasive cultures—a situation that recalls the buffer zone status of Greece in “the margins of Europe.”¹³ Such cultural ambiguity feeds on localized forms of otherness, onto which dominant powers and their regional agents map larger, global divisions. Among those suspected in both countries of harboring communist sympathies were members of minority groups, some with ethnic affiliations with neighboring and hostile nation-states. Even here, however, there are important differences, showing how cultural specificities inflect shared geopolitics. In Thailand, while the Muslims of the southern-most provinces enjoy full citizenship, the hill tribes of the north—“jungle peoples” (*chao paa*) in Thai¹⁴—have been denied full citizenship. Yet it is

these people whom the Thais, in a localized version of Victorian survivalism, have sometimes represented as embodying the conditions from which *siwilai* has long since rescued the Thais themselves.

In Greece, the status of minorities is also complex, although the complexities take an interestingly different form. Muslims are a recognized *religious* minority, as are Jews—but woe betide any who call themselves “Turks.” The Greek authorities counter such self-ethnicizing terms on the grounds that not all Greek Muslims are culturally Turkish, which is in fact true: Pomaks speak Bulgarian, while there are others who speak Albanian and other languages. But the state’s solution has been to deny the existence of *ethnic* minorities altogether, which means that those with potentially dangerous affiliations to neighboring countries—especially Macedonians and Turks—find their ethnicity completely silenced by their (Greek) citizenship.

At first sight one might deduce that this was the exact analogue of the situation facing the hill tribes in Thailand. Yet it is not so much the *chao paa*—despite their noncitizen status—who are treated as subversive in Thailand; the authorities are particularly suspicious of southern Muslims of harboring separatist sentiments and equally suspect Chinese residents of supporting the communist cause. But they see the *chao paa* as instead representing the Thais’ own “primitive past,” a past to which energetic cultural regimentation will now bring these remaining personifications of Thailand’s collective childhood.¹⁵ If the *chao paa* are potential Thais in the making, however, communists—and all who might be suspected of sympathizing with them—are treated as irremediably “un-Thai.”¹⁶ In this last respect the Thai and (pre-1974) Greek situations have exhibited significant convergence. Hellenization in Greece and the quest for a pan-Thai *siwilai* in Thailand, moreover, are both about the creation of a strong, centralized cultural identity designed to protect the “weaker” members of the nation from the immoral blandishments of the “uncivilized” and “subversive.”

To make sure that this crypto-hegemony was properly locked in place, moreover, local cultural and political leaders have waged aggressive centralizing campaigns to homogenize their respective national languages. Here again we see national pride and cultural independence as a mark of political dependence. But whereas in the Greek case the model of “purist” (*katharevousa*) speech, which remained the official language of state until 1976, was constructed in emulation of West European ideas about the classical Greek language, leaving the local dialect of Athens to perish from neglect, Thai

language reforms seem to have been directed more to homogenization and to the adoption of a Sanskritic vocabulary that would — nonetheless — match the demands of academic and philosophical discourse in the West. Both, in other words, were attempts to emulate the West; but their relationship with local linguistic practices was interestingly divergent.

One common feature springs from the resentment that elite emulation of Western models has engendered. Both countries are, significantly, home to religions in which monasticism plays an important role, one that is increasingly, albeit through marginal groups (such as the neo-Orthodox movement in Greece and reformist programs in Thailand), generating opposition to Western and materialist morals and models. Indeed, such reactions even turn against the official repositories of religious authority; the neo-Orthodox complain about the “protestantization” — at least in a formal, Weberian sense — of the Church of Greece, while criticism of the Sangha in Thailand by groups such as Santi Asoke has similarly attacked its bureaucratic structure as well as its tolerance of corruption and materialism. While this is not the whole story — other religious developments, such as the Dhammakaya movement and certain local cults, have appeared to sanction materialist concerns — it does at least suggest that one common reaction to crypto-colonialism may take the form of antimaterialist religious activity in places widely separated by geography and culture.¹⁷

Such parallels, I suggest, are far from coincidental. If Thailand and Greece had to make major concessions to the European powers in order to maintain any semblance of sovereignty, internal cultural regimentation — the space where the agents of foreign powers displayed, so to speak, their own agency — provided such deals with a firm base: they established a presumed common code of diplomatic morality, empowering these elite individuals and groups to consolidate their authority, using culture as its primary measure and economic coercion as its most compelling instrument. There were important differences at this level also, to be sure. Thailand, unlike Greece, had existed as a recognized sovereign state, albeit in much more fragmented form,¹⁸ for many centuries. Its monarchy was locally embedded in religious systems, whereas the Greek kings had to make symbolic claims on a Byzantine crown that rang especially hollow in that the ancient Byzantium was now the enemy’s — Turkey’s — most important city, Istanbul. The Greek monarchy was always derided as foreign, because it was widely perceived to be a key agent of the crypto-colonial process.

Anthropology and the Quest for Origins: Hellenism Bound

So Sanskrit was the bedrock; but Greece was assumed to be where it was thought to have erupted in a truly recognizable burst of European genius, individualism, and initiative. Such is the discipline's implicit origin myth. This anthropology, moreover, is not the *anthropologia* (the study of humankind's role in the cosmos) of Orthodoxy, but the project of a supposedly "superstition"-free rationality.¹⁹ I have encountered informal, casual attempts to represent both anthropologies as fundamentally the same, just as there is a long history in post-Independence Greece of trying to prove that the ancient philosophers were the intellectual forerunners of Christianity, but these are after-the-fact versions of the long-standing Greek agony over how (pagan) Hellenism and (Christian) Greekness might be combined.²⁰ Nor is the study of "ordinary people" (*anthropi*, classical *anthropoi*), with all their socially lubricating flaws and twists, the model for anthropology as it conceived itself until very recently. That model is severely neoclassical—as neoclassical as a nineteenth-century bourgeois Greek house, and, I suggest, no closer than that to the conceptual systems of high antiquity.

Because the Greek case allows us to ironize the history of the discipline so effectively, an exploration of the peculiarly unsatisfactory classical genealogy of anthropology may be useful in assessing critically its role in the description and analysis of society and culture in Thailand—or, indeed, in any other country that might plausibly be counted among the ranks of the crypto-colonies. This is not to essentialize the crypto-colonies and so reduce them to yet another case of anthropological classification. It is to use taxonomy to undo taxonomy, but always with an eye on significant differences that will also make any generalizations usefully unstable. It is in this spirit that I propose the Greek case as offering a way into the disentanglement of a discourse that, while purporting to celebrate national independence, actually seems to further its effective strangulation at birth.

Historians and Anthropologists

The usual institutional starting-point of anthropology as a discipline coincides with E. B. Tylor's earliest use of the word in 1871.²¹ But underlying assumptions about Western civilization appear to have pushed the origins back to a far earlier date. Margaret Hodgen, for example, argued strongly

against the Tyloorean claims to originary status, adducing impressive evidence for the emergence of a truly anthropological perspective in medieval and Renaissance Europe and—in an unconscious echo of the Greek historian's own etymological myths of origin—"tracking down" its ultimate origins to Herodotus.²²

At least since her impassioned but scholarly attempt to set the record straight, the older, classical line of ancestry has been the received wisdom. In this recension, Herodotus is not only the "father of history" but also the "father of anthropology," a suggestively unilineal descent attribution that also generates the quarrelsome myth of the rival siblings, history and anthropology, in the contested history of anthropology. At several stages in the development of anthropology—but most dramatically in the scientific rejection of history as a model for anthropology—anthropologists have fought over whether history was even relevant to anthropological concerns. Such debates have particular relevance for the present discussion when they occur at the heart of empire. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, for example, saw the specificity of history (what he called its "idiographic" character) as necessarily incompatible with the kind of dehistoricized cultural science that he wanted to create; E. E. Evans-Pritchard, at once product and critic of the colonial enterprise, saw in that same specificity the possibility for an understanding of culture lodged in the social *experience* of ordinary people—a pluralist vision of history, a multiplicity of histories.²³

The suppression of history paralleled the suppression of philological concerns; in the aftermath of survivalism, questions about cultural origins were in bad odor. Yet, as Vico had shown, the philological and historical tool most used for the legitimation of power—etymology—could also be used subversively, in order to generate what Nancy Struever has recognized as a critique of civil disability.²⁴ Precisely because the seeming persistence of word forms may mask considerable disruptions of older meanings, etymology is a two-edged sword. Evans-Pritchard, whose reading of Vico through the works of R. G. Collingwood may have sensitized him to the subversive possibilities of etymology, recognized that "anthropologists have seldom made very serious efforts to reconstruct from historical record and verbal tradition the past of the people they have studied. It was held that this was an 'antiquarian' interest and that it was irrelevant to a functional study of institutions to know how they have changed."²⁵ But Evans-Pritchard was probably more interested in the simpler question of recovering facts about the past. Even though

scholars of oral tradition were subsequently, and somewhat controversially, to reintroduce the techniques of manuscript genealogy,²⁶ the majority of this kind of work remained in the hands of nationalist folklorists. And they were certainly not interested in subverting authoritative etymologies; they were more interested in constructing their own.

Evans-Pritchard's vision was an important step in the decolonization of anthropology. He recognized the effects of events on what seemed to be the most intractably atemporal forms of social structure, both in his treatment of Nuer lineage segmentation and also, especially, in his work on the rise of the Libyan monarchy. One of his pupils, J. K. Campbell, an anthropologist and historian who trained numerous scholars in both disciplines, moved the seemingly ahistorical idiom of Evans-Pritchard's analysis of moral community into the European setting of Greece, where history, even though the marginal population of shepherds he studied might be officially excluded from it, nonetheless could not be sidestepped by the ethnographer.²⁷

History and anthropology are curiously ambivalent about each other. The complementary opposition between them lies in the ease with which each discipline can stifle its own object. Institutionalized histories abolish time in the name of time; what Radcliffe-Brown called "nomothetic" ways of doing anthropology can abolish the structuring of social experience or in the name of social structure.²⁸ Analysis of these processes entails a committed resistance to the process of progressive amnesia: like Vico, demanding a subversive view of etymology precisely *because* institutions habitually used etymology to legitimize themselves, we should try to turn the discipline's name into a critique of Eurocentric identity situated in the particularities of its inescapably material history.²⁹

In the nomenclature of anthropology (or of any other scientific discourse), the rhetoric of classical etymology is not just a posture; it is also a strong instance of that ultimate rhetorical trick, that of a rhetoric that denies that it is rhetorical at all. The simplest demonstration of this point is likely to be the most effective. Etymology not only legitimizes a connection that does not necessarily subsist, but also deflects attention away from the ephemerality of that connection—indeed, materializes it—by the device of proclaiming the cognate signifiers as though they were a single signified, collapsing all temporal shifts in meaning into a single, indivisible, timeless truth. The derivation of *anthropology* from *anthropos* and *logos* rests on idealizations, arguably more appropriate to the Enlightenment and Romanticism

than to classical thought, of both humankind and discourse. To turn again to Thailand, where the terminology of the human sciences is all derived from Sanskrit, the term for *anthropology*—*maanuthyawithayaa*, “the science of humankind”—is calqued on Western terminology but evokes scriptural authority through its use of Sanskrit; the usual word for “person,” *khon* (as in *khon Thai*, “Thai person”), does not possess this resonance, would not make sense in a modern Thai academic context, and yet (together with *phuu* and the prefix *nak-*) captures more or less the range of social meanings implied by the everyday Greek use of *anthropos* (“person”), although it is neutral with respect to the everyday moral flaws that go with being an ordinarily sociable person and that are implied in the Greek phrase *anthropi dhen imaste?* (“aren’t we human?”). It is perhaps significant that whereas in Thailand anthropology as a discipline taught in the national university system has a history of several decades, the first Greek department of social anthropology was founded only in 1986.³⁰ Not only did Greek anthropologists have to address the entrenched hegemony of nationalistic folklore studies, but the very ordinariness of the discipline’s subject matter made it hard to grasp: the resentful municipality of Mytilene, where the first university department of social anthropology replaced the popular (and populous) education department, voted for a motion criticizing the “cloudy [that is, vague] discipline of social anthropology.”

The problem is precisely that in Greece the name *anthropolyia* appeared to confirm the sense, entertained by many Greek scholars, that anthropologists were simply making a lot of academic noise about perfectly ordinary matters that required no elucidation. Outside Greece, however, the grandiose resonance of the Tylolean coinage produced the opposite effect. Like those verbose medical Hellenisms that mystify the work of doctors in a way that Hippocrates would surely have found objectionable, the very name of anthropology appeared to lodge its origins in classical thought. Above all, it evoked a notion of abstract theory that has come—as D tienne pointed out³¹—to be identified in the writings of Hegel with the very notion of Europe itself. It appealed at once to an Enlightenment view of the exercise of pure reason and a Romantic vision of human nature. Greece’s relationship with European claims on intellectual hegemony and even transcendence—a phenomenon that Humphreys specifically traced to the ancient Greeks—makes its relative exclusion from the theoretical canon a point of particular interest.³² But we must also consider why other countries have been simi-

larly excluded. It is not a matter of size (Thailand, for example, has about five times the population of Greece); nor, obviously, is it the result of colonial domination, not only because these countries are precisely the ones that were *not* directly ruled by the colonial powers, but also because it is precisely these former colonies that have long been and remain the sites of some of the most energetic theory-building—India, Indonesia, large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa, the Australian outback, the Maghreb, just to name the obvious cases.

Lineages and Identities

So total is the assumption that Greece is the Hellas of the classical past that the first major ethnography of a *modern* Greek community actually had to be subtitled *A Village in Modern Greece*.³³ (Being an ethnographer of Greece today provides a fine introduction to the problem, since one's interlocutors are apt to assume automatically that one is a classical archaeologist.) At least other civilizations that the West could bring itself to canonize as "great"—India, China, Japan—were exotic enough, and clearly "not us." As such, their extension into modern times did not pose as great a potential threat to the self-constitution of "Europe"; they seemed unambiguously and emphatically not "really modern." European nationalist ideologues collectively distinguished the world's ancient civilizations, including that of Greece, from modern civilization, by invoking the relative homogeneity of the former as compared with the latter.³⁴ But this is not the whole story; for the assumption that "the Greeks" somehow fathered the West as a whole meant that they had to be invoked and suppressed at the same time. Claude Lévi-Strauss, who argued that all our commentaries on ancient myths are but variants of those myths, might be intrigued to discover here an Oedipal process at the very heart of European intellectual history.³⁵ Herodotus is, let us recall again, hailed as the *father* of modern anthropology. (Perhaps it is no coincidence that a closely related intellectual tradition, this time in the form of classical philology, succeeded—according to Martin Bernal—in suppressing this same Herodotus' opinions about the origins of Greek and therefore of European culture, in order to generate a myth of spontaneous genesis?³⁶)

The classical Greece of the anthropologists is thus, for the most part, a chimera. Those who made exciting discoveries by applying anthropologi-

cal techniques to classical materials remained marginal to anthropology at least, if not to classical philology as well. Jane Harrison was a philologist by training, while the explorations of Louis Gernet in classical culture have rarely been invoked by modern anthropologists except a few who share his special interest in classical Athens and its social life—S. C. Humphreys, for example. Indeed, the general apathy that greeted the republication in English of Gernet's major work on classical Greece would seem to suggest that the very idea of a theoretical perspective derived from the classical past must be decidedly unwelcome.³⁷

Appeals to a presumed knowledge of the classical world were also little more than caricature. Thus, for example, Ruth Benedict's characterization of cultural ethos as either Apollonian (restrained and rationalistic) or Dionysian (frenzied and orgiastic) merely took a complex segment of Greek religious philosophy, already refracted through the writings of Nietzsche, as the basis for creating ideal types that lost their original meaning through the simple act of reifying them in this way. In ancient Greece these personified conditions of the human psyche drew significance from the playful tension recognized to subsist between them throughout human society; Benedict, by quite openly severing them from their roots in Greek social life, turned them into caricatures that had virtually nothing to do with the ancient culture from which she claimed to have derived them. Benedict did acknowledge some of these departures: "Apollonian institutions have been carried much further in the pueblos than in Greece. Greece was by no means as single-minded. In particular, Greece did not carry out as the Pueblos have the distrust of individualism that the Apollonian way of life implies, but which in Greece was scanted because of forces with which it came into conflict."³⁸ Indeed they could not have done, if they were to remain the emblematic ancestors of those most determinedly self-proclaimed individualists, the Europeans. There are historical indications of this: "Greek civilization . . . is unintelligible without recognizing the Dionysian compensations it also institutionalized. There is no 'law,' but several different characteristic courses which a dominant attitude may take." But then, one might ask, why invoke the Greeks at all?

Here, I think, the answer is to be sought in the history of European identity. Benedict is, perhaps unconsciously, reflecting a view of European civilization, and especially of its Greek starting point, in which the possibility of choice constitutes the characteristic ideology and practice of agency

known as individualism—an agency linked historically not only to the rise of property ownership but also to the emergence of that collective individualism known as nationalism.³⁹ American “rugged individualism,” itself a colonial ethic, falls within the same tradition. Benedict probably saw no need to interrogate such assumptions beyond remarking, with the precision of a good scholar, that the Greek model from which Nietzsche derived these ideal types, could usefully be dismembered and distributed among the various native peoples she studied. She evidently felt no urge to question the motivating assumption that this move indicates: that native peoples lack the hallmarks of true, European civilization—agency, individualism, and the ideological choice that today we associate with the idea of “civil society.” One might make similar judgments of the eagerness with which some anthropologists of structural persuasion, no doubt delighted to find their work cited in elicitation of the prevalence of binarism in pre-Socratic thought,⁴⁰ perpetuated the view that the simpler forms of binarism also represented a “cold” state of cognitive development and so unwittingly used the synamic history of Greek philosophy to perpetuate the survivalist view of a world divided between natives and Europeans—a simple binary opposition if ever there was one, and only slightly transmogrified in the opposition between colonized and colonizers.

Greece and the Multicultural World

That European identity is the issue becomes immediately clear when we more critically examine Margaret Hodgen’s tactics for tracing the history of anthropology much further back than its conventional point of origin in the professional establishment of Victorian academe. Hodgen’s approach is at once scholarly and ideological. In an approach that reproduces the ancient historian’s own Hellenocentrism,⁴¹ Hodgen explicitly credits Herodotus with a rationality and a relativism that anticipates modern anthropology; moreover, she strongly emphasizes his appetite for travel, something that he shares with Thucydides but that thereafter only reappears with Columbus and the Europeanization of America. It is also relevant in this context that she castigates medieval writers for lacking understanding shown by Herodotus, pointing out that it was only with the renewal of contact beyond the immediately known world that tolerance for exotic others reappears: knowledge means understanding, and collapsing history in this way sim-

plifies the implicitly Hellenic claims of Western epistemology. At several points she makes it clear, moreover, that her goal is a historical justification, not merely of anthropology as a discipline, but more particularly of its diagnostic activity—fieldwork by participant observation.

Hodgen's distrust of medieval observers springs from the same idiom of Eurocentrism that has also banished Byzantium from the entire history of anthropology. It was in the stormy history of Byzantine relations with the Latin West that European identity became definitively separated from that of contemporary Greeks, so that the neoclassical revival in Greece would eventually generate the strains that are so characteristic of Greek culture and politics today—especially a pervasive binarism of motives, in which outer-directed neoclassicism vies with a potentially self-critical (but often merely “nationistic” rather than “nationalistic”) form of eastern-oriented nativism, an imploded Orientalism.⁴² The widespread hostility shown by Greek monks and others to the Pope during his 2001 visit to their country shows that “the West” is by no means viewed with equanimity or pleasure, even when the target is not the United States or the European Union (of which Greece is now a member-state).

Like the Greeks' official, neoclassical self-presentation, which is a rejection of the specificities of local history and social experience, Hodgen foreshortens anthropological history; and so, in part, she abolishes it. Anthropologists may easily recognize the process as the sort of temporal “telescoping” characteristic of many nonliterate cultures and most commonly expressed through the “structural amnesia” of lineage systems.⁴³ By seeking ostensible links between Herodotus, Columbus, and the Victorians (she also slights the Enlightenment as a period of intellectual regression for anthropology), she links up a whole series of ideological *topoi*: rugged individualism, enterprise, visual exploration, imperial or mercantile contact, and, quite simply, just “being there”—the major claim, as James Clifford has pointed out in his provocative analysis of fieldwork ideology, of “ethnographic authority.”⁴⁴

Doubtless, the medieval writers who mined Herodotus did indeed, as Hodgen claims, simplify and recast much of what he had to say. Their experience of other parts of the world was, as she points out, less direct than his, and their interest more inwardly directed. That Hodgen has not discussed the equally striking elements of their similarity with Herodotus is most of all an index of the philological standards by which she judges them; those

standards, however, are also the means by which European culture avoided seeing its own textualizations of alterity as symbolic of an ideologically necessary commitment to cultural difference. Remarkably like Greek nationalist writers of the nineteenth century, who either ignored that phase of Greek culture or simplified its Greekness beyond recognition, historians of modern anthropology have thus constructed a genealogy in which the Middle Ages simply do not figure at all, or treat that phase as an aberrance through which something of the ancient genius nevertheless managed to survive, then to be reborn under conditions of nascent modernity. It is a convenient story.

In a Eurocentric world that defines itself in circular fashion by evoking a classical Greece that it has itself constructed, the role of anthropology as a myth of origin might be expected to yield a strong commitment to some form of classical derivation. Under these circumstances, the paucity of explicitly classical points of reference is telling. It parades an ancestry that cannot be too precisely traced. For anthropology, in order to lay claim to the status of a modern science, must be able to claim roots in the ancient culture: a precise replication of the besetting paradox of European nationalism itself, which wanted to root itself in classical Greece while at the same time relegating the latter to the domain of the premodern, socially and culturally undifferentiated, ideologically primitive type of society—a necessary projection in a truly survivalist universe.

The rediscovery of ancient Greece has required a very different development, one that is consistent with the more reflexive and anticolonialist leanings of the discipline today. It is telling that, precisely at the point when the classics are disappearing from many Western curricula, a more generous engagement with classical Greece has begun to emerge. The gradual fading of classical learning from the schoolrooms of the West accompanied the demise of the imperial world hegemonies that had most enthusiastically supported it. In consequence, the Greeks only return to consciousness as significant players in the constitution of anthropology at the same time as the beginning of a more systematic interest in the *modern* Greeks gets under way. Hodgen's rehabilitation of Herodotus appeared in the United States in the same year, 1964, that J. K. Campbell's *Honour, Family, and Patronage* was published in England.

Hodgen had earlier noted that the form of survivalism acquires peculiar contours when anthropology finds itself dealing with the role of the Greeks,

ancient and modern, in the constitution of European culture.⁴⁵ In the Tyloorean version, survivals pointed back to more primitive times, whereas the neoclassical version tried to identify the remnants of a process of decay rather than advancement—the “sad relics” of a glorious past immured in the passive peasant stupidity of today. Yet the paradox lay in this circumstance: the classical past was both the ideological imprimatur of cultural respectability and at the same time a necessarily less complex, less sophisticated version of the European present. The collapse of survivalism in the next generations of anthropology buried that paradox once and for all by rebuilding it on the ruins: it removed classical Greece from both the self-conscious intellectual ancestry of the discipline and the corpus of legitimately comparable ethnographic cases. By the time Hodgen sought to restore Herodotus to his place at the head of the disciplinary genealogy, and J. K. Campbell, Ernestine Friedl, and Irwin T. Sanders began the important process of bringing Greece into the domain of acceptable ethnography, the process of structural amnesia had permitted the sophisticated European rationality conjoining Herodotus to modern anthropology to replace the crudely racist European superiority of such writers as Gobineau (who regarded the Greeks as “orientals” although he also professed to like them.⁴⁶ This rationality, in Hodgen’s work as in Gobineau’s pontifications, stifles the “superstitious” medieval phase by treating its denizens much as earlier anthropologists had treated the “primitive” cultures they studied. The Greeks had definitively disappeared from the hegemonic definition of *European*; swallowed up by the “medieval” Byzantines and the “oriental” Ottomans. Thus safely quarantined from the realities of modern European culture and society, they could now reappear (as “modern Greeks”) in the writings of a few anthropologists as “ethnographic subjects.”⁴⁷

With the increasingly rapid disappearance of the classics from both the schoolroom and the diplomatic reading list, even the legitimating resuscitation of ancient authors begins to yield to a much more critical understanding of the role of ancient Greek history in the schooling of imperial power brokers. Such tectonic shifts, however, are deeply unsettling for the crypto-colonial elites whose roles depended on maintaining the old understandings. Many educated Greeks today, especially those of conservative inclinations, are outraged by Martin Bernal’s rejection of the idea that Hellenic culture sprang fully formed from the soil of Greece: the idea that Greek culture might be “African” comes across as a betrayal of the most faithful

cultural sycophants—a not-uncommon fate of fully colonial elites as well, it should be noted.⁴⁸ Even those who lean further to the left are upset by the threat to the Greeks' one claim on universal importance that they see in the rise of Western multiculturalism, which they link to the demise of the classics; a sympathetic journalist, who otherwise reported my comments on Greek nationalism quite accurately, nonetheless incorrectly represented me as treating Greece as the “victim of a new fashion [that is, multiculturalism].”⁴⁹ Yet it is precisely at this point that anthropologists begin to treat ancient Greece, not as a quaint ethnological curiosity (as did the survivalists), not as a vague source of ancestral authority for the West, but as part of a global history in which colonialism may have spread the word but local ingenuity has actively transformed it. Multiculturalism recognizes the contribution of the Greeks, but not according to the canonical history constructed in the heyday of imperial domination.

Let me illustrate this with a single, striking illustration of what this shift can entail. Stephen Gudeman has collaborated with a local (Colombian) colleague to trace a veritable genealogy of ideas from Aristotle and other, later thinkers to the “folk theories” of Colombian peasants and anthropologists alike.⁵⁰ But note that his is a double act of defiance: not only do he and his colleague reintroduce classical Greek models in order to trace the origins of variants they encounter in the new world, a move that Gudeman has subsequently expanded in his theoretical work, but they also compare them with indigenous models and take the latter seriously as theoretical constructs. In so doing, they collapse the absolute distinction that many writers presuppose between theory and ethnography. Such a move challenges scholarly authority as well as the larger authority of the Western canon. But it also involves sharing that quintessentially Hellenic and European ancestry, not only with a local scholarly collaborator, but also with “the natives.” This is a genuinely reflexive shift of perspective.

Anthropology and the Fate of Hellenism

Such shifts reimport ironies into the original space of analysis. The term *modern Greece*, for example, is increasingly subject to informal questioning, although it persists in everyday scholarly usage. There is a reason for this: those of us who do ethnographic research in Greece, confronted by the automatic assumption that we must be archaeologists (an assumption

made all the more recalcitrant by the now-deafening absence of any general knowledge about classical Greek culture), cannot dispense with it entirely, if only because it provides one of the few ways of reminding people that the country is still inhabited! Ironically, the model of seamless continuity between ancient and modern Greece, as articulated in the crypto-colonial and nationalist discourses, cannot now be allowed to disappear, because it would apparently take awareness of the *living* population away with it as well.

We can begin to search for the common ground of such exclusions by thinking about the languages of scholarship. Although what follows is an impressionistic judgment, I submit that it is precisely in the crypto-colonies that the local languages, rather than the languages of imperial rule, serve the goals of academic publishing. This is a proud assertion of cultural independence, and indeed it should be so interpreted. But it is also, and here lies the rub, a means of self-exclusion, and not only from the broader international academic community dominated by English, French, and Spanish (with increasing doses of Japanese, Chinese, German, and perhaps Russian and Arabic); it also contributes to a two-tier system in which local scholars have tended to write in isolation from their foreign counterparts, who rarely cite the local scholars' work except when it is published in English or French.

That situation is beginning to change. If one checks the bibliographies of recent monographs about the ethnology of Greece, the proportion of Greek titles has increased, and works based on Greek research but purporting to offer a wider theoretical purview are beginning to figure in the citations of monographs dealing with other parts of the world; significantly, in the present context, Seremetakis, writing (in English) about Greece, appears in a recent study of Thailand.⁵¹ (Oddly enough, the ethnography of Italy lags further behind here; despite the heroic attempts of George Saunders to promote the thinking of Ernesto de Martino, for example, most Italian-language references in ethnographies of Italy are to historical, sociological, political-science, or journalistic works, and largely ignore the impressive roster of Italian scholarship on Italian local worlds—a tradition that seems to have fallen afoul of a publishing situation no less riven by localism than the politics of the country as a whole!⁵²)

Such changes show that crypto-colonialism has real consequences, and that these are sometimes unpredictably slow to respond to changes in the global balance of power. Indeed, I suggest that the crypto-colonies have

been doubly victimized: not only have they suffered many of the economic and political effects of colonialism itself, but they have then found themselves excluded, materially and epistemologically, by the massive forces upholding the binarisms of late-twentieth-century realpolitik. Caught in the exclusionary logic of cold war oppositions, they have also been squeezed between the imperial powers and their officially recognized victims. This has enabled local elites to maintain their grip on power in ways that elsewhere proved vulnerable, and has also led to challenges that seem remarkably similar in some crypto-colonial situations. The trajectories leading to the 1973 Polytechnic students' uprising in Athens and the 1976 student massacre at Thammasat University in Bangkok, as well as subsequent developments in both places, are sufficiently similar to suggest that these events may index comparable (although not identical) consequences of cold war dynamics. But these dynamics followed in already well-established paths of global politics, in which crypto-colonies were forced to play roles not of their own choosing. Within that larger geopolitical context, their civilizational discourses—pleas for recognition and respectability—followed the parallel dynamic of a global hierarchy of culture. The relative indifference with which the West has generally reacted to such appeals suggests that the crypto-colonies—which in the postcolonial world cannot persuasively lay claim to economic or cultural “reparations”—must continue to struggle, burdened by their ancient pasts, with a future for which there is as yet no clear categorical slot.

The reality of colonialism's heritage is that the global hierarchy of cultural value it has created persists long after the demise of the political and military empires. The Greeks' struggles to conform to dominant images of Hellenic culture only confirmed their cultural subordination to such imported models. They were caught in a double bind. If they emphasized familiar cultural idioms, they were “contaminated” by Turkish and Slavic influences; the everyday was not really Greek. But if they instead followed the Hellenic models, they were derided for their slavish devotion to a past they were held to have lost and for the recovery of which they were beholden to the very foreigners who mocked them. There is nothing intrinsically “bad” about Slavic or Turkish influence; nor is there any reason to suppose that the values celebrated by Enlightenment and Romantic Europe were particularly good. But they have come to dominate the global environment, sustained by international realities, and the crypto-colonies have for long had to choose between

adapting to them or risking ever more crushing marginalization. It is easy, in these terms, to see why work like Bernal's provokes such a tense mixture of anxiety and resentment in Greece.

In the case of Thailand, we see a closely related dynamic. Especially in their cultivation of foreign rulers, the nineteenth-century Thai kings were petitioners for a cultural recognition few were prepared to vouchsafe them; the Russian czar, who was the sole "European" monarch to receive the Siamese King Chulalongorn with full dignity, faced widespread doubts about his own country's right to account itself "European" and was no doubt happy to show himself more civilized than those of his fellow-monarchs who despised his country. As Thongchai has shown, moreover, the attempts of the Siamese to present themselves as equal partners with Europe in the work of civilization, especially at the great world fairs of colonialism's heyday, led to continual humiliation. It was only when the Siamese pavilion was literally placed among those of colonies that they were able to address that humiliation directly and to any effect and succeeded in getting it reclassified and relocated; most of the time, Siam appeared as a country more imitative than productive.⁵³

Whereas the Siamese project of *siwilai* was an attempt to capture the aura of technological achievement associated with the West, an attempt that perhaps still infuses aspects of Thai modernity, the Greeks' project had more to do with recapturing the aura of an eternal European quintessence. That project still informs the common Greek lament that the West "stole the light" from Hellas and justifies the appropriation of West European cultural elements—grammatical structures, for example—in what, according to the dominant ideology, is the true culture of Greece. But whereas the Greeks saw this project as a *return* to cultural leadership, their European patrons simply saw it much as they saw the Thai civilizational projects—as an attempt to *catch up* with the West.

Crypto-colonialism is thus about the exclusion of certain countries from access to the globally dominant advantages of modernity. That exclusion is reflected in the history of anthropology. Whereas the former colonies became important objects of theoretical reflection, the crypto-colonies had a much more ambiguous and frustrating relationship to the production of anthropological theory. While I do not want to exaggerate this distinction, which is also much less applicable now than it would have been two decades ago, I suspect that much of the theoretical labor conducted in the

crypto-colonies has remained marginalized—in dramatic contrast with, for example, “subaltern studies” in the Indian subcontinent or “postcolonial studies” in sub-Saharan Africa.

I do not want to suggest that particular countries *should* appear as the bearers of new theory. Theory is itself a problematic category; its close etymological links with the Greek for “observation” should, following Vico’s subversive use of etymology, undermine any simplistic discrimination between theory and observation as contemporary forms of academic practice—and observation itself, as Johannes Fabian notes,⁵⁴ is a trope of domination. My goal is thus not to prescribe a return to the pedestal, historical or theoretical. More modestly, I want to argue that those countries that have been excluded to any significant degree from the production of social theory may now instead serve as sources of insight into the hegemonic pretensions that social theory has—often inadvertently—tended to endorse. If comparing anthropology and Greek nation-building has seemed a useful exercise, might we not gain comparable insight from comparing anthropology (or sociology, or cultural studies, or even history) with the Thai discourse of *siwilai*, for example?

Such exercises, of which the potential variety is enormous, would challenge a hegemonic structure that, initiated under colonialism, repeats itself as both tragedy and farce in its successors.⁵⁵ The opposition between colonizer and colonized is itself a discursive part of that deeply problematic heritage. Breaking apart the binarism of colonizer and colonized may be distasteful to some, especially those whose commitments and struggles have helped to pinpoint and dismantle the evils that it indexes. But that move will concomitantly reveal the presence of other hegemonies, harder to disassemble precisely because they have been well concealed. Meanwhile, it is important not to reify crypto-colonialism: even the shadowy account of the Thai experience that I have sketched in as a foil to the Greek may suffice to illuminate the similarities and the differences alike.

The world is no longer made up of colonizers and colonized alone, nor was it ever so simply split. The provisional category that I have identified as crypto-colonialism offers a critical perspective on the distribution of cultural significance in anthropology and the world: instead of simply accepting the idea that some countries might be unimportant while others might be uninteresting, we ask who defines the nature of importance and interest and so challenge the established world-order politics of significance. This moves

anthropology to the critique of new subalternities and new complexities of power. In the process anthropology may again show the capacity that has ensured its survival against repeated expectations of its intellectual bankruptcy and demise: the capacity to rethink itself and its role in the world.

Notes

I would like to thank the following, who read versions of this essay at quite divergent moments in its long birth and provided precious insights to which I have tried to rise: Loring M. Danforth, Nancy Felson-Rubin, Gregory Jusdanis, Prista Ratanapruck, Sohini Ray, Eric Schwimmer, Saipin Suputtamongkol, Stanley J. Tambiah, and Thongchai Winichakul.

- 1 Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).
- 2 A few key authors (for example, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *The Monkey As Mirror: Symbolic Transformations in Japanese History and Ritual* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987], 11–12) have begun to turn the tide, but this development has, significantly, arrived slowly and late.
- 3 Michael Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- 4 Douglas Holmes, *Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 5 See, for example, the useful comparative overview provided by T. M. Luhmann, *The Good Parsi: The Fate of a Colonial Elite in a Postcolonial Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 5–24.
- 6 See James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); but see also Lila Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin Women,” *American Ethnologist* 17 (1990): 41–55; Deborah Reed-Danahay, “Talking about Resistance: Ethnography and Theory in Rural France,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 66 (1993): 221–29.
- 7 This is the position of those who now call themselves *Neokyprioi* (“Neo-Cypriots”)—mostly young intellectuals who resent the rapid cultural as well as institutional absorption of the Greek-Cypriot world by the Greek nation-state.
- 8 The idea that Slavs were subject to a “somehow communistic influence,” possibly attributable to their living in extended family structures that were later to be taken as positive evidence for that supposed proclivity, was articulated early; see Dora d’Istria, “La nationalité hellénique d’après les chants populaires,” *Revue des deux mondes* 70 (1867): 584–627; see especially 590. The converse view, that the true European must be an individualist, remains prominent in the discourse of Greek identity politics, especially among right-wingers.
- 9 See Scot Barmé, *Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993), 126–27, 147–49; the Greek phrase, emblematic of the struggle especially on the island of Crete, was celebrated by the novelist Nikos Kazantzakis in the novel published in English as *Freedom or Death* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).

- 10 On the Thai terminology, see Barmé, *Luang Wichit Wathakan*, 160; Thongchai Winichakul, "The Quest for 'Siwilai': A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth-Century Siam," *Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (2000): 528–49.
- 11 David Horn, *Social Bodies: Science, Reproduction, and Italian Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1985), 32.
- 12 Sydel Silverman, *Three Bells of Civilization: The Life of an Italian Hill Town* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
- 13 Thongchai, "The Quest for 'Siwilai,'" 532, following Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the Looking-Glass*.
- 14 Thongchai, "The Quest for 'Siwilai,'" 535.
- 15 Thongchai, "The Quest for 'Siwilai,'" 535, 546.
- 16 Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 170.
- 17 On Santi Asoke, see Marja-Leena Heikkilä-Horn, *Santi Asoke Buddhism and Thai State Response* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi Förlag, 1996). On the Dhammakaya movement, see the special report on research by Apinya Feungfusakul, *Bangkok Post*, no. 21 (December 1998). Rosalind C. Morris, *In the Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Northern Thailand* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 218, discusses the engagement of medium cults with issues of modernity.
- 18 Stanley J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
- 19 Stanley J. Tambiah, *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- 20 Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the Looking-Glass*, 195, 200.
- 21 E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (London: John Murray, 1871).
- 22 Margaret T. Hodgen, *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 22.
- 23 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Essays in Social Anthropology* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 46–65.
- 24 Nancy Struever, "Fables of Power," *Representations*, no. 4 (Fall 1983): 173–85; the discussion of civil disability is on 123.
- 25 Evans-Pritchard, *Essays*, 50.
- 26 For example, Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
- 27 On lineage segmentation and event structure, see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); Paul Dresch, "The Significance of the Course Events Take in Segmentary System," *American Ethnologist* 13 (1986): 309–24. On the rise of the Libyan monarchy in this framework, see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Samusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949); compare J. Davis, *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution—An*

- Account of the Zuwaya and Their Government* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). On Greece and Europe, see J. K. Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); J. Davis, "History and the People without Europe," in *Other Histories*, ed. Kirsten Hastrup (London: Routledge, 1992), 14–28.
- 28 A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), 1. On structuration, see especially Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
- 29 See Struever, "Fables of Power." I might add, ironically, that even those anthropologists who have mined Vico for his very considerable insights have virtually ignored the centrality to these of a subversive reading of classical history—and thus of a subversive classical history to the critical project of examining the Eurocentric assumptions that underlie anthropological practice. In these "neutral" or "professional" anthropological readings of Vico (for example, José Guilherme Merquior, "Vico et Lévi-Strauss: notes à propos d'un symposium," *L'Homme* 10 [1970]: 81–93), the material Vico used appears to be incidental to the ideas, rather than—as Vico intended—critical for understanding a modern world in which we have reexpropriated classical culture for exclusive ideological ends.
- 30 At the University of the Aegean, Mytilene (Lesbos); see Evthymios Papataxiarchis and Theodoros Paradellis, *Taftotites ke Filo sti Singkhroni Elladha* (Athens: Kastaniotis, 1992).
- 31 Marcel Détienne, *The Creation of Mythology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 [1981]), 8.
- 32 S. C. Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
- 33 Ernestine Friedl, *Vasilika: A Village in Modern Greece* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962).
- 34 Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the Looking-Glass*.
- 35 Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *Journal of American Folklore* 68 (1955): 428–44.
- 36 Bernal, *Black Athena*, 78.
- 37 Louis Gernet, *Anthropologie de la Grèce antique* (Paris: François Maspero, 1968).
- 38 Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), 57.
- 39 On possessive individualism, see C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); on its extension to nationalism, see Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Michael Herzfeld, "The European Self: Rethinking an Attitude," in Anthony Padgen, ed., *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union* (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 139–70.
- 40 G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); compare, for example, Rodney Needham, "Introduction," in *Right and Left: Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), xxix.
- 41 See Hodgen, *Early Anthropology*, 28; compare François Hartog, *Le miroir d'Hérodote: Essai sur la représentation de l'Autre* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980).
- 42 The terminological distinction follows Dimitrios Tziouvas, *The Nationism of the Demoticists*

- and Its Impact on Their Literary Theory (1888–1930): An Analysis Based on Their Literary Criticism and Essays (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1986).
- 43 The terminology is that of Ioan Lewis, "Force and Fission in Northern Somali Lineage Structure," *American Anthropologist* 63 (1961): 94–112.
- 44 See James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Authority," *Representations*, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 118–46.
- 45 Margaret T. Hodgen, *The Doctrine of Survivals: A Chapter in the History of Scientific Method in the Study of Man* (London: Allenson and Company, 1936), 48 n. 1.
- 46 Campbell, *Honour, Family, and Patronage*; Friedl, *Vasilika*; Irwin T. Sanders, *Rainbow in the Rock: The People of Rural Greece* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). On Gobineau, see the special issue of *Nouvelle revue française* (1934): 119.
- 47 The groundwork for this process had been laid centuries before. By equating the Arabic-Turkish name for their Byzantine forebears with a non-European identity in which they recognized themselves (as *Romii*), the Greeks had perforce acquiesced in the process of their marginalization from the European mainstream: this was an already corrupt Roman Empire become Ottoman, and so foreign to the Hellenic spirit that Europeans so much admired. The Greeks (or, more precisely here, the Hellenes) had, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. Their reconstitution as an ostensibly independent nation-state during the half-century immediately before anthropology became a professional discourse provided a *cordon sanitaire* between Europe and the Orient in cartographic time, while anthropology performed the same function in discursive space (Herzfeld, *Anthropology through the Looking-Glass*); the Greeks could be Hellenes only if they accepted to belong to a bygone era, cultural coelacanths that validated the West's self-appointed right to sneer at their primitivity and their decadence.
- 48 See, for example, Luhmann, *The Good Parsi*.
- 49 Takis Mikhas, "I Elladha, thima mias neas modhas," *Eleftherotypia*, February 24, 1994, 44.
- 50 Stephen Gudeman and Alberto Rivera, *Conversations in Colombia: The Domestic Economy in Life and Text* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 145–49.
- 51 Morris, *In the Place of Origins*, cites C. Nadia Seremetakis, "The Memory of the Senses: Historical Perception, Commensal Exchange, and Modernity," *Visual Anthropology Review* 9 (1993): 2–18.
- 52 For example, George R. Saunders, "'Critical Ethnocentrism' and the Ethnology of Ernesto de Martino," *American Anthropologist* 95 (1993): 875–93.
- 53 Thongchai, "The Quest for 'Sivilai,'" 538–42.
- 54 Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 106–9.
- 55 See, for example, Achille Mbembe, "Provisional Notes on the Postcolony," *Africa* 62 (1992): 3–37.