

THE AGE OF MIGRATION

International Population
Movements in the Modern
World

Sixth Edition

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6 Migration in Europe since 1945

Since the sixteenth century, Europeans have been moving *elsewhere* through conquering, colonizing and settling in lands elsewhere on the globe, as well as by transporting slaves from Africa to the Americas and moving indentured workers from South and East Asia, to work in the Caribbean, East Africa, Mauritius and elsewhere. These patterns would largely reverse in the second half of the twentieth century. Under the influence of decolonization, demographic change and rapid economic growth, Europe emerged as a major global migration destination. This would take most European societies by surprise, as large-scale immigration and settlement were neither planned nor generally desired. There have been four main phases in post-WWII European migrations:

- 1945–1973: West European decolonization, rapid economic growth, decreasing emigration to North America and Oceania, post-colonial migration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, recruitment of Mediterranean ‘guestworkers’, and the settlement of Russians in Soviet republics;
- 1973–1989: Economic stagnation and restructuring, settlement of migrant workers in Western Europe alongside family migration, increasing labour migration to Eastern Europe from communist countries, and planned Soviet migration;
- 1989–2008: End of Cold War, demise of Soviet empire, growing East–West migration and intra-European circulation following the creation of the Schengen zone and EU enlargements, increasing labour migration to Southern Europe, alongside the increasing politicization of migration across Europe;
- Since 2008: Post-Great Recession slump followed by a resurgence of labour migration to the European economic core areas, along with a further politicization and securitization of asylum and undocumented migration.

While migration of Europeans to the Americas and Oceania rapidly declined in the 1960s and 1970s, Western European economies started to attract increasing numbers of migrants. Initially most migrant workers came from former colonies and countries located on the European periphery, but would start to include an increasingly diverse array of European and non-European origin countries. Although governments have often struggled to come to terms with these new realities, immigration levels in much of Europe have come to match or exceed those of classical immigration countries. In 2017, an estimated 82 million foreign-born people were living in Europe (including former Soviet states), of whom 34 million were born outside Europe, compared to 55 million foreign-born in North America and 41 million foreign-born in the Middle East. The drying up of Europe as a global source of migrants would also change the face of migration to North America, Australia and New Zealand, which would become increasingly Latin American and Asian in character. The structural increase in immigration from non-EU countries as well as intra-EU migration has contributed to a growing diversity of populations, particularly in Western Europe. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the evolution of European immigrant




Figure 6.1 Foreign-born populations in Western Europe, by origin region, 1960–2017

Source: UNDESA 2017 and Global Bilateral Migration Database

Note: 'Western Europe' includes all European countries that were not part of the communist East Bloc. Eastern Europe and Central Asia include former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and most of the former Soviet Union

populations since 1960. They show the fast increase in immigrant populations in Western Europe, which represented 12.7 per cent of the total population in 2017. Migration in Eastern European and Central Asia (comprising the former Soviet Union) is also significant but lower and more stable, with most people moving within the region.

Migration in the post-war boom (1945–1973)

While global migration rates have remained relatively stable, one of the fundamental changes in post-WWII migration geography has been the emergence of Europe as a global migration destination. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, various types of migration led to the formation of new, ethnically distinct populations in advanced industrial countries in Northwest Europe:

- Mass movements of European refugees and displaced people at the end of the Second World War, particularly in Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union;
- Migration from former colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean to the previous colonial powers, particularly France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium; consisting of repatriation of colonial settlers as well as migrant workers;
- Migration from 'labour frontier' countries in the European periphery including Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Morocco to the industrial core nations of Western Europe, sometimes through 'guestworker systems';
- State-led settlement of Russian populations in other Soviet Republics, high internal and rural-to-urban migration, and increasing student migration to the Soviet Union.




Figure 6.2 Foreign-born populations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, by origin region, 1960–2017


Source: UNDESA 2017 and Global Bilateral Migration Database

Map 6.1 gives an idea of some of the main migratory flows of this period from a European perspective, with declining movements to the New World being gradually replaced by large-scale migration towards Europe from countries in the European periphery and former colonies.

Foreign workers and ‘guestworker’ systems

In the first phase from 1945 to the early 1970s, the chief economic strategy of West European governments and large-scale enterprises was the concentration of investment and expansion of industrial production. As a result, large numbers of migrant workers were employed or recruited from less developed countries in the Mediterranean region as well as from Ireland and Finland into the fast-growing industrial areas of Western Europe. With the exception of former Yugoslavia, Communist countries in Eastern Europe were largely sealed off from Western Europe, and apart from some refugee movements, migration between ‘East’ and ‘West’ was minimal. All the highly industrialized countries of Northwestern Europe used temporary labour recruitment at some stage, although this sometimes played a smaller role than spontaneous entry of foreign workers, which was facilitated by the development of migrant networks.

Immediately after the Second World War, the *British* government brought in 90,000 mainly male workers from refugee camps and from Italy through the European Voluntary Worker (EVW) scheme. The scheme was fairly small and only operated until 1951, because it was easier to make use of colonial workers. A further 100,000 Europeans entered Britain on work permits between 1946 and 1951, and some of these migrations continued subsequently (Kay and Miles 1992). *Belgium* also started recruiting foreign workers immediately



Map 6.1 International migration, 1945–1973

Note: The arrow dimensions give an approximate indication of the volume of flows in the 1945–2015 period. Exact figures are often unavailable

after the war. They were mainly Italian men, and were employed in the coalmines and the iron and steel industry. The system operated until 1963, after which foreign work-seekers were allowed to come of their own accord. Many brought in dependants and settled permanently, changing the ethnic composition of Belgium's industrial areas.

France established an *Office nationale d'immigration* (ONI) in 1945 to organize the recruitment of workers from Southern Europe. Essentially continuing pre-war trends, immigration was seen as a solution to post-war labour shortages. In view of continuing low birth rates and war losses, massive family settlement was envisaged. ONI also coordinated the employment of up to 150,000 seasonal agricultural workers per year, mainly from Spain. By 1970, 2 million foreign workers and 690,000 dependants resided in France. Many found it easier to come as 'tourists', get a job and then regularize their situation. This applied particularly to Portuguese and Spanish workers, escaping their respective dictatorships, who generally lacked passports. By 1968, ONI statistics revealed that 82 per cent of the foreigners admitted by the ONI came as 'clandestines'.

Switzerland pursued a policy of large-scale labour import from 1945 to 1974. Foreign workers were recruited abroad by employers, while admission and residence were controlled by the government. Job changing, permanent settlement and family reunion were forbidden to seasonal workers until the mid-1960s. Considerable use was also made of cross-frontier commuters. Swiss industry became highly dependent on foreign workers, who made up nearly a third of the labour force by the early 1970s. The need to attract and retain workers, coupled with diplomatic pressure from Italy, eventually led to relaxations on family reunion and permanent stay, so that Switzerland, too, experienced settlement and the formation of permanent migrant communities.

The examples could be continued: *the Netherlands* and *Belgium* brought in 'guestworkers', mainly from Spain, Italy, Turkey and Morocco, but also from Portugal, Greece and

former Yugoslavia. In the 1960s and early 1970s, *Luxembourg's* industries were also highly dependent on foreign labour, while Sweden employed workers from Finland and Southern European countries. In *Italy*, migration from the underdeveloped south was crucial to the economic take-off of the northern industrial triangle between Milan, Turin and Genoa in the 1960s. This was internal migration, but rather similar in its economic and social character to foreign worker movements towards other European countries.

The key case for understanding the 'guestworker system' was the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), which set up a highly organized state recruitment apparatus (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles *et al.* 1984). The former West-German Government started recruiting foreign workers in the mid-1950s. The Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, or BfA) set up recruitment offices in the Mediterranean countries. Employers requiring foreign labour paid a fee to the BfA, which selected workers, tested occupational skills, provided medical examinations and screened police records. The workers were brought in groups to Germany, where employers had to provide initial accommodation. Recruitment, working conditions and social security were regulated by bilateral agreements between the FRG and the main origin countries: first Italy, then Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

The number of foreign workers in the FRG rose from 95,000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in 1966 and 2.6 million in 1973. This massive migration was the result of rapid industrial expansion and the shift to new methods of mass production, which required large numbers of low-skilled workers. Foreign women workers played a major part, especially in the later years: their labour was in high demand in textiles and clothing, electrical goods and other manufacturing sectors.

German policies conceived of migrant workers as temporary labour units, which could be recruited, utilized and sent away again as employers required. To enter and remain in the FRG, a migrant needed a residence permit and a labour permit. These were granted for restricted periods, and were often valid only for specific jobs and areas. Entry of dependants (family members) was discouraged. A worker could be deprived of his or her permit for a variety of reasons, leading to deportation.

However, it was impossible to prevent family reunion and settlement. Often migrant workers were able to get employers to request their wives or husbands as workers. Competition with other labour-importing countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands to attract migrant workers contributed to relaxation of restrictions on entry of dependants in the 1960s (Bonjour 2011). Families became established and children were born. Foreign labour was beginning to lose its mobility, and social costs (for housing, education and healthcare) could no longer be avoided. When the Federal Government stopped labour recruitment in November 1973, the motivation was not only the looming Oil Crisis, but also the belated realization that permanent settlement was taking place (Castles and Kosack 1973; Castles *et al.* 1984).

The FRG represents, in the most developed form, all the principles – but also the contradictions – of temporary foreign labour recruitment systems. These include the belief in temporary sojourn, the restriction of labour market and civil rights, the recruitment of single workers (men at first, but with increasing numbers of women as time went on), the inability to prevent family reunion completely, the gradual move towards longer stay, and the inevitable pressures for settlement and community formation. The FRG took the system furthest, but its central element – the legal distinction between citizen and foreigners as a criterion for determining political and social rights – was found throughout Europe (see Hammar 1985).

Multinational agreements were also used to facilitate labour migration. Free movement of workers within the European Economic Community (EEC) which came into force in 1968, was relevant mainly for Italian workers, while the Nordic Labour Market facilitated migration of Finns to Sweden. However, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the labour movement within the Community was actually declining, owing to gradual equalization of wages and living standards within the EEC, while migration from outside the Community, particularly from Turkey and Morocco, was already increasing.

Colonial workers

Migration from former colonies was important for Britain, France, the Netherlands and later also for Portugal. Since they lacked colonial empires, Germany, Austria and Switzerland would continue to mainly rely on Mediterranean 'guestworkers' from Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Britain experienced a net inflow of about 350,000 migrants from Ireland, its traditional labour reserve, between 1946 and 1959. Irish workers provided manual labour for industry and construction, and many brought in their families and settled permanently. Irish residents in Britain enjoyed all civil rights, including the right to vote. Immigration of workers from the New Commonwealth (former British colonies in the Caribbean, the Indian subcontinent and Africa) started after 1945 and grew during the 1950s. The 1948 British Nationality Act gave all Commonwealth subjects the status of British citizen and, hence, the full right to work and settle in the UK. Some workers came as a result of recruitment by London Transport, but most migrated spontaneously in response to labour demand. By 1951, there were 218,000 people of New Commonwealth origin (including Pakistan, which subsequently left the Commonwealth), a figure which increased to 541,000 in 1961. Entry of workers declined after 1962, partly through the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 which abolished free entry of Commonwealth citizens, and partly because of the early onset of economic stagnation in Britain. One unexpected result of these restrictions was a 'beat the ban' migration rush from the Caribbean just before the Commonwealth Immigrants Act came into effect (Peach 1968).

Most of the Commonwealth immigrants had come to stay, and family reunion grew in importance, until it in turn was restricted by the 1971 Immigration Act. The population of New Commonwealth origin increased to 1.2 million in 1971 and 1.5 million in 1981. Most Afro-Caribbean and Asian immigrants and their children in Britain enjoyed formal citizenship (although this no longer applies to those admitted since the 1981 Nationality Act). Most black and Asian workers found unskilled manual jobs in industry and the services, and a high degree of residential segregation emerged in the inner cities. Educational and social disadvantage became a further obstacle to mobility out of low-status positions. By the 1970s, the emergence of ethnic minorities was inescapable.

France experienced large-scale immigration from its former North African colonies Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia as well as from Southern Europe through recruitment and spontaneous migration, while many French *colons* were forced to leave Algeria after independence in 1962 (see Chapter 9). Some of these migrants came before independence, while they were still French citizens. Others came later through preferential migration arrangements, or irregularly. Migration from Algeria was regulated by bilateral agreements which gave a unique status to Algerian migrants. Moroccans and Tunisians, by contrast, were admitted through the ONI. Many people also came from the overseas departments and territories such as Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion. Non-European immigrants were relegated to the bottom of the labour market, often working in highly

exploitative conditions. Housing was frequently segregated, and very poor in quality; indeed, shanty towns (known as *bidonvilles*) appeared in France in the 1960s (see [Chapter 13](#)). Extreme-right groups began to subject non-European immigrants to racial violence: 32 North Africans were murdered in 1973.

The Netherlands had two main inflows from former colonies. Between 1945 and the early 1960s about 375,000 ‘repatriates’ from the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) entered the Netherlands. Although most had been born overseas and many were of mixed Dutch and Indonesian parentage, they were Dutch citizens. Although these ‘repatriates’ awaited a cold reception in the Netherlands, this group of ‘Indos’ has now largely assimilated into Dutch society. The exception is the roughly 12,500 Moluccan migrants. They served as soldiers in the Dutch colonial army, who wished to return to their homeland to achieve Moluccan independence from Indonesia, a promise on which the Dutch government had failed to deliver. They remained segregated, and rejected integration into Dutch society – an example of *internal closure*. In the late 1970s, a strong sense of injustice led to several violent incidents, including train and school hijackings by second generation Moluccan-Dutch. After 1965, increasing numbers of migrants from the Caribbean territory of Surinam came to the Netherlands. A peak was reached in the years leading up to independence in 1975, and 1980, when visas were introduced. This ‘now or never’ migration surge led to an increase in the number of Surinamese in the Netherlands from 39,000 in 1973 to 145,000 in 1981 (van Amersfoort 2011; Vezzoli 2015) (see [Chapter 7](#)).

Soviet migration

Similar to West European colonialism, Russian imperial expansion would create political, cultural and economic ties that would lead to a regional migration system centred around the economic core areas of Russia. The Communist Revolution of 1917 had led to the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922, which consolidated the czarist empire into a modern state. Although nominally a federal union of Soviet Republics, its government was highly centralized and ethnic Russians dominated the Soviet regime (Pipes 1997). Particularly under Stalin, this would often go along with brutal oppression of non-Russian peoples, such as the deliberate starvation of millions of Ukrainians and Kazakhs during the 1932–1933 famine, a case of ‘negligent genocide’ (Ellman 2007), and the mass deportation and killing of (Muslim) Crimean Tatars in 1944 (Uehling 2004). As part of Soviet imperialism, large numbers of Russian settler colonists had been directed to migrate to Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Kazakhstan (Kuzio 2002).

In the Soviet Union, industrialization, urbanization and agrarian mechanization stimulated large-scale rural-to-urban migration, particularly in Russia, Ukraine and other economically advanced republics. While in 1917 only 17 per cent of the Soviet population lived in urban areas, in 1961 this proportion had risen to half, and by 1987 two thirds of Soviet citizens lived in urban areas (Zickel 1989). Urbanization was most advanced in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Although the process was started later in economically underdeveloped, peripheral regions, most of the Soviet republics underwent intensive, rapid industrialization and urbanization (Siegelbaum and Moch 2014). The Soviet Union would reach its peak of military and economic power after the Second World War, in the 1950s and 1960s, when it consolidated its hegemonic sphere of influence over Central and Eastern European satellite states as well as communist and socialist countries in the ‘Third World’, such as Cuba, Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt, Algeria and Vietnam.

Through draconian exit controls, the state prohibited people from leaving the Soviet Union as well its Central and Eastern European satellite states. At the same time, it tried to regulate internal migration with the aim of redistributing the labour force where workers were most needed. Mobility was partly regulated by the registration (*propiska*) system, although this system did not inhibit migration (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017). Apart from rural-to-urban migration *within* Soviet republics, millions of people moved *between* Soviet republics in attempts by the state to stimulate resettlement to sparsely populated, natural resource-rich regions, such as Kazakhstan and Siberia in the north and the far-east. From the early 1950s to the mid-1970s, the dominant direction of migration was therefore out of Russia, with 2.7 million people moving to other Soviet republics. As part of this ‘imperial emigration’, Russian migrants moved to Ukraine and Belarus for post-war reconstruction and development, to the Baltic republics, to Kazakhstan for the development of agriculture and to Central Asia to build newly industrialized economies (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017).

In the broader context of Cold War politics, the Soviet Union, and Russia in particular, would also evolve into an important destination for student migrants, particularly from countries with socialist-inclined regimes (White 2009). In 1960, 13,500 foreign students were in the Soviet Union, a number that would further rise to 180,000 by 1990. During the Soviet period, more than 60,000 people from 165 countries studied at the People’s Friendship University of Russia, which was established to train students from newly independent countries in Africa and Latin America (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017).

Settlement and the growth of dual labour markets (1973–1989)

The 1973 Oil Shock brought economic fortunes to oil-producing countries, but marked the start of a period of economic stagnation in Western Europe and North America. In Western Europe, rising unemployment led to a recruitment freeze, and the general expectation was that that ‘guestworkers’ would return and that the post-war era of large-scale immigration had come to an end. However, not only did such large-scale return not happen, but immigration would also continue during this period, against expectations and political rhetoric arguing in favour of border closure. The main trends include:

- A decline of government-organized labour migration to Western Europe and a recruitment freeze;
- Family reunion of foreign workers, and the resulting growth of permanent migrant communities;
- Increasing labour migration to emerging new economic core areas in Spain and Italy, particularly from North Africa and Latin America;
- Recruitment of migrant workers in communist developing countries to work in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The curbing of organized recruitment of manual workers by West European countries in the early 1970s was part of a larger process consisting of a fundamental restructuring of the world economy and the emergence of a new international division of labour, with industrial production increasingly relocated to low-wage countries and a growth of higher- and lower-skilled service sectors in high-income countries, which was to generate new forms of mobility and migration.

Economic restructuring and the growth of dual labour markets

The period of recessions following the 1973 Oil Shock gave further impetus to a trend of restructuring of the world economy. This restructuring involved capital investment in new industrial areas in developing countries, altered patterns of world trade and involved the introduction of new technologies. Most notably, this economic restructuring led to a decline in employment in the industrial ('secondary') sector in industrialized countries, which accelerated a general trend typical for post-industrial economies of increasing concentration of employment in the service ('tertiary') sector. On the one hand, this shift from industry to services was a consequence of advanced mechanization and automation of production. On the other hand, this reflected relocation or 'outsourcing' of industrial production to low-wage countries, particularly in East and Southeast Asia, a process which again was prompted by increasing wage costs in Europe. This process of economic restructuring led to the mass dismissal of factory and mine workers, many of whom were migrant workers. However, the recruitment freeze did not lead to the large-scale return of workers. Although significant return did happen, many migrant workers preferred to stay and to bring over their families. Family migration largely explains why migration to Northwest Europe continued at relatively high levels even during this period of economic stagnation and unemployment.

The 1970s and 1980s were also marked by a departure from post-WWII economic strategies, which focused on state intervention and income redistribution through progressive taxation, state pensions and welfare as well as an expansion of public services such as health care, housing and education. These policies were replaced by new economic policies, frequently dubbed as 'neoliberal', which pinned their hopes on economic deregulation and flexibilization of labour markets and the privatization of state companies. This went along a partial dismantling of welfare states and tax reforms that increased inequality between poor and rich. These policies of regulation and decreased state interference reinforced the growth of 'precarious' labour market segments, consisting of low-paid, insecure, often informal jobs in the service sector, construction and agriculture, which increasingly contrasted with stable, well-paid jobs in more specialized services.

The resulting growth of dual labour markets (Piore 1979: see [Chapters 3](#) and [12](#)) led to a growing split between a *primary labour market* consisting of stable, formal jobs in the primary sector and precarious jobs in the *secondary labour market*. This labour market segmentation stimulated renewed labour immigration to Europe, as the supply of native workers willing to do precarious jobs had dwindled, partly due to demographic change and increasing education levels, partly due to the low status, pay and prospects such 'dead-end' or '3D' (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs offer. From the mid-1980s, when economic growth resumed, the rapid growth of the service sectors would start to draw in more and more migrant workers from increasingly diverse skill levels, while labour demand in sectors such as intensive agriculture and construction was maintained. Economic reforms of the 1973–1989 period thus laid the groundwork for the resumption and rapid growth of labour migration to Europe over the 1989–2008 period.

Settlement of 'guestworkers' and new labour migrations

The immediate post-1973 period was one of consolidation and demographic 'normalization' of immigrant populations in Western Europe through family reunion. Active recruitment of foreign workers and colonial workers largely ceased. For migrants in Britain,

France and the Netherlands, trends to family reunion continued. In fact, the recruitment freeze and other immigration restrictions interrupted circulation by pushing many migrants into permanent settlement, as they feared that they would not be able to re-emigrate if their return were not successful. Governments initially tried to prevent family reunion, but with little success. In several countries, the law courts played a major role in preventing policies deemed to violate the protection of the family contained in national constitutions and international treaties (see [Chapter 11](#)). The settlement process, and the emergence of second and third generations born in Western Europe, led to the development of community structures and consciousness. By the 1980s, migrants and their descendants had become clearly visible social groups, sparking debates about the need to 'integrate' groups whose presence had long been considered as temporary.

In the same period Southern European countries started to experience migration transitions. Economic growth, combined with a sharp fall in birth rates and increasing labour shortages, ended the post-War emigration surge to the Americas and Northwest Europe. Italy, Spain, Greece, and, to a more limited extent, Portugal, all became countries of immigration, using labour from North Africa, Latin America, Asia and – later – Eastern Europe for low-skilled jobs (King *et al.* 2000). Although growing labour demand was often not matched by immigration policies, governments influenced by economic lobbies were often willing to turn a blind eye towards the illegal employment of migrant workers. These policies of lax enforcement would lead to large-scale migration of North African, East European and Latin American male and, increasingly, female workers in the post-1989 period, particularly to Spain and Italy.

Meanwhile, significant migration occurred within and between communist countries. There was substantial migration *within* the Soviet Union. Imperialist Russification policies went along with continued Russian emigration to non-Russian Soviet States. While between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, the dominant movement had been of Russian 'colonists' moving to other Soviet republics, a reverse migration movement, from other Soviet republics to Russia, had gradually gained momentum. Between 1975 and 1991 these reverse flows dominated and increased Russia's population by 2.5 million. Initially, these migrations were directed at remote, resource-rich areas aided by state investments in the development of oil and gas fields in West Siberia and mineral resources elsewhere in Eastern Russia (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017) instead of cities. These movements can be considered as *frontier migration* into 'resource niches' (see also Skeldon 1997), typical of imperial and colonial states vying to 'develop' peripheral zones such as by exploiting their resources.

The Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe also recruited migrant workers from abroad. East Germany, one of the most industrialized communist countries, set up its own version of a 'guestworker' system by recruiting workers from Hungary (from 1967), Poland (from 1971), Algeria (from 1974 to 1984), Cuba (from 1978), Mozambique (from 1979), Vietnam (from 1980), Angola (from 1985), and North Korea and China (from 1986). In 1989 the number of foreigners in East Germany reached a peak of 190,000 and represented 1.2 per cent of the total population (see also Schwenkel 2014; Mac Con Uladh 2005); Hungary and Czechoslovakia started to recruit migrant labour from Cuba, Vietnam and elsewhere as planners thought that economic growth was hampered by labour shortages as a result of low fertility (Perez-Lopez and Diaz-Briquets 1990). From the 1970s the Soviet Union also recruited thousands of temporary migrant workers from other communist countries, mostly from Bulgaria, North Korea, and Vietnam to work in major Soviet cities and other areas of Russia (Chudinovskikh

and Denisenko 2017). The fact that such recruitment happened despite the stagnation of the Soviet economy from the mid-1970s reveals that Piore's (1979) central argument that industrialized economies have a chronic, built-in demand for migrant workers (see [Chapter 3](#)) is not only applicable to 'capitalist' societies, but also to communist and other state-capitalist models of industrialization.

Migration during neoliberal globalization (1989–2008)

West and East European migrations would undergo fundamental changes in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the downfall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and their gradual incorporation into the European Union (EU). The 1992 *Maastricht Treaty* would lay the basis for the reinforcement and expansion of federalist European institutions. In 1995, the Schengen Agreement came into effect and eliminated internal border controls. This was followed by enlargement rounds in 1995, 2004 and 2007 which increased the number of EU members from 12 to 25 (see [Chapter 10](#) for further details). The end of the Cold War went along with a period of 'market triumphalism' and neoliberal globalization, a fast increase of world trade and accelerating immigration of lower- and higher-skilled migrants from an increasingly diverse array of European and non-European origin countries. In this period of neoliberal globalization, European migration underwent the following structural shifts:

- Post-Soviet repatriation of Russian-speakers from former Soviet Republics and the subsequent consolidation of Russia as a destination country for labour migrants from former Soviet republics;
- Initial refugee movements because of nationalist tensions and violent conflict in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia;
- Increased migration and circulation from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe following EU enlargement and the abolition of internal border controls among signatories of the Schengen agreement;
- Increasing labour migration from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), West Africa (countries such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana and Nigeria), Latin America (countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil) and to Western and Southern Europe;
- Transition of Southern European countries and also Turkey from countries of emigration into countries of immigration and transit.

Migration in the former Soviet space

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 precipitated the collapse of the closed communist migration system, although deeper regional connections and migration systems created by Soviet imperialism and socialist internationalism would remain intact. The end of the Soviet Union and its extended Eurasian empire would create a series of political crises and economic shocks and transformations. In total, 13 out of 14 non-Russian successor states of the Soviet empire (except for Belarus) underwent post-imperial transitions involving nation state building (Kuzio 2002; Shevel 2009). Increasing nationalism and the concomitant stoking up of anti-Russian feelings (Janmaat 2007) would ignite 'post-imperial' migrations of Russians living in former Soviet Republics to Russia.

Source: Getty Images/Gerard Malie



Photo 6.1 West Berliners crowd in front of the Berlin Wall on 11 November 1989 as they watch East German border guards demolishing a section of the wall in order to open a new crossing point between East and West Berlin, near the Potsdamer Square

In the early 1990s, significant resettlement took place of Russian-speaking people from former Soviet Republics that no longer felt at home after independence (Ivakhnyuk 2009). Anti-Russian nationalist backlashes, including laws elevating languages other than Russian to official language states and armed conflicts, prompted ethnic Russians to move to Russia (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017; Kuzio 2002). This was similar to the post-colonial ‘repatriations’ experienced by France, the Netherlands and the UK in the 1950s and 1960s.

On the other hand, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, comprising ten post-Soviet republics) in 1992, and again in parallel with the earlier experiences of West European colonial powers, Russia underwent a post-imperial migration reversal (a structural change in the dominant direction of migration flows): Russian emigration to the former Soviet republics would largely stop while Russia reinforced its role as a destination for non-Russian labour migrants from former Soviet republics. Initially, around 2 million ethnic Russians left or were displaced from the Baltic states, Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union (Münz 1996: 206). Additionally, there were nearly 1 million refugees from various conflicts (such as in the Caucasus, Moldova and Tajikistan) and some 700,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) mainly from areas affected by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Wallace and Stola 2001: 15).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent states meant that millions of internal migrants became international migrants overnight. Also non-migrant

ethnic groups, such as the millions of Russians in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, found themselves increasingly marginalized (Pilkington 1998). The reclassification of internal into international migrants caused a (somehow artificial) hike in the global international migrant numbers in the early 1990s. This exemplifies the somewhat blurred distinctions between internal and international migration. On the other hand, the drawing of new borders had real consequences for migrants and ethnic minorities, through a change in their legal position, discrimination or increased pressure to integrate.

The fall of the Berlin Wall also allowed ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) to move to Germany and Jews to depart for Israel, Germany or the United States. According to official statistics, from 1987 to 1991, 134,000 people moved from Russia to Israel, 102,000 to Germany and 15,000 to the United States (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017). Between 1989 and 2002, more than 1.5 million Jews and their relatives emigrated from the former Soviet Union. About 940,000 (or 62 per cent) went to Israel, and the rest were mainly divided between the US and Germany (Tolts 2003).

After an initial hike of repatriation of ethnic Russians to Russia, refugee migration and departure of ethnic and religious minorities, labour immigration to Russia became increasingly important. Reflecting the deep cultural, political and economic connection forged by centuries of Russian imperial domination, migration from former Soviet Republics remained mainly oriented on Russia, with the exception of the Baltic republics (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia), who were to join the EU in 2004, and to some extent also Ukraine and Moldova. Migration patterns can differ across gender, related to the structure of labour demand in destination countries. For instance, most Moldovan men migrate to Russia and other CIS countries to work in construction, while the majority of women seek work in Italy in the care and service sectors (Yanovich 2015). Between 1991 and 2015, citizens from former Soviet republics represented more than 90 per cent of all arrivals and more than two thirds of departures in Russia. Over this period, total estimated immigration to Russia was 11.8 million and total emigration 5.3 million (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017). This caused a fundamental change in the composition of immigrant populations in Russia (Abashin 2017; Schenk 2018).

While immigrant populations from Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states have shrunk (partly because migration became increasingly oriented towards Western Europe), inflows from Central Asia and Transcaucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have increased – from 15 per cent of total immigration in the 1990s to almost 40 per cent in the early 2010s. This reflects a gradual transition of temporary to permanent immigration. In 2010, main countries of birth of international migrants in Russia were Ukraine (about 3 million people, or 26 per cent of all migrants), Kazakhstan (2.5 million, 22 per cent), Uzbekistan (1.1 million, 10 per cent), and Belarus and Azerbaijan (740,000, or 6.6 per cent each) (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko 2017).

Migration in Central and Eastern Europe until EU accession

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the political and economic instability this caused initially precipitated movements of migrant workers and refugees to Western Europe. The demise of communism led to the disintegration of several multinational federal states – the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – from which a multitude of new sovereign nations arose, most of which had little or no recent history of independent statehood (Janmaat and Vickers 2007). The political turmoil that followed would lead to significant population

mobility in Central and Eastern Europe particularly from former Yugoslavia. The collapse of communism also undermined many of the barriers that had kept population mobility in check, and led to an increase of East–West migration, although at lower structural levels than expected. After an initial hike, East–West migration did not gain the massive proportions as once expected (or feared), and could not substitute for increasing labour migration from outside Europe, as many expected (and hoped) in the 1990s (de Haas *et al.* 2019b).

In more structural terms, this phase saw the opening up of a new ‘labour frontier’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic republics emerged as important new source regions of migrants in Western and Southern Europe, but would also become transit and destination countries in their own right. The fall of communist regimes and the sudden demise of Soviet-Russian imperialism heralded the rapid incorporation of most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) into expanding West European migration systems. This preceded the formal accession of most of these states to the EU in 2004, which did not start but rather consolidated migration patterns that were already established over the 1989–2004 period (see de Haas *et al.* 2019a).

The post-1989 transition from Communist rule to democracy and market economies transformed states and societies in Central and Eastern Europe. The lifting of exit restrictions led to a largely temporary surge in East–West migration. Many Roma (‘Gypsies’) from Southeastern Europe (especially Romania) participated in such movements. Initially, this fuelled fear of mass migrations in Western Europe. Populist politicians and media spoke of a ‘migration crisis’ (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994), and warned that ‘floods’ of desperate migrants would ‘swamp’ Western European welfare systems and drag down living standards (Thränhardt 1996).

Such fears were reinforced through a hike in refugee migration as a result of the wars in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Croatia (1991–3) and Kosovo (1999). This led to a large influx of largely temporary asylum seekers, particularly from Bosnia, to Germany and other Northwestern European countries as well as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (de Haas *et al.* 2019b). Asylum-seeker entries to European OECD countries peaked at 695,000 in 1992 in response to the Yugoslav civil wars and then declined. There was another peak in 2001 (425,000 application in the EU 27) after which the number of applications fell to around 200,000 (Seilonen 2016). While during the Cold War refugees from communist countries were often warmly welcomed, asylum seekers were increasingly received with suspicion, particularly if they came from non-European countries such as Sri Lanka, Iran or Somalia.

East–West migration increased as well. Initially most migrants were members of ethnic minorities moving to so-called ancestral homelands, where they had a right to entry and citizenship: ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) to Germany (Levy 1999; Thränhardt 1996: 273), Russian Jews (officially known as *jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge*) to Germany, Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, and Pontian Greeks (see below) to Greece. Germany was the most important destination of such ‘ethnic migration’ from East to West. Since 1989, approximately 2.2 million ethnic Germans and 235,000 Jews have migrated to Germany (Dietz and Roll 2017).

Migration from Central and Eastern European countries was stimulated by often bumpy transitions towards democracy and market economies that initially increased unemployment and inequality, the dismantling of social security, socio-economic hardship and interethnic tensions. This fuelled migration to Western Europe, particularly among new generations of aspiring youth. However, by the mid-1990s it had become clear that an ‘invasion’ was not going to take place. Movements of Polish, Ukrainians, Russians and

other East Europeans to Western Europe in search of work increased, but did not reach the levels originally predicted, while much of their migration turned out to be temporary and circular. There were some exceptions to this rule, such as Moldova and the Baltic republics, where emigration levels reached very high levels.

At the same time, more economically advanced states like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic started attracting immigrants in significant numbers, which was a partial continuation of migration patterns established under communist rule. For instance, the emigration of Polish workers after EU accession on 1 May 2004 increased employers' fears of labour shortages. Poland, as other CEE countries, is experiencing low fertility and an ageing population alongside rapid economic growth. It was in this context that Poland lifted restrictions on short-term workers from Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, which would stimulate 'replacement migration' from these countries.

The EU and Schengen: Expansion and integration

The processes of EU enlargement and the concomitant removal of internal borders stood at the basis of an increasingly integrated European migration system. The current EU results from a long process that started in 1951 when Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community, and, subsequently in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was renamed the European Community (EC) in 1993 and became the European Union (EU) in 2009 by the Treaty of Lisbon. In seven successive accession waves from 1973 to 2013, the current EU enlarged from the original 6 to 28 members in 2013. This enlargement process started with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973. Greece joined the EEC in



Source: Getty Images/Dan Kitwood

Photo 6.2 A Polish Supermarket in Grimsby, England, in October 2018

1981, to be followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland and Sweden became EU members in 1995 (de Haas *et al.* 2019).

On 1 May 2004, 10 new member states gained accession to the EU: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (known as the EU10). Most of the existing member states (the EU15) decided to restrict migration from the new Eastern and Central European member states over a seven-year transitional period, but Ireland, the UK and Sweden opted not to. This stimulated major immigration from Poland and the Baltic republics, especially Lithuania, to the UK and Ireland. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, and finally Croatia in 2013, creating the current EU28.

In parallel, the 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement led to a borderless European Area in 1995, which included all then EU members, except for the United Kingdom and Ireland, which opted out. Since then, all new EU members as well as non-EU members Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein joined the Schengen Area, which in 2018 comprised 26 members. This contributed to a growing integration of European migration systems and a drastic expansion of the European free migration space.

These developments stimulated East–West migration, but not to the extent once hoped (by EU bureaucrats) or feared (by populist politicians). The biggest emigration occurred from Poland. One million Poles emigrated between 1 May 2004 and April 2007, principally to the UK, Ireland and Germany. However, part of such increases may be statistical artefacts. The 2004 enlargement process had a significant *legalization effect* for EU10 workers that were already working in the EU employed irregularly in the EU15 states before May 2004: several hundred thousand benefited from *de facto* legalization (Tomas and Münz 2006).

Over this period, migrant workers of countries like Poland (particularly in the UK and Germany), Romania (particularly in Spain), Bulgaria and Baltic countries have come to occupy an important role in West European economies. While the removal of migration barriers led to migration surges – particularly when economic gaps between origin and destination countries were large – these tended to be temporary, with migration after a few years consolidating at lower levels and becoming increasingly circular (de Haas *et al.* 2019). The major exception on this rule was the UK, where large-scale settlement of Polish and other East European workers occurred.

While the removal of barriers for travel and migration has boosted intra-European mobility, the increase in intra-European migration was not as large as expected. Intra-European migrations remained too modest to replace immigration from non-EU countries, dashing such hopes among some EU bureaucrats. The main effect of the liberalization of border regimes following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the successive EU enlargements has been an increase in *circulation* while permanent migration has remained limited with a few notable exceptions, such as the large-scale settlement of Poles in the UK (de Haas *et al.* 2019).

Totally contradicting expectations, immigration from non-EU countries showed a structural increase over this period. In fact, both intra-EU and extra-EU immigration increased at the same time (see Figure 6.1). Origin countries of non-EU migrants no longer mainly comprised North Africa, Turkey or former colonies, but migration from Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa also increased. This immigration would also become increasingly diverse in terms of education and skills of migrants. Although lower-skilled workers kept on responding to labour demand in service, agriculture and construction sectors, migration from higher-skilled workers and students, particularly

from Asia, increased over this period. The effects would be most significant in Southern Europe, and particularly Spain and Italy, which, after having been prominent emigration countries for many generations, transformed to major lands of immigration.

Southern European migration transitions

In the period between 1989 and 2008, Southern Europe – the main labour reserve for Western Europe, North America, South America and Australia for over a century – established its new position as destination region. Until the 1970s, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece were primarily emigration countries. Then, at somewhat different junctures, and as a result of economic growth, demographic transitions, democratization and EU membership, they started to experience declining emigration and increasing immigration. As a result of these migration transitions, they started to share many of the characteristics and concerns of Northern EU states, yet remain distinct by the central role played by the informal economy in shaping migration, the importance of undocumented migration as well as a low governmental willingness and capacity to regulate international migration (Reyneri 2001). Many women from Latin America and Asia have migrated to Southern Europe to work as caretakers, which is linked to the lack of state-subsidized facilities for childcare and, particularly, elderly care. Although many have irregular status, their essential role in care provision makes them into socially accepted, ‘tolerated’ workers (Ambrosini 2015).

In *Italy*, numbers of foreigners with residence permits doubled between 1981 and 1991, from 300,000 to 600,000, and then rose to 1.4 million by 2000 and 4.6 million in 2010, representing 7.6 per cent of the total population living in Italy (OECD 2012; Strozza and Venturini 2002: 265). These steep increases reflect a series of regularizations of undocumented migrant populations between 1986 and 2009. Entry of non-EU citizens for employment into Italy is officially governed by annual quotas. However, the quotas are very low and do not reflect real labour demand, resulting in substantial rates of overstaying and irregular entry. Romanians form the largest immigrant group. In 2017, their number reached 1 million. The leading group of non-EU residents are Albanians (458,000) and Moroccans (435,000) (OECD 2018) (see Box 13.6 for more data on immigrants in Italy).

Spain went through a similar migration transition to Italy. Prior to 1980, Spain was mainly a land of emigration. That status quo began to change with post-Franco democratization after 1975 and EC membership (alongside Portugal) in 1986. The 1986–99 period saw rapidly increasing immigration particularly from North Africa, which was boosted by economic growth, the large-scale incorporation of Spanish women into the labour market which generated a demand for reproductive labour (such as domestic work) and regulation of entry through recruitment and regularizations. After 2000, growth consolidated, migration from Latin America was encouraged and, as a consequence of permanent settlement of workers, family migration grew in significance. The registered foreign population in Spain grew from 279,000 in 1990 to 1.3 million in 2000. By 2005, it had shot up to 4.1 million only to increase further to 5.7 million in 2010, (OECD 2012). As in Italy, a large share of immigrants entered legally and subsequently overstayed visas while a minority entered Spain irregularly. Between 1985 and 2005, Spain carried out 12 legalization campaigns (Plewa 2006: 247).

In 2017, the numbers of foreign-born people had reached 6 million, representing 12.4 per cent of the Spanish population. The biggest groups are Moroccans (700,000), Romanians (607,000), Ecuadorians (409,000), Colombians (362,000). Other

significant immigrant groups include British (298,000, often pensioners and ‘lifestyle migrants’) and Argentinians (256,000) (OECD 2018). In line with dual labour market theory (see [Chapter 3](#)), foreign workers have become specialized according to their origins and gender: Moroccans and other Africans tend to work in agriculture. Latin American women often work in domestic service and care work, while Latin American men tend to work in construction and services and Europeans in industry (OECD 2006: 214).

Other Southern European countries also witness increased immigration, although to a lesser extent than Italy and Spain. Migration to *Portugal* has remained predominantly post-colonial. From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-1970s, Portuguese emigrated in large numbers, leaving a legacy of some 5 million Portuguese and their descendants living abroad (OECD 2004: 254). The revolution of 1974, the end of dictatorship, and decolonization prompted significant postcolonial migration from former Portuguese possessions in Africa. As in Spain and Italy, most recent immigrants overstayed visas or arrived irregularly and there have been recurrent legalizations (Cordeiro 2006; OECD 2007: 276). According to the most recently available official figures, in 2011 the most sizeable immigrant groups were Angolans (163,000), Brazilians (140,000), French (95,000), Mozambicans (73,000) and Cape Verdeans (62,000) (OECD 2018). In contrast to Italy and Spain, however, Portugal has never ceased to be an important emigration country, reflecting the relative weakness of its economy.

Until 1990, international migration to *Greece* mainly involved repatriation of ethnic Greeks from abroad and arrivals of refugees in transit. After 1990, immigration soared and in 2010 the estimated 810,000 foreigners constituted 7.1 per cent of Greece’s population. About a third of Greece’s migrants are of Greek ethnic descent: Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union (150,000) and ethnic Greeks from Albania (Triandafyllidou and Lazarescu 2009). In 2010, the largest groups of registered non-EU immigrants were from Albania (491,000), Ukraine (21,500), Georgia (17,000) and Pakistan (16,000). The largest groups of EU nationals living in Greece came from Bulgaria and Romania (OECD 2012: 234). From 2015, Greece would become the focal point of large-scale sea crossings by Syrian and other refugees from Turkey (see below).

The politicization of migration and the ‘global race for talent’

The end of the Cold War also prompted the politicization of migration, with politicians in Northwest Europe stoking up fears of massive East–West and South–North migrations. Politicians started to scapegoat migrants for problems not of their making, such as the closure of factories and mines and defunding of public housing. High unemployment and welfare dependency amongst low-skilled migrant workers led to a perception that immigration was a threat to the welfare state, an idea which gained increasing traction. From the late 1980s and early 1990s, politicians and media in countries such as the UK and the Netherlands started to portray asylum seekers as welfare scroungers in disguise. Although refugees represented a minority of immigrants, the ‘bogus asylum seeker’ became a favourite subject of political fearmongering. Governments vied with each other in introducing tougher asylum rules, although they struggled in implementing these rules because of constitutional constraints, humanitarian concerns and the practical difficulties associated with – and frequent public protests against – the deportation of rejected asylum seekers and their families.

Confronted with the growth of sizeable communities of former migrant workers from North Africa and Turkey and their descendants, and the growing perception that their integration had 'failed' or at least remained far behind expectations, there were growing political calls to prevent admission of lower-skilled migrant workers. In addition, concerns continued about 'secondary family migration' as a result of new unions between the children of former guestworkers and their spouses living in origin countries, which continued legal immigration even after primarily family reunification had been completed in the 1980s, reinforced attempts to make such migration more difficult by introducing language tests, income requirements and (rather controversial) investigations into partners' romantic relationships to prevent 'sham marriages'.

However, governments encountered legal constraints in the extent to which they could infringe on the fundamental rights (such as to family life) of migrants, particularly if they had become citizens. Family reunion has therefore long remained the largest single immigration category in the many West European countries. The relative importance of family reunion for these migrant groups would decrease over the 2000s, partly because of policy restrictions and partly because integration went together with a decreasing social pressure in migrant communities and decreasing willingness among members of the second and, particularly, third generation to marry partners from origin countries.

This coincided with a growing importance of labour migration including 'free movement' migration from Eastern Europe to Western and Southern Europe, increased migration from outside the EU – lower-skilled workers from Latin America, Africa and former Soviet Republics such as Ukraine and Moldova, as well as skilled workers, particularly from Asia. As part of an increasingly intensive 'global race for talent', many governments introduced preferential entry rules for skilled migrants and students in a bid to attract 'the best and the brightest' (Czaika and Parsons 2017; Kapur and McHale 2005). Yet the continued demand for lower-skilled labour migrants continued to be unmatched by long-term admission schemes, and continued to be met either through limited temporary and seasonal recruitment schemes, or through undocumented migration.

Figure 6.3 shows the evolution migration within and towards the area comprising the EU25, the 25 countries that formed the EU from 2004 to 2006. It excludes Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, which joined the EU in 2007 and 2013, as no data was available for these countries. The graph distinguished (1) migration *between* countries of the EU25 (2) migration from non-EU countries considered part of Europe (such as Russia, Ukraine and Switzerland) to the EU; and (3) migration from outside Europe (including, somewhat controversially, Turkey) towards the EU. The picture is clear:

- There has been a structural long-term increase in migration to Europe;
- The immigration peak of the 1960–1973 period mainly concerned immigration from Mediterranean countries and Turkey;
- Intra-EU mobility has gradually decreased in relative importance since 1963 with Eastern European migration to Western Europe largely replacing Southern European migration over time;
- Post-1989 immigration to the EU soared to unprecedented levels and has been mainly driven by a structural increase of non-EU legal immigration;
- Business cycles largely explain short-term fluctuations in immigration, highlighting the importance of destination country labour demand in driving migration.




Figure 6.3 Annual migration flows within and towards the EU25, 1953–2009

Source: Adapted from de Haas *et al.* 2019b; DEMIG C2C database, International Migration Institute (www.migrationinstitute.org); data for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia not available

Annual total inflows into the current EU28 countries were above 2 million between 1998 and 2009. The long-term trend is upward: from around 1 million over most of the 1970s, then increasing fast since the late 1980s stabilizing at levels of around 2 million yearly entries over the 1990s, and then accelerating again to reach immigration levels of up to 3 million over the 2000s. While entries to many Northwestern European countries also increased, the biggest increases in the number of legal entries occurred in Southern Europe, which peaked in 2007 at 921,000 in Spain and 515,000 in Italy. Intra-European migration has remained rather stable over the long term, and has therefore not been a substitute for immigration from outside the EU. Instead, extra-EU immigration reached levels of between 2 and 2.5 million per year over the 2000s. Increasing legal migration from Africa and Latin America are the most important factors explaining this increase (de Haas *et al.* 2019b).

Free intra-EU migration and the establishment of the Schengen zone resulted in the establishment of common visa rules for non-EU citizens and provided the impetus to step up external border controls. For instance, this led to the introduction of Schengen visas for citizens of Morocco and Tunisia who, before 1991, could previously travel freely back and forth to Spain and Italy. More stringent visa rules and increasing border controls stimulated undocumented migration and smuggling and could also not stop the structural increase in legal immigration, by remained far the biggest source of entry to Europe. Immigration restrictions interrupted circulation by pushing migrants into permanent settlement by discouraging their return. While labour demand continued to fuel labour migration through legal and illegal channels, family reunification facilitated the continuation of legal migration, this time particularly to Southern Europe.

Box 6.1 Europe's recurrent migration crises

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Europe has been gone through a series of recurrent 'migration crises'. The usual pattern is one where some politicians exploit hikes in arrivals to create a climate of fear by fabricating doomsday scenarios about an impending migrant invasion. For instance, the post-communist lifting of exit restrictions in Central and Eastern Europe fuelled fear of mass migrations in Western Europe. Populist politicians and media spoke of a 'migration crisis' (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994), and warned that 'floods' of desperate migrants would 'swamp' Western European welfare systems and drag down living standards (Thränhardt 1996).

When it became clear that this invasion would not happen, the fear of mass migration was increasingly projected on to Europe's southern border. The introduction of a visa requirement for North Africans by Spain and Italy in the early 1990s launched the phenomenon of 'boat migration'. Intensified border patrolling prompted a diversification of crossing points further east, such from Libya to Italy, and, later, from West Africa to the Canary Islands, where the arrival of 31,000 Africans in 2006 provoked a highly mediatized 'migration crisis' with politicians claiming that Europe would be swamped (de Haas 2008a).

In 2011, the Arab Spring prompted a temporary hike in undocumented emigration from Tunisia to Italy and, from there on, to elsewhere in Europe (Natter 2014). This provoked a political crisis in the EU, prompting governments of some countries including France and Denmark to temporarily reintroduce controls at Schengen borders. When conflict broke out in Libya in the same year, Italian interior minister Maroni warned of a 'biblical exodus' and 'an invasion ... that would bring any country to its knees', although movements remained relatively small.

The politicization of migration in Europe came to a boiling point during the 'refugee crisis' of the mid-2010s. In Syria, violent attacks by the Assad regime on pro-democracy protestors in 2011 provoked a devastating cycle of violence and the outbreak of civil war. Up to 2019, this led to the internal displacement of 6.2 million while 5.6 million Syrian refugees moved to neighbouring countries. A lack of prospects motivated increasing numbers to move to Europe, provoking a peak in refugee migration in 2015, when more than 1 million asylum seekers, mostly Syrians, but also Afghanis and Iraqis, crossed from Turkey into Greece, and from there further into Europe.

This precipitated a major political crisis, highlighting the inability to establish effective international cooperation on EU level. The failure to agree on 'burden sharing' undermined political support for generous refugee policies in countries such as Germany (Pries 2018). This increased pressure to step up border controls to prevent asylum seekers from arriving in the first place, such as through closing borders on the 'Balkan route'. In 2016 the EU concluded a deal with Turkey, with the Turkish government agreeing to take back refugees in exchange for major financial assistance and the promise to abolish EU visas for Turkish citizens. This exemplifies the extent to which irregular migration has become a negotiation chip in relation between European and transit states in the Middle East and Africa (see Box 13.4 and 13.6, (Paoletti 2011; Brachet 2016).



However, the real refugee crisis did not happen in Europe but in the Middle East. In 2019, about 1 million Syrian refugees lived in Lebanon, of a total population of 6 million, while over 3.5 million lived in Turkey, the largest refugee hosting country in the world. By comparison, in 2015 about 0.4 per cent of the total EU population was a refugee (Postel *et al.* 2015). However, the most severe consequences are for those who flee: border controls and three decades of attempts by the EU to ‘externalize’ border controls through bilateral agreements with transit states have increased the costs and risks of migrating. Between 2000 and 2017 more than 33,000 people have died while crossing the Mediterranean, making it by far the world’s more lethal border area (Fargues 2017).

Migration after 2008: Destination Europe

The Great Recession marked the end of – or at least a pause in – the previous period of accelerated globalization, neoliberal policies and EU expansion. The Recession initially led to a slump in, particularly undocumented, immigration as unemployment amongst lower-skilled migrant groups, such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the United Kingdom and North African and South American immigrants in Spain increased fast (BBC/MPI 2010). However, large-scale return of migrant workers did not occur, and the Recession did not fundamentally change the long-term patterns of non-EU immigration. Return migration has generally been highest for EU member state citizens enjoying free mobility (such as Romanians in Italy or the Polish in the UK). Return rates were lower for non-EU migrants, such as Moroccan, Ecuadorian, Peruvian and Bolivian workers in Spain. As return would often be tantamount to giving up residency rights and the possibility to re-emigrate, many preferred to stay put, on the safe side of the border. Similar dynamics had made many ‘guestworkers’ stay in Northwest Europe after the 1973 Oil Shock.

The migratory consequences have been largest for the countries where the crisis hit hardest, particularly Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece and some Eastern European countries, which would experience plummeting immigration and increasing out-migration. For instance, in Spain the unemployment rate of foreigners climbed to 36 per cent in 2011, explaining the decline in inflows from 921,000 in 2007 to 248,000 in 2013. In parallel, outflows also increased, although more modestly from 199,000 in 2007 to 459,000 in 2011. The crisis also prompted new Spanish emigration, principally towards the UK, France, Germany and the US, but also to Argentina, Brazil, China and Australia (González Ferrer 2012). Since then, immigration has rebounded and returns declined, and in 2015 Spain turned into a net immigration country again.

Although migration to crisis-hit countries in Southern Europe would plummet in the wake of the crisis, it would not stop, but rather stabilize at lower, but still significant, levels. This continuity can be explained by the specific segmentation of dual labour markets, which perpetuates a certain demand for migrant workers in particular sectors even in times of economic crisis and soaring domestic unemployment. For instance, although the crisis most severely hit (male) migrants working in the construction sectors (see González Ferrer 2012), labour demand in other sectors has remained less affected, or even increased, such as the demand for personal care-workers in increasingly ageing societies (Ambrosini 2015).

The Recession neither prompted a massive return, nor did it lead to a substitution of non-European migrant workers by Eastern or Southern European labour migrants. Although migration from particularly crisis-hit Southern European countries such as Spain and Greece to Northwestern European countries such as Germany and the UK would increase, intra-European migration levels have in fact remained surprisingly modest (de Haas *et al.* 2019b), and much below expectations. Moreover, such intra-European migrants are generally higher skilled than previous generations and generally less motivated to pick up jobs typically done by non-European migrant workers in domestic work, cleaning, care, construction, catering and agriculture.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the effects of the Recessions varied a lot. The crisis hit hard in Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and particularly in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, leading to decreasing immigration and increasing emigration parallel with steadily worsening labour market conditions (OECD 2012: 248). By contrast, the Polish economy has kept on growing throughout the crisis, and Poland has entered a phase of decreasing emigration and increasing return migration (OECD 2012: 260). Foreign immigration reached 107,000 in 2018, which may signal Poland's future transition into a destination country.

The poorer economies of Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine remained emigration countries throughout the Recession (see Kubal 2019). Worsening economic conditions continued emigration from Romania (primarily to Italy, Spain and Hungary), Bulgaria (primarily to Turkey and Spain) and Ukraine (primarily to Poland, Russia, Italy and the Czech Republic), although return migration increased as a result of the crisis affecting South European destinations. Russia continued to attract immigrants from former Soviet Union republics (such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine) and China. At the same time, growing numbers of Russian workers and asylum seekers moved to the Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland and Germany.

While total entries into European OECD countries declined to about 3 million in 2009 and 2010, the decline has been much smaller than anticipated. In most Northwestern European countries including Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands immigration trends were barely affected at all. The recession did not reverse the long-term migration trends, principally because it did not fundamentally affect the economic and demographic transformations that had perpetuated the demand for migrant workers over the post-1989 period. After economic growth resumed in the 2010s, immigration therefore rebounded to and even beyond pre-crisis levels. In European countries such as Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Russia and Scandinavia, immigration reached record high levels. Particularly Germany, the world's second most important migration destination after the US, would consolidate its position as Europe's main migration destination, with annual foreign immigration surpassing the 1 million mark after 2012 (see Figure 6.4).

According to Eurostat data, 2.4 million immigrants entered the EU from non-EU countries in 2017, similar levels as before the Great Recession. Figure 6.5 shows that Germany, Russia, UK, France, Spain and Italy have evolved as Europe's main migration destinations, each home to 6 million or more migrants in 2017. Ukraine, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Belgium also have sizeable immigrant communities. In most European countries, migrants now represent between 10 and 15 per cent of the population, although these percentages are higher in some countries ranging such as 17.6 per cent in Sweden up to 29.6 per cent in Switzerland. The data also show that




Figure 6.4 Migration to and from Germany, 1950-2016

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt

non-European immigrants form the majority of immigrant populations in former colonial powers such as the UK, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, while most other countries mainly draw on European sources of migrant labour.

The period after 2008 has also been characterized by a continued politicization and securitization of migration, particularly marked by the rise of populist, anti-immigration and anti-EU parties. The securitization of migration had already increased since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but after the crisis more and more politicians were drawn towards rhetorics representing immigration, particularly of Muslims, as a fundamental threat to the security and identity of European societies. This resulted in electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties across Europe and also tempted mainstream parties to adopt more restrictive and sometimes xenophobic positions (see Davis 2012). However, the gap between tough migration rhetoric and more liberal policy practice remained high. While most entry policies did *not* become more restrictive, labour market demand for migrant workers continued as the European immigration policies have been increasingly redesigned to serve economic interests (see Chapter 11).

However, the politicization of migration and the staging of a series of 'migration crises' over the 2000s and 2010s (see Box 6.1) would have real political consequences. The politicization of migration came to a boiling point during the 'refugee crisis' of 2015 and 2016, which led to a major political crisis following the influx of about 1 million asylum seekers into Europe, mostly via Greece. This led to a massive increase in European investments in border controls, and increased hostility towards asylum




Figure 6.5 Foreign-born populations in European countries, by origin, 2017

Source: UNDESA 2017

seekers, and attempts to prevent humanitarian organizations from assisting or saving migrants from drowning in the Mediterranean (see also [Chapter 9](#), Box 13.4 and Box 13.6). In the UK, fears of mass immigration – stoked up by decades of immigrant scapegoating by media and politicians – were a decisive factor in the 2016 Brexit vote – alongside a more general trend towards nationalism and protectionism (see [Chapter 10](#)). Although the outcome of such processes is uncertain, this shows that public xenophobia have far-reaching geopolitical and economic consequences. If anything, it shows the political potential – and risks – of playing the migration card.

Conclusion

The upsurge in migration in the post-1945 period shows the extent to which large-scale immigration has become an structural feature of European societies and economies. This marks the transformation of Europe from a region of mass emigration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to a region of large-scale inflows from an increasingly diverse array of origin countries. This shift has been driven by demographic transitions, economic transformations and the related growth of dual labour markets, that have increased the demand for migrant labour and subsequent recruitment of ‘guestworkers’ in Mediterranean countries.

Besides recruitment of workers, decolonization processes played an important role in stimulating non-European migration to West Europe’s industrial heartlands, particularly in the UK, France, Netherlands and Russia. The dismantling of West European and the Soviet empires between 1945 and 1991 led to a post-colonial migration reversal in the form of a turnaround in the dominant direction of migration flows between centre and periphery. Initially, such reverse flows often consist of returning colonial settlers, the ‘repatriation’ of their (mixed) descendants (such as Algerian *colons*

to France, Indonesian *Indos* to the Netherlands, and ethnic Russians to Russia), and other minority populations who left because of rising nationalism and anti-colonial sentiment. This illustrates how nation state building in newly independent countries often led to decreasing tolerance of ethnic and religious minorities. On the other hand, after an initial surge of 'repatriates' reverse flows started to become dominated by labour migrants from former colonies, such as Maghrebis to France, Pakistanis and Bengalis to the UK, or non-Russians from former Soviet Republics to Russia. These labour migrations and family migrations they triggered became dominant over time and contributed to the increasing diversity of European destination countries.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dismantling of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe facilitated East–West migration and provided an impetus for intra-European migration. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 – by then the world's last remaining colonial empire (Kuzio 2002) – Russia evolved into the second-most popular European migration destination after Germany, mainly attracting migrants from former Soviet republics. As they went through migration transitions, the former labour reserves of the European periphery (Southern Europe, Ireland and Finland) as well as several Central and Eastern European countries have transformed from net emigration to net immigration countries, coinciding with the outward expansion of the European 'labour frontier' (see also Skeldon 1997).

These developments coincided with European integration and enlargement. The creation of the borderless Schengen Area in 1995 and the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 stimulated migration within expanding European migration systems. However, intra-European migration remained lower than expected and largely circular, and did not replace non-European immigration, which only kept on increasing in relative importance. This reveals an striking paradox: the creation of an of open border area has not led to massive internal migration, while external border controls were not able to curb rising legal immigration of non-EU and non-European citizens.

The post-War emergence of Europe as a global migration destination exemplifies a major theme of this book: migration needs to be seen as an intrinsic part of broader processes of development and socioeconomic transformation. Fundamental processes of structural change such as decolonization, demographic ageing, the shift from industrial to service sector jobs, and the growing importance of precarious labour in increasingly segmented labour markets have created the conditions for large-scale immigration to occur. The recent European immigration history highlights the crucial role of active labour recruitment in facilitating migration, either through state-led efforts as with the 'guest-workers', or through recruitment agencies and other migration intermediaries. The latter form part of a burgeoning 'migration industry' (see Chapter 3), whose room for manoeuvre has expanded as a result of labour market deregulation.

This shows the relevance of historical-structural and dual labour market theories highlighted in Chapter 3: states have played a central role in shaping migration patterns, directly – through immigration policies and recruitment practices, as well as indirectly – through 'non-migration' policies affecting economic growth, inequality, labour markets and social security. Dual labour market theory is particularly useful to understand why labour migration to Europe has continued even in times of economic crisis and rising unemployment. Population ageing, increasing education and the massive entry of women in the formal labour forces have depleted traditional domestic supply – school-leavers and women – for low-status and informal sector work. In addition, decades of immigration have contributed to the 'racialization' of

particular labour market segments. This particularly applies to low-skilled and often informal jobs in agriculture, construction, catering, cleaning and care. Their subsequent labelling as 'migrant jobs' further decreased the status of such occupations in the eyes of native workers.

Not only West European countries, but also several communist states in Central and Eastern Europe started to recruit migrant workers from the 1970s. Although numbers were comparatively lower, this illustrates that the key factors behind dual labour market formation (particularly shrinking domestic labour supply and job status, (see Piore 1979) and the resulting 'chronic' demand for migrant workers affect all types of industrialized, highly-developed societies with ageing, increasingly educated populations. Although such migrants were widely considered to be temporary, network effects and migration system dynamics (see Chapter 3) explain why, once certain number of migrants had settled at the destination, migration processes tended to gain their own momentum and became increasingly difficult for governments to control, and why immigration restrictions had the unintended effect of stimulating their settlement, prompting large-scale family migration.

The demand for lower- and higher-skilled migrant workers has become structurally embedded in the European economies characterized by increasingly complex and segmented labour markets. This also explains the long-term 'resilience' of immigration to economic downturns such as the Great Recession, because they hardly affected the long-term structural drivers behind immigration. Particularly because of the drying up of traditional Southern European labour reserves, and the transition of South European countries into migration destinations in their own right, migrant workers have increasingly come from outside Europe, particularly from Africa, Latin America (for Western Europe) and Central Asia (for Russia). As a result, many European societies have been confronted with an unprecedented, largely unintended and unplanned increase in non-European migration and a concomitant increase in ethnic and cultural diversity, particularly in urban areas. In 2018, 22.8 million non-EU citizens were estimated to live in the EU (representing 4.4 per cent of the EU28 population) alongside 17.6 million EU citizens living in another EU country.

The politicization and securitization of migration of the 2000s and 2010s seems to have been partly driven by the realization that immigration has gained increasingly permanent features, that migrants were 'there to stay', and considerable political reluctance to accept that new reality. Different from former European settler societies such as the United States and Canada, where immigration has been part of nation building, many European nation states are built on ideas around common ancestry and culture. The new reality of large-scale immigration and settlement did often not resonate with the self-image of most European societies and often clashed with dominant nation state ideologies which struggle to accommodate ethnic diversity. This inevitably generated significant debate and political tensions, particularly as migrants started to settle and started to demand their place and rights in their new homelands.

In times of growing inequality and decreased economic security, some politicians have exploited the unease and fears created by immigration by fanning the flames of xenophobia. They have done so by classic migrant scapegoating and by creating an image of a European continent that is besieged by hordes of fortune seekers or potential welfare scroungers, and bogus asylum seekers and illegal migrants. However, tough migration rhetoric often contrasts with policy practice, which has continued to allow legal immigrants in while often turning a blind eye towards the presence of undocumented migrants that are eager to do jobs native workers are not willing or able to do.

Guide to Further Reading

For a general overview and analysis for migration in Europe, the annual *International Migration Outlook* of the OECD is invaluable. Many European national statistical offices now provide data online (often in English), while reports from interior ministries and other government authorities are also often available. The Migration Policy Centre (www.migrationpolicycentre.eu) at the European University Institute is a good resource for recent analysis on European migration, while the Migration Observatory (migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk) at Oxford University is a good resource for UK migration issues. The Clandestino project (irregular-migration.net) gives information and estimates on undocumented migration in Europe.

To understand the emergence of Western Europe as a destination for migrant workers, Castles and Kosack (1973) is a comparative study of immigrant workers in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK from 1945 to 1971, while Miller (1981) provides an early analysis of the political effects of migration. Castles *et al.* (1984) continue the story for the period following the ending of recruitment in 1973–4. Boswell and Geddes (2011) analyse post-Cold War European migration patterns and their relation to political and policy making processes. Schierup *et al.* (2006) examine the ‘European dilemma’ of migration and increasing diversity. Düvell (2006) provides a good overview of undocumented migration and Düvell (2012) and Collyer *et al.* (2012) give critical analyses of transit migration.

De Haas (2008) reviews myths and facts on of African migration to Europe. Givens and Maxwell (2012) give an overview of ethnic minority and migrant political participation in Western Europe. King *et al.* (2000) gives a useful overview of Southern European migrations. Baganha and Fonseca (2004) gives an overview of the origins of East European migration Southern Europe. Lutz’s (2016) gives a European perspective on the relation between undocumented migration and domestic work. Ambrosini (2016) gives an overview of the crucial function of undocumented migration (of women) in providing ‘invisible welfare’, between official ‘political rejection’ and ‘practical tolerance’. Kubal (2016) gives insights into the socio-legal integration of Polish migrants in the UK. Fargues (2017) gives an overview of four decades of trans-Mediterranean undocumented migration. Schenk (2018), Kubal (2019) and Heusala and Aitamurto (2016) give good overviews of post-Soviet migration and the emergence of Russian migration systems.

Extra resources can be found at: www.age-of-migration.com